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HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE

FALL OF NAPOLEON

IN MDCCCXV

TO THE

ACCESSION OF LOUIS NAPOLEON

IN MDCCCLII

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BY

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HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XIII.

ASIA MINOR AND GREECE: THEIR SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND STATISTICAL STATE—TURKEY.

1821.

1. Wars of Revolution in the West, and of Race in the East.

In the stationary nations of Western Europe, where the inhabitants have in a manner taken root in the soil, and the broad Atlantic alike forbids the entrance, and for long precludes the further migration of man, the contests of the species are chiefly social or religious. It is difference of faith or of political privileges which arms one part of the people against the other; and foreign wars, not less than internal discord, arise chiefly from the efforts which one part of the nation makes to alter the creed or shake off the institutions which have been imposed upon it by the other. But in the Eastern states, and where nations have been exposed in successive ages to the inroads of different tribes, issuing from that great nursery of migratory man, the table-land of Central Asia, the case is widely different. External wars, not less than internal convulsions, there arise, for the most part, from the violent superinduction of one race of men upon another—of a new horde upon the original settlers. The attempt to effect this induces, in the first instance, the most terrible wars of invasion; for what will men not do to prevent the inroad of a barbarous invader into

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their lands, their hearths, their temples?—in the last, the not less frightful civil dissensions in the efforts which a long course of oppression at length rouses the subjected people to make, to throw off the yoke of their oppressors.

> "Proud of the yoke, and pliant to the rod,
> Why yet does Asia dread a monarch's nod,
> While European freedom still withstands
> The encroaching tide that drowns her lessening lands?
> And sees far off, with an indignant groan,
> Her native plains and empires once her own." *

2. Effect of these different passions in effecting the dispersion of mankind.

The two great moving powers of mankind are the unseen but constantly acting springs of all these changes. Providence, to carry out the work of human progress and the dispersion of mankind, has impressed, in an equally indelible manner, upon the tribes of Central Asia, the passion for migration, and upon the inhabitants of Western Europe the love of freedom. From the first has arisen the peopling of Europe and the dispersion of the Asiatic race through the Old World; from the last, the civilisation of America and Australia, and the settlement of the European race in the New. If we would find a parallel to the vast swarms of Celts, Scythians, Goths, Huns, Saxons, Arabs, and Turks, who have successively invaded Europe and Africa from the eastward, and continued their devastating advance till they were stopped by the waves of the Atlantic, we must come down to the present day, when still greater hosts of civilised emigrants issue annually from the harbours of Great Britain and Germany, to seek in Transatlantic wilds or Australian steppes the means of livelihood and the pleasures of independence, till they are stopped by the waters of the Pacific. But the inroad of civilised is more fatal to the original inhabitants than that of savage man; the fire-water of the Christian destroys the species more effectually than the scimitar of the Osmanli. The last spares some, and permits in the end a mingled race of victors and vanquished to spring

* Gray.

up together on the conquered lands; the first utterly extirpates the original race, and leaves only its remains, like those of the mammoth, to excite the wonder of future generations of men.

3. They have produced the greatest wars recorded in history.

From these passions acting with equal force, and with the same consequences, upon distant lands in different stages of human existence, have arisen the greatest and most renowned wars, the most melancholy devastations, the greatest impulse to exertion, which have formed the subject of poetry and history from the earliest ages to the present time. From the time when the genius of Homer first sung the effort of Greece to repel the predatory inroads of Asia, and Iphigenia offered herself a willing sacrifice, that the Grecian maidens might sleep in peace, secure from the Eastern ravishers,* to these times, when, after a frightful but glorious struggle, the classic land of Hellas has been again liberated from its oppressors, and the Athenian damsels are secure from the slavery of the Turkish harems, the greatest struggles of mankind have been between the invading and conquering East and the defensive but indomitable West.

4. Lasting conquests of the East over the West.

Defeated at Salamis and Platæa, long kept at bay by the discipline of the Legions, pierced to the heart by the strength of the Empire, the East in the end asserted its superiority over the West, and resumed its place as the great aggressive and conquering power. Its swarms, long pent up, at length burst forth; the Goths broke through the barriers of the Danube and the Rhine, and fixed their lasting abode in the decaying provinces of

* "Das ganze grosse Griechenland hat jetzt
Die Augen auf mich Einzige gerichtet.
Ich mache seine Flotte frei—durch mich
Wird Phrygien erobert. Wenn fortan
Kein griechisch Weib mehr zittern darf, gewaltsan
Aus Hellas sel'gem Boden weggeschleppt
Zu werden von Barbaren, die nunmehr
Für Paris Frevelthat so fürchterlich
Bezahlen müssen."

SCHILLER, *Iphigenie in Aulis*, Act v. scene 5.

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the Roman empire; the Arabs issued from their fiery deserts with the Koran in one hand and the scimitar in the other, penetrated through Africa and Spain into the heart of France, and were only arrested by the enthusiasm of the Crusades on the shores of Palestine; the Huns and Sclavonians spread over Eastern Europe, and settled themselves in the plains of Poland and Hungary; the Turks stormed Constantinople itself, and subdued the finest provinces of the Eastern Empire. Europe may boast its courage, its freedom, its energy, and every quarter of the globe attests its industry or its prowess; but history tells a different tale, and points to Asia as the cradle of the lasting conquerors of mankind. It required the genius of Alexander to advance his phalanx into the centre of Asia, the energy of England to urge her standards into the mountains of Cabul; but neither were able to effect a permanent settlement in the regions they had overrun; while, without military genius, discipline, or warlike resources, the Eastern tribes have in every age settled themselves as permanent conquerors in the European fields. Where will the traveller find, in the Asiatic realms, a trace of the European race—where, in the European, are the descendants of the Asiatic not to be found?

5. Wars of races in the east of Europe.

From this ceaseless pressure of the East on the West has arisen not merely wars of invasion, but social conflicts, in the east of Europe, entirely different from those which have divided the Western nations. The barbarians who, issuing from Asia, succeeded in establishing themselves in Europe, formed permanent settlements, appropriated the land in whole or part to themselves, and transmitted it, as they hoped, in peace to their descendants. But they were not permitted to remain in quiet possession of their new acquisitions; another swarm followed in their footsteps, and they were themselves overwhelmed by the waves of conquest. Thence succeeded the fiercest and most enduring conflicts which

have ever divided mankind—those where different conquering races settled in the same territories, and contended with each other for its government, its lands, its revenues, its women. The strife of RACES is more lasting, their enmity more inveterate, their hostility more persevering, than that of parties. The animosity of the Magyar against the German, of the Pole against the Russian, of the Italian against the German, of the Celt against the Anglo-Saxon, of the Greek against the Turk, is more fierce and indelible than that of the democrat against the aristocrat, or the republican against the royalist. Like the colour of the hair or the tint of the visage, it is transmitted unchanged from generation to generation; unlike the fleeting fervour of cities, which is readily diverted by new objects of pursuit, it slumbers undecayed in the solitude of rural life, and, after the lapse of centuries, bursts forth with undiminished fury, when circumstances occur which fan the embers into a flame. The most animating and heart-stirring events which are recounted in the succeeding pages have arisen from the conflict of races, which, as more widespread and lasting, have in a great degree superseded that of social change.

6. Strife of races peculiarly vehement in the Turkish empire.

Placed on the confines of Europe and Asia, the regions which formerly formed part of the Byzantine, and now compose the TURKISH EMPIRE, have in every age been the chief seat of these frightful contests. The coasts of the Euxine, the isles of the Archipelago, the shores of the Danube, the mountains of Greece, have from the earliest times been the battle-field between Europe and Asia. When the vast stream of the Crusaders poured across the Hellespont, they wound unconsciously around the tombs of Achilles and Ajax; they trod the fields of the Scamander, they drank at the fountain at the Scæan gate. The environs of Jerusalem have been the theatre of the greatest and most heart-stirring conflict which has occurred since Titus drew his trenches round the devoted city. The plains of Bessarabia, broken only by the Scythian

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tumuli, are whitened by the bones of those swarms of warriors whose names, as a Russian poet expresses it, "are known only to God;" the walls of Byzantium, which for a thousand years singly sustained the fortunes of the Empire, yielded at length to the fierce assault of the Osmanlis; the island of Rhodes has witnessed the most glorious conflict that ever occurred between the enthusiasm of the East and the heroism of the West; the straits of Thermopylæ have in our day been signalised by second acts of devotion; the Ægean Sea has reddened with other conflagrations than that of Salamis; the Russians and the Turks are now combating on the banks of the Danube, at the same spots where, fourteen hundred years ago, the hordes of the Goths broke into the decaying fields of Roman civilisation.

7. Variety of races in the Turkish dominions.

From this peculiarity in their geographical history has arisen the great variety of different races who now inhabit the vast provinces of the Turkish empire, and the inextinguishable hatred with which they are animated against each other. The Persians, the Romans, the Goths, the Russians, the Arabs, the Vandals, the Franks, the Venetians, the Christians, the Mahommedans, have at different times contended, and alternately obtained the mastery in its vast dominion. They have all left their children in the land. Besides the descendants of the original Greeks, whom the King of Men ruled at the siege of Troy, or Alexander led to the conquest of Asia, there are now to be found in it the bold Wallachian, who has fearlessly settled in the land which has been desolated by the wars of three thousand years; the free and independent Servian, who has never ceased to contend, even amidst Turkish bonds, for the freedom of his native steppe; the patient and industrious Bulgarian, who has often found protection and happiness in the recesses of the Balkan; the fierce and indomitable Albanian, who, since the days of Scanderbeg, has maintained a desultory warfare with his oppressors in his native mountains; the

effeminate Syrian, who bows his neck, as in ancient days, to every invader; the unchanging Israelite, who has preserved his faith and usages inviolate since the days of Abraham; the wandering Arab, whose hand is still against every man, and every man's against him; the passive and laborious Egyptian, who toils a slave on the banks of the Nile, from whence his ancestors, under Sesostris, issued to conquer the world. And over all are placed as rulers the brave and haughty Osmanlis, who govern, but do not cultivate the land, and who, in Europe, not more than three millions in number, maintain their sway over four times that number of impatient and suffering subjects.

8. Division of the Christians and Mussulmans.

To govern dominions so vast, and inhabited by so great a variety of different and hostile nations, must, under any circumstances, have been a matter of difficulty; but in addition to this there was superadded, in the case of Turkey, a still more fatal and indelible source of discord, which was the difference of RELIGION. Turkey, even in Asia, is not, properly speaking, a Mahommedan country. The Seven Churches were established in Asia Minor in the days of the Apostles; the Empire of the East had embraced the faith of the Gospel four centuries before Christianity had spread in Western Europe. We are accustomed, from its ruling power, and its position in the map, to consider Turkey as a Mahommedan state, forgetting that Christianity had been established over its whole extent a thousand years before Constantinople yielded to the assault of Mahomet, and that the transference to the creed of Mahomet was as violent a change as if it were now to be imposed by foreign conquest on France or England. Even at this time, after four centuries of Mahommedan rule, Christianity is still the faith of three-fourths of the whole Turkish empire in Europe, and one-fourth in Asia. Cast down, reviled, persecuted, the followers of Jesus, from generation to generation, have adhered to the faith of their fathers: it still forms the distinguishing mark between them and their oppressors:

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more even than difference of race it has severed the two great families of mankind; and when the Greek revolution broke out, the cry was not "Independence to Greece," but "Victory to the Cross."

9. Turkish system of government.

The system of government by which the Turks for four centuries have maintained themselves in their immense dominions, and kept the command of so many and such various races of men, is very simple, and more suited to Oriental than European ideas. It is neither the system which distance and the extreme paucity of the ruling nation has rendered a matter of necessity to the English in India—that of conciliating the great body of the rural cultivators, and drawing from them disciplined battalions which might establish their dominion over their former oppressors—nor that of penetrating the wilds of nature with the light of civilisation, and conquering mankind to pacify and bless them, like the legions which followed the eagles of Rome to the extremities of the earth. It is more akin to the establishment and system of government of the Normans in England, where the people were not only conquered, but retained in subjection by force, and sixty thousand horsemen annually assembled at Winchester to overawe and intimidate the subject realm. Their number is small compared to the entire population of the country. Three millions of Osmanlis in Europe are thinly scattered over a territory containing twelve or thirteen millions of Christian subjects; but they are all armed, and ready to become soldiers; they are in possession of the whole fortresses, harbours, and strongholds of the kingdom; they have the command of the government, the treasury, the capital, and the great cities: the Christians are scattered over the country, and depressed by centuries of servitude; the Turks are concentrated in towns, and rendered confident by the long exercise of power.

What renders the government of the Christians, though so superior in number, by the Mahommedans more easy in

10. Division of races in Turkey renders government more easy.

Turkey, is the variety of tribes and races of which the subjected population is composed, their separation from each other by mountains, seas, and entire want of roads, and the complete unity of action and identity of purpose in the dominant race. The Greeks are not only a different race, but speak a different language from the Bulgarians: the Servians are a separate tribe from the Wallachians, the Albanians from both. The Greek of the Fanar* has nothing in common with the peasant of Roumelia; the Armenian with the Syrian; the Egyptian with the Cappadocian; the Jew with the Albanian. These different nations and tribes have separate feelings, descent, and interests; they are severed from each other by recollections, habits, institutions; vast ranges of mountains, in Greece, Macedonia, and Asia Minor, part them; roads, or even bridges, there are none, to enable the different inhabitants of this varied realm to communicate with each other, ascertain their common wrongs, or enter into any common designs for their liberation. On the other hand, the Turks, in possession of the incomparable harbour and central capital of Constantinople, with the Euxine and the Black Sea for their interior line of communication, are a homogeneous race, speaking one language, professing one religion, animated by one spirit, swayed by one interest, and enabled, by means of the government couriers, whose speed compensates the difficulty of transit, to communicate one common impulse to all parts of their vast dominions. The example of the English in India is sufficient to show how long the possession of these advantages is capable of enabling an inconsiderable body of strangers to subdue and keep in subjection a divided multitude of nations, a thousand times more numerous.

The military strength of the Turks, which was long so formidable to Europe, and more than once put Christen-

* The quarter of Constantinople where the richest and most intelligent of the Greeks reside.

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dom within a hair's-breadth of destruction, is derived *entirely* from the Osmanlis. It is a fundamental maxim of their government, that the Mussulmans alone are to be armed, or called on to combat either foreign or domestic enemies; the Christians are to be made to contribute to the expense of armaments, and uphold by their industry the strength of the empire, but by no means to be intrusted with the duty of defending it in the field. The former is the generous war-horse, which, sedulously trained to military exercises, is released from all toil till the glorious dangers of war commence; the latter is the humble beast of burden, which is worn out in the meaner occupations of peace, and follows at a distance his proud compeer to the field, to bear his burdens and provide for his subsistence. As the military strength of the empire thus depends solely on the Osmanlis, it is drawn from a comparatively limited body, and depends entirely on their spirit and courage. Yet is this difference between the Turks and other homogeneous nations greater in appearance than reality. Except in periods of extraordinary excitement, when the whole nation, under the influence of an ungovernable impulse, runs to arms, the military strength of every people is derived from a portion only of its inhabitants. The *military caste* is seldom more than a third or a fourth of the whole number; and if, as in Turkey, that proportion is all trained to arms as a profession, and engages in no other, it is fully as much as the labour of the remainder of the people can maintain in idleness, ever ready for the toils of war.

11. The military strength of the empire entirely derived from the Turks.

As the Turks are the military caste upon whom the whole strength in war of the Ottoman empire depends, so the Christians are the *industrious* class upon whom its whole riches and material prosperity rest. The natural and inevitable ascendancy of mind over matter, of intelligence over strength, never appeared more strongly than in the destinies of the Greek people. Still, as in ancient times, they have asserted the dominion over their con-

12. The whole civil business of the country is conducted by the Greeks.

querors; if the sword of the Osmanlis, as of the Romans, has subdued their bodies, their minds have again reasserted the ascendancy over their oppressors. The Greeks at Constantinople seem rather the allies than the subjects of the Turks. The same is the case in most of the other great towns of the empire; and their presence is indispensable, their superiority still more manifest, in the divans of all the pachas. The Turks, who long, above all things, after repose, and know no excitement but love and war, leave the whole management of affairs to the Greeks: civil administration, negotiations, pacific situations, letters, the arts, commerce, manufactures, industry, navigation, all are in their hands. The Turks command, and are alone intrusted with military power; but the Greeks direct the commander, often in military, always in civil affairs. The seamen of the Archipelago, skilful now as when they rolled back the tide of Persian invasion in the Gulf of Salamis, have the entire commerce of the empire in their hands; for although the Turks are admirable horsemen and most formidable soldiers by land, they have a superstitious aversion to the sea, and often find it easier, as Gibbon observes, to overrun an empire than to cross a strait.[1]

[1] Lami. vii. 325, 326.

13. Great and rapid increase of the Christians compared to the Turks.

As the Turks are thus the indolent, luxurious, dominant race, and the Greeks, Armenians, and other Christians the laborious, hard-working, servant race, they have respectively undergone the usual fate of mankind in such positions in society. The masters have diminished, the slaves have multiplied. The lazy rulers, with their sabres, their horses, their harems, their coffee-houses, their life of repose and enjoyment, are unable to maintain their own numbers; the despised and insulted subjects, with their ploughs, their shuttles, their oars, their single wives and cottages, have overspread the land with their descendants. They have increased in some places as fast, and from the same cause, as the reviled Catholic Celt under Protestant and Orange domination did in Ireland. In the level country,

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indeed, where the horsemen of the Osmanlis have found it easy to extend their ravages, and the pachas their oppression, the human race has in many places wholly disappeared, and the mournful traveller, after traversing for days together the richest plains, studded with the ruins of ancient cities, now left without a single inhabitant, has repeatedly expressed a dread of the entire extirpation of the human species in the very garden of nature, the places in the world best adapted for its reception.* But this is sometimes the result rather of a migration than an absolute diminution of inhabitants. In the mountains where the janizaries have not been able to penetrate, or the regions where the tyranny of the pachas has been exchanged for a fixed tribute—in Servia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the fastnesses of Albania, the Taurus, and Lebanon—the human race is increasing with great rapidity, cultivation is daily extending into the wilds of nature, and the beautiful spectacle is presented to the eye of the charmed traveller of industry overcoming the difficulties with which it is surrounded, and man existing in simple innocence, surrounded with the comforts of unsophisticated nature.

14. Picture of the Servians by Lamartine.

M. Lamartine, whose brilliant imagination is accompanied with a close observation of external things, and whose travels are suspected to be poetical dreams only because they exhibit sketches from nature, coloured with

* "En général, pour les productions, le paysan en Turquie ne demande à la terre que ce dont il a rigoureusement besoin pour sa subsistance, et le reste est livré à l'abandon. La partie qui avoisine les côtes, jusqu'à une distance de quinze à vingt lieues, est plus généralement la mieux cultivée; mais au-delà l'on marche souvent, pendant plusieurs heures, à travers de vastes espaces en friche, remplis de broussailles et de mauvaises herbes, dont la vigueur de végétation atteste la fécondité et la richesse productive du sol. A voir ce délaissement de l'agriculture dans la Roumélie, on serait tenté de croire à la réalité de ce dicton, beaucoup plus commun parmi nous qu'en Turquie, que les Turcs ne se considèrent que comme campés en Europe, et qu'ils détachent, peu à peu, leurs pensées des provinces qu'ils sentent leur échapper pour les rapporter de préférence sur cette terre d'Asie, qui fut le berceau de leur nation. Cependant, si nous portons nos regards de l'autre côté des détroits, l'aspect ne change pas: même fertilité partout, et même désolation. Si l'on excepte quelques riches plaines de l'Asie Mineure, vous n'apercevez presque nulle-

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the tints of his poetic mind, has given the following picture of Servia, where, ever since its formidable insurrection in the commencement of the present century, independence, under the tutelary arm of PRINCE MOLOSCH, has been practically established: "The population in Servia amounts now (1836) to 1,000,000 souls, and it is rapidly increasing. The mildness of the climate, which resembles that between Lyons and Avignon; the riches of the deep and virgin soil, which covers the surface everywhere with the vegetation of Switzerland; the abundance of rivers and streams which descend from the mountains, circulate in the valleys, and often form lakes in the spacious woods; the felling of the forests, which at once, as in America, furnishes space for the plough and materials for the houses of those who hold it; the mild and pure manners of the people; their wise and protective institutions, the reflection, as it were, of the best in Europe; the supreme power concentrated in the hands of a man worthy of his mission, Prince Molosch — all these elements of prosperity and happiness promise to advance the population to several millions before a century is over. Should that people, as it desires and hopes, become the kernel of a new Sclavonic empire by its reunion with Bosnia, a part of Bulgaria, and the warlike Montenegrins, Europe will see a new empire rise from the ruins of Turkey,[1] and embrace the vast and beautiful regions which extend

[1] Lamartine, Voyages en L'Orient, vii. 12.

part quelque trace de culture. De vastes solitudes, coupées à de lointains intervalles par quelques tentes de tribus Kurds ou Turcomans, des forêts de pins et de chênes, que le gouvernement livre à la discrétion de quiconque veut les exploiter, sur la réserve de trois pour cent, sur la vente du bois; le désert presque à la sortie des villes, de loin en loin échelonnés parfois à des distances de neuf ou dix heures de marche; des villages, dont le misérable aspect contraste péniblement avec la richesse de la végétation qui les entoure. Voilà ce qui s'offre à la vue du voyageur sur cette terre, qui portait jadis tant de villes fameuses—Pergame, Sardis, Troie, Nicomédie, et toutes les autres dont le nom seul a survécu. M. de Tchitchatchef mentionne une plaine qui s'étend sur un surface de 600 milles géographiques carrés, et qui offre à peine 50 milles cultivés. La production annuelle de céréales en Asie Mineure évaluée à 705,100,000 kilogrammes, ou 9,263,000 hectolitres (5,500,000 quarters), et réprésentant une valeur de 75,000,000 francs (£3,000,000), atteindrait aisément le quintuple, et même *le décuple.*"—UBICINI, 366, 367.

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15. Continued.

between the Danube, the Balkan, the Euxine, and the Adriatic.

"The traveller cannot quit this beautiful region, as I have done, without saluting with regrets and benedictions its rising fortunes. Those immense virgin forests, those mountains, those plains, those rivers, which seem to have come fresh from the hands of the Creator, and to mingle the luxuriant youth of nature with the youth of man; those new houses, which seem to spring out of the woods, to stretch along the side of torrents into the most sequestered nooks of the valleys; the roll of the revolving mills, busied with the cutting of wood; the sound of the village bells, newly baptised in the blood of the defenders of the country; the songs of the youths and maidens, as they lighten their toil; the sight of the multitude of children who issue from the schools or from the churches, the roofs of which are not yet finished; the accents of liberty, of joy, and of hope in every mouth; the look of spring and gladness in every countenance; the sight of those mountains which stand forth shaded with primeval forests; the fortresses of nature, and of that Danube, which bends as if to embrace so beauteous a region, and waft its productions to the east and the north; the prospect of the mosque everywhere in ruins, and the Christian churches rising in every village—all those speak the youth of nations, and we mingle our prayers with the song of the freeman.

"When the sun of Servia shines on the waters of the Danube, the river seems to glitter with the blades of the yatagans, the resplendent fusils of the Montenegrins: it is a river of liquid steel which defends Servia. It is sweet to sit on its shore, and to see it waft past the broken arms of our enemies.—When the wind of Albania descends from the mountains, and engulfs itself in the forests of Schamadia, cries issue from them as from the army of the Turks at the rout of Mosawa.[1] Sweet is that murmur to the ears of the freed Ser-

[1] Lamartine, Voyages dans L'Orient, viii. 41, 42.

vians. Dead or living, it is sweet after the battle to repose at the foot of that oak which expands in freedom as we do."

16. General decrease of population in Turkey.

But examples like that of Servia, of which there are several in the Turkish dominions, particularly in Bulgaria, and the valleys of Lebanon, are the exceptions, not the rule. Generally speaking, the country is retrograde, and exhibits the usual and well-known features of decaying societies. Roads there are none, except bridle-paths, often impassable for any save daring horsemen: harbours choked up; walls falling into ruin; bridges broken down, and never repaired; villages wholly deserted, or consisting of a few huts among extensive ruins; rich plains in a state of nature, or traversed only by the wandering Arab, who seeks shelter in the remains of former magnificence—are the general features of the country. The Turkish empire is perishing, literally speaking, from want of inhabitants; and while the philosophers of Europe were contemplating with dread the productive powers of its overflowing inhabitants, the travellers in Asia were anticipating the entire disappearance of the human race, in the regions where it was first created, and where the most ample means have been provided for its increase. The Ottoman dominions present from day to day a wide void for anarchy and barbarism to rule in; territories without inhabitants, tribes without rulers, plains without culture. No foreign interposition is necessary to complete its downfall; it is working out its own ruin; the colossus is falling without even a hand being stretched forth to hurl it to the ground. The population, thrown back upon itself, is expiring from its own impotence—in many places it no longer exists. The Mussulman race is reduced to nothing in the sixty thousand square leagues which compose its immense and fertile domain; excepting in the capital, and a few great cities, there is scarcely a Turk to be seen. Gaze over that vast empire, its fertile fields, and seek the Ottoman race—you will nowhere find it,

1 Lamartine, Voyages dans L'Orient, viii. 331, 332.

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except in large towns. The senseless, or rather murderous government of the Ottoman has in most places created a desert. The conquered races have generally increased, while the conquering is daily disappearing.

17. Statistics of Turkey.

Statistical facts of unquestionable veracity prove that these observations are not the mere offspring of a heated imagination, but the sober deductions of reason. The Ottoman dominions, which are nearly the same with those which, on the partition of the Empire, fell to the lot of the emperors of Constantinople, contain 60,000 square geographical leagues, or 540,000 square miles—above four times the size of Great Britain and Ireland, and more than three times that of France. The benignity of the climate, luxuriance of vegetation, and warmth of the sun, have rendered the plains of extraordinary fertility, often yielding eighty and a hundred for one, while in England ten to one is reckoned a large crop, and at the same time made the rocky slopes, here abandoned to furze or heath, capable of yielding the finest crops of grapes and olives. Magnificent forests, furnishing inexhaustible resources for shipbuilding, clothe the mountain sides; and the Ægean lies in the midst of the empire, studded with islands of ravishing beauty, inhabited by skilful and hardy sailors, as if to furnish the means of communication between its most distant extremities. Its capital is Constantinople, the finest harbour in the world, and so advantageously situated for foreign commerce that it in every age has engrossed the most lucrative traffic which man carries on—that between the East and the West. The greatest rivers of Europe, Asia, and Africa—the Danube, the Euphrates, and the Nile—are its streams, and waft the varied productions of its industry to distant quarters, where they may find a ready vent. Yet with all these immense advantages, which supported the Byzantine empire for a thousand years after the Western had fallen, the Ottoman empire now contains less than thirty millions of inhabitants, not a third of

its population in former times, or a fifth of what it is capable of maintaining; and such as it is, this scanty population is daily declining. Turkey in Europe, with a territory more than twice as large as Great Britain, contains only ten millions of inhabitants, of whom little more than three millions are Mahommedans,* certainly not a third of what it contained in ancient days.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vii. 842, 843; Von Hammer, ii. 273.

18. In what does Turkish oppression consist?

There must have been some grievous faults on the part of government and institutions in Turkey, which, with such advantages, has produced so fearful a diminution of inhabitants. Nor is it difficult to see in what those faults consist. It is common to it with all the states in the East. There are no elements of freedom, no guarantees against oppression in the land. The rule of the Osmanlis is not more oppressive than that of other Asiatic states; but it is entirely despotic, and there is no check on the abuse of power by the sultan or the inferior governors of provinces. It is the practical application of the principles of government acted on in Turkey which has occasioned such a fearful chasm in the population, and weakened so remarkably the strength of the empire. 1. The first of these principles is, that the sultan nominates at pleasure,

* The following is the estimated population of Turkey in Europe, according to M. Hassel and Malte Brun:—

I. Christians.		II. Mussulmans and Jews.	
Greeks,	3,090,000	Turks,	2,350,000
Sclavonians,	2,000,000	Tartars,	275,000
Arnauts,	700,000	Jews,	312,000
Armenians,	85,000	Gypsies,	120,000
Wallachians,	1,375,000		
			3,057,000
Total native Christians,	7,250,000		

—M. Hassel *and* Malte Brun, vii. 844.

Military force of Turkey in time of peace,			79,500
Military force of Turkey in war,	infantry,	100,000	
	regular cavalry,	24,000	
	irregular do.,	100,000	
			224,000

—Von Hammer, ii. 273.

More recent writers, favourable to Turkey, have represented the population of the country as much more considerable, but still with the same excess of Christians over the Turks in Europe, and of the Turks over the Christians in Asia. The following is the estimate of M. Ubicini, the latest and best informed

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and removes at will, all the civil and military functionaries of the empire. He is absolute master of their fortunes and their lives; but the difficulty of carrying his mandates into execution in the distant pachalics, renders this power often more nominal than real; and the sultan, destitute of adequate regular troops to enforce his mandates, is obliged to bribe one pacha to depose another, by the promise of his power, his treasures, his harem, and oblivion for his crimes. 2. The second principle is, that every depositary of power can delegate it entire and uncontrolled to his subordinates in office; so that every aga or

writer on the subject, of the inhabitants of the entire empire, according to their religions:—

	In Europe.	In Asia.	In Africa.	Total.
Mussulmans,	4,550,000	12,650,000	3,800,000	21,000,000
Greeks,	10,000,000	3,000,000	...	13,000,000
Catholics,	640,000	260,000	...	900,000
Jews,	70,000	80,000	...	150,000
Divers others,	...	...	...	300,000
				35,350,000

—Ubicini's *Lettres sur la Turquie*, 25.

According to their *races*, the inhabitants stand thus:—

	In Europe.	In Asia.	In Africa.	Total.
Turks,	2,100,000	10,700,000	...	12,800,000
Greeks,	1,000,000	1,000,000	...	2,000,000
Armenians,	400,000	2,000,000	...	2,400,000
Jews,	70,000	80,000	...	150,000
Sclavonians,	6,200,000	...	...	6,200,000
Romains,	4,000,000	...	...	4,000,000
Albanians,	1,500,000	...	...	1,500,000
Tartars,	16,000	...	...	16,000
Tsiganis,	214,000	900,000	3,800,000	4,914,000
Arabs,	...	235,000	...	235,000
Syrians,	...	...	...	...
Druses,	...	30,000	...	30,000
Kurds,	...	1,000,000	...	1,000,000
Turcomans,	...	85,000	...	85,000
	15,500,000	16,050,000	3,800,000	35,330,000

—Ubicini, 22.

janizary within his territory is as despotic as the sultan in Constantinople. It is a common saying in Turkey, that the sword of the sultan does not fall upon the dust; and neither does it: but the sword of the sultan falls upon the pacha, and the sword of the pacha falls upon the aga, and the sword of the aga upon the janizary, and the sword of the janizary upon the peasant. Each is invested with uncontrolled power over all beneath him; and as there is no popular representation, or check of any sort on power, it may readily be imagined with what severity it falls on the humblest classes. It was well expressed in a letter, written by Odysseus to Mahomet Pacha, explaining the reasons which induced him to take up arms at the commencement of the Greek Revolution: "It was the injustice of the viziers, waywodes, cadis, and baloukbashis, each of whom closed the book of Mahomet, and opened a book of his own. Any virgin that pleased them, they took by force; any merchant in Negropont who was making money, they beheaded and seized his goods; any proprietor of a good estate they slew, and occupied his property; and every drunken vagabond in the streets could murder respectable Greeks, and was not punished for it."[1]

[1] Odysseus to Mahomet Pasha, Nov. 15, 1822; Gordon's Greek Revolution, i. 466; Malte Brun, vii. 706.

19. The lives and property of all belong to the Sultan.

3. A third principle of government, which proved not less destructive in practice than the first, is, that the lives and property of all the inhabitants in his dominions are by the right of conquest the property of the sultan, and may be reclaimed by him at pleasure. It is true, this extreme right is kept in abeyance, and not in general acted upon; but its reality is never doubted, and it forms a fearful principle to fall back upon, when arbitrary acts have been resolved upon, or the public treasury stands much in need of replenishing. The whole Christians, whether Greeks or Armenians, and the Jews, as well as other similar "dogs," stand in this situation. They purchase their lives annually by payment of a capita-

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tion tax, known by the significant name, "Redemption of the price of heads;" but the application of the principle to immovable property produces still more disastrous consequences. It is held that no one, not even the Turks, can enjoy the *hereditary right* to landed estates; they never can be more than usufructuaries or liferenters. If the owner dies without a male child, the sultan is the heir, to the exclusion of the daughters; if there are sons, their right of succession is redeemed by the payment of a tenth of the value, but that tenth is estimated by the officers of exchequer. The persons holding office under the sultan in any degree are subject to still greater uncertainty; all their property of every description belongs on their death to the sultan, and must be redeemed at an arbitrary rate. So great is the apprehension entertained of this right, that no one ventures to expend money on heritable property. If a house, a roof, or an arch fall, it is suffered to remain in ruins. Whatever property can be accumulated is invested in movable effects—jewels or money—which, being easily concealed, are more likely to escape the Argus eyes of the tax-gatherers. The only way in which property in perpetuity can be settled in Turkey, is by bequeathing it for pious purposes to a mosque, the directors of which, for a moderate ransom, permit it to be enjoyed by the heirs of the testator.[1]

[1] Volney, Voyages en Syrie, chap. ii.; Ludecke, Relation de la Turquie, i. § 63; Lady Mary Wortley Montague's Letters, ii., Letter 32; Malte Brun, vii. 706, 707.

20. Great extent of land in Turkey held in mortmain.

In consequence of this insecurity of land-tenure in Turkey, and of the mosques affording the only security that can be relied on, a very large proportion of the heritable property in the country has come into the hands of these ecclesiastical trustees; some estimate it as three-fourths, none at less than two-thirds of the entire surface. This species of property, being subject neither to taxes nor confiscation, is largely resorted to in every part of the empire; but as it rests in the hands of priests and lawyers, in the double fangs of ecclesiastical power and legal subtlety, with nothing but a usufruct or liferent right of

enjoyment in the trustee or real owner, it is of course utterly fatal to any expenditure of money on, or improvement of, landed property in Turkey. This is one great cause of the general dilapidation of buildings, roads, and bridges in the rural districts, and the entire want of anything like expenditure of capital on lasting improvements. Add to this, that, by a fundamental law of the empire, landed property, even when not in the hands of a mosque, can be alienated to or held by a Turk alone. No Christian, be his fortune in money what it may, can become a landed proprietor; when they really do so, it can be done only by holding in name of a Turk. This necessarily is fatal to the improvement of land, for it excludes from its purchase the entire Christian population, the only one possessed of capital, energy, or resources, and confines it to the dominant Ottomans—like the Normans, a race of warriors who utterly despise all pacific pursuits, and know no use of land but to wrench the last farthing out of the wretched cultivators.[1]

[1] Michelus, Ottoman Empire, 178; Ubicini, Lettres sur la Turquie, 270.

21. Injury done to Turkey by importation.

Turkey, in consequence of this extraordinary and anomalous position of its landed property, and of the want of any durable interest in the dominant race of the state in its prosperity, has long been the victim of the old imperial policy, inherited by the Ottomans from the ancient masters of the world—that of sacrificing the interests of production in the country to those of consumption in towns. The magnitude and importance of Constantinople, the extreme danger of any serious discontent among its turbulent inhabitants, the number of sultans who have fallen victims to insurrections among the janizaries, have contributed to impress upon the Ottoman government, at all hazards, the necessity of keeping down the price of provisions. Everything is sacrificed to this object. Goods of every sort, including grain, *imported*, pay an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent; all goods *exported* pay an *ad valorem* duty of 12 per cent. This strange

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policy, akin to that of the Popes in modern, and the Emperors in ancient Rome, springing from dread of the old cry of "*Panem et Circenses*" of the Roman populace, is of itself sufficient to account for the ruinous state of agriculture in the Turkish empire. Constantinople is fed from Alexandria, Odessa, and Galatz, not Roumelia. The Turkish government at one period went so far as to *prohibit* exportation from Wallachia and Moldavia to any other place than Constantinople; and yet so great are the agricultural resources of these provinces, that, since this restriction has been removed, the exportation of grain from Galatz and Brahilow, the chief harbours, has increased at the rate of 700,000 quarters a-year, and now amounts to 5,000,000 quarters annually.[1]

[1] Ubicini, Lettres sur la Turquie, 280, 281, 285.

22. Universal venality in the holders of office.

There results from this general life-tenure and insecurity of property in Turkey the most scandalous venality on the part of persons holding office, and the most rapacious exactions on the unfortunate persons subjected to their authority. Every one feeling his situation precarious, his property liferented only, hastens to make as much of and expend as little upon it as possible. The situations of vizier, pacha, cadi, and the like, are sold to the largest bidder, and the purchasers, who have often paid a high price for these offices, seek to make the best use of their time to repay the purchase-money, and leave something considerable in a movable form, capable of being concealed to their families. It is true, if the oppression of any one pacha has become intolerable, the complaints of his subjects, despite all the tyrant's vigilance, sometimes reach the ears of the sultan, and a terrible example is made. The bowstring is sent to the culprit, his head is exposed on the gates of the seraglio, with an inscription detailing the crimes of which he has been guilty; his property, wherever it can be discovered, is seized for the sultan's use, his harem dispersed, and the most beautiful of its inmates transferred to the royal

seraglio. But no redress is thereby afforded to the sufferers by his oppression; the fruit of his rapacity is conveyed to the treasury at Constantinople, not restored to its original owners. Hence it is a common saying in Turkey, that "the pachas are so many sponges put over the ground, in order to suck up the wealth of the inhabitants, that it may be the more readily squeezed into the sultan's coffers." It is impossible to suppose that the process of squeezing will be very vigilantly watched by the rulers of the empire, when it is foreseen that, if carried to a certain length, it is likely to terminate in such a result. [1]

[1] Porter's Travels, 79, 80; Malte Brun, vii. 707.

23. Ruinous weakness of the Executive.

To these manifold evils must be added another, which, in its practical result, is often the greatest of the whole; and that is, that the central government at Constantinople has no adequate force at its command to enforce its mandates, or compel a just administration on the part of its remote satraps. The regular military force at the disposal of the sultan is so small, in comparison to the immense extent of his dominions, that he is often unable to find troops under his immediate control to punish or restrain his rebellious or oppressive vassals; and thus he has no resource but to punish one pacha by the forces of another—that is, to destroy one culprit by creating a second. This can only be done for an adequate consideration; and that consideration in general is, either the gift of the culprit's pachalic, or oblivion for some huge delinquencies on the part of the officer to whom the execution of the sultan's decree has been intrusted. In either case, the system of oppression continues, or rather is increased; for the executioner is secured of long impunity by the lustre of his recent victory over his victim. This system, so well known in Scottish history, and, indeed, in that of all the feudal monarchies of Europe, is still in full vigour in Turkey, and was exemplified early in the Greek revolution, by the dethronement and decapitation of Ali

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Pacha by the forces of his rival, Kourchid Pacha, who hoped to succeed to his pachalic, but was himself in his turn the victim of the jealousies of the government. It is evident that, though this system conduces at times to the signal punishment of a guilty or rebellious satrap, it is utterly inconsistent with anything like regular or good government, and only chastises crime by providing for its unpunished continuance in future times.

24. Venality and corruption of justice.

Justice is venal in the Ottoman, as, indeed, it is in all Oriental states. The judges, both high and low, are taken from the *Oulema*, a sort of incorporation of persons learned in law and jurisprudence; and if they were persons of probity, their influence would be very great. But they are so venal in their conduct, and so arbitrary in their decisions, that no weight whatever can be attached to their judgments. All judges—the mollah, the cadi, and simple naib—pronounce sentences, both in civil and criminal cases, without appeal; thence, of course, an infinite variety in the judgments pronounced, and an entire impossibility of rectifying an unjust decision. The cadi, in flagrant cases, may be deposed, bastinadoed, and his fortune confiscated; but the only effect of that is to enrich the sultan or the officers of his treasury, but by no means to rectify the injustice done to the unhappy suitor. The Turkish jurisprudence consists in a few maxims from the Koran, and a few traditionary principles handed down in the courts; written statutes, collections of decisions, they have none; witnesses are examined, and oaths administered on both sides, and at the end of a few minutes or hours the decision, which is final and irreversible, is pronounced. The defendant or culprit, if poor, is bastinadoed; if rich, or a Frank, he is amerced in a pecuniary fine called an "avaria;" if a thief or a robber, he is hanged.[1] Everything is done as swiftly as it was in the camp of Othman; and so strongly is the military impress still retained in the empire, that the chief judges of the

[1] Volney, ii., Letter ii.; Tournefort, ii., Letter xiv.; MalteBrun, vii. 709.

empire in Europe and Asia bear the name respectively of *Kadi-laskar*, or judge of the army.

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25. Contrary principles of good in Turkey. Weakness of power.

So powerful are these causes of evil, that they must long since have led to the entire dissolution of the Turkish empire, were it not that they have been combated by circumstances, which have, in a great degree, neutralised their influence, and prolonged its existence long after, under other circumstances, it must have terminated. The first of these is the *weakness of government* itself, the principal, often the only, shield to innocence and industry in the East. As much as this weakness impedes the regular administration of affairs, and often secures impunity to crime in the depositaries of power, does it prevent their previous abuse of its authority, and shield the people when nothing else could save them from its excesses. The inhabitants are often saved from oppression, not because the pachas want the inclination, but because they want the power to oppress. Industry is sometimes left at peace, because the tyrants cannot reach it. The military force of the empire being entirely confined to the Osmanlis, and they being in many places, especially in the rural districts, not a tenth, sometimes not a twentieth part of the entire inhabitants, they are often without the means of enforcing their exactions; without any regular force to levy taxes or carry into execution their mandates, without money to equip a body of troops from the Turks in towns, they cannot make their power felt in the remoter parts of their provinces.

26. And want of the means of communication.

The very desolation and ruin of the country, the want of roads, harbours, or bridges, the difficulty of reaching the distant places with an armed force, often proves the salvation of the inhabitants. This is particularly the case in the mountain districts, which form so large a part of the territory of Turkey, both in Europe and Asia. Hence the smiling aspect of the villages and valleys in Servia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, the Lebanon, the Taurus, and some parts of Macedonia, which contrast so strangely with the

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desolation and ruin of the plains in their vicinity. The cavalry of the pachas pause at the entrance of the rugged valleys, where nothing but break-neck bridle-paths are to be seen, and sturdy mountaineers, armed with their excellent fowling-pieces, are ready to pour death upon the reckless invaders. They are happy to exchange the doubtful chances of warfare for the certainty of a regular tribute. The inhabitants of the plains, especially if they have made any money, flock to these asylums of industry in the midst of a wasted land; and hence the constant increase of inhabitants in the mountains, contrasted with the general depopulation of the plains, which has been observed by all travellers, and led to such opposite conclusions as to the ultimate destiny of the Eastern Empire. In the north of Europe, where commerce is indispensable to comfort, industry protected, and an exchange of surplus rude produce for foreign luxuries is essential to civilisation, the formation of roads is always the first step in improvement; but in the East, where wants are few, and the benignity of the climate furnishes every luxury that man requires, this want is not experienced, and roads are rather dreaded as affording an entrance to oppression, than desired as giving the means of export to the productions of industry.[1]

1 Vide Mante's Travels, Volney's Travels, Porter's Travels, Clark's Travels, Lamartine's Voyage dans L'Orient, Chateaubriand's Itinéraire de Paris à Jerusalem, and Urquhart's Spirit of the East.

27. Excellent qualities in the Turkish character.

Further, the *character* of the Turks, taken as individuals, has many estimable qualities, which have gone far to counteract the disastrous effects of their system of government. That they are brave and determined, and at one period were most formidable to Europe, from their military prowess, need be told to none; but it is not equally well known how worthy they are, and how many excellent traits of character are revealed in their private life. They are not in general active or industrious—they have left the labours of the fields to the natives of the soil—the cares of commerce to the Armenians, and the islanders of the Archipelago. Like the ancient Romans or the medieval Knights, they deem

the wielding of the sword or managing a steed the only honourable occupation, and worthy of a freeman. But no one can mingle with them, either in business or society, without perceiving that few races of men are more estimable in the relations of private life. Fearless, honest, and trustworthy, their word is their bond, and they are destitute of the restless spirit and envious disposition which so often in western Europe and America at once disturb happiness and provoke to crime. Inactivity is their great characteristic, repose their chief enjoyment. Their wants, generally speaking, are few; their enjoyments such as nature has thrown open to all. To sit on a carpet, smoke a scented pipe, and gaze under shade on the dancing of the sunbeams on the waves of the Bosphorus, is their supreme enjoyment. Satisfied, if wealthy, with his own harem, which combines the ideas of home and pleasure, the Turk has generally no ambition to invade that of his neighbour; and the enormous mass of female profligacy which infests the great cities of western Europe is unknown. Nothing excites the horror of the Osmanlis so much as the details of the foundling hospitals, and fearful multitude of natural children in Paris and Vienna; they cannot conceive how society can exist under such an accumulation of evils. Though capable, when roused either by religious fanaticism or military excitement, of the most frightful deeds of cruelty, they are far, in ordinary times, from being of a savage disposition; they are kind to their wives, passionately fond of their children, charitable to the poor, and even extend their benevolent feelings to dumb animals.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vii. 702, 704; Urquhart's Spirit of the East, i. 420, 427; Lamartine, Voyages dans L'Orient, viii. 356, 357.

28. The theory of the central government is comparatively mild.

To this it must be added, that though in practice the administration of government by the pachas is generally to the last degree oppressive and destructive, yet the system of government is by no means equally tyrannical, and in some respects is wise and tolerant, to a degree which may afford an example to, or excite the envy of the Christian powers. Though the Turks, when they

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stormed Constantinople in 1453, established the religion of Mahomet as the creed of the empire, yet they were far from proscribing other tenets, and to the religion of Jesus in particular they extended many immunities. They admitted its divine origin, confessed that the Koran embodied many of its precepts, and claimed only for their own faith that of being the last emanation of the Divine Will. They did not at first trample upon or oppress their Christian subjects merely on account of their faith; on the contrary, the heads of the Greek Church were treated with respect, and its clergy maintained in their chapels and other places of worship. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Catholics, and Protestants were alike tolerated, though not admitted to power; it was the long, obstinate, and at last disastrous wars with the Christians, which rendered the "*Giaour*" so much the object of aversion, and led to so many instances of savage oppression. Still the original tolerant principles of the government have again asserted their supremacy over these transient ebullitions of rage, and by an edict of Sultan Mahmoud all his subjects, of whatever religion, were declared equal in the eye of the law.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vii. 712.

29. Institution of Ayams.

An institution exists in Turkey, specially intended to protect the weak against the strong, and which, despite the usual arbitrary nature of the government, sometimes had this effect. This is the institution of *Ayams*, a sort of popular representation, and which provides a functionary who, like the tribunes of the people, is specially charged with the protection of a particular class of the inhabitants committed to his charge. The duty of these functionaries, who are elected by the burghers and traders, is to watch over the interests of individuals, the security of burghs, combat the tyranny of the pachas, and effect a just and equal division of the public burdens. Every Mussulman, without exception, who is in trade, belongs to some incorporation, the heads of which are elected by its members, and whose duty it is to bring the strength of the incorporation to

bear upon the defence of any individual of it who is threatened with oppression. These are the ayams; they are usually chosen from amongst the most wealthy and respected of the trade; are assisted by a divan, composed also of the most eminent of the trade; and they often discharge their duties with great courage and fidelity. Still, so venal is justice, and so arbitrary the administration of government in the Ottoman dominions, that even the ayams, supported by the whole strength of the incorporation, are seldom able to obtain redress but by the payment of a large sum of money. But nevertheless redress obtained in this way is better than no redress at all; for the sum usually paid to ward off the threatened exaction is larger than any single individual, unless very opulent, could afford to pay.[1]

[1] Tournefort, Voyage du Levant, ii., Letter xiv.; Volney, Voyage en Syrie, ii., Letter c.; Malte Brun, vii. 709, 710.

30. The village system.

The ayams, however, are to be found chiefly in the towns, and among the Mussulman burghers. The great, indeed the only security of the inhabitants of the country, is to be found in the *village system*, which is universal in the East, and has proved the great preservative of rural industry in every age, amidst the innumerable oppressions to which it has from the earliest times been subject. This admirable system, which has been described in a former work in reference to Hindostan,[2] and in this to Russia,[3] is established over the whole extent of Turkey; and wherever the industry of the peasants has survived the tyranny of the pachas, it has been mainly owing to its influence. It is, in fact, the natural resource of industry against exaction, of weakness to secure revenue, and of justice to partition burdens, and this is done with rigid impartiality. These little communities, though often extinguished through the exactions of the pachas, and the entire disappearance of the population in the plains, flourish in undisturbed security in the recesses of the mountains; and it is in their protection, and the shelter which they afford to industry, that the chief principle of vitality in the Ottoman dominions is to be found.[4]

[2] Hist. of Europe, c. xlvii., § 19.

[3] Ante, c. viii., § 29, 30.

[4] Malte Brun, vii. 707, 708.

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31. Small revenue derived from Turkey.

There cannot be a stronger proof of the mal-administration and oppressive nature of the government in Turkey, than the extremely small amount of the public revenue, compared with its extent and material resources. The entire revenue of the empire is from 650,000,000 to 750,000,000 piastres (£6,000,000 to £7,000,000), not a seventh part of the public income of Great Britain, possessing in the portion taxed not a fifth part of the extent of surface, nor a tenth part of the natural riches and agricultural advantages of the Ottoman dominions. In ancient times they maintained four times their present inhabitants, and yielded five times their present revenue. Yet, trifling as it is, this revenue is felt as so oppressive by the inhabitants that it operates as a serious bar to industry. It is raised by a tithe on agricultural produce and animals, and a tax of 17 per cent on incomes—in all 27 per cent on landed property, a grievous burden, and crushing to industry. The Turkish government cuts up its own resources from the roots, by destroying the industry from which they must arise. "When a native of Louisiana," says Montaigne, "desires the fruit of a tree, he lays the axe to its root. Behold the emblem of despotism."[1]

[1] Ubicini, 275, 276.

32. Great population of the towns, and decline of the country.

Like all declining empires, and none more than its own provinces under the Byzantine rule, Turkey exhibits the symptoms of decline more strongly in the rural than the urban districts; and several great towns, besides the capital, exhibit considerable marks of prosperity, while the provinces around them are every day sinking deeper in the abyss of misery. The constant migration of the inhabitants from the country to the towns is the evil everywhere most strongly felt and complained of in Turkey, for it paralyses all rural operations, and cuts up by the roots the ultimate resources of the state. The newcomers in towns pick up a subsistence by trade and manufactures, or fall as burdens on the charity of the mosques and opulent inhabitants. In the crowd they are over-

looked by the tax-gatherers, and generally escape with the payment only of a trifling capitation-tax, a thing impossible when exposed to his rapacity in the solitude of rural life. Accordingly, while the provinces are every day more and more going to ruin, and large tracts of land are daily returning to a state of nature, the chief towns exhibit a considerable degree of prosperity, and often a surprising number of inhabitants.[1] *

[1] Ubicini, 361, 364.

33. Multitude of idle servants in the country.

One evil of a very peculiar kind exists in Turkey, highly injurious to industry. This consists in the prodigious multitude of servants and idle retainers who are to be found in the establishments of the pachas and the affluent, and who consume the fruits of the earth, and the resources of the state, without contributing anything either to the one or the other. Their number amounts to 1,500,000 —a burden nearly as heavy as a standing army to the same amount would be, and far more enervating to the state. It is the hope of getting into some of these great establishments, where they may be maintained in idleness and luxury at the expense of the rural cultivators who are toiling at the plough, which is the great inducement that attracts such multitudes from the country to the great towns. When once there, they never go back; rural labour is ever insupportable to those who have once tasted the varieties and excitement of urban life.[2] But

[2] Ubicini, 290.

* The following is the population of the chief cities of the Turkish empire:—

In Europe.		In Asia.	
Constantinople,	700,000	Broussa,	100,000
Adrianople,	110,000	Smyrna,	156,000
Widdin,	20,000	Koniah,	33,000
Nicti,	50,000	Angora,	35,000
Bosna Serai,	65,000	Sivas,	40,000
Scutaria,	35,000	Trebizond,	55,000
Salonica,	80,000	Erzeroum,	100,000
Mitylene,	80,000	Halib,	100,000
Rhodes,	38,000	Damascus,	150,000
Janina,	13,000	Diarbekir,	60,000
Gallipoli,	16,000	Moussoul,	65,000
Varna,	16,000	Bagdad,	105,000
		Tripoli,	25,000
		Bassora,	60,000
		Medina,	19,000

—Ubicini, 45, 49.

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this vast abstraction of robust hands from country labour to urban indolence, an evil in every country, is doubly so in one like Turkey, labouring under the scourge of a scanty and declining rural population.

34. Variable strength of the Turkish empire.

It results necessarily from this peculiar and anomalous position of the Turkish empire, that its political and military strength varies extremely from time to time, and depends rather on casual fits of excitement or sudden fits of passion, than any lasting strength or permanent resources. When a sultan of great vigour or military capacity is at the head of affairs, and the nation is excited by the prospect of glory or pillage, or when the religious feelings of the people are violently excited against the infidels, nearly the whole race of the Osmanlis run to arms, and the grand-vizier finds himself at the head of a mighty host, which has often proved for the time irresistible by the utmost strength of the Western powers. It was thus that Rhodes was conquered in 1517 from its valiant chevaliers by Selim I.; and Vienna besieged by Soliman II., in 1529; and Candia conquered by Mahomet IV.; and Vienna again besieged, and saved from destruction only by John Sobieski in 1683. On many of these occasions the grand-vizier found himself at the head of 150,000 men, whose desperate onset in the field was equalled only by the skill with which they wielded their weapons. But as these efforts were founded on passing excitement, not durable strength or lasting policy, they were seldom of long duration: a single considerable reverse was generally sufficient to disperse the mighty host which was held together only by the fervour of fanaticism, or the lust of plunder; and the grand-vizier often found himself wholly deserted, a few days after he had been at the head of an army apparently capable of conquering the world.

Hence the history of Turkey presents the most extraordinary vicissitudes of fortune, and has oscillated alternately from the most prosperous to the most adverse

circumstances. Mahomet II. stormed Constantinople in 1453, and ere long he had subdued Greece, and extended his dominion from the Adriatic to the Crimea; Selim I., in 1517, subdued Egypt, Syria, and Rhodes; and in 1529, Hungary, torn by civil dissensions, opened to Soliman II. the road to Vienna. Soon after Cyprus yielded to Selim, but here the star of the Crescent was arrested. The battle of Lepanto, in 1571, checked for ever their naval progress; the siege of Malta put a limit to their conquests in the Mediterranean. Azof, in the north of the empire, acquired in 1642, was successively lost and regained; Vienna, again besieged in 1683 by 150,000 Turks, beheld their total defeat by the arms of John Sobieski. The Ottoman arms yielded in several campaigns to the scientific manœuvres and daring valour of Prince Eugene, and Austria made great acquisitions from them by the treaties of 1699 and 1718, but she lost them all by the disgraceful peace of 1739. Long victorious over the Turks under the banners of Marshal Mornich, the Russians, under Peter the Great, were reduced to capitulate, in 1711, on the Pruth, to the Ottoman forces, and purchase a disgraceful retreat by the abandonment of all their conquests. The Morea was conquered from them by the Venetians in 1699, though soon after regained, and the conquest of Bagdad seemed to announce their decisive superiority in Asia over the Persians. Yet were these great successes, which filled all Europe with dread, and seemed to presage for them almost universal dominion, soon followed by still greater disasters. The growing strength of Russia rose up in appalling vigour beside the at length declining resources of the Osmanlis. Romanzoff crossed the Danube, and carried the ravages of war to the foot of the Balkan; the fleet of Orloff made the circuit of Europe, and consigned the Turkish fleet to the flames in the bay of Tchesme; the Morea took up arms in 1783, and for a time acknowledged the sceptre of Russia; and nothing but the intervention

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of France and England preserved the empire from dismemberment, when threatened with the combined armies of Russia and Austria, two hundred thousand strong, immediately before the French Revolution. The war of 1808 still more clearly revealed the increasing weakness of the Ottomans. Russia alone proved more than a match for Turkey. Wallachia and Moldavia were by a formal ukase incorporated with the dominions of the Czar, and nothing but the invasion of Napoleon in 1812 obliged the cabinet of St Petersburg to acknowledge for a brief season the Pruth as the frontier stream of the two empires.

36. Independent position of the larger pachas, and consequent weakness of the central power.

One great cause of these extraordinary mutations of fortune is, that the Ottoman empire is not *one state*, in the European sense of the word; that is, a united dominion, ruled by one government, obliged to obey its direct mandates, and contributing all its resources to its support: it is rather an aggregate of separate states, owing only a nominal allegiance to the central power, and yielding it effective support only when the vigour and capacity of the ruling sultan, or the strong tide of passing enthusiasm, leaves them no alternative but to render it. The pachas, especially the more distant and powerful ones, are often in substance independent; they pay only a fixed tribute to the sultan, generally inconsiderable compared to the sum which they contrive to exact from their subjects: they are bound to send, in case of need, a certain body of troops to his support, but it is generally delayed as long as possible, and when it does arrive, like the contingents of the German princes, it seldom gives any effective aid to the forces of the empire. Many of the bloodiest and most desperate wars the Porte has ever carried on, have been with its own rebellious satraps. Czerny George and Prince Milosch, at the head of the strength of Servia, maintained a prolonged contest with the Ottoman forces, which terminated, in recent times,

in its nominal submission and real independence. Ali Pacha, the "Lion of Janina," long set the whole power of the sultan at defiance, and was only subdued at length by treachery. Wallachia and Moldavia, under their elective hospodars, are only bound to pay a fixed tribute to the sultan, and are rather the subjects of the Czar than the Porte; and the Pacha of Egypt, by whose aid alone the balance was cast against the Greeks in 1827, brought the dominions of the Osmanlis to the verge of ruin a few years after, from whence they were rescued by the intervention, still more perilous, of Russia. The empire of the Turks would, from these causes of weakness, have long since fallen to pieces were it not for the jealousies of the European powers, who interpose, before it is too late, to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of any of their number, and the strength and incomparable situation of that capital itself, which, in modern as in ancient times, has singly supported the tottering fabric of the empire for more than one century.

37. Vast influence of Constantinople on the fortunes of mankind.

CONSTANTINOPLE, one of the most celebrated and finely situated capitals in the world, has exercised almost a more important influence on the fortunes of the species than any other city in existence in modern times. It broke in pieces the vast fabric of the Roman empire, and was the principal cause of the fall of its western division; for after the charms of the Bosphorus had rendered its shores the head of empire, the forces of the West were no longer able to make head against the increasing strength of the barbarians. Singly, by its native strength and incomparable situation, it supported the Empire of the East for a thousand years after Rome had yielded to the assault of Alaric, and preserved the precious seeds of ancient genius till the mind of Europe was prepared for their reception. It diverted the Latin Crusaders from the shores of Palestine, and occasioned the downfall of the Empire of the East by the

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ruthless arms of the Franks; it attracted afterwards the Osmanlis from the centre of Asia, and brought about their lasting settlement in the finest provinces of Europe. It has since been the object of ceaseless ambition and contention to the principal European powers. A kingdom in itself, it is more coveted than many realms. Austria and Russia have alternately united and contended for the splendid prize; it broke up the alliance of Erfurth, and brought the arms of Napoleon to Moscow; and in these days it has dissolved all former confederacies, created new ones, and brought the forces of England and France to the Bosphorus, to avert the threatened seizure of the matchless city by the armies of the Czar.

38. Its incomparable situation.

It is no wonder that Constantinople has ever since its foundation exercised so great an influence on the fortunes of the species, for its local advantages are unique, and its situation must ever render it the most important city in the Old World. Situated on the confines of Europe and Asia, with a noble harbour, it at the same time centres in itself the trade of the richest parts of the globe; commanding the sole outlet from the Euxine into the Mediterranean, it of necessity sees the commerce of the three quarters of the globe pass under its walls. The Danube wafts to its quays the productions of Germany, Hungary, and northern Turkey; the Volga, the agricultural riches of the Ukraine and the immense plains of southern Russia; the Kuban, of the mountain tribes of the Caucasus; caravans, traversing the Taurus and the deserts of Mesopotamia, convey to it the riches of Central Asia and the distant productions of India; the waters of the Mediterranean afford a field for the vast commerce of the nations which lie along its peopled shores; while the more distant manufactures of Britain and the United States of America find an inlet through the Straits of Gibraltar. The pendants of all the nations of the earth are to be seen side by side, in close profusion, in the Golden Horn:

"the meteor flag of England" and the rising star of America, the tricolor of France and the eagles of Russia, the aged ensigns of Europe and the infant sails of Australia. Hers is the only commerce in the world which never can fail, and ever must rise superior to all the changes of fortune—for the increasing numbers and energy of northern only renders the greater the demand for the boundless agricultural productions of southern Europe, and every addition to the riches and luxury of the West only augments the traffic which must ever subsist between it and the regions of the sun.

39. Description of the city.

The local facilities, strength of situation, and beauty of Constantinople, are commensurate to these immense advantages of its geographical position. Situated on a triangle, two sides of which are washed by the sea, it is protected by water on all sides, excepting the base, to which the whole strength of the place only requires to be directed. The harbour, called the "Golden Horn," formed by a deep inlet of the sea, eight miles in length, on the northern side of the city, is at once so deep as to admit of three-deckers lying close to the quay, so capacious as to admit all the navies of Europe into its bosom, and so narrow at its entrance as to be capable of being closed by a chain drawn across its mouth. The apex of the triangle is formed by the far-famed Seraglio, or Palace of the Sultans, in itself a city, embracing within its ample circuit the luxurious apartments in which the beauties of the East alternate between the pastimes of children and the jealousies of women, and the shady gardens, where, beneath venerable cedars and plane-trees, fountains of living water cool the sultry air with their ceaseless flow.[1] The city itself, standing on this triangular space, is surrounded by the ancient walls of Constantine, nine thousand eight hundred toises, or about twelve English miles, in circuit, and in most places in exactly the state in which they were left, when the ancient masters of the world resigned the sceptre of the

[1] Malte Brun, vii. 722; Von Hammer, Constantinople und der Bosphorus, 72, and History, i. 100.

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East to the Osmanli conquerors. The breach is still to be seen in the walls, made by the cannon of Mahomet, by which the Turks burst into the city. In many places, huge plane-trees, of equal antiquity, overshadow even these vast walls by their boughs; and in others, ivy, the growth of centuries, attests at once the antiquity of the structure and the negligence or superstition of the modern masters of the city.

40. Description of the city, as seen from the sea.

No words can express the beauty of the city of Constantinople, with its charming suburbs of Pera, Galata, and Scutari, when seen from the waters on the opposite shore of the Hellespont. Situated on a cluster of low hills, which there border the Sea of Marmora, it presents an assemblage of charming objects, such as are not to be seen in a similar space in any other part of the world. It has not the magnificent background of the Bay of Naples, nor the castellated majesty of Genoa; but in the perfection of the scene, the harmony of all its parts, and the homogeneous nature of the emotion it awakens, it is superior to either. The scene is perfect; the panorama, as seen from the bay, is complete. To the north, the majestic entrance of the Bosphorus—the waters of which are covered with *caïques*, while its shores exhibit alternately the wildness of the savage forest and the riches of cultivated society—kindles the imagination with the idea of unseen beauties; to the east, the suburb of Scutari, in itself a city, with its successive ranges of terraces and palaces, the abodes of European opulence and splendour; to the west, the superb entrance of the Golden Horn, crowded with vessels, and the dense piles of the city itself, rising one above another in successive gradations, surmounted by the domes of a hundred mosques, among which the cupola of St Sophia and the minarets of that of Sultan Achmet appear conspicuous;[1] while to the south the view is closed by the beautiful Point of the Seraglio, its massy structures guarded with jealous care, half obscured by the stately trees which

[1] Lam. iii. 172; Malte Brun, vii. 722.

adorn its gardens, and dip their leafy branches in the cool stream of the Dardanelles.

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A nearer approach, however, considerably dispels the illusion, and reveals, under this splendid exterior, in a larger proportion than usual the evils and sufferings of humanity. Built in great part of wood, in crowded streets and contracted habitations, it is, in ordinary times, in most places, dirty and unhealthy, and at times subject to the most dreadful conflagrations. The plague is its annual, frightful fires its almost triennial, visitant. On the 2d September 1831 a fire broke out, which, before it was extinguished, had consumed eighteen thousand houses, and turned adrift upon the world nearly a hundred thousand persons. Conflagrations, however, are so frequent, that, except when they extend to these terrific dimensions, they excite very little attention. The population of the city varies much, from time to time, with the ravages of pestilence, or the terrors of conflagration. In one quarter—that of the *Fanar*—the principal Greek families reside, many of whom have acquired in trade and commerce very considerable fortunes. They are the "sad remains of the Byzantine noblesse, who, trembling under the sabre of the Mussulmans, give themselves the titles of princes, purchase from the Porte the temporary sovereignty of Wallachia and Moldavia, seek riches in every possible way, crouch before power, and convey to this day a faithful image of the Lower Empire."[1]

41. Defects of its interior.

[1] Zallony, Des Fanariotes, Paris, 1824, p. 72; Malte Brun, vii. 723.

The population of Constantinople, with its adjunct suburbs, is nearly 900,000; and the proportion of women to men is very nearly the same as in the capitals of western Europe, the former domiciled being 388,000, and the latter only 364,000. The former comprises 42,000 female slaves. This is a very curious fact, because it demonstrates that polygamy, as common sense might long ago have told us, is scarcely an evil affecting the mass of society, however dreadful with reference to the peace of

42. Population of Constantinople, and equality of the sexes.

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families and education of youth; for the excess of women above men is not so great as it is in London or Paris, or any other of the capitals of Europe. Nature has chained man, in general, by the strongest of all laws—that of necessity—to a single wife. A harem, like a stud of racers or hunters, can be kept only by the affluent.[1]*

[1] Ubicini, 27, 28.

43. Maritime forces of Turkey and Greece.

The quarter from which this magnificent city is most assailable is the sea; and the expedition of Sir John Duckworth in 1807, however unfortunate in its final results, from the tardiness with which its operations were conducted, yet revealed its inherent weakness, and proved that it might be brought to subjection, despite the castles of Europe and Asia, by the vigorous assault of a great maritime power.[2] But in this respect the Turks had long the advantage of the Russians, from the admirable skill of the Greek sailors who manned their fleet. These hardy seamen, as expert now as when they rolled back the tide of Persian invasion in the Straits of Salamis, constituted the real strength of Turkey. Engrossing nearly the whole trade of the Euxine and the Archipelago, they had covered these seas with their sails, and been trained to hardihood and daring amidst their frequent storms. Their principal naval establishments, Hydra, Spezzia, and Ipsara, had become great seaports, where an immense

[2] Hist. of Europe, c. xlv. § 64.

* Population of Constantinople in 1844.

	Military, &c.	Domesticated Inhabitants.		Total.
		Men.	Women.	
Mussulmans, .	68,000	194,000	213,000	475,000
Armenians, . .	16,000	93,400	95,600	205,000
Do. united, . .	...	8,420	8,580	17,000
Greeks, . . .	32,000	48,000	52,000	132,000
Jews, ...	...	18,000	19,000	37,000
Strangers, . .	...	...	...	29,000
	116,000	364,820	388,480	894,000

—Ubicini, 27.

commerce was carried on, and which, from the entire dependence of Constantinople upon their seamen for supplies in peace and defence in war, had for long practically enjoyed the blessings of independence. Their barks conveyed the 1,500,000 bushels of grain annually from Egypt and Odessa to the mouths of the Danube, which supplied the metropolis with food; their seamen manned the stately line-of-battle ships which lay at the entrance of the Bosphorus, to guard the approach to the capital from the assaults of Russia. The Czar had no seamen of his own who could compete on their native element with the incomparable Greek islanders; his vessels were for the most part manned by them: a war at sea between him and the Porte was like one between England and America; the same race of seamen were seen on both sides. Under the influence of these favourable circumstances, the islands of the Archipelago had made unexampled strides in population, riches, and strength; the level fields of Scio were covered with orchards, vineyards, gardens, and villas, where one hundred thousand Christians, freed from the Ottoman yoke, dwelt in peace and happiness; the rocks of Hydra and Ipsara bristled with cannon, which defended the once desert isles, where fifty thousand industrious citizens were enriched by the activity of commerce; while the trade of the islands, carried on in 600 vessels, bearing 6000 guns, and navigated by 18,000 seamen, maintained the busy and increasing multitude in comfort and affluence. [1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 388, 389; Pouqueville, 172, 180.

44. The Janizaries.

The chief military strength of Turkey, as is well known, till very recent times, consisted in the JANIZARIES, a sort of standing army of great vigour and courage, established in the capital and the principal towns of the empire.

* "M. Pouqueville evalue la Marine marchande de toutes les isles Grècques à 615 bâtimens, sans compter les Polacres, barques pontées, montées par 17,526 marins et armées de 5847 canons. On a vu dans la discussion de la loi des grains en France, qu'en 1817 et 1818 il n'y avait moins de 400 ou 500 bâtimens Grecs employés au transport des grains de la Mer Noire."—*Annuaire Historique*, iv. 388, note.

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They were originally formed from the sons of Christians, chiefly in Armenia and Circassia, who were torn from their parents in early life, circumcised, and bred up in the Mahommedan faith. Being thus severed from their families, and accustomed to look up alone to the sultan as their military chief, they formed for long a numerous and faithful body of guards, the terror of Christendom, and the cause of the most brilliant triumphs in former days gained by the Ottoman arms. They were possessed of the privilege, after twenty years' service, of settling as tradesmen in any town of the empire, still remaining, however, liable to be called out occasionally if the service of the state required it, and retaining their arms and military accoutrements. Thus they were on a footing very much resembling in this respect, though by no means in others, the foot-guards in London, who, on the days in which they are not on duty, pursue their ordinary pacific avocations. About 25,000 to 40,000 of these troops usually were stationed in Constantinople and its vicinity. Their numbers over the whole empire exceeded 200,000, and they constituted the entire infantry of the army until the recent changes of Sultan Mahmoud. Of this number there were, in 1776, 113,403 men actually enrolled and in the service, and their number down to the end of the century was still 100,000.* In time, however, there arose among them the usual vices of household troops: if they rivalled the Prætorians in valour, they did so not less in arrogance and insubordination. Conscious of their own strength, having no rival force to dread, they aspired to dictate to the government,

* Eton gives the following as the military strength of Turkey in the end of the eighteenth century:—

Cavalry,	181,000
Janizary infantry,	207,000
	388,000
Deduct for garrisons, &c.,	202,000
Disposable,	186,000

—ETON'S *Survey of Turkish Empire*, 372.

and to select their own prince of the imperial house for a sultan. They would submit to no changes or improvements in discipline. Many of the most formidable revolts in Turkish history originated with them; and the overturning of their camp-kettles, the well-known signal of the commencement of such disorders, was more dreaded by the Divan than the approach of a hostile army. Sultan Mahmoud, the then reigning sovereign, as some check on their violence, had greatly augmented the topjees, or artillerymen, who were at last raised to 20,000 men; but the janizaries were still in unbroken strength in their barracks, and, being highly discontented at the preference given to the topjees, there was already presaged the terrible catastrophe by which their power was terminated.[1]

[1] Ubicini, 442, 444; Malte Brun, vii. 844; Gordon, Greek Revolution, i. 17.

45. Turkish cavalry.

The great military strength of the Turks, as of all Oriental nations, consisted formerly in their cavalry. Accustomed to ride from their infancy, the Turks are daring and skilful horsemen, and in the use of the sabre decidedly superior to any nation of Christendom. Travelling of every sort is performed on horseback, and, from constant practice, a degree of skill and hardihood is acquired in the management of their steeds rarely attained either in the *manège* or the hunting-field of western Europe. The Turkish cavalier plunges into ravines, descends breakneck scaurs, ascends precipices, and scales hill-sides, from which the boldest English hunters would recoil with dread. Seated on their high saddles, with a formidable peak before and behind, with stirrups so short that their knees are up to their elbows, and the reins of a powerful bit in their hands, the Turkish horseman pushes on with fearless hardihood at the gallop, confident in his sure-footed steed, and in his own power, if occasion requires, instantly to pull him back on his haunches. With equal readiness he gallops, with his redoubtable sabre in his hand, up to the muzzles of the enemy's muskets, or charges his heaviest batteries, or

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plunges down a precipitous path on which a chasseur can with difficulty keep his footing. Woe to the enemy which incautiously advances into a rocky country without having his flanks and rear adequately explored! Two or three turbans are first seen cautiously peeping above the summit of the ravines, or through the brushwood by which the bridle-path is beset; for a few seconds they disappear, when suddenly a rush is heard, the clatter of sabres and hoofs rings on all sides, and these redoubtable horsemen, with deafening shouts, precipitate themselves from all quarters on the unfortunate battalion which has advanced into the toils. The glorious victory of Bajazet over the French chivalry at Varna, in 1453, and of the Grand Vizier over Peter the Great, on the Pruth, in 1711, was mainly gained by the aid of the incomparable horse.[1]

[1] Veterani, 34; Valantini, Guerre contre les Turcs, 12, 13.

46. The advantages of the Turks in this respect are now lost.

But the Osmanlis have lost this great advantage by the results of the wars with Russia during the last century. By the successive acquisitions of the Crimea, Oczakow with its territory, and Bessarabia, the Russians have not only got a valuable sea-coast, on which they have built the rising harbour of Odessa, the Dantzic of the Euxine, but they have gained the advantage, inestimable in Eastern war, of having *got the nomad tribes on their side*—of having arrayed against Asia the forces of Asia itself. Immense has been the influence of this decisive change on the relative positions and fortunes of the great contending powers on the banks of the Danube. The territory thus acquired by Russia, the Scythia of the ancients, is precisely that from whence the clouds of horsemen have issued who have determined so many important events in history—who repelled the invasion of Cyrus—who destroyed the army of Darius—who rolled back the phalanx of Alexander. What the Russians have gained by these important acquisitions the Turks have lost, and this has entirely altered the relative positions of the contending parties. The fate

which befel Peter the Great on the Pruth in 1711—that of being starved out in the midst of his armed squares by clouds of light-horse—would now be the inevitable fate of any Turkish army which should advance into the same plains; and, strange to say, in the present (1853) war with the Russians, the principal deficiency which the Turks have experienced is in light horse.[1]

[1] Valentini, 12, 15, 19.

47. In what the strength of the Turks now consists.

Deprived of the powerful aid of their light horse, the main strength of the Turkish armies is now to be found in the skill with which they manage their arms, the perfection of their mark, either with muskets or cannon, and the facility with which the same men can, from their previous habits of life, discharge the duties either of a foot-soldier or cavalier. Every Turk is armed—the more easy in circumstances, magnificently so. Most of the better class have either a horse, or have been trained from infancy to the duties of horsemanship. If a spahi loses his steed, he throws himself into the ranks of the infantry, seizes the first firelock he can find, and makes a steady grenadier; if a janizary loses his musket, he mounts the first horse he can seize, and uses his redoubtable scimitar as skilfully as any cavalier in the army. This thorough command of all the exercises of war, which is universal in the Turkish population, who are, literally speaking, a nation of warriors, renders them at once more formidable as individuals, and less so in masses, than the soldier of western Europe, who has no such individual prowess to fall back upon, and trusts only to his steadiness in the ranks, and standing shoulder to shoulder with his comrades. If worsted in a serious encounter, the Turks, in their own country, and knowing its by-paths, generally disperse; the Russians, far from their home and kindred, fall back upon their fellow-soldiers, and combat, back to back, to the last man. The Ottoman array, like the Vendeans or Spaniards, dissolves upon defeat, and the late commander of a mighty host finds himself surrounded only by a few attendants.

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"When you have once given the Turks a good beating," said one who knew them well (Prince Cobourg), "you are at ease with them for the whole campaign." But the armed force often reassembles as quickly as it had dissolved, and, again issuing from their homes and their retreats, the undaunted Turks enter a second time on the career of glory and plunder.[1]

[1] Valentini, 12, 13.

48. Where are the Turks now strongest in war?

The Turkish armies are little to be apprehended now in pitched battles in the open field, and their strength consists rather in the defence of a woody, broken, or intricate country, where the individual courage and skill in the use of arms which they possess may be brought into play. We read frequently, in the ancient wars of the Ottomans with the Austrians and Russians, of bodies of seventeen, twenty, or twenty-five thousand men defeating a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand Turks; and this would probably still be the fate of a Turkish array, should it venture to meet the disciplined battalions of Europe in the open field. But the case is very different when they come to fight in a broken or woody country. The rolling fire of the Russian square generally, in the plains, repels the fierce charge of the Turkish swarm; but the case is widely different when the Osmanlis are posted on the rocks or in the thickets of the Balkan, where they can at leisure, and comparatively free from danger, take aim at their adversaries. There their cool and practised eye and steady hand tells with desperate effect upon the hostile columns, and the brave and steady array of the Muscovites often melts away before the deadly fire of an unseen but indomitable opponent.[2]

[2] Veterani, 74, 80; Valentini, 29, 30.

49. Turkish fortifications, and mode of defending them.

It results, from the same circumstances, that the Turks are the most formidable of all enemies in the defence of fortified places. The Turkish system of fortification and mode of defence is essentially different from those of western Europe. It has few outworks, often none; and scarce any of the appliances which the genius

of Vauban invented to add to the natural strength of places. There are neither ravelins, nor lunettes, nor covered-ways around their fortified places. The town, in the form which the natural circumstances of the ground has given it, is surrounded by a high and strong wall, in front of which lies a deep ditch. A few bastions or round towers here and there project beyond the general line, and form kind of salient angles, often filled with enormous gabions. Along the crest of the parapet is placed a line of gabions, between which are the embrasures, from behind which the besieged fire in perfect security on the besiegers. Along the parapet is also placed, at certain distances, square loopholed blockhouses, built of brick, intended to sweep the ramparts in the event of the breach being mounted, which often occasions a serious loss to the besiegers. They have a way also of stationing musketeers at the bottom of the ditch, who communicate with each other, and effect a retreat, in case of need, by a subterraneous passage worked out below the ramparts.[1]

[1] Valentini, 63, 64.

50. Their mode of defending them.

Their mode of defending these fortified towns is as peculiar, and as different from the European, as the fortifications themselves. They disquiet themselves little with the enemy's approaches, seldom even fire at the working parties in the trenches, but occasionally amuse themselves with discharging round shot from their guns at single figures in the distance. Even the breaching of the rampart, considered as so serious a matter in ordinary European war, gives them very little uneasiness. Their whole efforts—and on such occasions they are great indeed—are concentrated on the interior defences within the rampart, which is chiefly valued as affording a covering to their construction. The whole approaches to the interior of the city are there retrenched in the strongest manner: huge barricades of wood bar the entrance into the streets; while at every door, every window, every aperture, are stationed two or more Turks, armed

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with their excellent fusils, who, with deadly aim, open a close and sustained fire on their assailants. The house-tops, which are all flat, are crowded with musketeers, who in like manner rain a shower of balls upon the enemy. So great is the effect of this concentric fire, that in general the head of the assaulting column is swept away the moment it reaches the summit of the trench; for the fire is quite incessant, as each Turk has two muskets, and a pair of pistols in his girdle, which they aim with practised skill. If these dangers are surmounted, and the assaulting column succeeds in making its way into the streets or gardens within the rampart, a danger not less formidable awaits them; for it is instantly assailed on all sides by a mass of Turks, with their scimitar in their right hand, and their short sword in their left, with which they cut at their opponents, and parry their thrusts; and in that mortal strife it has been often proved that the European bayonet is no match for the Turkish sabre. So deadly are these methods of defence, that several repelled assaults of ill-fortified Turkish towns have cost more to the besiegers than the entire reduction of the best-constructed citadels of Vauban and Cohorn. Witness the unsuccessful assault on Roudschuck in 1810, which cost the besiegers 8000 men;[1] and that of Brahilow in 1828, which was repulsed with the loss of 3000 men killed and wounded.[2]

[1] Hist. of Europe, c. lxix. § 79.
[2] Valentini, 61, 62.

51. Causes of the obstinate defence of fortified cities by the Turks.

A very simple cause explains this obstinate defence of fortified cities by the Turks: it is Necessity. The whole male inhabitants capable of bearing arms are arrayed in defence of the place. A city of 30,000 citizens will array on its walls 10,000 warriors, each of whom, trained from infancy to the use of arms, and splendidly equipped with his own weapons of defence, forms at once a valuable soldier. They fight desperately, because, like the citizens of towns in antiquity, they have nothing to hope in the event of capture. The male inhabitants will all be put to the sword, the young women sold for slaves, or swept

into the Turkish harem; the entire fortunes of the inhabitants drawn into the coffers of the sultan or victorious pacha. The commander himself, if he escape death at the hands of the assailants, is almost sure to meet it at those of the sultan. Misfortune is punished in the same way as misconduct, and no amount of previous skill or valour in defence, can save the governor who has lost his fortress from the bowstring. Thus the Turks in fortified towns make a resolute defence, for the same reason that the Russians do in the open field: they have no hope of safety in flight, their only chance is in standing resolutely together. [1]

[1] Valentini, 64, 65.

52. Russian mode of fighting the Turks.

Although the Turks, prior to the great change made by Sultan Mahmoud in the military organisation of the empire, had few regular troops, and none disciplined after the European fashion, yet the vast feudal militia they could at any time call out was extremely formidable, from the perfect arms, and entire command of them, which every member of it possessed, and the individual courage by which they were animated. The Russians and Austrians, at least till the more recent wars, were almost always greatly inferior in number; and as so large a proportion of the Turkish armies in those days was cavalry, this disproportion, by enabling the enemy to surround them, often exposed the Christian forces to the greatest danger, especially as the scene of conflict generally was the level country on the banks of the Danube. They were thus driven by necessity to adopt the tactics which could alone, in the open field, enable them to resist such formidable and superior enemies. This consisted in constantly forming square when the moment of decisive action arrives. These squares were generally of five or six battalions each, with artillery at the angles, capable of firing on either side which might be assailed. They advance into battle drawn up in this form, and the squares moving forward

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in the *oblique* order in echelon; so that the leading square is protected at least on one side and rear by the fire of those which follow it. If broken, the square endeavours to form a still smaller body in the same array, and often becomes reduced to knots of a dozen men—for the troops are all aware that flight is instant death under the sabre of the Osmanlis, and their only chance of salvation is in the rolling fire which issues from the sides of their steady squares.[1]

[1] Valentini, 18, 19.

53. Triple barrier which defends Constantinople.

Notwithstanding the declining military strength of the Turkish empire, it is by no means easy of conquest, for nature has furnished it with a triple line of defence, which it is difficult even for the greatest military skill and strength to overcome. The first of these consists in the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, which, from their physical conformation and the habits of their inhabitants, oppose great obstacles to an invading army. The greater part of the country, the Scythia of the ancients, consists of wide level plains, and which afford comparatively few resources for a considerable army. There are few roads in the country, and such as exist are speedily cut up, and become nearly impracticable by the passage of any large quantities of artillery or carriages over them. The constant wars between the Turks and Russians, of which this country has long been the theatre, has rendered the inhabitants for the most part averse to tillage. They trust in a great degree to the spontaneous productions of the soil and growth of nature, which covers the earth in spring with a luxuriant herbage, and in summer with crops of the richest hay. But in autumn even this resource fails; the long droughts parch the surface of the soil; vegetation is burnt up, huge gaps and crevices appear—and an invading army, the prey of fevers and contagious disorders, finds neither water nor resources in the thirsty soil wherewith to subsist the troops. Hence it is that it has at all times been felt of such importance

to pass over this wasted *land debatable* in spring, when the herbage of the plains might afford subsistence for the horses and herds of cattle which accompanied the army; and that the fate of a campaign is so much dependent upon possession of the coast, and command of the sea, in order to insure getting up supplies by water.[1]

[1] Valentini, 36, 38.

54. The Danube as a frontier stream.

The second defence of Turkey consists in the line of the Danube, which covers the whole northern provinces of the empire. This noble river, which, when it approaches Belgrade, on the frontiers of Turkey, is already twelve hundred yards broad, flows through the whole of Turkey with a rapid current, which renders the construction of bridges over it always a matter of difficulty, sometimes impossible. It is often intersected by large islands, but they do not facilitate the passage, for the current, broken by rocks, flows round them in foaming surges with extraordinary rapidity. The right bank, which forms the northern boundary of Bulgaria, is in general higher than the left, which limits the plain of Wallachia; and in many places bold rocks or steep banks of clay form, as it were, the natural ramparts of Turkey behind this formidable wet ditch. This barrier, naturally strong, is rendered doubly so by the resources of art and the desolate state of the country. Silistria, Brahilov, Roudschuck, and Widdin, are the chief of the fortresses upon its banks, with the siege of which every war between the Russians and Turks commences, and which are never reduced but after a most obstinate defence, and a dreadful sacrifice of men. The waste of human life in these sieges, which are generally prolonged to the close of the season by the obstinate valour of the Turks, is much augmented by the unhealthy nature of the country on the banks of the Danube in the autumnal months, and the quantity of grapes, which, growing amidst beds of roses on the sunny slopes,[2] and eagerly devoured by

[2] Valentini, 38, 39.

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The Balkan.

the northern invaders, spread amongst them the destructive scourge of dysentery.*

The last and most important barrier of Constantinople is the BALKAN, which, stretching from east to west the whole breadth of Turkey, presents the very greatest obstacle to any invading army. This celebrated range, the Mount Haemus of antiquity, is far inferior to the Pyrenees, the Alps, or the Caucasus in altitude and ruggedness; but it is superior to either in the difficulties which it opposes to the march of armies. This is often the case with comparatively low ranges of hills, which afford a stronger line of defence than mountains of the greatest elevation. The Alps never prevented the march of the French into Italy; the Caucasus was penetrated by the Russians; even the Himalaya was pierced by the battalions of Britain: but from the hills of Torres-Vedras the arms of Napoleon permanently recoiled; and it required two years of harassing warfare on the part of England, to expel six thousand naked savages in Kaffirland from the recesses of the Waterkloof. The reason is, that lofty mountain-ranges are always intersected by deep valleys, the crests of which can be surmounted at a comparatively moderate elevation, and with little difficulty; while inferior heights are intersected by gullies and water-courses, and generally covered with forests, brushwood, or thickets, which can only be cut through at an immense expense of time and labour. This is exactly the case with the Balkan, which, running nearly parallel to the line of the Danube at from forty to fifty miles to the south, presents a wooded and intricate ridge about thirty miles broad, which must be crossed before the plains of Roumelia are reached, or Constantinople is approached. It is not in general higher than the

'With grim delight the brood of winter view
A brighter day, and heavens of azure hue,
Scent the new fragrance of the breathing rose,
And quaff the pendant vintage as it grows."
GRAY.

Vosges Mountains near Kaiserslautern, the Mont Tonnerre in the Limousin, or the Lammermoors in Scotland; but, nevertheless, it took two centuries of almost ceaseless warfare before the Russians crossed this formidable barrier. The very desolation of the country and benignity of the climate augment its defensible character. It is traversed only by bridle-paths, which, without any regard to a gradual slope, ascend hills and descend gullies inaccessible to chariots or artillery; and where the rocky heights on either side are not covered with forest or brushwood, they are laid out in thick orchards, which oppose almost the same impediment to an advancing army.* In their wooded intricacies, the superiority of the Russian tactics and discipline is in a great measure lost: war can no longer be conducted by the action of masses, but comes to depend on individual hardihood and skill; and in the prolonged struggles and hand-to-hand conflicts, the deadly aim and perfect skill in the use of arms of the Mussulmans have often proved fatal to the most powerful columns of the Muscovites.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vii. 728, 729; Valentini, 48, 49.

56. Country between the Balkan and Constantinople.

So great are these difficulties, that, notwithstanding the rapid decline of the Ottoman power during the last century, it was not till the year 1829 that the Russian forces succeeded in passing the Balkan and reaching Adrianople, and then it was only with an army not exceeding 25,000 men. The best military authorities have declared that the passage of the Balkan need not be attempted with less than 140,000 men, which large force would only leave 60,000 disposable to advance upon Constantinople.[2] When this barrier, however, is surmounted, the defences of Constantinople are carried; and unless a force capable of keeping the field and repelling the enemy in the open country exists, nothing remains to the Turks but submis-

[2] Valentini, 55, 56.

* Its woody character was the same in ancient times, as is attested in the well-known lines of Virgil—

"O, quis me gelidis in vallibus Haemi
Sistat, et ingenti ramorum protegat umbra!"

VIRGIL, *Georg.* lib. ii.

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sion. From the southern face of the Balkan to the gates of the capital the country is entirely open, and for the most part uncultivated. Luxuriant herbage, coming up to the horses' girths, at once attesting the riches of the soil, and showing the oppression of the government, continues up to the gates of the capital. In this open and level country there is no defence whatever against an invading army, especially if it possesses the superiority in light horse which the Russians, ever since their conquest of the nomad nations, decisively enjoy. If a hostile army reaches Constantinople, the conquest of the city is easy, and cannot be long averted. The ancient walls still remain in imposing majesty, but they are in many places mouldering, and, by cutting off the aqueducts which supply the city with water, it may easily be starved into submission. The old cisterns, of enormous magnitude, constructed by the Roman emperors to guard against this danger, still exist; but they are in part filled up, are no longer water-tight, and could not now be applied to their destined purpose.[1]

[1] Ubicini, 366, 369; Clarke's Travels, vii. 247, 251; Walsh's Constantinople, 272.

57. The command of the sea, or the support of Austria, is essential to the success of Russia.

It results from these peculiarities in the physical situation of Turkey, that the command of the sea, or the support, or at least the neutrality of Austria, is *essential* to a successful irruption into the plains of Roumelia by the forces of the Czar. No amount of force, how great soever, at the command of the Muscovite generals, can relieve them of this necessity; on the contrary, it only renders it the more imperious. Turkey is defended by the effects of its own oppression: it has rendered its territory a wilderness, through which the enemy, without supplies brought by the Danube or the sea, cannot pass. External support is indispensable. It is impossible by land-carriage to bring up the requisite supplies for a large army from Sevastopol and Odessa—a tract of nearly seven hundred miles, in great part without roads practicable for wheel-carriages. Equally impossible is it to find in the desert plains of Roumelia the requisite supplies for the support

of an army capable of threatening Constantinople. The Russians in modern Turkey, like the Romans of old in invading Caledonia, and for the same reason, must advance by the sea-side. Accordingly, in 1828, in addition to the fortresses on the Danube, it was deemed essential, before attempting to cross the Balkan, to reduce the seaport of Varna. The support of Austria, however, may render it possible to dispense with the assistance of a fleet on the Euxine, if the command of all the fortresses on the Danube has been obtained; because from the rich plains of Hungary ample supplies even for the largest army may be obtained, and from these fortresses, as a secure base, ulterior operations to the southward might be conducted. Thence it was that the Emperor Nicholas so readily and powerfully intervened in favour of the Emperor of Austria in 1849; he knew that he would march through Hungary to Constantinople.[1]

[1] Valentini, 49, 52.

58. Schumla.

The principal defence of the Balkan, against an enemy approaching from the north, consists in the fortified camp of SCHUMLA. This celebrated stronghold has borne so important a part in all the last wars between the Turks and Russians, that a description of it is indispensable to the understanding of the last and most important of them. It is a considerable town, containing thirty thousand inhabitants, lying upon the northern declivity of the Balkan, and, seen from the plains of Bulgaria as you approach it from the northward, resembles a triangular sheet spread upon the mountains, as Algiers does when seen from the blue waters of the Mediterranean. It is not regularly fortified like the fortresses of Flanders, but still it is very strong, and cannot be reduced but by a very large army. A promontory of the Balkan, in the form of a horse-shoe, surrounds its sides and rear, which is covered with thick and thorny brushwood, extremely difficult of passage, and affording an admirable shelter to the skilled Turkish marksmen. The town itself is surrounded by a deep ditch and high wall, flanked by the square towers for musketeers

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which are peculiar to the Turkish fortresses. It forms the centre of the intrenched camp, which shuts it in on every side. Its great extent, the steep declivities, wooded heights, and rocky precipices which surround it, render it extremely strong, and the nature of the adjoining hills, impassable for artillery, secure it from the dangers of bombardment. A stream of pure and perennial water flows through its centre, amply sufficient for a garrison of any amount. All the roads from the north over the Balkan, whether from Roudschuck, Silistria, or Ismael, intersect each other in this fortress, which thus becomes a strategetical point of the very highest importance; and, garrisoned by thirty thousand janizaries, it is equally impossible to pass, and difficult to reduce.[1]

[1] Valentini, 48, 49.

59. Asiatic defence of Turkey. The Caucasus.

If its natural defences are alone considered, the ASIATIC PROVINCES of Turkey are more bountifully dealt with even than its dominions in Europe. The CAUCASUS—the continuation of the great mountain-range which, under the name of the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Carpathians, and the Himalaya, runs like a stony girdle around the globe—forms a vast barrier between the Black Sea and the Caspian. Inaccessible to mortal foot, alternately glittering in a cloudless sun and enveloped in impenetrable mists, there

> "The palaces of nature, whose vast walls
> Have pinnacled in clouds their snowy scalps,
> And throned eternity in icy halls
> Of cold sublimity, where forms and falls
> The avalanche, the thunderbolt of snow,"*

have from the earliest times formed the subject of imaginative mythology and fabled terrors to the inhabitants of Europe and Asia. On their shivering summits the fancy of Æschylus made Prometheus expiate his generous self-devotion; in their dark caverns the Argonauts sought the Golden Fleece. The poetry of Persia, the tales of Arabia, make perpetual mention of these awful piles of rock, the abode of genii and magicians, which

* BYRON.

seemed to them to bound the habitable globe, and form the appropriate scene of punishment for the rebellious spirits. They have been rendered familiar to the childhood of all in the charming tales of Scheherezade; they have, in our own time, been the theatre of deeds of heroism rivalling the Retreat of the Ten Thousand, and the triumph of Morgarten. Nor is Sacred History wanting to complete the interest of the mountains which have formed the subject of so many fabled adventures; for on one of their summits the ark rested, and on the sides of Ararat the rainbow shone

"Which first spoke peace to man."

60. Its value as a military barrier.

In a military point of view, the Caucasus forms a more important barrier than either the Alps or the Pyrenees; for, equally with them, it runs from sea to sea, and it is more inaccessible, and less penetrated by passes than either. Generally speaking, it consists of two vast ranges, running, like those of the Finster-Aarhorn and Monte-Rosa, opposite to each other, and both terminating in a peak of surpassing magnitude and elevation. The Elbruz is the culminating point of the northern of the two ranges, and Mount Ararat of the southern. Each is about 15,300 feet in height, or as nearly as possible the elevation of Mont Blanc.* The medium elevation of the two chains is about 10,000 feet, and their summits are so rugged and sharp that, except in a few places where they are intersected by deep and narrow ravines, forming the well-known passes through them, they are wholly impassable even by foot-soldiers. Seen from the vast steppes which stretch to the northward from its front towards Tartary, the Caucasus presents a vast barrier, rising

* The Elbruz has been only once ascended. In 1829, M. Kupfer, of the Academy of St Petersburg, with two other gentlemen, ascended to a point only six hundred feet below the summit, but could not reach it, owing to the slipperiness of the melting snow. In the night, however, a shepherd, named Killar, taking advantage of the frost, surmounted the difficulties, and reached the summit, from whence he was seen by the Russian detachment under General Emanuel, which was stationed in the valley.—FONTON, p. 5.

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insensibly from 1200 to 10,000 feet in height. Immense downs, covered with grass, unbroken by tree, shrub, or rock, compose the summits of the first range, which in general does not exceed 4000 feet in height; but their sides are furrowed by frightful ravines, whose torrents descend with irresistible violence amidst broken scaurs and rugged thickets. But in the interior range the character of the mountains changes: far above the traveller's head dark forests clothe their shaggy sides; their summits start up into a thousand fantastic and inaccessible peaks, which repose in icy stillness on the azure firmament.[1]

[1] Fonton, Guerre des Russies dans l'Asie Mineur, i. 3.

61. Description of the passes through the Caucasus.

Few passes accessible to troops or wheel-carriages traverse this terrific barrier. The principal one, through which the great military road of Georgia passes, is that of Vladi-Caucase, or Dariel, which is defended by fortified blockhouses at all the stations, and which, at its highest point of elevation at the mountain of the Holy Cross, is 1329 toises, or 7974 feet above the level of the sea; being about the height of the Great St Bernard in Switzerland. The pass, in approaching that summit, forms the *Pilæ Caucasiæ* of the ancients, and is called by the Persians "The Iron Gate." The next in point of importance, and which forms the great Russian line of communication to the eastern parts of Georgia, is that which goes by the shore of the Caspian, through the famous *Gates of Derbend.* This celebrated pass, the *Pilæ Albaniæ* of the ancients, is formed by the meeting of a perpendicular precipice, 1400 feet in elevation, the last face of the Caucasus, and the waves of the Caspian. It is called now the "Gates of Derbend," which signifies narrow passage. The Turks call it Demir-Kapi, or the "Gates of Iron." It is strongly fortified, and forms the western end of this great natural barrier; these fortifications, like the wall of China, having been erected in ancient times by the kings of Persia, to avert the incursions of the Tartars. They never had this effect, however, for any length of time, any

more than the wall of Antoninus had that of repelling the incursions of the Caledonians, or the rampart of Trajan those of the northern Germans. The chief incursions of the Tartars, which proved so frightful a scourge to Persia and Asia Minor, those of Genghis Khan and Timour, were effected by this pass, through which repeatedly three and four hundred thousand of these ruthless barbarians have passed on horseback, carrying their forage at their saddle-bows, bent on southern devastation and plunder.[1]

[1] Fonton, 10, 15; Malte Brun, vii. 62, 63.

62. Description of Asia Minor.

Asia Minor, which, in every period of history, has borne an important part alike in Asiatic and European annals, is a country of great extent, intersected with a variety of mountain ranges, and in its valleys and plains abounding with all the choicest gifts of nature. The climate in the valleys of Georgia, which stretch to the south, is mild and temperate. Sheltered from the chilly blasts of the north by the huge rampart of the Caucasus, all the productions of the temperate zone come to maturity; and with them are blended, where the valleys approach the plain of Mesopotamia, the palm-trees, pomegranates, and dates of the tropical regions. It is on these sunny slopes that the Garden of Eden is placed by Scripture, and from thence that the human race set out in its pilgrimage through the globe. On the banks of the Kara, which descends through the rival chains of Elbruz and Ararat to the Caspian, the beauty of nature realises all that the imagination of Milton has conceived of the charms of Paradise; and it is rivalled by the surpassing loveliness of those of the Kuban, which forces its way through rocky precipices from the western shoulder of Elbruz to the Black Sea. Vines, olives, apricots, peaches, and all the more delicate fruits, are there found in profusion; while green pastures nourish innumerable flocks on the mountain sides; and the finest crops of wheat, maize, and barley, reward the labour of the husbandmen at their feet. The beneficence of physical nature may be judged of by the extraordinary perfection of the ani-

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mals of all kinds which are found in that favoured region, and the exquisite beauty of the women, celebrated over all the world as combining all that is most perfect in the human figure. Erzeroum is the capital of this beautiful region, as of the whole of Asia Minor. It is a city containing a hundred thousand inhabitants; the seat of a pacha of three tails, or of the highest grade; and of an importance second only to Constantinople in the government and defence of the empire.[1]

[1] Remigg's Voyages, ii. 109, 120; Guldenstedt's Voyages, i. 353, 369; Fonton, 42; Malte Brun, vii. 68, 69.

63. Military resources of Asia Minor.

Although Turkey has repeatedly been threatened by Russia from the side of Asia Minor, and the greatest danger she has ever run, as will appear in the sequel, has arisen in that quarter, yet the military resources of that part of the Ottoman dominions are very great, and such as, if ably led and fully drawn forth, would seem capable of enabling it even to assume the offensive in that direction. The Pacha of Erzeroum has, in time of war, twenty thousand regular troops at his disposal, to which, when the strength of the Osmanlis is fully called forth, two hundred thousand hardy and brave irregulars may be added, all admirable horsemen, and, though undisciplined, thoroughly trained individually to the use of arms. The formidable nature of this force arises from the fact, that the Mussulmans in the Asiatic provinces of Turkey form a decided majority of the inhabitants; they compose twelve millions out of sixteen millions of its entire population. Though not capable of moving in masses under fire, or meeting the disciplined battalions of Russia in the open field, these hardy irregulars are most formidable in the defence of woody fastnesses or rocky heights, often extremely so in a swarm charge, and inferior to none in the world in the tenacity with which they maintain walled towns.[2]

[2] Fonton, 206, 207; Ubicini, 25.

The nature of the country in Asia Minor, especially between the Caucasus and its capital, Erzeroum, adds immensely to its defensible nature against a northern invader. Extremely mountainous, intersected in all direc-

tions by ranges of hills, in general rugged and precipitous, and yet so twisted and interwoven with each other that it is a matter of necessity often to cross over them, it is as impervious to regular European troops, burdened with artillery and chariots, as it is easy of passage to the Turkish hordes, who are seldom troubled with any such encumbrances. Fortresses strong, according to Oriental ideas, and very difficult of reduction to an invader without artillery, guard the most important passes, or crown the overhanging cliffs. Few roads, and most of them practicable only for horses or foot-soldiers, traverse this rugged region. That by the coast stops at Trebizond. Only one road fit for carriages traverses the centre of the country by Kars to Erzeroum, and it is defended by several formidable forts. Altogether, Asia Minor presented the greatest possible difficulties to an invading army; and they were much augmented by the tyrannical nature of the Turkish government, which had rendered great part of the country a perfect desert, and in all so thinly inhabited as to be incapable of furnishing the supplies necessary for a large army.[1]

64. Mountainous nature of the country, and want of roads.

[1] Fonton, 206, 209.

65. The Caucasian tribes.

The Caucasus has, from the earliest times, been the abode of tribes inured to privations by necessity, stimulated to exertion by suffering. It is a mistake to suppose that the great migrations of the human species have descended from its snowy ridges. Mountaineers seldom emigrate, at least in inland situations, though they often plunder the vales beneath; it is the herdsmen of the plains who traverse the globe. The very rigour of their climate, the churlishness of the soil, the hardships of their situation, attach them the more strongly to their native land.

"No product here the barren hills afford,
But man and steel, the soldier and his sword;
No vernal bloom their torpid rocks array,
But winter, lingering, chills the lap of May.
Yet every good his native wilds impart,
Imprints the patriot passion on his heart;
And e'en those hills that round his mansion rise,
Enhance the bliss his scanty fund supplies.

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Dear is that shed to which his soul conforms,
And dear that hill which lifts him to the storms;
So the loud torrent, and the whirlwind's roar,
But bind him to his native mountains more." *

Much surprise has often been expressed in western Europe at the inability of the Russians, after above a century of conflicts, thoroughly to subdue the inhabitants of the Caucasus; but the wonder will cease when it is recollected what difficulty the Romans, even with the strength of the Cæsars, had to subdue the inhabitants of the Alps, who guarded the very gates of Italy, and how long, in our own day, the naked Kaffirs, who never could bring six thousand men into the field, withstood the strength of Britain. The Caucasians have done no more with the Russians than they have done with all their neighbours for three thousand years: plunder is to them the condition of existence; the spoil of the vales at their feet, their chief excitement in war, their main source of riches in peace; and the rugged inaccessible nature of their country enables them long to carry on their depredations with impunity. The Russian army of the Caucasus, generally thirty thousand strong, is inured to constant conflicts with the mountaineers; the great military roads through the range are only kept open by large bodies of men; strong forts are placed at every station, and the very lazarettos loopholed and guarded, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.[1]

[1] Fonton, 207, 210; Malte Brun, vii. 92, 97.

66. Russian policy of intervention.

Based upon a correct appreciation of the immense advantages which they derive from their own unity, and the weakness to which their neighbours are exposed by their divisions, the Russian policy in regard to all of them has for a century and a half been directed to one object. This is to avoid direct conquest or flagrant usurpation, and never hazard an extension of territory till the circumstances of the people, from whom it is to be wrested, have rendered them incapable of resistance. To accomplish

* GOLDSMITH.

this, their system is to foment discord and divisions among the inhabitants of the adjoining states, and protect the weaker against the stronger, till all effectual means of resistance have been destroyed, or the Muscovite strength is invoked to terminate their contests, or defend a portion of the people from the tyranny of the rest. The maxim "*Divide et Impera*" is not less the rule of conduct of the cabinet of St Petersburg than it was of the Roman senate, and now is of the English government in India. By this means, the appearance of direct aggression is in general avoided, the path of conquest is prepared before it is attempted, and the dominant power is frequently on the defensive when hostilities actually commence, or it takes up arms only on an urgent and apparently irresistible appeal for protection from some suffering people in its vicinity. It is, in truth, the natural and usual policy of the strong in presence of the weak, of the united when surrounded by the divided; and so great is the advantage which in these respects they possess, that they can in general drive their future victims into the commencement of hostilities, and themselves maintain the semblance of moderation, while perseveringly pursuing a system of universal conquest.

67. Examples of the application of this principle.

The situation of Russia, and the political and religious circumstances of the people by whom she is surrounded, have contributed no less than her internal unity and strength to the advantages she has derived from the prosecution of this policy. Placed midway between Europe and Asia, she touches on the one side the states torn by the social passions of Europe; on the other, those divided by the divisions of religion and race which distract Asia. United in ambition and feeling herself, she is surrounded by countries disturbed by every passion which can afflict or desolate the world. In Poland, the path of conquest had been prepared for her by "the insane ambition of a plebeian noblesse," as John Sobieski called it, and the divisions of a people in whom it was hard to say whether

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the passion for freedom, or the inability to bear its excitement or exercise its powers, have been the most conspicuous. In Turkey she found above seven millions of Christians oppressed by little more than three millions of Turks; and by raising the standard of the Cross, and preaching a crusade, she could at any time, at once, rouse to the highest pitch the religious enthusiasm of her own subjects, and proportionably distract the feelings and weaken the strength of her opponents. In Asia, where the Mussulmans were three to one, she enjoyed almost equal advantages, though of an opposite description; for the Christian religion had taken refuge in the hills of Georgia from the sabres of the Turks or the scimitars of the Persians; and the constant attacks, of which they were the objects, from one or other of these powers, naturally led to her protection being invoked by her suffering co-religionists between the Euxine and the Caspian, and the valour and hardihood of the hills being arrayed under her banners against the ambition and fanaticism of the plains.

63. Intervention of Peter the Great in the affairs of neighbouring states.

Peter the Great, who fully appreciated these advantages of his situation, first made use of them, and gave the earliest example of the system of INTERVENTION. Passionately desirous of trade and commerce, and sensitively alive to the disadvantages under which his subjects laboured from their inland and remote situation, it was his great object to extend his frontiers to maritime stations. By the conquest of Courland and Livonia, and construction of St Petersburg, he accomplished this in the north; by the conquest of the Crimea his successors effected it in the south; by the interventions in the Caucasus and Georgia they brought their standards down to the Caspian. All these conquests, which entirely altered the position of Russia, and from a remote inland rendered it a first-rate political power, were effected by Russia taking advantage of her central situation, and steadily directing her energies to these objects. The oppression of the inhabitants of Georgia, who were

Christians, by their formidable Mussulman neighbours in Persia and Turkey in Asia, gave Peter a pretext for intervening in the affairs of the Caucasus; "not," as the Russian historians express it, "in order to extend the limits of his empire by distant foreign conquests; but in order to prove the facility with which Russia could push its dominions to the shores of the Caspian, to consolidate its conquests, extend its influence, establish regularity in the relations of different states, and permit the growth, under its powerful shield, of an order of things accessible to the development of commercial relations." [1]

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[1] Fonton, 79, 83.

69. Establishment of the Russians in the Caucasus and on the Caspian.

Inspired with these ideas, Peter set out ten years after his disaster on the Pruth, at the head of 30,000 men, for the Caucasus, and, passing through the Gates of Derbend in less than a year, made himself master of the whole country between the Euxine and the Caspian, as far as Astrabad. The Caucasus resounded with his exploits: the conquerors of Pultowa were irresistible to these rude mountaineers; for the first time in history the hill tribes of Central Asia felt the superiority of European arms and discipline. Persia and Turkey were alike compelled to yield to his ascendancy; and by the treaties of 1723 and 1724 the Russian dominion was extended to the mouth of the Araxes and the shores of the Caspian. Subsequently, and for nearly seventy years, the mountains of the Caucasus were the theatre of almost incessant contests between the Russians, Turks, and Persians, who contended with each other for their possession; and not less with the Caucasians themselves, who seldom allowed the dominion of any to extend beyond the fortified posts which they occupied. But at length an important event took place, which cast the balance decisively in favour of Russia, and established the Muscovite dominion in a durable and solid manner to the south of the mountains. This was the bequest of George XIII., Prince of Georgia, who, himself a Christian,[2] and feeling that his Christian

[2] Fonton, 85, 93.

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subjects could only be protected from Mussulman oppression by the tutelary arm of Russia, bequeathed his whole dominions to the Czar Paul by testamentary deed, dated 28th Oct. 1800.

70. Acceptance of the crown of Georgia by the Emperor Alexander. Sept. 12, 1801.

The death of Paul, which took place shortly after this event, caused some delay on the part of the Russian government in the acceptance of this magnificent bequest; but at length the Emperor Alexander, by his manifesto of 12th September 1801, declared his willingness to accede to it, from a sense of duty, and a desire to protect the Christian population of the country.* As this great acquisition brought the Russians into direct contact with Turkey and Persia beyond the great mountain-range which had hitherto separated them, it led to a decisive change of policy on the part of the cabinet of St Petersburg on the Caucasian frontier. The first object was to secure and strengthen the central military road across the mountains by Vladi-Kaukas, and that was effected, though at the expense of almost continual hostilities ever since with the mountain tribes; with Turkey and Persia also she was involved in almost constant warfare, but there the weight and discipline of the Muscovites ere long made themselves felt. The fortress of Gandja was stormed in 1803, and the whole western range of the Caucasus subjected to Russia; and at length, after various vicissitudes of fortune, in the course of which her generals had often great difficulty in making head against the forces of Persia and Turkey, Derbend, with its important Gates, were carried and strongly fortified, Baka reduced, Anapa on the Euxine battered by a Russian fleet, and the Muscovite power established in a solid manner on all the western

* "Ce n'est pas pour accroître nos forces, ce n'est pas dans la vue d'intérêt, ou pour étendre les limites d'un empire déjà si vaste, que nous acceptons le fardeau du trône de Géorgie; le sentiment de notre dignité, l'honneur, l'humanité seule nous ont imposé le devoir sacré de ne pas résister aux cris de souffrance partis de votre sein, de détourner de vos têtes les maux qui vous affligent et d'introduire en Géorgie un gouvernement fort, capable d'administrer la justice avec équité, de protéger la vie et les biens de chacun et d'étendre sur tous l'égide de la loi."—*Proclamation de l'Empereur*, 12th Sept. 1800. FONTON, 94.

slope of the Caucasus, as far as the frontiers of the pachalic of Erzeroum. The peace of Bucharest with Turkey, in March 1812, and of Gulistan with Persia, on 12th October 1813, gave durable acquisitions of great value to Russia, both in Europe and Asia—for in the former it brought her frontier forward to the Pruth, and rendered her master of the mouths of the Danube; while in the latter it gained for her the important district between the Araxes and the Akhaltakh range, as far as the chain of Allaghez. These acquisitions, besides a territory of great extent, rendered the Russians masters of the whole southern slope of the Caucasus, and brought their outposts within a comparatively short distance of the great frontier Persian fortress of Erivan.[1]

[1] Fonton, 100, 109.

71. Wars with the Caucasians, and fresh rupture with Turkey and Persia.

As the territories thus acquired by the Russians, both towards Persia and Asia Minor, however, were almost entirely mountainous, inhabited by semi-barbarous tribes, passionately enamoured, like all mountaineers, of freedom, and long inured to the practical enjoyment of its blessings and its discord, under the nominal rule of Persia and Turkey, they brought them into almost constant hostilities with the Caucasian tribes. These rude but gallant mountaineers were not long of discovering the weight of the Muscovite yoke. Immense was the difference between its systematic exactions, supported by regular armies traversing great military roads, every post of which was strongly fortified, and never abandoned, and the occasional and transitory irruptions of the pachas to which they had been accustomed, who retired after their spoil had been collected, and were not seen for years again. Hostilities in consequence broke out on all sides; the power of Russia was soon confined to the fortresses occupied by its own troops, many of which yielded to the fierce assault of the mountaineers; and it was even with great difficulty that they succeeded in maintaining the great military lines of the Vladi-Kaukas and the Gates of Derbend. The courts of Ispahan and Constantinople were not slow

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in perceiving the advantages which this state of things promised to afford them, especially as Turkey appeared at that period about to be involved in hostilities with Russia on the Danube. They fomented the irritation, and aided the incursions of the tribes to the utmost of their power; and at length an open war broke out between Russia and Persia, in which the question at issue was, which was to become master of the Caucasus. The prospect was sufficiently dark for Russia; her army beyond the Caucasus, which the Czar could bring into the field, consisted only of eight battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and some thousand irregulars, in all not ten thousand combatants; while that of the Persians was of triple the strength, consisting of 16,000 regular infantry, 12,000 regular cavalry, and 8000 irregulars, besides 24 pieces of cannon.[1]

[1] Fonton, 108, 116.

72. Battle of Elizabethpol, Aug. 3, 1826.

But then was seen, as in India under the guidance of Clive and Wellington, what can be done by the vigour and capacity of one man. The little Russian army was commanded by a hero destined to distinguished celebrity in future times, GENERAL PASKEWITCH. Skilfully bringing all his guns to bear on the Persian centre, he opened upon it a concentric fire of such severity that it was already shaken, when the Russian battalions, advancing with the bayonet, completed its rout. Driven back in wild confusion, the whole centre took to flight, and the wings, which had never yet fired a shot, finding themselves separated and deserted, fled in confusion. The whole artillery and baggage of the conquered fell into the hands of the victors, and the Persian forces were soon driven out of the Russian territory.[2]

[2] Fonton, 116, 117.

73. Glorious peace with Persia. Oct. 29, 1827.

Early next year operations recommenced, and the Russians, being considerably reinforced, were able to bring 16,000 men into the field. The effect was decisive. Sardar-Abad and Nakhitchevan were taken, ERIVAN carried by assault, and Tabriz opened its gates. Threatened with destruction, the Persians had no resource

but in submission, and on 29th October 1827 a peace was concluded between the courts of St Petersburg and Ispahan, on terms eminently advantageous to the former. By this treaty the Muscovite dominions in Asia were greatly augmented. The Khanat of Talish, the province and great fortress of Erivan, were ceded by the Persians, and the Muscovite dominion came to include the holy mountain of Ararat. In addition to this, Persia ceded the important harbour of Anapa on the Black Sea to Russia, with its adjacent territory. These names will convey but little ideas to a European reader; but it will aid the facility of conception to say that it gave the Russians the entire dominion of the Caucasus, and as thorough a command of the entrances into Persia as would be given to France by the acquisition of the whole of Switzerland and Savoy, with the fortresses of Alessandria and Mantua, and the harbour of Genoa, for an irruption into Italy.[1]

[1] Fonton, 106, 116.

74. Affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The system of intervention, so successfully practised by the Russians in Asia, was not less ably taken advantage of in Europe. The peculiar situation of the provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, which adjoined the southern provinces of Russia, gave them great advantages for the prosecution of that system. Although the two former provinces had been conquered by the Turks, yet they had never been thoroughly reduced to subjection, and were rather in the condition of tributary states than provinces of the empire. They paid an annual tribute to the Porte, but they were governed by their own rulers, or "hospodars," as they were called, who were nominated by the Sultan; and as the great majority of the inhabitants were Christians, they were chosen in general from the descendants of the princes of the old Byzantine empire, who dwelt at the Fanar in Constantinople. Servia, a strong mountainous and wooded country, had long aspired after, and in some degree attained, the blessings of independence. Under their intrepid leader, Czerny George,

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its inhabitants had, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, waged a long and bloody war with the Ottomans; and although it terminated, on the whole, to their disadvantage, and the Turks remained in possession of the principal fortresses in the country, and compelled a tribute from the inhabitants, yet their subjection was more nominal than real; the power of the Osmanlis did not in truth extend beyond the range of the guns of their fortresses; and in the rural districts the people, nine-tenths of whom were Christians, practically enjoyed the blessings of self-government and independence.

75. Russian system of intervention regarding them.

Subsequent to the time of Peter the Great, the Russians had repeatedly made such good use of this distracted state of the northern provinces of the Ottoman empire, as to have more than once brought it to the verge of dissolution. After the victories of Marshal Munich in 1739, and of the Austrians and Russians under Prince Cobourg in 1789, and the taking of Belgrade, the Russians were earnestly counselled by their general to march direct upon Constantinople, and rouse a national war by proclaiming the independence of the Greeks under a Christian prince;* and although the intervention of the other European powers prevented that design from being carried into execution at that time, yet it was only postponed. Peace between Russia and Turkey is never more than a truce; the designs of the cabinet of St Petersburg on Constantinople are unchanged and unchangeable. The Empress Catherine christened her youngest grandson, brother of Alexander, *Constantine*, because for him she destined the throne of Constantinople, and that of St Petersburg for the elder brother. Although the designs of immediate conquest were laid aside for the

* "Après la victoire qu'il avait remportée à Stawoutjancé, près Choczim, entre le Dneister et le Pruth, le Maréchal Munich écrivit de Jassy aux conseillers de son Impératrice, 'qu'il fallait profiter des circonstances favorables, et marcher *réunis aux Grecs*, sur Constantinople, que l'élan, l'enthousiasme et l'espérance de cette nation, ne se retrouveraient peut-être jamais portés à un pareil point.'" —VALENTINI, 192.

present, the foundation was established for future inroads in the right of intervention, stipulated for the cabinet of St Petersburg in the affairs of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, by the treaties between the Russians and Turks in 1774, 1792, and 1812. The Divan, pressed by necessity, glad to avert or postpone the cession of fortresses or provinces, and not foreseeing the use which would be made of this right, acceded to it without difficulty, and thereby gave the Russians the means, at any time when they might deem it expedient, of availing themselves of some real or imaginary grievance, under which the Christian inhabitants of Turkey might be thought to labour, to declare war upon the Porte. All the subsequent wars between the two powers have taken their rise from these treaties.[1] *

[1] Valentini, 57, 58; Gordon's Greek Revolution, i. 12, 18.

76. Repeated insurrections of the Greeks.

The court of St Petersburg made great efforts in the latter part of the eighteenth century to raise the population of the southern provinces of Turkey against their Ottoman oppressors. With such success were their exertions attended, that more than once the Morea, Albania, and the Isles, were roused into insurrection against the Turks, and for some years the Morea was practically independent. The effect of these insurrections, which were all in the end suppressed, was to the last degree

* This right of *intervention*, which has ever since borne so prominent a part in the differences and diplomatic relations of Russia and Turkey, is founded on the treaties of Kainardji in 1774, Jassy in 1792, and Bucharest in 1812. By these treaties, Russia, after having conquered, restored to the Porte, first the whole, and afterwards a large part of Bessarabia, upon the following among other conditions: 1. The Porte engaged to protect the Christian religion and churches, without hindering in any manner the free exercise of the former, or putting any obstacle in the way of repairing the latter, or building new churches. 2. To restore to the convents, or the persons from whom they had been taken, their lands in the districts of Brahilov, Choczim, and Bender, and to hold the ecclesiastics in that consideration which their sacred office required. 3. To have regard to humanity and generosity in the levying of taxes, and to receive them through deputies to be chosen every two years. 4. That neither the pacha nor any other person should be entitled to levy taxes, or make exactions of any description, excepting such as were authorised by decree or custom. 5. That the natives should enjoy all the advantages which they had in the reign of Mahomet IV. 6. The provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be allowed to have chargés-d'affaires with the Sublime Porte, of the Christian

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disastrous to the inhabitants of the country, but it produced an inextinguishable and indelible hatred between them and their oppressors. At the period of its final subjugation by the Turks in 1717, the Peloponnesus was supposed to contain 200,000 inhabitants, but during the course of the century many fearful calamities contributed to thin their number. In 1756 a dreadful plague appeared, which carried off one-half of them. Before they had well recovered from this calamity, the ill-conducted expedition of Orloff in 1770 occasioned still heavier misfortunes, for the inhabitants were excited to rebellion, and after having expelled the Turks at first, they were abandoned by the Russians, and overwhelmed by a horde of Albanians, who exercised unbounded cruelty and rapacity over the whole country for the next ten years. In 1780 these severities produced another insurrection; and the Empress Catherine, by sending her fleet into the Mediterranean, effected a powerful diversion in favour of the Greeks; but they were again abandoned by their allies, the Ottomans renewed their oppression, the plague reappeared in 1781; and such was the devastation produced by these concurring causes, that the inhabitants were reduced to 100,000 souls. Disheartened by these repeated desertions and misfortunes, the Greeks in the next war, which broke out in 1789, refused to move, and the Empress

communion, to watch over the interests of the Principalities, and their agents were to enjoy the privileges of ambassadors by the law of nations. 7. The ministers of Russia were to be permitted to make representations in favour of the Principalities, and complain of the infraction of these treaties whenever circumstances might require it. 8. Russia restored the islands in the Archipelago which she had conquered, stipulating for the inhabitants the same privileges, and for herself the same right of intervention, as obtained in regard to the Principalities. 9. The treaty of Bucharest, in 1812, stipulated that the Servians should have the right of administering their own affairs, upon paying a moderate contribution to the Porte. It was natural and laudable in the Russian government to make these stipulations in favour of their co-religionists in Turkey, especially when subjected to such a ruthless and despotic government as that of the Ottomans; but it was evident what innumerable pretences for interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey these claims were calculated to furnish. In truth, they inserted the point of the wedge which might at any time split the Ottoman empire in pieces.—See the treaties in SCHOELL, *Traités de Paix*, xiv. 67, 503, 539.

transferred her intrigues to Epirus, where her agents succeeded in stirring up an insurrection of the Souliotes, who gained a brilliant victory over ALI PACHA, the Lion of Janina, as he was called, while the islanders carried on for some months a brilliant but fruitless contest with the navy of Constantinople.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 30, 31.

77. Mutual exasperation of the Greeks and Turks.

These repeated and unsuccessful insurrections had produced a more universal and bitter feeling of exasperation in Greece against the Osmanlis than in any other part of the Ottoman dominions. Deeds of cruelty had been mutually inflicted, deadly threats interchanged, which could never be either forgotten or forgiven. The savage disposition and arrogant temper of the Turks, which is often obliterated during the tranquillity of peace, reappeared with terrible severity during these disastrous contests. Not a village in the Morea but bore testimony to the ravages of the Ottoman torch; not a family but mourned a father, brother, or son, cut off by the Turkish sabre, or a daughter or sister carried off to the captivity of the Turkish harems. The Turks had almost as great injuries to avenge; for in the political, not less than the physical world, action and reaction are equal and opposite; and the cruel law of retaliation is the invariable and unavoidable resource of suffering humanity. The disposition of the Greeks, light, gay, and volatile as their ancestors in the days of Alcibiades, rendered them in a peculiar manner accessible to the influence of these feelings, and turned the ardent spirit of ancient genius into the inextinguishable thirst for present vengeance.[2]

[2] Gordon, i. 32, 33.

The first dawn of the Greek revolution appeared in the dubious hostility, and at last open rebellion, of Ali Pacha.* This celebrated man, at once one of the most

* Ali Pacha was born in a little village of Epirus, from which he took his name. His father, Veli-Bey, having been despoiled of his share of the little paternal inheritance by his elder brothers, engaged as a private soldier in one of those bands of nomad adventurers common in Albania, where men became alternately heroes and banditti. Having risen to command among his com-

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78. Insurrection of Ali Pacha.

heroic, the most tyrannical, and the most cruel of modern times, had, at the head of his brave and faithful, but half-savage Albanians, long maintained a doubtful neutrality, but real independence, with the Porte, and it was the extreme difficulty with which he was at last subdued which opened the eyes of Europe most effectually to the decline of the Ottoman power. He preserved a studious neutrality between the Sultan and the rebellious vassals and indomitable mountaineers; with thirty thousand disciplined Mussulmans under his orders, and yet maintaining a secret correspondence with the discontented Greeks, he rendered himself an object of importance to, and was

rades, Veli-Bey re-entered his native village at the head of his band, and burned his brothers in the house which had been the subject of contention between them. After this he was appointed Aga of Tebelen, and married the daughter of a bey, named Chamco, a woman of great beauty, and a savage energetic character, in whose veins some of the blood of Scanderbeg is said to have flowed. She transmitted to her son Ali, who afterwards became the pacha, the energy, the passions, and the ferocity of her race.

Veli-Bey died young; but his widow Chamco, who was endowed with a masculine energetic spirit and indomitable courage, resolved to preserve for her children, by intrigue, the force of arms, and the influence of her beauty, which was still at its zenith, the power which her husband had acquired in Tebelen. She left her retreat in Tebelen, put on the dress of the other sex, and placing herself at the head of a band of the mountain chiefs of Albania, who were devoted to her by admiration for her courage and the influence of her charms, ventured to measure her strength with the enemies of her husband's house, who contended with her for the command in Tebelen. She was defeated and made prisoner; but, like the Greeks of old, she subdued her conquerors by her charms, and being ransomed by a young Greek whom she had captivated by her beauty, she re-entered Tebelen, where she occupied herself for several years in the education of her son Ali and his sister. In one of his first expeditions he was defeated, like Frederick the Great and Wellington. "Go, coward!" said she, presenting to him a distaff, "that trade befits you better than the career of arms."

Ashamed of his defeat, Ali fled from his paternal home, discovered a hidden treasure in the ruins of an old chateau, where he had taken refuge for the night, enrolled thirty banditti under his standard, with whom he pillaged the adjacent country. Surprised by the troops of Courd Pacha of Albania, he was brought into his presence in order to be beheaded; but his youth and beauty softened the heart of the ferocious chief, who pardoned him, and restored him to his mother in Tebelen. He then married the daughter of Delvino Emine, an alliance which at once gratified his love and forwarded his ambition. In consequence of it, he was secretly engaged in the first efforts of the Greeks to achieve their independence in 1790, when they reckoned on the support of Russia. This attempt, however, proved abortive, and it led to Ali's father-in-law being strangled by the Turks. He was succeeded in the pachalic of Delvino by the Pacha of Argyro-Kastro, to whom he gave his sister Chainitza in

courted by, both parties. He turned his hostility, at the instigation of the Porte, against the Souliotes, who had taken up arms in favour of the Russians, and reduced them to subjection with great slaughter; and on occasion of the conflicts of the Sultan with the janizaries, he advanced to the gates of Adrianople at the head of eighty thousand men. Such was his influence at this time with the Divan, that his two sons, Veli and Mouctar, were appointed to important commands in the Morea; while he himself, secure in his inaccessible fortress in the lake of Janina, revolved in his mind dark schemes of conquest and independence. At length the Sultan, having received intelli-

marriage. She, however, was enamoured of Soliman, her husband's younger brother; and Ali having advised his sister to poison her husband, in order that she might espouse the object of her affection, and she having refused to do so, he instigated Soliman himself to murder his brother, which he did, and Ali made over his sister to him over the dead body of her husband.

The Sultan having afterwards become suspicious of Selim, Pacha of Delvino, Ali's steady friend and protector, and his designs having come to the knowledge of Ali, he resolved to make his own fortune by the ruin of his benefactor. For this purpose he invited Selim to his house, murdered him as he was drinking a cup of coffee, and sent his head to Constantinople. For this signal service he was rewarded with the pachalie of Thessaly. He there soon accumulated great treasures by every species of extortion and oppression, with the fruits of which he bought the pachalic of Janina, in one of the richest and most delicious valleys of Epirus, where he constructed an impregnable fortress, amassed immense treasures, and collected a formidable army. He aided the Porte with these forces in suppressing the insurrection of the Souliotes, but still preserved in secret his old connection with the Greeks, and often drank in private to the health of the Virgin. Yet, still keeping up his system of hypocrisy, he marched with twenty thousand men against the Pacha of Widdin, who had declared for the Greeks, and destroyed him at the very time when he was encouraging in his palace the poetry of the Greek Rhigas—the Tyrtæus of the modern war of independence. During one of his expeditions, his eldest son, Mouctar, being intrusted with the government in Janina, excited the jealousy or suspicions of Ali by an intrigue with a beautiful young Greek named Euphrosyne. Having sent his son off on a distant expedition, Ali surrounded in the night the house of Euphrosyne, and seized her, with fifteen other young women, her companions, who were all thrown into the lake. His wife Emine threw herself at his feet to implore the lives of some of them; instead of according it, he discharged a pistol at the wall so near her, that she fell down dead of fright at his feet. Soon after, he was seized with such admiration for a young Greek girl of twelve years of age, whose village he had delivered to the flames, that he brought her to his harem, espoused her, and inspired such a passion, though five times her age, in her youthful breast, that she remained faithful to him in all his subsequent misfortunes.—*Biographie Universelle*, Supplement, i. 172 (Ali Pacha); and LAMARTINE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, vii. 337, 345.

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gence of his designs, and dreading his daily increasing power, summoned him to Constantinople to answer some charges preferred against him; and upon his refusal to obey the summons, he prepared, with all the energy of the Ottoman character, to reduce him to submission. Chourchid Pacha, a neighbouring satrap, received the command of an army of forty thousand men, with which he approached Albania; but the reduction of that province proved not so easy as he had expected: and when the Greek revolution broke out, he had already been two years engaged in ceaseless hostilities with its indomitable mountaineers.[1]

[1] Lac. iii. 92, 94; Lam. vii. 343, 345.

79. Statistics of Greece.

GREECE, which rendered itself immortal in ancient story, and is, perhaps, destined to be hardly less memorable in modern events, is a country of extremely small dimensions compared to the great figure it has made in human affairs. Including the Cyclades, its entire population, in 1836, was only 688,000 souls; its superficies 2470 square geographical leagues, or 21,430 square miles; being less than Scotland, and not half the size of Ireland. The density of the population is only thirty-one to the square mile; while in England it is three hundred—a fact speaking volumes as to the oppressive nature of the Turkish government. Owing to the benignity of the climate, however, and the advantages of its situation for maritime purposes, it is extremely fruitful, and yields an amount of produce far beyond what could have been anticipated from its scanty population; for its value amounted, within the straits of Thermopylæ, in 1814, to 60,000,000 piastres, or £3,000,000 nearly. This amount, which must be considered very large, when the extreme scantiness of the population and mountainous nature of the greater part of the soil is taken into account, is mainly owing to the genial warmth of the sun, which renders rocky slopes, which in northern Europe would produce only furze or heath, capable of bearing rich crops of grapes, maize, and olives.[2]

[2] Pouqueville, Grèce en 1814, 72, 85; Malte Brun, vii. 874; Gordon's Greece, i. 73.

Though so limited in extent, and deficient in inhabit-

ants, however, Greece is extremely defensible in a military point of view, and second to none in difficulty of subjugation by an army with the artillery and carriages of modern warfare. The mountains are extremely steep, covered with forests, sharp-pointed stones, or brakes of thorny plants, and intersected by numberless deep ravines, the beds of winter torrents. Their chains are so numerous, and intersect each other in so many directions, that it is quite impossible to get through the country without passing over some of them. The roads, good enough as long as they pass over the little plains—for the most part the bottoms of ancient lakes, with which the country abounds—become mere rugged paths the moment they enter the hills, bordered by precipices, and continually open to a plunging fire from above, where the enemy may be placed, often unseen, in prickly thickets or rugged cliffs. An invading enemy must either weaken itself at every step by detachments, or expose itself to have its communications cut off by the inhabitants, who retire, before its advance, into sequestered caverns and monasteries of solid construction, placed in accessible situations, and against which cannon can rarely be brought to bear. To transport artillery or heavy equipages is a prodigious labour, rendered the more toilsome, as the bridges were nearly all broken down, and never restored. The Turkish government never think of repairing anything. Add to this, that every straggler is destroyed by the armed peasants, whose ordinary mode of life, and endurance of privations, make them excellent guerillas. By the possession of the sea, these difficulties, as in the early part of the Persian invasion, may be overcome; but the skill and courage of the Greek sailors gave them the command of that element; and the Turks, never at home in naval warfare, were distinguished by nothing but cowardice and incapacity in their maritime contest with the islanders of the Archipelago.[1]

Defensible nature of the country.

[1] Gordon, i. 58, 59.

A celebrated English traveller has left the following account of the celebrated land of Hellas: "The last

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81. Clarke's description of Greece.

moments of this day were employed in taking once more a view of the superb scenery exhibited by the mountains of Olympus and Ossa. They appeared upon this occasion in more than usual splendour, like one of those imaginary alpine regions suggested by viewing a boundary of clouds, when they terminate the horizon in a still evening, and are gathered into heaps, with many a towering top shining in fleecy whiteness. The great Olympian chain, and a range of lower eminences to the north-west of Olympus, form a line which is exactly opposite to Salonica; and even the chasm between Olympus and Ossa, constituting the defile of Tempe, is hence visible. Directing the eye towards that chain, there is comprehended in one view the whole of Pieria and Bœotia, and with the vivid impressions which remained after leaving the country, memory easily recalled into one mental picture the whole of Greece. In this imaginary flight the traveller enters the defile of Tempe from Pieria, and as the gorge opens towards the south, he sees all the Larissæan plain; this conducts him to the plain of Pharsalia, whence he ascends the mountains south of Pharsalus; then crossing the bleak and still more elevated region, extending from those mountains towards Lamia, he has Mount Pindus before him, and, descending into the plain of the Sperchius, passes the straits of Thermopylæ. Afterwards, ascending Mount Œta, he beholds, opposite to him, the snowy point of Lycorea, with all the rest of Parnassus, and the towns and villages at its base; the whole plain of Elatina lying at his feet, with the course of the Cephissus to the sea. Passing to the summit of Parnassus, he looks down upon all the other mountains, plains, islands, and gulfs of Greece, but especially the broad bosom of Cithæron, Helicon, Parnes, and of Hymettus. Thence roaming into the depths, and over all the heights of Eubœa and of Peloponnesus, he has their inmost recesses submitted to his contemplation. Next resting upon Hymettus, he ex-

amines, even in the minutest detail, the whole of Attica to the Sunian promontory; for he sees it all, and the shores of Argos, Lecyon, Corinth, Megara, Eleusis, and Athens. Thus, though not in all the freshness of its original colours, yet in all its grandeur, doth GREECE actually present itself to his mind's eye; and may the impression never be obliterated."[1] What a list of names! what magic in their very sound! And was it surprising that the resurrection of a country fraught with such recollections thrilled like the sound of a trumpet through the heart of Europe?

[1] Clarke's Travels, vii. 475, 477.

"Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild;
Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields,
Thine olive ripe as when Minerva smiled,
And still his honied wealth Hymettus yields;
There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds,
The freeborn wanderer of thy mountain-air;
Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds,
Still in his beam Mendeli's marbles glare;
Art, Glory, Freedom fail, but Nature still is fair." *

* BYRON, *Childe Harold.*

CHAPTER XIV.

GREEK REVOLUTION—BATTLE OF NAVARINO—ESTABLISHMENT OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE.

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1. Elements remaining of Grecian resurrection.

ALTHOUGH the Greeks had for four centuries groaned under the dominion of the Osmanlis, and the heel of conquest had perhaps crushed them with more severity than any other nation in Europe, yet they had preserved the elements of nationality, and kept alive the seeds of resurrection more entirely than any other people. Amidst all the severities of Turkish rule they had retained the great distinctive features of nationality, their country, their language, their religion. As long as a nation preserves these, no matter how long the chains of servitude may have hung about it, the means of ultimate salvation are not lost, the elements of future independence exist. The very severity of the Ottoman rule, the arrogance of their Turkish masters, the difference of language, religion, manners, laws, between the victors and the vanquished, had tended to perpetuate the feelings of the subjugated people, and prevent that amalgamation with their oppressors which, though it softens at the time the severity of conquest, does so only by preventing its chains from being ever thrown off. They had lost all—all but the sense of oppression and the desire of vengeance.

Notwithstanding the oppressive government and boundless exactions of the Turks, the Greeks in some places had come to enjoy a very high degree of prosperity, and

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2. Recent favourable circumstances in the condition of Greece.

various circumstances had contributed in the early part of the nineteenth century to increase in them to a great extent the material sources of national strength. The islanders of the Archipelago had come to engross the whole coasting trade of the Levant; their traffic was carried on in 600 vessels, bearing 6000 guns, and manned by 18,000 seamen.* Hydra and Ipsara, the chief seats of this flourishing commerce, had become large towns, strongly fortified, containing each 30,000 inhabitants on their barren rocks, the refuge, like the sandbanks on which Venice was built, of independence in the hour of disaster; while the beautiful fields of Scios, peopled by 80,000, exhibited every feature of a terrestrial paradise. Fanned by the charming breezes of the Archipelago, illuminated by its resplendent sun, surrounded by a placid sea, which reflected its azure firmament, and was chequered by the white sails of innumerable barks—these islands seemed to realise all that the fancy of the poet had figured of the abodes of the blessed:—

> "The Isles of Greece, the Isles of Greece,
> Where burning Sappho loved and sung,
> Where grew the arts of war and peace,
> Where Delos rose and Phœbus sprung!
> Eternal summer gilds them yet,
> But all except their sun is set."†

The Turkish pachas never set their feet in these blessed abodes of industry and freedom. Secretly afraid of the naval strength of the Greeks, and aware that their sailors constituted their own entire maritime power, the sultans of Constantinople had long commuted their right of dominion for a fixed annual tribute, which was collected by themselves, and, being regularly paid, took away all pretext for further intrusions.[1] And thus the islands of Greece had long been remarked by travellers as a sort of

[1] Gordon's Greek Revolution, i. 35, 36.

* This trade had augmented in the most surprising manner, and been attended with extraordinary profits, in consequence of the Continental blockade during the last ten years of the war, and the vast commerce which was carried on through Turkey into Hungary, and all the centre of Europe, which had come to exceed £3,000,000 of exports from Britain.

† Byron, *Don Juan*, Canto iii.

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oasis in the social desert with which they were surrounded, and as making manifest the general Turkish oppression by exhibiting the happiness which man could reach in those blessed spots when emancipated from its influence.

3. Recent spread of information, and passion for independence.

As a natural consequence of this extraordinary and sudden influx of material prosperity, there had arisen in the islands of Greece, and even in some of the principal towns of the continent, an ardent thirst for knowledge, and an anxious desire to be readmitted into the European family, to which they felt they belonged by religion, language, and recollections. Crushed and trodden under foot by the Asiatics, their hearts were still European; ruled in their bodies by the Mussulmans, their souls were free with the Christian. The mosque was seen in the cities, but the monastery still stood erect in the mountains. The Crescent flamed in the eastern, but the Cross was arising in the western sky. To assuage the thirst for knowledge which arose with an extended intercourse with foreign nations, and a rapid increase in the means of purchasing it, there had sprung up schools in many of the principal cities of Greece, and translations of several of the best modern works had already been printed in the Greek tongue.* They incredibly augmented the general fervour. The newly-instructed Greeks found to their astonishment that they were the descendants of a people, inhabited a country, and spoke a language celebrated beyond any other in the literature of western Europe, and from the genius of which nearly the whole illumination of the world had sprung. The image of ancient freedom, the triumphs of ancient art, the glories of ancient warfare, which had come down to them in their own country only

* "Outre les Ecoles déjà fondées à Salonique, au Mont Athos, à Chio, à Smyrne, à Kydonie, à Bucharest, à Jassy, et même à Constantinople, où se rendaient des professeurs formés dans les meilleures écoles d'Allemagne et de France, il y avait dans les villes un peu considérable de la Grèce, des lycées, des gymnases, des bibliothèques, et jusque dans beaucoup de villages, des écoles d'enseignement mutuel, malgré la répugnance de la Porte Ottomane et même, dit-on, du clergé Grec."—*Annuaire Historique*, iv. 378.

through the dark and uncertain streams of tradition, now stood clearly revealed in the works of their own ancestors, written in their own tongue, and preserved with pious care by the Christians of the West. The contest between the European and the Asiatic was seen to have been as old as the siege of Troy; the animosity of the Christians against the Mussulmans to have burst forth with inextinguishable ardour during the fervour of the Crusades. No one doubted that, on the first hoisting of the standard of independence, the Christian nations would crowd as zealously around it as the tribes of Hellas had done round that of the King of men, and join them in the assault of Constantinople as zealously as they had followed Godfrey of Bouillon to the breach of Jerusalem.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 378; Gordon's Greek Revolution, i. 37, 38; Lac. iii. 91, 92.

4. Formation of the Society of the Hetairists.

Though these, however, were the secret feelings of the Greeks, they did not venture to express them openly; the sabre of the Turk was still suspended over their heads, and it might at any moment fall, and involve them in one common ruin. Unarmed, at least on the continent, with all their fortresses in the hands of the Mussulmans, and the only military force in the country at the disposal of their oppressors, it was evident to all that open insurrection would be the signal for general ruin. Great hopes were entertained that something would be stipulated in their favour at the Congress of Vienna; but jealousy of Russia, of which it was thought infant Greece would merely be an appanage, prevented anything of the kind being attempted in that assembly. In these circumstances, the Greeks took refuge in the usual resource of the weak in presence of the strong: they formed *secret societies*. A great association was formed of Greeks, not only in their own territory, but in Constantinople, Bavaria, Austria, and Russia—the object of which was to effect, as soon as circumstances would permit the attempt to be made, the entire independence of Greece by their own efforts.[2] Several distinguished Russians were members of this society; in particular, Count Capo d'Istria, a Greek by

[2] Ann. Hist. iv. 377; Gordon, i. 42, 43; Lac. iii. 91.

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birth, and whose situation as private secretary to the Emperor Alexander naturally encouraged the hope that the objects of the society were, in secret at least, not alien to the inclinations of that great potentate.

5. Different gradations in the Hetairists.

Like all other secret societies, this of the Hetairists had several different gradations. The first class, into which all Greeks without exception, who desired admission, were eligible, were only informed that the object of the society was to ameliorate the social condition of the Greeks. The next class, called the Systemenoi, or Bachelors, were selected with more discrimination, and were apprised in secret that the object of the society was to effect an entire revolution, and severance from Turkey. The third class, which was termed the *Priests of Eleusis*, were cautiously informed that the period of the struggle approached, and that there existed in the Hetairia higher classes than their own. Nearly the whole Greek priests belonged to this class, and it embraced no less than one hundred and sixteen prelates of their persuasion. The fourth class contained only sixteen names, and it was never known who they all were, which only augmented their influence; but it was known to contain Count Capo d'Istria's, and it was whispered that among it were many illustrious names, in particular the Czar, the Crown Prince of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Hospodar of Wallachia, and many other of the first men in the East. These were mere rumours, however—the real members of that select body, whoever they were, were too well aware of the influence of the unknown to permit their names to be revealed; but the course of events gives reason to think that some at least of these illustrious personages were in the association, and formed part of its highest grade. For very obvious reasons, the seat of the grand circle, or ruling committee, was in Moscow, and their orders were written in cipher, and signed with a seal bearing in sixteen compartments as many initial letters.[1] The society had secret signs and modes of recognition,

[1] Gordon, i. 42, 43, 44, 46; Lac. iii. 93.

some common to all the members, others known only to the higher grades, each of which had separate signs, known only to themselves; and all contributed according to their means to the common objects of the society.

6. Extraordinary secresy preserved regarding the affairs of the Society.

As Capo d'Istria bore so important a situation as private secretary to the Emperor Alexander, he was very careful of the part which he ostensibly bore in the proceedings of the society. He took a share openly only in the measures for the extension of knowledge and the relief of suffering, aware that the impulse thus given would speedily lead to other objects in which it was not advisable for him to take a visible lead. Notwithstanding the usual levity of the Greek character, such was the intensity of the feeling from which the association emanated, that the secret of its existence was preserved in a most surprising manner. It was betrayed, indeed, by a faithless brother, a Zantide butcher, to Ali Pacha; but that astute potentate, who foresaw a storm brewing at Constantinople against him, and never doubted that the Emperor Alexander was at the head of the society, preserved the secret revealed to him as a claim for protection in time of need. The Mussulmans, surrounded on all sides by the association, remained in utter ignorance of its existence; and when the insurrection burst forth in 1821, they were taken as much by surprise, and were as much astounded as if the earth had suddenly opened under their feet.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 47, 49; Lac. iii. 93, 94.

7. Their eyes are all fixed on Russia.

The eyes of all the Hetairists were fixed on Russia, not merely from a community of religion, but from the decided line of policy which for nearly a century past that power had adopted towards the Turkish empire. It was notorious to all the world that the cabinet of St Petersburg had long been set on territorial aggrandisement in Turkey, and that the Porte had found in it the most formidable enemy of Islamism. Twice had Catherine excited an insurrection in Greece; the Turkish fleet had been delivered by the Russians to the flames in the bay of Tchesmé; Constantine had been christened by that

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name, precisely because the Empress designed him for the successor of Constantine Palæologus, the last of the Cæsars; and the intervention of the European powers in 1789 had alone prevented that design being accomplished, and the Cross being restored to its original place on the dome of St Sophia. It was impossible to doubt that the power which had in this manner so clearly evinced its disposition to extend its influence in the Levant, would avail itself of the present opportunity which appeared so favourable to shake the Ottoman power to the foundation, by establishing an independent state in Greece. It was equally evident that it was from Russia *alone* that any substantial support would be given on this occasion; for whatever were the inclinations of the inhabitants of the other European states, their governments were too strongly impressed with the danger to the independence of other nations from Russian power to concur in any measures which undermined the only empire that presented an efficient barrier against it in the East.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 49, 50; Ann. Hist. iv. 378, 379.

8. Cession of Parga in 1819.

A very melancholy event, in the year 1819, had strongly awakened the sympathy of the inhabitants of western Europe, and revealed the ardent feelings with which the Greek people were animated in regard to their native soil. The town of PARGA, on the sea-coast of the mainland, opposite to the Ionian Islands, the last remnant of the once great territorial possessions of the Venetian republic, on the coast of Albania, had long been considered as a dependence of the state of which they had come to form a part; and in the interval between its cession to France, by the treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, and its transference to Great Britain by that of 1814, it had contained a French garrison, and its inhabitants had begun to taste the blessings of powerful Christian protection. The treaty of 1815, however, unfortunately made no mention of Parga; but, on the contrary, stipulated an *entire* surrender of the mainland of Turkey to the Porte. In consequence of this circumstance, the government of Constantinople

demanded the cession of Parga as part of the mainland; and in this they were zealously seconded by Ali Pacha, within whose territory it was situated, and who was extremely desirous of getting its industrious and thriving citizens within his rapacious grasp. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Parga, justly apprehensive of the consequences of being ceded to that dreaded satrap, solicited and obtained a British garrison, which in 1814 took possession of it, and effectually preserved its inhabitants from Mussulman rapine and rapacity. The inhabitants joyfully took the oath of allegiance to the English crown. Thenceforward they regarded themselves as perfectly secure under the ægis of the victorious British flag.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ii. 450; Ann. Reg. 1819, 194.

9. Consternation of the Pargiotes at their abandonment.

When it was rumoured, after the treaty of 1815, that Parga was to be ceded to the Turks, the inhabitants testified the utmost alarm, and made an urgent application to the British officer in command of the garrison, who, by order of Sir Thomas Maitland, the governor of the Ionian Islands, returned an answer, in which he pledged himself that the place should not be yielded up till the property of those who might choose to emigrate should be paid for, and they themselves be transported to the Ionian Islands. An estimate was then made out of the property of the inhabitants, which was found to amount in value to nearly £500,000; and the inhabitants were individually brought up before the governor, and interrogated whether they would remain or emigrate; but they unanimously returned for answer, that "they were resolved to abandon their country, rather than stay in it with dishonour, and that they would disinter and carry with them the bones of their forefathers."[1] Commissioners had been appointed to fix the amount of the compensation which was to be awarded by the Turkish government to such of the inhabitants of Parga as chose to emigrate; but they, as might have been expected, differed widely as to its amount, and in the end not more than a third of the real value was awarded. Meanwhile, Ali Pacha, little accus-

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tomed to have his demands thwarted, and impatient of delay, repeatedly threatened to assault the town, and reunite it to his pachalic, without paying one farthing of the stipulated indemnity. At length, in June 1819, the compensation was fixed at £142,425 ; and Sir Frederick Adam gave notice to the inhabitants that he was ready to provide for their embarkation.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1819, 195.

10. Heart-rending scene at the evacuation of the town. June 10, 1819.

The scene which ensued was of the most heart-rending description, and forcibly recalled the corresponding events in ancient times, of which the genius of antiquity has left such moving pictures. As soon as the notice was given, every family marched solemnly out of its dwelling without tears or lamentation ; and the men, preceded by their priests, and followed by their sons, proceeded to the sepulchres of their fathers, and silently unearthed and collected their remains, which they put upon a huge pile of wood which they had previously collected in front of one of their churches. They then took their arms in their hands, and, setting fire to the pile, stood motionless and silent around it till the whole was consumed. During this melancholy ceremony, some of Ali's troops, impatient for possession, approached the gates of the town, upon which a deputation of the citizens was sent to inform the English governor, that if a single infidel was admitted before the remains of their ancestors were secured from profanation, and themselves with their families safely embarked, they would instantly put to death their wives and children, and die with their arms in their hands, after having taken a bloody revenge on those who had bought and sold their country. The remonstrance was successful ; the march of the Mussulmans was arrested, the pile burnt out, and the people embarked in silence, with their wives and children. The Mussulmans soon after entered, but they found only a single inhabitant in the place, and he was drunk, lying near the yet smoking pile.[2]

[2] Edinburgh Review, lxiv., Art. 1 ; Ann. Reg. 1819, 195, 196; Ann. Hist. ii. 432, 433.

A scene so melancholy, and so unwonted in modern

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times, excited, as well it might, the most profound sympathy in Europe; and as it proved, by a decisive act, how deep were the feelings of nationality which slumbered under the weight of Turkish oppression, it strongly awakened the general feeling in favour of the Greeks. The affair was made the subject of warm debates in both Houses of Parliament; but it was too late. Parga had been delivered up to its oppressors; its inhabitants, like the Athenians in the days of Xerxes, had fled, and its deserted streets had become the abode of the pirate and wild animals. The Opposition loudly declaimed against the cession of this town and expatriation of its unfortunate inhabitants, as a breach of national faith, a surrender of the national honour on the part of England, which could never be effaced. But although it must ever be a matter of deep regret to every person animated with right feelings, that so deplorable a catastrophe should have taken place under the shadow of the British flag, and to those who had, in trusting sincerity, taken the oath of fidelity to the British crown, there does not appear to have been any direct breach of treaty in our conduct on this occasion. Parga had been either forgotten at the Congress of Vienna, when the general cession of Epirus to the Porte had been stipulated, or it had been intentionally ceded to that power. In either case we were bound by the faith of treaties to give it up; and the evacuation, however melancholy, was conducted with every possible regard to the interests and feelings of its inhabitants.[1]

11. Debates on this subject in Parliament.

[1] Parl. Deb. xl. 1177, 1182.

Matters were in this state, with the public feeling all over Europe strongly excited in favour of the Greeks, when the Spanish revolution of 1820 broke out, so frightful in political consequences in every part of the world. Followed as it speedily was by those in Naples, Sicily, and Piedmont, and by an extraordinary fermentation alike in France, Germany, and England, it produced such a commotion in men's minds as led, in the course of the next year, to the GREEK REVOLUTION.

12. Effect of the Spanish revolution on Turkey and Greece.

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The inhabitants of Hellas, already prepared by the efforts of the Hetairists for an approaching convulsion, deemed the hour of their deliverance at hand; the friends of the Greeks, or *Philhellenes* as they were called, in every part of Europe encouraged these ideas, and secretly made subscriptions in money and contributions in arms to carry it into effect. The desire for liberty, the fervour of democracy, combined with hatred of the infidel in stimulating the Greeks to an effort to restore their long-lost nationality; and the strongest passions which can move the human breast, the love of freedom, the animosities of race, and the hostility of adverse religions, came for once to pull in the same direction.[1]

[1] Lac. iii. 93; Lam. vii. 345; Ann. Hist. iv. 373, 374.

13. State of Turkey at this period.

When this outbreak took place in the beginning of 1821, which deserves to be marked as one of the most disastrous eras the Ottoman empire has ever known, the Turkish dominions were in a very dilapidated condition. They had lost the vigour of barbarism, and not gained the strength of civilisation. Between the two they appeared destined to sink into the dust. Nominally extending over the fairest portions of Europe, Asia, and Africa; embracing in extent nearly the whole which, on the division of the Empire, fell to the lot of Constantine, their real dominion was confined to a much narrower circle. Egypt and Algeria were only in form subject to their sway; the Pacha of Bagdad could little be relied on; even the nearer provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, containing 2,000,000 inhabitants, and yielding a revenue approaching to a million sterling, were rather tributary states than real parts of the empire. Governed by hospodars selected by the Porte from the most wealthy Greeks of the Fanar, who looked to these appointments chiefly as the means of augmenting their fortunes, they had been subjected to innumerable burdens beyond what actually flowed into the coffers of the Sultan, and the inhabitants were so discontented that they not only formed no addition to the strength of the empire, but rather were a

burden to its resources. They had been three times occupied by the Russian troops, and as often incited to revolt by their commanders, within the last half-century, and as often ceded back, on peace being concluded, to the Turks, with stipulations in their favour, which the Porte constantly found the means of eluding. Thus the Ottomans, as well as themselves, had come to regard their dominion over them as merely temporary, to be made the most of while it lasted. Their agriculture was annihilated by an ordinance prohibiting the export of their grain anywhere but to Constantinople, whither they sent 1,500,000 bushels of wheat annually; and only three commodities—wool, yellow berries, and hare-skins—were allowed to be exported. It may easily be conceived, therefore, how discontented their inhabitants were, and how they longed for the steady government and comparative freedom of industry which the Muscovites enjoyed. Servia, with its million of inhabitants, might be expected, at the first signal from Russia, to join its gallant youth to the Muscovite bands; and Albania, under the sceptre of the wily tyrant, Ali Pacha, was as likely to join the enemies of the Porte as to support its fortunes. The Turkish empire was rapidly approaching that state which characterised the last days of the Lower Empire, when the distant provinces had all fallen off or become independent, and the whole strength of the state consisted in the capital, and the provinces which immediately surrounded it.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 373, 376; Gordon, i. 92, 93.

14. Its weakness in a military point of view.

Add to this, that the military strength of the empire was in that state of decrepitude which invariably ensues when one method of carrying on war is substituted for another, and the *national* armaments are exchanged for those formed on the model of other states. The Turks were a nation of soldiers, and as every one of them was trained to the management of a horse and the use of arms, they were capable, when thoroughly roused, and deeply imbued with the military spirit, of forming immense armies, which had more than once proved extremely

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formidable to the eastern states of Europe. But as the Turks in Europe were only a third of the entire inhabitants, and they alone were intrusted with arms, the military strength of the empire, at least in that quarter, rested on a very narrow foundation; and, such as it was, it had sensibly declined during the last century. The Turkomans had become citizens, and habituated to the enjoyments of peaceful life; the janizaries were in great part tradesmen, who were unwilling to exchange the certain profits of business for the uncertain gains of war. Then the feudal militia had become greatly less warlike and efficient than it had been in former days, and no regular army had as yet been formed to supply its place. Such as were enrolled were often more dangerous to their own government than its enemies. So unruly were some of its armed defenders, that it was hard to say whether the Sultan did not often run greater risks from their insubordination than from the open hostility of his enemies. Revolts of the janizaries had, in very recent times, brought the reigning family to the very brink of ruin, and been appeased only by abject submission on the part of the government; and though various efforts had been made to introduce the European discipline among them, yet they had been constantly eluded, and the attempt to enforce them led to such discontent, as augmented the danger arising from their mutinous disposition and arrogant habits.[1]

[1] Val. 93, 96; Fonton, 126, 129.

15. Commencement of the insurrection in Wallachia.

The insurrection, the embers of which had so long been prepared by the efforts of the Hetairists, and which the Spanish revolution at length blew into a flame, broke out first in Wallachia. The reason was that these provinces were nearest to Russia, upon whose support the insurgents mainly relied. It was brought to a point by the death of Prince Alexander Suzzo, the hospodar of Wallachia, who expired on the 30th January 1821. The Porte lost no time in appointing a new hospodar, Prince Charles Callimachi, the head of one of the most illustri-

ous Greek families of the Fanar; but as the short interregnum which must ensue in some degree weakened the hands of government, the Hetairists resolved to take advantage of it to raise the standard of revolt. It began with a band of Greeks and Arnauts, one hundred and fifty in number, who assembled in Bucharest unknown to the Turks, and marched out of the town under the command of a brave officer, Theodore Vladimaruko, formerly a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian service, and who was so called from his having received the order of St Vladamir from them. With this slender band he seized the small town of Czernitz, near the ruins of Trajan's bridge over the Danube, from whence he issued a proclamation, announcing that the hour of their deliverance was at hand, and calling upon the people to rise and shake off the tyranny of their oppressors. Such was the discontent which generally prevailed, in consequence of the oppressive exactions of the Turkish satraps, and the depression of the value of their produce by being confined to the market of Constantinople, that the peasants all flocked to his standard; and in a few days Theodore found himself at the head of twelve thousand men, to whom were soon added two thousand Arnauts, who formed the police of Bucharest, but deserted to his standard.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 96, 98; Ann. Hist. iv. 377, 380.

Ere long another insurrection, equally formidable, broke out in Jassy, the capital of Moldavia. On the 23d February (7th March, new style), Prince Alexander Ipsilanti, an officer of distinction in the Russian service,*

* Prince Alexander Ipsilanti was descended from an illustrious Greek family of the Fanar, and his father had formerly been hospodar of Wallachia. The young prince was admitted early into the military academy at St Petersburg, from whence he obtained a commission in the Imperial Guard, and lost an arm in the battle of Culm in 1813. He gradually rose in the Russian service to the rank of major-general; but he became, after the peace of 1815, wearied of the inactivity of pacific life, and entered warmly into the designs of the Greek Hetairists. His known bravery and experience, and the rank he bore in the Russian service, pointed him out to the Grand Arch as the proper person to command their armies, and he accordingly received the commission of generalissimo—"Steward of the Stewards of the august Arch."—*Annuaire Historique*, iv. 582; GORDON, i. 88.

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16. Ipsilanti's insurrection in Moldavia. March 7.

entered Jassy, the capital of that province, at the head of two hundred horse, from whence he issued a proclamation, calling on the Greeks of every denomination to take up arms, and promising them, in no obscure terms, the support of Russia.* The effect of this proclamation was prompt and terrible. Assured of the connivance, if not the support, of the governor of the province, promised the all-powerful protection of Russia, the whole Christian population of the town, whether Greek, Moldavian, or Arnaut, rose in insurrection, fell upon the Turks, great numbers of whom they massacred, and pillaged their houses. Similar excesses were perpetrated at Galatz, the chief seaport of the province, where great numbers of Mussulmans perished, and the town, being set on fire, was in part consumed. The vessels in the harbour, with the guns on board, fell into the hands of the Greeks, to whom they proved of essential service. The whole armed Mussulman force in the two provinces consisted of six hundred horse, who were unable to make head against the insurgents, who soon amounted to twenty thousand men. The intelligence of these events excited the utmost enthusiasm among the Greeks at Odessa, among whom Ipsilanti's proclamation was publicly read amidst deafening cheers, and large subscriptions to provide for the support of the insurgents were made. Ipsilanti, encouraged by these auspicious events, organised a battalion styled the Sacred Battalion, and which embraced the entire flower of the youth of the country.[1] Their uniform was black, with

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 381, 383; Gordon, i. 94, 109.

* "Inhabitants of Moldavia! know that at this moment all Greece has lighted the torch of liberty, and broken the yoke of tyranny. It reclaims its inalienable rights. I go where duty calls me, and I offer you, as well on my own part as on that of all my countrymen assembled here, whom I have the honour to command, the assurance of protection, and of perfect security to your persons and property. Divine Providence has given you in Prince Michael Suzzo, your present governor, a defender of your rights, a father, a benefactor. He deserves all these titles; unite with him to protect the common weal. If some desperate Turks venture to make an incursion into your territory, *fear nothing; for a great power is ready to punish their insolence.*—ALEXANDER IPSILANTI. Jassy, 23d February 1821" (old style).—*Annuaire Historique*, iv. 381.

a cross formed of bones in front, with the famous inscription of Constantine, "In this sign you shall conquer." *

17. Ipsilanti's first measures.

The great thing required to give consistency to the insurrection, and cause it to extend over the whole inhabitants of Greece, was to hold out some security for the support of Russia. To favour this idea Ipsilanti spread abroad the news of approaching aid from Russia, and made large requisitions in horses and provisions for the alleged use of the troops of that power. In a few weeks he was at the head of 1500 troops, chiefly horsemen, at the head of which he entered Jassy, and organised his little force in a regular manner, which, with the exception of the second battalion, 600 strong, all consisted of cavalry. Meanwhile the fermentation was extreme throughout all Greece and the isles, and the utmost alarm prevailed at Constantinople. In vain the Russian minister, Baron Strogonoff, gave the Divan the strongest assurance that the imperial government were strangers to the movement, and would in no way whatever countenance it; in vain the Patriarch and Synod of Constantinople issued a proclamation denouncing the insurrection in the most emphatic terms, and calling on all the Greeks to remain faithful in their allegiance to their sovereign. The Ottoman government, now thoroughly alarmed, persisted in regarding the danger as most serious, and in secret instigated by the agents of Russia; and on the 30th March a proclamation was issued by the Divan, ascribing the disorders which had broken out to the distrust which the malversations of the governors of provinces had inspired, and calling on all Mussulmans to forego all the luxuries of life, to provide themselves with arms and horses, and to recur to the life of their ancestors and of camps, the primitive state of the nation.[1]

March 9.

March 21.

March 30.

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 383, 385; Gordon, i. 102, 104.

The first intelligence of these events was brought to the Emperor Alexander in April, at the congress of Laybach,

* "In hoc signo vinces."

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engaged in deliberating with the other sovereigns on the affairs of Spain, Naples, and Piedmont. It may readily be conceived what a prospect was here opened to Russian ambition. The object which the cabinet of St Petersburg had been labouring for a century to attain, seemed now to be placed within its grasp. Turkey, long sinking into decrepitude, now convulsed in its most important provinces by insurrection, seemed to be falling to pieces; the unanimous voice of the Greek nation called upon the Czar to take the lead in their deliverance; nothing, to all appearance, could prevent the conquest of Constantinople, and replacing the cross on the dome of St Sophia. The other nations of Europe were so entirely occupied with their domestic troubles, and the social dangers with which they were threatened from the effects of the Spanish revolution, that no serious resistance to this conquest was to be anticipated from the jealousy which had hitherto alone prevented it. Everything within and without conspired to recommend a forward movement of the Muscovite troops; and there can be no doubt that the crossing of the Pruth by their battalions would have been the signal for a universal insurrection of the Christian population, and the entire expulsion of the Turks from their dominions in Europe.

18. Reasons which urged the Emperor Alexander to intervene in Turkey at this time.

19. Reasons which induced him to remain neutral.

It may readily be conceived that it must have been motives of no ordinary kind which induced the Emperor Alexander at this juncture to forego such manifold advantages, and remain neutral when he had only to give the signal, and the empire of the East must have fallen into his grasp. What those motives were is now known from the best of all sources—his own words, in confidential conversation with M. de Chateaubriand: "The time is past," said he, "when there can be a French, Russian, Prussian, or Austrian policy. One only policy for the safety of all can be admitted in common by all people and all kings. It devolves on me to show myself the first to be convinced of the principles on which the Holy

Alliance is founded. An opportunity presented itself on occasion of the insurrection of the Greeks. Nothing certainly could have been more for my interests, those of my people, and the opinion of my country, than a religious war against the Turks; but I discerned in the *troubles of the Peloponnesus the revolutionary mark. From that moment I kept aloof from them.* Nothing has been spared to turn me aside from the Alliance, but in vain. My self-love has been assailed, my prejudices appealed to, but in vain. What need have I of an extension of my empire? Providence has not put under my orders eight hundred thousand soldiers to satisfy my ambition, but to protect religion, morality, and justice, and to establish the principles of order on which human society reposes." In pursuance of these principles, Count Nesselrode declared officially that "his Imperial Majesty could not regard the enterprise of Ipsilanti as anything but the effect of the exaltation which characterises the present epoch, as well as of the inexperience and levity of that young man, whose name is ordered to be erased from the Russian service." Orders were at the same time sent to the imperial forces on the Pruth and in the Black Sea to observe the strictest neutrality.[1]

[1] Chateaubriand, Congrès de Verone, i. 222; Ann. Hist. iv. 384, 385.

20. Enthusiasm of the Turks, and measures taken against Ipsilanti.

The publication of this resolution on the part of the imperial government was a death-blow to the insurrection in the provinces to the north of the Danube. The tumultuary bands which Theodore and Ipsilanti had raised proved wholly unequal to a contest in the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia with the strength of the Ottomans, now fairly aroused, and stimulated by every feeling of religious zeal and patriotic ardour. The fermentation soon became excessive in Constantinople. Large bodies of Ottomans daily crossed over from Asia Minor, all animated to the very highest degree with fanatical enthusiasm, and loudly demanding to be led instantly against the Giaours, whom they would exterminate to the last man. Nothing would satisfy the populace but

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liberty to massacre the whole Greeks in the capital; and it was only on the earnest remonstrances of the Russian, French, and English ambassadors, that the Divan was prevented from giving the reins to their fury. As it was, they hastened the march of the Asiatic troops through the capital to the Balkan and the Danube, and there was soon accumulated a force with which the Greeks in Moldavia and Wallachia, now discouraged by the policy of Russia, were unable to cope.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 385, 386; Ann. Reg. 1821, 247, 248.

21. Commencement of the insurrection in Greece Proper and the islands.

But while these serious preparations were in progress for crushing the insurgents to the north of the Danube, the insurrection had broken out, and already become formidable, in the Morea and the islands of the Archipelago. COLOCOTRONI, formerly a major in the service of Russia, Peter Mavro, Michael, and other chiefs, who had been prepared for the event, had been collecting arms all winter in the caverns of Mount Taygetus; and having received orders from Ipsilanti no longer to delay their rising, they assembled their followers in the mountains, in the centre of the Peloponnesus, and raised the standard of revolt. In Patras, a strong and important fortress, the revolt burst forth under circumstances peculiarly frightful. The

April 6.

Christians rose in arms, and set fire to the Turkish quarter; the Ottomans retired to the citadel, from whence they kept up an incessant bombardment on the burning city: the contending parties fought with incredible fury in the streets; no quarter was shown on either side; and at length victory declared for the insurgents, in consequence of the arrival of the prelate Germanos with some thousand peasants, half-armed, headed by their priests singing psalms, and promising eternal salvation to such as died combating for the Cross. This reinforcement proved decisive: the Turks were on all sides driven back into the citadel; the town and harbour fell into the hands of the insurgents; the crucifix, amidst boundless joy, was raised in the Place of St George,[2] and a proclamation was issued by the assembled chiefs, which concluded with the

[2] Gordon, i. 147, 149; Ann. Hist, iv. 386, 387.

words—"Peace to the Christians, respect to the consuls, death to the Turks."

1821. 22. The insurrection spreads over all Greece.

The intelligence of this success spread like wildfire through the Morea, and everywhere caused the insurrection to break forth. With incredible enthusiasm the peasants assembled in their vales; old arms were searched for and brought forth; and a variety of skirmishes took place, with various success. The general result, however, was favourable to the insurgents. Gradually the Turks were driven back into their strongholds; and in a few days they possessed nothing in the Morea but the Acro-Corinthus of Corinth, the towns of Coron and Modon, the castle of the Morea, Tripolitza, Napoli di Romania, and the citadel of Patras. Attica followed the example: the Ottoman garrison of Athens, too weak to hold the city, shut itself up in the Acropolis, and the cross was re-erected in the city of Theseus. In the isles the flame spread with still greater rapidity, from the superior security which their insular situation and maritime resources afforded. The peasants in Crete rose, and compelled the Turks to take refuge in their strongholds; the whole islands of the Archipelago hoisted the standard of the Cross; and Hydra, Spezzia, and Ipsara, the strongest and most powerful among them, fitted out armaments with incredible activity, to protect their shores, and intercept the commerce of the enemy.* The chiefs of Peloponnesus soon after assembled at Calamata, in the Morea, from whence they issued a proclamation, in which they stated that they had taken up arms "to deliver the Peloponnesus from the tyranny of the Ottomans;[1] to

April 9. [1] Gordon, i. 144, 149, 163; Ann. Hist. iv. 335, 337, 338.

* "The insupportable yoke of Ottoman tyranny hath weighed down, for above a century, the unhappy Greeks of Peloponnesus. So excessive had its rigour become, that its fainting victims had scarcely strength enough left to utter groans. In this state, deprived of all our rights, we have unanimously resolved to take up arms against our tyrants. Our intestine discord is buried in oblivion, as a fruit of oppression: we breathe the air of liberty; our hands, having burst their fetters, already signalise themselves against the barbarians." —PETROS MAUROMIKLIALES, 28th March 1821. GORDON'S *Greek Revolution*, i. 183.

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restore to its inhabitants their liberty; to combat for it, for their religion, and for that land which had been illustrated by so much genius, and to which Europe is mainly indebted for the light and the blessings of civilisation. We ask nothing in return but arms, money, and councils."

23. Violent excitement at Constantinople, and murder of the Patriarch. April 21.

The intelligence of these events succeeding one another with stunning violence, excited the utmost sensation at Constantinople both among the Greeks and Mussulmans. But the latter, who were a majority of the inhabitants, had the military force at their disposal, and were encouraged by the continual passage of armed and fanatical Turks from Asia towards the Danube, instead of being intimidated by so many and such threatening dangers, were only roused by them to fresh exertions, and inspired with more sanguinary passions. Instant death to the Christians was the universal cry among the Mussulmans. Unable to resist the torrent, and in secret not averse to measures of severity, which, it was hoped, might crush the insurrection in the bud, the Divan resolved on an atrocious act, which, more than anything else, tended to spread and perpetuate the insurrection, and may be regarded as one of the principal causes which hastened the ruin of the Turkish empire. This was the murder of Gregory, Patriarch of Constantinople, a revered prelate, eighty years of age, who was

April 21.

seized on Easter Sunday, as he was descending from the altar, where he had been celebrating divine service, and hanged at the gate of his archiepiscopal palace, amidst the ferocious cries of a vast crowd of Mussulmans. The blameless life and exemplary character of this prelate, the proof of fidelity to the government which he had recently given by his proclamation against the insurgents, the courage he evinced in his last moments, while they were unable to move his enemies, enshrined his memory in the hearts of his grateful countrymen. His blood cemented the foundations of the Christian empire in the East; he might say, with the Protestant

martyr at the stake, "We shall light a fire this day which, by the grace of God, shall never be extinguished." After hanging three hours, the body was cut down and delivered to a few abandoned Jews, by whom it was dragged through the streets, and thrown into the sea. The same night the body was fished up by some zealous Christian fishermen, by whom it was conveyed to Odessa, and interred with great pomp on the 1st July, in presence of all the authorities, and nearly the whole inhabitants of the place.[1]*

[1] Gordon, i. 184, 187; Ann. Hist. iv. 392, 393.

24. Succession of murders by the Turks.

This atrocious murder had been preceded and was soon followed by others equally ruthless, which demonstrated that the Ottoman government was either compelled or inclined to give the reins to the savage passions of the Osmanlis; and that no hope remained to the Greeks but in the most determined resistance. On the 16th, Prince Constantine Morousi, dragoman to the Porte, was seized, and instantly beheaded; and next day ten of the most illustrious persons in the Fanar shared the same fate. At Adrianople, the Patriarch Cyrille, one of the highest functionaries of the Greek Church, and with him eight other dignified ecclesiastics, were beheaded. The Christian churches were everywhere broken open, rifled of all their valuable contents, and exposed in their most sacred recesses to every species of profanation. Not a day passed that numbers of the Greek citizens of the highest rank were not murdered, their property plundered, and their wives and daughters sold as slaves. In ten days several thousand innocent persons were in this manner massacred. To such a length did these cruelties proceed, that, upon the unanimous representation of the

* The Turks alleged to the Russians, in subsequent correspondence on the subject, that the patriarch was put to death because letters, implicating him in the insurrection in the Peloponnesus, had been intercepted the evening before his execution. But this was a mere pretext; for they *never could produce either the originals or copies*, though repeatedly urged to do so. "*De non apparentibus et non existentibus*," says the civil law, "*eadem est ratio*."—*Annual Register*, 1821, p. 253.

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European diplomatists, the grand-vizier was deposed, after having been only ten days in office, on the ground "that his conduct had been too severe." But the removal of this officer made no change in the system of severity which was pursued; on the contrary, it seemed to increase. On the 15th June, five archbishops, three bishops, and a great number of laymen, were hanged in the streets, without any trial, and four hundred and fifty mechanics transported as slaves to the Assyrian frontier; and at Salonica the battlements of the town were lined with a frightful array of Christian heads, the blood from which ran down the front of the rampart, and discoloured the water in the ditch. Similar atrocities were perpetrated in all the great towns of the empire.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 187, 188; Ann. Hist. iv. 391, 393.

25. Vigorous measures of Sultan Mahmoud.

While these atrocious acts of cruelty were disgracing the Ottoman government, and arousing the indignation or awakening the commiseration of the brave and humane in every part of Europe, Sultan Mahmoud, with that mixture of energy with violence, of capacity with cruelty, which formed the distinguishing features of his character, was making head against internal difficulties still more serious than those arising from the Greek revolution, and laying the foundation of a newly organised and more efficient military force in the capital. His chief difficulty was with the janizaries, who, having been excited to the highest degree by the Greek revolution, took the lead in all the massacres and atrocities which were going forward; and, discontented with the removal of the former grand-vizier, who had given the full reins to their fury, loudly demanded his recall to office, and the heads of six of their principal enemies in the council. The Sultan at first tried to subdue them by his firmness; but, destitute of any other armed force, he soon found that such a course could lead to no other result but his own destruction. Accordingly, though more thoroughly convinced than ever of the necessity of getting quit of these unruly defenders, he resolved to dissemble in the mean time, and submit till his prepa-

rations for resistance to their thraldom were complete. In consequence of these resolutions, he distributed great largesses among the troops, to which the new favourite Babu-Bachi added others still more considerable; and the discontents of the entire bands were appeased by a decree, in virtue of which the body of janizaries was to be represented in the Divan by three persons chosen by themselves from among their number. This was followed, a fortnight after, by another decree of the Sultan, agreed to in full Divan, that a large body of troops should be organised in the European fashion, clothed and drilled like the soldiers of western Europe, and that the odious name of *Nizam Djedib*, which had cost the life of Sultan Selim by whom the attempt was first made, should be for ever abolished.[1]

May 5.

June 19.

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 393, 394; Ann. Reg. 1821, 249, 250.

26. Atrocious acts of cruelty in Asia Minor. June 15.

Dreadful as were the cruelties in Europe with which the Turks in its outset met the insurrection, they were exceeded by those perpetrated in Asia, for there the fanatical spirit was more violent, the intercourse with the nations of western Europe less; and the Mussulmans, strong in the consciousness of superior numbers, as well as in the exclusive possession of arms, had no restraint whatever on their atrocities. The deeds of violence perpetrated in Smyrna, always distinguished by the fanatical spirit of its Mussulman inhabitants, threw all others into the shade. From the moment of the breaking out of Ipsilanti's revolt, the Christian inhabitants of that great and flourishing city, who were not more than sixty out of one hundred and eighty thousand inhabitants, were kept in a continual alarm by the dread of a general massacre, which was openly threatened by the Mahommedans; and at length, on the 15th June, it took place under circumstances of unheard of horror. News having arrived of a defeat of the Ottoman fleet off Lesbos, a band of three thousand ruffians broke into the Greek quarter, and commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the inhabitants. The men who could be reached were all put to death;

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the women, especially such as were young and handsome, sold for slaves. The magistrates were cut to pieces because they would not give a written order authorising the general slaughter of the Christians. Several thousands fell under the scimitars of the Moslems; but, during the time required for such wholesale butchery, fifteen thousand of the better class of citizens got on board boats, and found shelter in the islands of the Archipelago. Such as could not escape in this manner, for the most took part refuge in the hotel of M. David, the French consul, whose rooms and gardens were soon filled with a weeping crowd of women and children imploring his protection. His janizaries refused to act against their compatriots, and the doors were on the point of being burst open, when that noble-hearted man, with a single companion, placed himself in the gateway, and at the hazard of his life, and by the mere weight of character and courage, kept the assassins at bay till boats were got which conveyed the trembling crowd to the adjacent islands.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 190, 191; Ann. Hist. iv. 407, 408; Ann. Reg. 1821, 254.

27. Massacres in Cyprus.

This melancholy catalogue of disasters, which proves of what mankind are capable when their passions are let loose by the remissness of government, or excited by its policy, may be concluded with an account of the calamities of Cyprus. That celebrated island, 146 miles in length and 63 in breadth, intersected along its whole extent by a range of central mountains bearing the classic name of Olympus, deserved, if any spot in the globe did, the appellation of an earthly paradise. Its population, however, which was above a million in the time of the ancients, from the effects of Turkish oppression had sunk, when the insurrection in the Morea broke out, to seventy thousand, of whom about one-half were Christians, and the other Mahommedans. Separated by a wide expanse of sea from the mainland of Greece, and blessed with a delicious climate and mild character, the Cypriots remained strangers to the movement for two months after it had elsewhere

commenced. The Mussulman forces in the island were very trifling; Famagusta, so renowned in the wars of the Ottomans with the Knights of Malta, almost in ruins, was garrisoned by only three hundred regular soldiers. In the end of May, however, the massacres commenced. The Porte sent a body of troops from the neighbouring provinces of Syria and Palestine, ten thousand in number, who effected the ruin of the island. Instantly on landing they spread through all the villages, and commenced an indiscriminate massacre and plunder of the Christian inhabitants. The chief towns of the island, Nicosia and Famagusta, were sacked and burnt; the metropolitan, five bishops, and thirty-six other ecclesiastics, executed; and the whole island converted into a theatre of rapine, violation, and bloodshed. The atrocities did not cease till several thousand Christians had fallen by the sabres of the Mussulmans, and their wives and daughters had been conducted in triumph to the Mussulman harems.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 192, 194; Ann. Hist. iv. 411, 413.

28. Universal spread of the insurrection, in Greece.

This dreadful series of atrocities, and especially the murder of the Patriarch, had the effect of spreading the insurrection through the whole of Greece. All saw that no hope remained but in the most determined resistance. The mountainous nature of the country and the entire want of roads rendered it possible to organise the insurrection with impunity in the hill fastnesses, and often enabled the insurgents to take a bloody revenge on their oppressors when they entered them. Besides the Morea, Attica, and the islands of the Archipelago, the flame spread far and wide wherever the Greek tongue was spoken, or Greek feelings cherished. The Souliotes all rose in Epirus, and in conjunction with the Ætolians made themselves masters of the fortress of Salona, and forced the troops of the pacha to shut themselves up in Picorsa and Arta. Six thousand men were soon in arms in Thessaly; the mountaineers of Olympus responded to the signal of freedom, and the insurrection

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spread even into the hill districts of Macedonia. Thirty thousand hardy mountaineers rose in the peninsula of Cassandra, and laid siege to Salonica, the seat of the pacha, a city containing eighty thousand inhabitants; and though they were repulsed in the assault of that place, they took a bloody revenge on the Mussulmans when they pursued them into their hills, and attempted to force the intrenchments which guarded their mountain passes, from which the Turkish hordes recoiled with great slaughter. Meanwhile the genius of poetry, roused as in the days of Tyrtæus at the call of patriotism, made the valleys and hills resound with heart-stirring strains;* and the necessities of men led to the formation of some sort of government amidst the general chaos. At Hydra a board of the principal inhabitants was formed, which soon obtained the direction of the islands: a council of military chiefs at Calamata gave something like unity to the operations of the land forces; and at Athens the venerable walls of the Areopagus beheld a senate established which obtained the shadow of authority over an insurgent people.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 220, 248; Ann. Hist. iv. 403, 405.

* "Δεῦτε παῖδες τῶν Ἑλλήνων."

Thus rendered by the kindred genius of Byron:-

1.

"Sons of the Greeks, arise!
The glorious hour's gone forth,
And, worthy of such ties,
Display who gave us birth.
Sons of Greeks! let us go
In arms against the foe,
Till their hated blood shall flow
In a river past our feet.

2.

"Then manfully despising
The Turkish tyrant's yoke,
Let your country see you rising,
And all her chains are broke.
Brave shades of chiefs and sages,
Behold the coming strife!
Hellénes of past ages,
Oh, start again to life!

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But while the insurrection was thus gathering strength and acquiring consistency in Southern Greece, it received its death-wound in the provinces to the north of the Danube. The support of Russia was indispensable to its establishment in that quarter; for the bands of the Wallachians and Arnauts, imperfectly disciplined and inferior in number, could never contend in the grassy plains with the admirable horsemen of the Osmanlis. This support the policy of Alexander, determined by terror of the Spanish and Italian revolutions, denied them. On the 9th April the Russian consul at Jassy issued, by command of the Emperor, two proclamations, which were decisive of his intentions regarding the insurrection. By the first, Ipsilanti and his partisans were summoned forthwith to repair to the Russian territory, to await the chastisement which awaited them as the disturbers of the public peace, while by the second the whole Moldavians in arms were summoned forthwith to submit to the lawful authorities. At the same time the assemblies of Hetairists, which had

March 29. Official declaration of Russia against Ipsilanti.

April 11.

April 11.

At the sound of my trumpet, breaking
Your sleep, oh, join with me!
And the seven-hilled city seeking,
Fight, conquer, till we're free.
Sons of Greeks, &c.

3.

"Sparta, Sparta, why in slumbers
Lethargic dost thou lie?
Awake, and join thy numbers
With Athens, old ally!
Leonidas recalling,
That chief of ancient song,
Who saved ye once from falling,
The terrible! the strong!
Who made that bold diversion
In old Thermopylæ,
And warring with the Persian
To keep his country free;
With his three hundred waging
The battle, long he stood,
And like a lion raging,
Expired in seas of blood.
Sons of Greeks, &c."

—Byron, iv. 219, 8vo edit.

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been formed on the Pruth in Bessarabia, were ordered to be removed into the interior of Russia. Upon receipt of these proclamations, the hospodars of Wallachia waited on Prince Michael Luzzo, who still held the reins of government, entreating him to leave their territory, which he accordingly did two days afterwards, taking refuge in Odessa: and a deputation was sent from the boyards to Constantinople, imploring the Sultan to appoint a new hospodar.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 389, 390.

30. Treachery and death of Theodore. June 7.

Ipsilanti was in his camp at Messid, on his march to Bucharest, when he received this disastrous intelligence; but he was not discouraged. "None of the sovereigns of Europe," he said, "will venture to declare against us. Who among them will allow history to say of them that he has abandoned Greece at the moment when it was marching to defend that beautiful land against the attacks of barbarians whom civilised Europe abhors?" His followers received his address with loud acclamations, and continued their advance without interruption towards Bucharest, which he reached in a few days, at the head of ten thousand men. From thence he continued his march towards the west, ostensibly to rouse the Servians, but really to be near the Austrian frontier in case of disaster; while Theodore, who remained in command at Bucharest, fortified himself in the convent of Kotroczeni in its neighbourhood, and, despairing of success, openly received with great distinction an envoy of the Sultan, who came to propose terms of accommodation. Soon after, he abandoned Bucharest, which was entered by the Turks on the 28th, and, bending his steps towards Ipsilanti, was by him seized and publicly shot, on the 7th June, for his treachery to the cause of Greece.[2]

April 12.

April 28. June 7.

[2] Ann. Hist. iv. 390, 398; Gordon, i. 104, 103.

31. Defeat of the insurgents at Galatz. May 13.

Meanwhile the Ottomans, having now gathered up their strength, and received large reinforcements, chiefly from the savage and fanatical tribes of Asia, had completed their preparations for the suppression of the rebellion to the north of the Danube. Three corps, of nine

or ten thousand men each, entered the principalities: one under the command of the Pacha of Widdin; one under the Pacha of Silistria; the third under Jussuf Pacha, governor of Brahilov. All were entirely successful. The Pacha of Brahilov came first into action. On the 13th May he came up with a body of six thousand men, with seventeen gun-boats, at Galatz, and after a sharp action of some hours' duration, in which the Turks lost a thousand men, he cut them in pieces, seized all the gunboats, and, entering the town, massacred nearly the whole of the inhabitants. Upon this defeat the Hetairists evacuated Jassy, and the whole of Moldavia was regained to the troops of the Sultan.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 396, 397; Gordon, i. 110.

32. Disasters of Ipsilanti.

Meanwhile Ipsilanti was actively pursued by the Pachas of Widdin and Silistria, to whom, after his victory at Galatz, the Pacha of Brahilov joined his forces. The game was no longer equal, for the Greek force was as much diminished by sickness and desertion as that of the enemy was increased. In addition to this, the Turks had established a secret correspondence with the Arnauts, Pandours, and Wallachians, who composed the bulk of Ipsilanti's army, and who were prepared on the first opportunity to pass over to the enemy. Thus overmatched, the prince retired slowly before the hourly-increasing forces of the enemy: Bucharest was abandoned on the 27th May, and immediately occupied by the Pacha of Silistria. At length, as he could retire no farther, being close upon the Austrian frontier, Ipsilanti resolved to fight; and notwithstanding the great superiority of the Ottoman forces, they would have been defeated, and possibly the Christian throne of Constantinople re-established, had his whole troops remained faithful to their colours. He had disposed his light troops in two wings, so as to envelop the enemy when they advanced to the attack; and the right wing, composed of Moldavians under Georghaki, executed their orders with intrepidity and success;[2] but the other wing, consisting of Arnauts and

May 27.

June 15.

[2] Ann. Hist. iv. 396, 399; Gordon, i. 115, 117.

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Wallachians, instead of doing the same, passed over to the enemy when they approached; others took to flight, and the Greeks, who stood firm, assailed on all sides, were put to the rout, and driven from the field, with the loss of the greater part of their artillery and baggage.

33. His total defeat at Dragaschan. June 19.

This disaster was attended with very little loss of life to the Greeks; but it increased the divisions of their army, discouraged the soldiers, and was the prelude to final ruin. Having collected all his forces, consisting of 4000 infantry, 2500 horse, and four guns, Ipsilanti, who saw that nothing but decisive success could restore his affairs, advanced on the 17th towards the enemy, the vanguard of whom was posted in the village of DRAGASCHAN. His dispositions were made with such ability that the situation of the Turks in the village, on the 18th, seemed hopeless; but as that day was a Tuesday, deemed of sinister augury by the Greeks, he deferred the attack till the following morning. Early on the morning of the 19th, Casavia, who commanded Ipsilanti's advanced guard, commenced the attack with more vigour than discretion. The Sacred Battalion advanced rapidly in support; but when it was seriously engaged, Casavia and his Arnauts fled in the most dastardly manner, leaving the Greeks alone engaged with a greatly superior body of Turkish horse. The "white turbans" were upon them before they had time to form square, but, falling back into knots and little circles, they long maintained the combat with the greatest resolution. At length, their ammunition being exhausted, they were nearly all cut to pieces, combating with heroic courage, like their ancestors at Thermopylæ, to the last man. A hundred horse under George, galloping up, rescued the sacred standard and two guns out of the hands of the enemy; but the destruction of the Sacred Battalion proved fatal to the little army. Twenty-five only of its number were saved from the sabres of the Turks, and escaped with Ipsilanti into Transylvania, where he met a less glorious fate than

his companions, by being consigned to an Austrian dungeon. He published the day after his defeat a valedictory address to his soldiers, inveighing in bitter but not unmerited terms against the treachery of which he had been the victim.* The remainder of his troops dispersed, and the insurrection in Wallachia and Moldavia entirely ceased, except in guerilla bands, who for some time longer maintained a desultory and predatory warfare.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 398, 400; Gordon, i. 120, 124.

34. Naval successes of the Greeks. June 8.

Had this stunning blow, which extinguished the revolt to the north of the Danube, been followed by a similar success in Greece Proper, the insurrection would have been entirely suppressed, and the land of Hellas might have groaned for a century longer under the Ottoman yoke. But Providence had decreed it otherwise; and a series of glorious efforts, though deeply chequered with disaster, at length effected the extrication of Greece from the hands of the barbarians. The first gleam of success, as in the days of Themistocles, came from the sea; the skill and hardihood of the sailors of the Archipelago asserted their superiority over those of Asia, in the days of Sultan Mahmoud, as they had done in those of Xerxes. With such vigour had the inhabitants of Hydra and Ipsara exerted themselves, that they equipped a large fleet of small vessels, armed with ten or fifteen guns each, with which they had obtained

* "Soldiers! I can hardly bring myself to sully that honourable and sacred name by applying it to persons such as you. Henceforth every bond is severed between us; but I shall ever feel profoundly the shame of having been your chief. You have trampled under foot your oaths: you have betrayed your God and your country. You have done so at the very moment when I hoped to conquer or die gloriously with you. We are severed for ever! Go and join the Turks, the only friends worthy of you. Go and purchase slavery at the expense of your blood, and of the honour of your wives and children. But you, shades of the Sacred Battalion, who have been betrayed, and who sacrificed yourselves for the deliverance of your country, receive through me the thanks of your nation. Soon shall monuments render your names immortal. I abandon to the contempt of men, to the Divine justice, to the maledictions of our country, the perjured and cowardly traitors Kaminari, Sawa, Dukas, Constantinos, Basta, Mano, who were the first to desert the army, and induced its dissolution.—ALEX. IPSILANTI.—Rimnick, June 20, 1821."—*Ann. Hist.*, iv. 400.

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the entire command of the Archipelago, and made a great number of rich prizes from the Turks. Samos, a flourishing island, containing forty thousand inhabitants, May 19. had declared for the cause of Greece, and its insurrection had been followed by a general and frightful massacre of the Turkish inhabitants, in retaliation for the cruelties exercised upon the Christians ever since the commencement of the war. To check these incursions, which threatened to intercept the supplies of grain for the capital, the Turks fitted out an expedition, consisting of two ships of the line, three large frigates, and a number of smaller vessels, which set sail from the Dardanelles on the 19th May. It was soon met by the Greek flotilla, which, unable to face the broadsides of its line-of-battle ships in stand-up fight, hovered at a distance, observed its motions, and made preparations by turning several of their old galleys into fireships to effect its destruction on the first favourable opportunity. Such ere long presented June 8. itself. On the 8th June, the Turkish admiral sent a vessel of seventy-four guns towards the Dardanelles, in quest of a reinforcement which he expected under the Capitan Pacha. It was soon followed by the Greek flotilla, and the captain, alarmed at their approach, took refuge in the bay of Adramyti, where his vessel grounded. It was immediately surrounded by the Greeks, who opened a tremendous fire upon it on the bows and stern, to which the stranded vessel could make no reply. After bearing with great resolution this raking fire for several hours, the Turkish seamen took to their boats, and set fire to the vessel, which was totally destroyed. Eight hundred were sunk by the fire of the Greek vessels as they rowed towards the shore; and the Turkish admiral, overwhelmed with consternation at this disaster, took refuge with his whole fleet in the Dardanelles, leaving the command of the Archipelago and the coasts of Greece to the Greek cruisers.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 405, 406; Gordon, i. 168, 170.

This success was of the utmost importance to the cause

of the Greeks, not merely as counterbalancing the disasters to the north of the Danube, but as giving them the entire command of the sea, a matter which has always been of the very highest importance in Hellenic warfare, as transportation by land is so difficult in its rocky territory, and the ocean is the highway leading to its numerous islands and deeply indented bays. Encouraged by their success, the Greeks, after threatening Smyrna, made a descent on the Mosconissi Islands on the 13th June, and having excited an insurrection in Aivaly, the ancient Cydonia, its chief town, containing thirty-six thousand inhabitants, a frightful conflict ensued in the streets, in the course of which fifteen hundred Turks perished, and they were driven out of the town, but not before they had set fire to and burnt it to the ground. The unfortunate inhabitants, deprived of their homes, were transported by the Greek flotilla to Hydra and Ipsara, where they augmented the number, and the recital of their sufferings increased the ardour of the people. About the same time, another division of the Greek fleet forced the passage of the Little Dardanelles, notwithstanding the fire of the Turkish castles; and having made their appearance in the bay of LEPANTO, already so memorable in Christian warfare, an insurrection broke out in MISSOLONGHI, and Anatoliko, which hoisted the Greek flag, and was immediately followed by the defection of the whole of Ætolia and Acarnania.[1]

35. Bloody action in Cydonia, June 15.

[1] Gordon, i. 207, 211; Ann. Hist. iv. 407, 409.

On the mainland the operations of the Greeks were far from being equally successful. Ghourchid Pacha, who commanded the Turks engaged in the siege of Janina, where Ali Pacha, though with very reduced means, still maintained a heroic defence, no sooner heard of the insurrection in the Morea than he detached a large body of men under Jussuf Pacha, who, penetrating the defiles near Corinth, which the Greeks had neglected to occupy, made their way to Patras, the citadel of which was still held by the Turks, and after relieving the

36. Successes of the Turks in the Morea.

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garrison, fell upon the Greeks in the town, on whom they took a bloody revenge for the atrocities committed by them on the Mussulmans at the commencement of the revolution. Fifteen thousand Greeks perished on this occasion, and above twelve hundred found refuge with M. Pouqueville, the French consul. So disheartened were the insurgents in the interior with this disaster, that they nearly all disbanded in the centre of the Morea; and a very little more would at that juncture have entirely crushed the insurrection in Greece. "I," said Colocotroni, "having with me only ten companions, including my horse, sat down in a bush and wept." Driven to extremities, the Greek chiefs at length agreed to fight a last battle for the independence of their country, and for that purpose took up a position at VALTEZZA, a village situated in the hills, three hours' march to the north-west of Tripolitza, and possessing great natural strength. Kihaya Bey issued from Tripolitza to attack them at the head of five thousand Turks, chiefly horse, and he entertained such confident hopes of success, that the soldiers had performed military dances in the streets of Tripolitza, before setting out, in token of approaching victory. In truth, the situation of the Greeks was all but desperate; for although the position they occupied was very strong, yet it had no water, and the water-casks in the village were only adequate for twenty-four hours' consumption.[1]

[1] Lac. iii. 121; Gordon, i. 157, 160; Ann. Hist. iv. 407, 409.

37. Battle of Valtezza. May 27.

The Turks approached the Greek position on the 27th May; and the action which ensued may well be dignified with the name of a battle, for although there were not five thousand men on each side, it determined the independence of Greece. The main body of the Greeks, supported by a few guns, which were placed on intrenchments hastily constructed, was posted in the village; but a body of fifteen hundred light troops, under Colocotroni, were stationed, unknown to the Ottomans, in the mountains on their right. The Greek fire was answered by discharges from the Turkish guns, which, being placed on lower

ground, passed over the enemies' heads. Three times were the Turks and Albanians repulsed in their attack on the village, and Colocotroni having descended with his men on the flank of the assailants, an obstinate conflict ensued, which continued two days, and was at length determined in favour of the Greeks by the appearance of Niketas, who came up with eight hundred followers by a forced march from Argos, and threatened to cut off the retreat of the Turks to Tripolitza. The retreat soon turned into a total rout; the Greeks took two guns, and raised a trophy of four hundred Mahommedan heads. Their own loss was only one hundred and fifty men. Three days afterwards, the Turks, having issued from Tripolitza, were May 31. again defeated, and driven back into the fortress on the rocky heights, around which the insurgents immediately took post. These successes, though gained by such small bodies of men, were of the utmost importance, as counterbalancing the moral effect of the disaster at Dragaschan; for had a similar defeat been experienced at that time in the Morea, the insurrection would have been crushed. Instead of this, the peasants now joyfully flocked to the standards of the Cross; twenty thousand men were soon in arms in Peloponnesus; and the Turks, cautiously keeping on the defensive, remained shut up in their fortresses, two of which, Navarino and Napoli di Malvasia, capitulated Aug. 9. from famine in the beginning of August. The capitulation, however, was violated by the fury of the Greek soldiers, who broke into the towns and massacred several of the prisoners—an atrocity which so shocked Demetrius Ipsilanti, brother of the generalissimo, who had come to the Morea to take the command, that he threw it up. This menace had the desired effect, and the chiefs, seeing the necessity of establishing some sort of government, assembled at Calamata to concoct measures for its formation.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 414, 416; Gordon, i. 154, 162.

Meanwhile the Turks, having collected considerable forces at Salonica, had forced the passes of Cassandra, and spread fire and sword through its peaceful valleys;

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38. Raising of the siege of Athens, and defeat of the Turks in Thermopylæ.

Aug. 29.

Sept. 6.

while large bodies of horse scoured all the plains of Thessaly and Bœotia, and, advancing almost without opposition, ravaged Attica, and raised the siege of the Acropolis of Athens, after it had continued eighty-three days. This disaster, however, was soon after compensated by a brilliant success. Odysseus, a brave Greek chief, after having worsted the Turks in several lesser encounters, fell back on the 6th September to the Straits of Thermopylæ (what magic in the name!) with 2000 men, where he was attacked by three pachas, who advanced from Larissa at the head of 5000 Mussulmans, chiefly Asiatics. The advantageous position of the Greeks, who were posted as tirailleurs among the rocks and thickets of that celebrated defile, compensated the inequality of numbers and want of artillery. The column of the Ottomans, encumbered, like its predecessors in the days of Xerxes, with baggage, was slowly advancing through the bottom of the defile, when it was suddenly assailed by a tremendous fire of musketry from an unseen enemy. Pushed on, however, by the troops behind, the column continued to advance, though sustaining a heavy loss, until they were attacked in flank by a body of four hundred Greeks under Lapas. Issuing then from their thickets, the insurgents rushed down the steep declivity, sword in hand, with loud cries, shouting "Victory to the Cross!" The shock was irresistible: panic-struck, the Turks fled on all sides, and were pursued several miles with immense slaughter. Twelve hundred were slain on the spot, seventeen standards and seven guns taken, and such was the consternation of the Ottomans that they broke down the bridge of Alamanne in their flight to Zeitoun. Two days after they were again defeated by Odysseus, with the loss of four hundred men and three guns; and the Turks in Attica, under Omer-Vrione, who had raised the siege of Athens, deprived of the expected succour, evacuated that country, and with great difficulty made their way by mountain paths into Thessaly;[1] and the

Sept. 8.

Dec. 17.

[1] Gordon, i. 278, 283; Ann. Hist. v. 418, 419.

Greeks, reoccupying Athens, after some unsuccessful attempts at escalade, resumed the blockade of the Acropolis.

39. Siege of Tripolitza: its description.

This brilliant affair, which was of great importance to the Greeks, by entirely ruining the enemy's plan of the campaign, was soon after followed by another of still more importance, in a military point of view, though not hallowed by such classical recollections. Demetrius Ipsilanti, who had been induced, by the formation of something like a regular government in the military council at Calamata, to resume the command, found himself at the head of nearly seven thousand men after the impulse given to the cause by the battle of Valtezza, and laid siege to Tripolitza. This fortress, standing on a cold and naked plain elevated two thousand six hundred feet above the sea, in the very centre of the Morea, and surrounded by peaks three thousand feet higher, was, previous to the war, inhabited by fifteen thousand persons, of whom one-half were Greeks. It was surrounded by a stone wall fourteen feet in height, with a double row of loop-holes for musketry, on which were planted thirty pieces of cannon. At its western extremity was a regular citadel, with bomb-proof casemates, but commanded by an eminence in its vicinity. The population of the town was doubled by the reflux of Turkish families to this stronghold, when the Greeks got the command of the open country; and when the blockade began to be straitened, in the end of August, thirty thousand mouths required to be fed, though not more than eight thousand sabres and bayonets could be relied on for a fight.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 233, 238; Ann. Hist. iv. 420, 421.

40. Progress of the siege.

Sept. 3.

The powerful cavalry of the Turks for a considerable time kept the besiegers at bay, and enabled their own horses to forage in the plain. But Colocotroni, who commanded the besieging force, having established himself in some houses which commanded the pasture-grounds, the Ottoman horses were restricted to the withered herbage at the bottom of the rampart, in consequence of

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which they soon all died or became unserviceable. Shortly after, news arrived of the victory gained at Thermopylæ, and from Epirus, that Chourchid Pacha was so engaged with the siege of Janina that he was unable to send any succours to the Morea. This intelligence brought a great number of recruits to the standard of Colocotroni, eager to share in the spoils of Tripolitza, and he soon found himself at the head of ten thousand men; and a few battering cannon were brought from the islands, and dragged by the peasants up to the plain which surrounded the fortress, but their fire did little execution, and was overmatched by the guns of the place. Famine and disease, however, soon made sad ravages among the crowded inhabitants in the town; and as this gave rise to frequent conversations about a capitulation, the Turkish commander, who confidently hoped to be relieved, put to death eighty Christian priests held as hostages in the town, in order to convince the garrison they had no chance of safety but in the most determined resistance. This severity led to a frightful reprisal, which, as usual, involved the innocent and guilty in promiscuous ruin, and affixed the first dark stains on the cause of Greek independence.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 237, 242; Ann. Hist. iv. 420, 421.

41. Storm and massacre of Tripolitza. Oct. 5.

On the 5th October, while conferences between the chiefs on the two sides were still going on, some Turkish sentinels having, for the sake of buying grapes, permitted a few Greeks to approach the wall, the latter, perceiving that it was negligently guarded, applied scaling-ladders, and soon got to the top. A whole company, with Captain Kephalas at its head, speedily followed, hoisted the *Labarum*, or Christian standard, on the tower of Argos, and turned the guns planted on it on the town. As soon as the standard of the cross was seen on the walls, a tumultuous cheer rang round the Christian lines, and a general rush was made towards the rampart. Panic-struck, the Turks everywhere left the wall, and the assailants got possession of some of the gates, and rushed

in. A scene ensued which baffles all description, and forcibly recalled to mind the most terrible pictures of human woe which the genius of antiquity has left to fascinate all future generations of men. The wrongs and cruelties of four centuries rose up in judgment against the Ottomans; retaliation, cruel and undistinguishing, was the universal passion—*væ victis* the universal cry. The conquerors, mad with vindictive rage, spared neither age nor sex; the young and the old, the armed and the unarmed, men and women, the Mahommedans and the Jews, were promiscuously massacred. The Albanians, fifteen hundred in number, retired into the court of the pacha's palace, and there claimed and obtained performance of the capitulation. They were marched out, set apart in Colocotroni's camp, and, a few days after, departed in safety to their homes. But, with this exception, the massacre was universal; flames soon broke forth in many places; the streets and houses were literally inundated with blood, and obstructed with heaps of dead bodies. The Greek chiefs in vain endeavoured to restore order, the infuriated soldiery listened only to the voice of passion: the slaughter continued through the whole night by the light of the burning houses; it went on all the next day; and when it ceased at length, by the exhaustion of the victors, nine thousand bodies, of all ages and sexes, encumbered the streets of Tripolitza.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 243, 245; Ann. Hist. iv. 420, 421; Ann. Reg. 1821, 147, 149.

42. Importance of the conquest, and subsequent measures of the Greeks.

Though disgraced by such frightful cruelty, the sad result of the war of extermination which had begun between the Greeks and Turks, the capture of Tripolitza was an event of the very highest importance to the Greek cause. They found there a considerable train of artillery, arms and ammunition in abundance, and immense treasures, the long accumulations of Ottoman rapine, which laid the foundation of some of the principal fortunes in the Morea. The army which had taken Tripolitza, after its important conquest, was divided into two parts: one-half sat down before the Acro-Corinthus of Corinth, which

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stronghold, commanding the entrance into the Morea, surrendered in the middle of November; while the other

Nov. 15. went to reinforce the troops under the Archbishop Germanos, which were blockading the citadel of Patras, where Jussuf Pacha, having been strongly reinforced by succours from the army besieging Janina, had become very audacious, and had defeated the Greeks in several sorties. Meanwhile the Sultan, irritated rather than discouraged by the defeat his fleet had sustained at sea in the beginning of summer, fitted out a new squadron in the Dardanelles, which put to sea in the beginning of July, and being much stronger than any the Greeks could oppose to it, arrived in safety in the harbour of Rhodes, where it effected a junction with the Egyptian fleet. The combined squadrons, consisting of four ships of the line

Oct. 22. and seventy smaller vessels, made sail for the Morea, where they revictualled all the blockaded fortresses having harbours, and regained the shelter of the Dardanelles in the end of October, closely watched by the Greek fleet, which, without venturing to hazard a general engagement, prevented the Ottoman squadron from effecting anything else. On the 24th November, the fleet re-entered the harbour of Constantinople, exhibiting as its only prizes thirty Greek sailors hanging from the yard-arm of one of the vessels. So elated was the Sultan, however, with the success of this maritime promenade, that he promoted the admiral, Kara Ali, to the rank of Capitan Pacha! Woeful picture of national decline, when escape from defeat is considered equivalent to victory![1]

[1] Gordon, i. 247, 253; Ann. Hist. iv. 422, 423.

43. Fresh massacre of the Christians in Smyrna.

The intelligence of the disasters sustained by the Turks in the Morea, and the entire ruin of their trade by the Greek cruisers, again roused the Mahommedan population of Smyrna to a state of perfect frenzy. The wine-shops were filled from morning to night with armed bands of Asiatics, threatening instant death and total extermination to the Christians. The European consuls presented

Nov. 2. an energetic note to the Turkish governor, representing

the frightful consequences which would ensue if these disorders were not repressed; but in vain. The Asiatics broke loose; above a thousand Christians were massacred in the following days; and the slaughter would have been much greater if the majority of the Christians had not found an asylum on board the French fleet, which fortunately lay at anchor in the roads at the time. At length, on the joint representation of the French and English consuls and the French admiral, an order was issued from the governor, closing the coffeehouses and spirit-shops, ordering the Asiatic troops to quit the city, and the Franks not to bear arms openly in the streets, by which means the massacre was stopped.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 424; Gordon, i. 256, 258.

44. Operations of Chourchid Pacha before Janina. Fall and recapture of Arta.

While these important events were in progress in Asia and southern Greece, Chourchid Pacha, commanding the army before Janina, justified the high confidence which the Sultan reposed in him. Though obliged to detach largely into the Morea and northern Greece, he never lost sight of his main object, the destruction of Ali Pacha. This old and savage chieftain, in the last extremity, justified his surname of the "Lion of Janina." Shut up with not more than four thousand followers in his impregnable fortress in the lake, he continued his obstinate resistance, though he amused his besiegers with delusive offers of accommodation. Chourchid's chief difficulty was to preserve his lines of communication through the mountains, which were beset by twelve thousand Greeks and Souliotes, from whom he sustained, in the beginning of September, a bloody defeat in the defiles of Mount Pindus. Having received a reinforcement, however, of eight thousand men soon after, his force was raised to thirty thousand men, with which he both continued the blockade of Janina, and kept up his communication with Arta, Prevesa, and the sea, though not without extreme difficulty, from the incursions of the hardy mountaineers. Hassan Pacha, alarmed at the dangers of his situation in Arta, set out with all his forces, in order to force his way

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1821. Sept. 12. through the defiles to Janina; but he was met in the defiles of Pindus by MARK BOZZARIS, a chieftain destined to future glory, and driven back with great slaughter to Arta. Chourchid, however, was not discouraged, and by repeated efforts he succeeded in re-establishing his communication with Arta. There, however, the Turks, under the command of four pachas, were soon vigorously assailed by Bozzaris at the head of his brave Souliotes, who, after driving them back into the fortress, at length carried it

Nov. 25. by assault. The greater part of the garrison found refuge in the citadel, which still held out; but all the stores and treasures of the four pachas fell into the hands of the Greeks, to whom they proved of essential service. They held their conquest, however, only for

Dec. 17. three weeks. At the end of that time it was regained by Omer-Vrione, who was detached by Chourchid Pacha from before Janina, and the heads of the two pachas, who had sought refuge in the citadel, were sent to the Sultan, by whom they were displayed at the gates of the Seraglio.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 258, 271; Ann. Hist. iv. 427, 429.

45. Failure of the Greeks before Napoli di Romania and Patras.

The Greeks, who now began to feel the effects of the divisions consequent in all insurrections on success, were far from making that use of their victory at Tripolitza which might have been expected, or, with more unanimity, might have been effected. Ipsilanti took the command of the army before Napoli di Romania, and prosecuted the siege with great vigour, in hopes of effecting the reduction of that important stronghold before the garrison was revictualled by sea in the following spring. This celebrated fortress, which in situation very closely resembles Gibraltar, is extremely strong, and by a few additions might be rendered impregnable. The citadel of Palamido, situated on a frowning rock eight hundred feet high, the base of which is washed by the sea, seemed almost beyond the reach of attack; and though the garrison consisted only of one thousand five hundred men, encumbered with ten times that number of useless mouths,

yet there were four hundred guns mounted on the ramparts, and the main warlike stores of the Turks were deposited within its walls. Animated by the hopes of gaining so rich a prize, the Greeks, on the night of the 15th December, attempted an escalade. So excessive was the negligence of the Turks that it had very nearly succeeded; and with more unanimity and resolution on the part of the besiegers, it unquestionably would have done so. But some of the assaulting parties refused to advance, others failed, and the attack was repulsed, after which the siege was turned into a mere blockade. At the same time, the insurgents experienced a severe check in the ruins of Patras. Encouraged by the fall of Tripolitza, a body of five thousand Peloponnesians, by a sudden assault, made themselves masters of the town, and remained there, blockading the citadel, till the beginning of December. Then Jussuf Pacha, observing how bad a look-out the Greeks kept, and knowing how completely their chiefs were divided, marched from the Morea Castle with four hundred men, and, aided by a sally from the citadel, drove the Greeks out of the town. Mavrocordato and the generals escaped with difficulty to Argos, but the greater part of the insurgents in the town were destroyed; and the Turks immediately commenced the destruction of what remained of the buildings, in order to prevent them from again becoming a shelter to the enemy.[1]

Dec. 15.

Nov. 3.

Dec. 3.

[1] Gordon, i. 289, 301.

46. Forcing of the line of Cassandra. Nov. 11.

While these important events, big with the future fate of old Hellas, were in progress in the Morea, the Greeks experienced a dreadful reverse in the peninsula of Cassandra. The position of that mountain ridge, washed by the waters of the Archipelago, and its close vicinity to the important town and harbour of Salonica, the centre of all the operations of the Turks in that quarter, rendered it an object of the highest importance to the Turks to extinguish the insurrection in its fastnesses. Accordingly, during the whole of October, large bodies of Asiatics were brought over from Smyrna, and on the 11th

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1821. Nov. 11. November, on a signal given by the discharge of a bomb, the Ottoman horde, ten thousand strong, rushed to the assault. Although the Greeks defended their intrenchments bravely, yet such was the fury of the onset, and the superiority of numbers on the part of the assailants, that they were broken through in several places, and at these openings the savage multitude rushed in with irresistible fury. It soon was no longer a battle, but a massacre. Such of the Greeks as could escape saved themselves in the mountains; but above three thousand fell under the Mussulman scimitars, and ten thousand women and children, with thirty thousand head of cattle, were taken and publicly sold in the market-place of Salonica. Taking advantage of the consternation produced by this dreadful event, the victorious pacha advanced to Mount Athos, where the trembling monks, though placed in their almost inaccessible eyries, were too happy to accept the proffered capitulation, by which they saved their lives and property on payment of 250,000 piastres a-year (£20,000.)[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 427, 428.

47. Operations in Crete. To complete the picture of this memorable year, it only remains to notice the operations in Crete. The mountaineers there, albeit endowed by nature with mild and pacific constitutions, were all in arms in consequence of the dreadful exactions and cruelty of the Turks, and the latter had brought over large bodies of Asiatics to complete their destruction. The Sfakiotes, a hardy race, whose position in the hills had hitherto saved them in a great measure from the tyranny of the Ottomans, defeated them in an action at

July 3. Soulo, near Canea, upon which the Turks massacred all the Christians in Candia, and seven hundred more in other towns in the island. All the bishops perished. The Sfakiotes, however, were not discouraged, but made several incursions into the plains, from whence they returned laden with the spoils of their oppressors to their mountains. Upon this, the Turks brought over ten

thousand Asiatic janizaries, who penetrated into their fastnesses, and stormed Therissow, their principal stronghold, laying waste everything with fire and sword; but want of provisions soon obliged them to retire, and the Sfakiotes again resumed their incursions. The revolt upon this spread universally over the island, and the Turks were obliged to take refuge in Canea, where, towards the end of autumn, they suffered severely from dysentery and other diseases.[1]

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[1] Gordon, i. 301, 309; Ann. Hist. iv. 429, 431.

48. War with Persia.

While the southern parts of the Ottoman dominions were thus the theatre of a frightful civil war, and the Turks, after many vicissitudes of fortune, were losing their hold of the richest and finest part of their territory, they were threatened with external danger both in the east and north scarcely less alarming. The Persians, deeming a rupture between Russia and the Porte inevitable, and probably secretly instigated by the agents of the Czar, declared war against Turkey in the beginning of August, and immediately invaded the pachalic of Bagdad with thirty thousand men. Although no great success attended their arms, yet it operated as an important diversion in favour of the Greeks, as it obliged the Sultan to employ an equal force in defence of his eastern dominions. Affairs also had become so threatening with Russia that an immediate rupture seemed inevitable, and the Turkish dominions, threatened alike in the south, the north, and the east, seemed doomed to destruction.[2]

Aug. 3.

[2] Ann. Hist. iv. 426, 428.

49. Angry negotiations with Russia.

Notwithstanding the determination of the Emperor Alexander to abstain from all interference with the Greek insurrection, it was inevitable that during the progress of the contest various points of dispute should arise between the two powers at St Petersburg and Constantinople. They were not long, accordingly, in showing themselves. M. Danesi, the banker to the Russian embassy, was arrested early in June, ostensibly for a debt of 300,000 piastres (£3000), but really for having furnished funds to the Greek insurgents; and notwithstanding the remon-

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strances of M. Strogonoff, the Russian ambassador, who reclaimed him as forming part of the embassy, sentenced to be beheaded, from which he only escaped by going into exile. Hardly was this subject of discord appeased when another and more serious one arose, in consequence of the Porte having issued an order that all neutral vessels passing the Dardanelles should be searched, and prohibiting the exportation of grain through the canal of the Bosphorus. These orders were vehemently opposed by the Russian minister, as interfering with the rights of the Russian merchants in the Black Sea; and as strongly maintained by the Sultan, as necessary to prevent succours being conveyed to the Greeks under the Russian flag, and within the acknowledged rights of a belligerent power. The execution of the Patriarch, and the frightful massacres in Constantinople and other chief towns of the empire, were next made the subject of well-founded complaints on the part of the Russian ambassador, to which the Divan replied by remonstrances founded on the asylum afforded at Odessa to the Greeks who had escaped from them, and the right of every government to repress rebellion among its subjects by every means in its power. M. Strogonoff next protested against the entry of the Turkish forces into the principalities, which was entirely disregarded; declared that, as long as the Turkish government continued, the Russians would never refuse an asylum to any Greek who might demand it; and that, if the system of violence continued, he would break off all diplomatic intercourse with the Porte. To all these remonstrances the answer constantly made was, that no foreign power had a right to interfere between the Turkish government and its own subjects, and that the insurrection could be subdued in no other way.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 394, 397; Gordon, i. 195, 197.

These angry recriminations continued through the whole of May and June; and at length, in the middle of July, matters came to such a point that M. Strogonoff shut himself up in his palace at Buysekdere, and deli-

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50. Russian ultimatum, and its refusal by the Divan. July 18.

vered the ultimatum of the Russian government to the Porte, which was required to be accepted unconditionally within eight days, failing which he was to take his departure with his whole suite. The conditions exacted by Russia did not consist in any cession of fortresses or provinces, but in reparation for the insults offered to the Greek religion, expiation for the murder of its Patriarch, and the adoption of a more humane system of warfare in the contest with its Christian subjects.* If these terms were not acceded to within the prescribed time, the Porte was openly menanced with the utmost hostility of Russia, and the support of the Greeks by the forces of entire Christendom. No answer was returned by the Divan to this menacing communication, and the eight days allowed having expired, Baron Strogonoff applied for his passports. July 26. He was at first threatened with being sent to the Seven Towers, and the Asiatic hordes loudly demanded the instant adoption of that severity; but the entire diplomatic body having protested against the recurrence to that barbarous usage, the passports demanded were delivered to him, and he set sail, with all his suite, and several

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 413, 415; Gordon, i. 193, 199.

* "Que les églises détruites ou pillées soient renouvelées sur le champ, et mises en état de servir à leur sainte destination ; que S. H., en rendant à la religion chrétienne ses prérogatives, en lui accordant la même protection que par le passé, en lui garantissant son inviolabilité à l'avenir, s'efforce de consoler l'Europe du supplice du Patriarche de Constantinople, et des profanations qui ont suivi sa mort ; qu'une sage et équitable distinction s'établisse entre les auteurs des troubles, les hommes qui y prenaient part, et ceux que leur innocence doit mettre à l'abri de la sévérité du Divan ; qu'à cet effet, on ouvre un avenir de paix et de tranquillité aux Grecs qui seront restés soumis, ou qui se soumettront, dans un délai donné ; et, qu'en tout état des choses, on se ménage les moyens de distinguer les innocens des coupables. Que si le Gouvernement Turc témoignait, contre toute attente, que c'est par suite d'un plan librement arrêté qu'il prend des mesures touchant lesquelles le Soussigné lui a déjà exposé l'opinion de son Auguste Maître, il ne resterait à l'Empereur qu'à déclarer, dès à présent, à la Sublime Porte qu'elle se constitue en état d'hostilité ouverte contre le monde chrétien, qu'elle légitime la défense des Grecs, qui dès-lors combattraient uniquement pour se soustraire à une perte inévitable ; et que, vu le caractère de leur lutte, la Russie se trouverait dans la stricte obligation de leur offrir asile parce qu'ils seraient persécutés ; protection, parce qu'elle en aurait le droit ; assistance, conjointement avec toute la Chrétienté, parce qu'elle ne pourrait pas livrer ses frères de religion à la merci d'un aveugle fanatisme."—*Note de M. le Baron* STROGONOFF, July 18, 1821. *Annuaire Historique*, iv. 413, 414.

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Greek families who had taken refuge in the Russian embassy, for Odessa on the last day of July.

51. Ultimatum of the Turks. July 31.

After the Russian ambassador had taken his departure, the Sublime Porte despatched a messenger to St Petersburg with an answer to the Czar's ultimatum, which was ante-dated 26th July, the last day assigned for its reception. In this state paper, which was very ably drawn, the Sultan, without disputing the truth of the charges made against him—which, in truth, were so notorious that they could not be denied—contented himself with throwing the destruction of the churches on the violence of the dregs of the people, who had been excited to madness by the Greek insurrection, justified the execution of the Patriarch by the alleged discovery of letters which implicated him in the insurrection in the Morea, vindicated the entry of the Ottoman troops into the principalities by the obvious necessity of extinguishing a dangerous rebellion, and the general arming of the Mussulmans by the threatening and undeniable danger of the Ottoman empire; finally, the note stated that orders had been given for reconstructing the churches which had been demolished, and promising, on the Greek refugees being delivered up, to execute rigorously and faithfully the whole treaties with the cabinet of St Petersburg.[1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 413, 416; Réponse à la Note de M. Strogonoff, July 26, 1821; Ibid., iv. 656, 659.

According to the known usages of European diplomacy, the departure of the Russian ambassador from Constantinople was tantamount to a declaration of war between the two powers; and consternation was universal

* "Que tous les individus punis à la suite de l'insurrection, et surtout le Patriarche Grec et autres prélats, n'avaient subi que la peine qu'ils avaient méritée d'après le droit que tout Gouvernement a de faire arrêter et punir sans miséricorde, sans distinction de religion ou de condition, de pareils malfaiteurs, afin de maintenir le bon ordre dans ses états et parmi le peuple.

"Que les insultes faites à quelques Eglises Grecques n'étaient que des désordres commis par des réprouvés de la lie du peuple.

"Que l'adoption de la vie des camps au lieu de celle des villes, et l'armement général de la Nation Mussulmane, n'étaient que des mesures indispensables pour le maintien du bon ordre intérieur, et ne regardait en rien les puissances amies ni les divers classes des Rayahs non coupables.

"Que les instructions données au commandant des troupes envoyées par la

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52. Efforts of Lord Strangford, the English minister, to avert a rupture.

among the Christian inhabitants that this would lead to a general massacre of them, as it had done at Smyrna, Salonica, and several other places. In effect, it was very near occurring, for the Asiatic troops, as soon as the departure of the Russian embassy was known, began to parade the streets, and call on the people to rise and exterminate the Christians without mercy or distinction. Multitudes, apprehending instant death, took refuge in the hotels of the ambassadors of the neutral powers; and fortunately the English ambassador, Lord Strangford, enjoyed at that period the highest consideration with the Porte, and employed his great influence and abilities to avert a rupture, and bring the Divan back to sentiments of moderation, and a just appreciation of the difficulties with which they were surrounded. In this praiseworthy attempt he was cordially seconded by the ministers of France and Austria, and at length, by their united efforts, a decree was obtained from the Porte commuting the punishment of Danesi into exile, taking off the embargo which had been laid on Russian vessels, and promising an amnesty to such of the Greeks as should submit within a short period.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 415; Note de la Porte Ottomane a Lord Strangford, Dec. 2, 1821; Ibid., iv. 663.

It was not so easy a matter, however, to appease the violence of the people as to bring back the Divan to sentiments of moderation; and the fermentation was such at Constantinople, all the autumn and winter, that a general massacre was hourly expected. Bands of Asiatics, worked up to the last point of religious fanaticism

Porte en Valachie et Moldavie n'avaient d'autre but que de réduire les rebelles et d'en purger les provinces, dont on ne voulait ni changer l'ordre ni abolir les privilèges.

"Qu'aussitôt que la tranquillité aurait été rétablie, que le ci-devant Prince de Moldavie, Michel Suzzo, et ses adhérens, qui se sont évadés avec lui, ainsi que ceux des scélérats qui auront pu s'enfuir sur le territoire Russe ou Autrichien, auraient été remis au Gouvernement Turc, ou bien publiquement punis sur les lieux mêmes où ils ont été saisis, la Sublime Porte procéderait immédiatement à l'installation des Hospodars, et mettrait le plus grand soin à faire observer les anciennes conventions et à maintenir les privilèges des deux provinces comme dans le passé."—*Réponse du Divan à l'Ultimatum de M. le Baron* STROGONOFF, July 26, 1821. *Annuaire Historique*, iv. 656, 660, Appendix.

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53. Alarming state of Constantinople, and efforts of the ambassadors. Dec. 2.

and savage fury, were continually traversing the streets, singing exciting songs, and calling on the janizaries to rise and complete the destruction of the infidels. To such a pitch did the disorders arise that the janizaries openly demanded the head of the new favourite, Halal-Effendi, who was thought to be too much inclined to moderate measures, and even of Abdul-Ahmed, the son of the Sultan, and sole heir of the empire. The popular fury was only appeased by the daily sight of a number of Christians hung in the streets, and a long row of heads displayed every morning at the gates of the Seraglio. At length Lord Strangford prevailed on the Divan to abate somewhat of their unbending attitude, and open the door, if not to accommodation, at least to renewed negotiations, by an ultimatum on their part, in which they consented to adjourn the demand for the surrender of the refugees, but refusing to withdraw their troops from the principalities till the rebellion was entirely put down, and then to maintain such troops in them as might be deemed necessary to maintain their tranquillity.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 434, 436; Note de la Porte, Dec. 2, 1821; Ann. Hist. iv. 663.

54. Formation of a constitution, and proclamation of independence of Greece.

The commencement of the year 1822 was signalised by an event of no ordinary importance in this contest: the formation of a regular government, and the proclamation of national independence in Greece. During the month of November preceding, a congress of chiefs and deputies assembled from all parts of Greece in Argos, which afterwards transferred its sittings to Epidaurus, and there a constitution was drawn up, and the national INDEPENDENCE PROCLAIMED. The act proclaiming it, signed by sixty-seven members of the congress, is remarkable as containing a forcible and not exaggerated statement of the dreadful nature of the oppression under which the nation had laboured, the reasons which had induced or rather compelled them to take up arms, and the grand object of national independence for which they contended,—very different from the democratic dreams

which at the same time were agitating the states of western Europe.* The constitution proclaimed—which, in default of heirs of the old Byzantine emperors, was perhaps the only one which could at that period be adopted—was very similar to that of the Directory which for a few years governed France: civil and religious liberty, security to person and property, equal eligibility to office, the independence of the judicial body, were duly provided for. The supreme legislative power was vested in a senate elected by the people, conjointly with an executive council appointed by the senate. This council, in whom the entire direction of affairs was vested, consisted of five members; it declared peace and war, and was invested with the supreme direction of affairs; but its members were elected only for a year, and were amenable to the senate for misconduct in duty. Prince Mavrocordato was unanimously elected the first president: the council immediately entered upon the discharge of its duties; and the congress, having accomplished its task of forming a constitution, declared itself dissolved. The seat of government was soon after transferred to Corinth, the citadel of which had just capitulated. It is easy to see the ideas of the French Revolution here germinating in the minds of a nation struggling for existence: and cer-

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* La Nation Grècque prend le ciel et la terre à témoin que, malgré le joug affreux des Ottomans, qui la menaçait de son dépérissement, elle existe encore. Pressée par les mesures aussi iniques que destructives, que ces tyrans féroces, après avoir violé leurs capitulations ainsi que tout esprit d'équité, rendaient de plus en plus oppressives, et qui ne tendaient à rien moins qu'à l'anéantissement entier du peuple soumis, elle s'était trouvée dans la nécessité absolue de courir aux armes, pour mettre à l'abri sa propre conservation. Après avoir repoussé la violence par le seul courage de ses enfans, elle déclare aujourd'hui devant Dieu et devant les hommes, par l'organe de ses représentans légitimes, réunis dans ce congrès national convoqué par le peuple, son Indépendance Politique.

"Loin d'être fondée sur des principes de démagogie et de rébellion, loin d'avoir pour motifs les intérêts particuliers de quelques individus, cette guerre est une guerre *nationale et sacrée;* elle n'a pour but que la restauration de la nation et sa réintégration dans les droits de propriété, d'homme, et de vie, droits qui sont le partage des peuples policés nos voisins, mais qui étaient arrachés aux Grecs par une puissance spoliatrice."—*Déclaration d'Indépendance*, Epidaure, Jan. 27, 1822. *Annuaire Historique*, iv. 679, Appendix.

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tainly its authors seem to have been thinking more of the rights of man than of averting the sabres of the Osmanlis. Yet it is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the brave men who, when their chief fortresses were still in the hands of the enemy, still reeking with the blood of their best and bravest citizens, and when Mahommedan fanaticism was roused to the highest pitch for their destruction, ventured, with the resources of seven hundred thousand men, to throw down the gauntlet to a power possessing thirty millions, and before which all Christendom had so often trembled.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 328, 329; Constitution de la Grèce; Ibid., iv. 675, 679.

55. Capitulation of Ali Pacha.

The Christian cause, thus irrevocably engaged, sustained, however, a grievous blow in the early part of this year by the destruction of Ali Pacha, who, although still a Mahommedan, and distrusted alike by the Greeks and Souliotes, had hitherto operated as a most important diversion, by retaining so large a portion of the Ottoman forces round his wave-encircled walls. Notwithstanding the courage and energy of the veteran pacha, who boasted in his inaccessible fortress in the lake that his enemies would find "that the bear of Pindus was still alive," his resources were daily declining. For more than three months he had been closely blockaded. Provisions were beginning to fail, and the garrison, worn out with the toil of incessant watching, and destitute of hope, had lent a willing ear to the offers of Chourchid Pacha, who promised them a large share of the treasures of the pacha, in the event of their delivering up the stronghold to him. This treachery was rendered the more easy from the defection of Ali's chief engineer, Caretto, who, alienated by the violence and caprice of that savage barbarian, had deserted his service, and brought to the besiegers a complete plan of the fortress, and the means adopted for its defence. Guided by this information, and aided by the defection of part of his Albanian garrison, the fortress was in the beginning of January occupied, after only a feigned resistance, by the troops of

Jan. 3.

Chourchid Pacha. Ali, however, was not without a last resource. He had time to escape into an inner tower three stories in height, which communicated only by a drawbridge with the remainder of the fortress, and which he had fortified in the strongest possible manner. It consisted of three stories, in the highest of which was placed the pacha, his harem, and fifty armed and trusty followers; in the second his treasures, the amount of which report had greatly magnified; and in the lowest a powder magazine, with every preparation ready at a moment's warning to blow the whole edifice into the air. There, with the means of negotiating in his hands, because he could in an instant deprive his besiegers of what they most coveted, his treasures and his head, the old chief awaited the proposals of his enemies.[1]

[1] Lam. vii. 359, 362; Gordon, i. 375, 376; Ann. Hist. iv. 330, 331.

56. Perfidious seizure and death of Ali Pacha. Feb. 1.

Alarmed at the prospect of what the despair of so indomitable a chieftain might suggest, and desirous at all hazards of securing his head as an ornament for the Seraglio, Chourchid Pacha had recourse to perfidy; and, strange to say, the old deceiver became the victim of his own arts. He held out the prospect of a favourable capitulation, in virtue of which Ali was to enjoy his treasures, his harem, and the title of Vizier, with a suitable command in Asia Minor during his life. He stipulated, however, in return for so many concessions, that Ali should remove himself from his impregnable tower into an island on the lake, where a pleasure-house had been constructed, there to await the firman containing the pardon of the Sultan, and the entire restoration to his favour. The old pacha fell into the snare: the lion forgot the fox. He not only removed with his young and ardently-loved wife, and a few intrepid Albanians, who were resolved to share his fate, to the island, but he was, though with some difficulty, prevailed on to deliver to the officers of Chourchid Pacha a signet ring, the well-known token which enjoined implicit obedience on all his servants. Armed with this instrument, the Turks instantly rowed across

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the lake, ascended the tower, showed the ring to the faithful guardian of the magazine and treasures, who stood at the door with a lighted match in his hand. The slave bowed with respect before the talisman, and extinguished the torch. He was instantly despatched by repeated strokes of the poniard, and the perfidious assassins, rowing back to Ali's island, presented to him the fatal firman, which, instead of the promised pardon, contained the order for his immediate death. As soon as he saw it, Ali exclaimed, "Stop! what are you bringing me?"—"The order of the Sultan," replied Hassan the officer; "he demands your head. Submit to the order of the Sultan; obey the decree of fate; pray to Allah; make your ablutions."—"The head of Ali," said the Pacha, "is not so easily won;" and, drawing his pistols, he laid Hassan at his feet with one, and with another the chief of the staff of Chourchid. A frightful conflict ensued between Ali's faithful guards and his assassins, in the course of which Ali was mortally wounded by a ball in the side. "Run," said he, "and put to death Vasiliki, my wife, that she may follow me to the tomb, and the traitors may not sully her beauty." These were his last words. The dead body of Ali, drawn by the beard, was pulled to the door, where the head was cut off, and sent to the Sultan. Vasiliki, in tears, was led to Chourchid's tent, who treated her with respect, and accorded the permission to inter her husband, whom she adored, in a way suitable to his rank; and the valleys of Pindus soon resounded with the death-wail for the Lion of Janina.[1]

[1] Lam. vii. 364, 367; Ann. Hist. v. 331, 333; Gordon, i. 376, 378.

57. Sensation this produced at Constantinople.

Such were the transports when the head of Ali was brought to Constantinople, and exposed at the gate of the Seraglio in a silver dish, that one would suppose the whole enemies of the Sultan had been destroyed by a single blow. Surrounded with troops, with a thousand bale-fires on the adjoining heights, casting a light over its streets at night, witnessing during the day the ceaseless march of the Asiatic troops towards the Balkan,

gazing on the head of their mortal enemy, the Pacha of Janina, at the gate of the Seraglio, the Turks of Constantinople believed themselves invincible.* In the camp at Adrianople the warlike enthusiasm was still stronger: cries of joy and incitements to violence were heard on all sides; and to such a pitch did the transports rise there, that the grand-vizier was obliged to issue a proclamation, declaring that "he was about to march to exterminate the *infidel Muscovites*, and that he was only awaiting the last orders of the Sultan for the campaign." The entry of the grandson of Ali, a boy of eight years of age, his harem and his treasures, into Constantinople, resembled a Roman triumph. But amidst all this exultation at the death of Ali, it proved fatal to his conqueror, who hoped to succeed to his government and his influence. The treasures sent to Constantinople by Chourchid Pacha, though considerable, were by no means so large as had been expected; and this disappointment, joined to the ill success of the succeeding campaign in Greece, of which he had the chief direction, ultimately occasioned his fall.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. iv. 332, 334; Gordon, i. 376, 377.

53. Turkish plan of the campaign.

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm produced by the fall of Ali, the Divan made the most extensive preparations for the next campaign. Chourchid Pacha, after subduing the Souliotes in his rear, was to unite all his

* The following inscription was put on Ali's head, a curious proof of the disorders of the Ottoman empire:—

"Il est notoire à l'univers que Depen-dilenti Ali Pacha depuis trente à quarante années avait reçu de nombreuses faveurs de la Sublime Porte. Loin d'en reconnaître le prix, il osa, contre la volonté expresse de la Porte, opprimer les peuples par ruse et par force: l'histoire ne présente pas l'exemple d'une perversité plus profonde que la sienne. Sans repos occupé de l'achèvement de ses coupables projets, il ne se contenta pas d'appuyer secrètement et ouvertement, par argent et par autres moyens, la rébellion et la trahison, partout où il pouvait en trouver les élémens, mais il sortit des limites de son territoire, excitant partout les troubles et plongeant dans la ruine nos infortunés sujets, gages confiés à nos soucis par le Juge suprême et tout-puissant. L'insurrection des Grecs éclata, et Ali, se livrant à ses projets de vengeance, employa de grandes sommes à armer les rebelles de la Morée, et des autres provinces, contre le peuple de la Foi. Cette dernière preuve de perversité devait rendre sa condamnation inévitable—VOICI SA TÊTE."—*L'Yaffa sur* ALI PACHA. *Annuaire Historique*, iv. 334.

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forces employed in the siege of Janina, and, conjointly with the Pacha of Salonica, invade the Morea with sixty thousand men. The army of the grand-vizier, divided into two columns, was to advance from Adrianople, the one moving on Brahilov, the other on Roudschuck, so as to keep the Russians, with whom a rupture was hourly expected, in check; while the Pacha of Erzeroum collected thirty thousand men among the warlike tribes of Asia to make head against the Persians, and cause the frontier of Georgia to be respected. At the same time a powerful squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and twenty brigs, with eight thousand land troops on board, was to issue from the Dardanelles, and, after revictualling the forts which still held out in the Morea, afterwards carry reinforcements to Candia and Crete.[1]

[1] Gordon. i. 377, 379; Ann. Hist. iv. 336, 338.

59. Success of the fleet, and defeat of Chourchid Pacha by the Souliotes. June 7.

These designs were very imperfectly carried into execution. The fleet, indeed, to which the Greeks had no adequate force to oppose, successfully accomplished its mission. It revictualled Napoli di Romania and the other fortresses in the Morea, made sail for Alexandria, and with stores taken in there relieved the strongholds of Candia and Cyprus. But the land forces were far from being equally successful, and their failure disarranged the whole campaign. By great exertions Chourchid got together 17,000 men in the neighbourhood of Janina, and with these, under the command of Omer-Vrione, he commenced, in the beginning of June, an attack on the Souliotes, preparatory to his grand expedition into the Morea. The Souliotes, even when strengthened by all the succour which could be obtained from the neighbouring mountains of Epirus, did not exceed 4000. Such, however, was the vigour of the defence, and the skilful use which these brave mountaineers made of the rocky and inaccessible nature of their country, that all the attacks of the Ottomans were repelled. The women fought by the side of their husbands and brothers, fearing death less

than Turkish slavery; and, after a desperate struggle of several days' duration, the Turks were finally repulsed. In vain Chourchid brought up 3000 fresh troops, and in person renewed the assault: the Souliotes were again victorious; and, after an incessant conflict of ten days among the rocks, ravines, and precipices, the Ottomans were finally routed, and driven out of the country, with the loss of their whole artillery, baggage, and stores, and above 4000 men slain and wounded. Despairing of success after this disaster, Chourchid drew off his troops into the plain, contenting himself with blockading the entrance of the passes, in order to straiten the mountaineers by want of provisions. Leaving the command of the blockading force to his lieutenant, Omer-Vrione, he himself set out with such forces as he could collect, to direct the operations in the Morea.[1]

June 13.

[1] Gordon, i. 378, 379; Ann. Hist. v. 335.

60. Extension of the insurrection to Chios. March 23.

Meanwhile, a frightful disaster occurred in the Archipelago, which, from the unexampled horror with which it was attended, and the sublime devotion by which it was avenged, forcibly attracted the attention of all Europe, and at length awakened the sympathy which led to the independence of Greece. The opulent, fertile, and prosperous island of CHIOS, the garden of the Ægean Sea, and literally speaking an earthly paradise, if any earthly spot deserves the name, had hitherto remained a stranger to the insurrection. Its eighty thousand inhabitants, satisfied with their condition, and horror-struck with the devastation which they beheld around them, aimed only at preserving the blessings of peace and neutrality. But the Turks, instead of improving on these dispositions by gentle treatment, increased their exactions to such a degree that the rural inhabitants became ripe for revolt; and a Greek squadron, under Logotheti, having appeared off the island in the end of March, the insurrection broke out. The Turks shut themselves up in the citadel, where four thousand men were in arms; the Greeks took possession of the heights of Tourlotti, which commanded it,

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and for the next ten days a distant cannonade was kept up between the contending parties, without any material effect on either side. But meanwhile the Sultan, exasperated at the loss of an island which was so productive to the public treasury, was making the most vigorous efforts for its conquest. An army of thirty thousand fanatical Asiatics, eager for the plunder of the garden of the Archipelago, was collected on the opposite coast of Smyrna, and loudly demanded to be led to the promised scene of rapine and massacre; while a powerful fleet, consisting of six ships of the line, ten frigates, and twelve brigs, was collected in the Dardanelles, under the Capitan Pacha, Kara Ali, in person, and appeared on the 12th April off the island.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 355, 357; Ann. Hist. v. 338, 340.

61. Frightful massacre in the island by the Turks. April 12.

The Turkish commander offered an amnesty to the islanders if they would submit to surrender their arms, and deliver up the authors of the revolt. These terms having been rejected, the capitan began to land his troops, which was effected, without much difficulty, under cover of the guns of the fleet, as the Greek squadron, unable to face the broadsides of the three-deckers, had been obliged to retire. Meanwhile, the garrison in the citadel, taking advantage of the general consternation, made a vigorous sortie, and a division of gunboats kept continually transporting the Asiatic troops from the opposite bay of Tchesmé. Resistance was impossible against such an accumulation of forces; the intrenchments on Tourlotti were speedily stormed; and the Turks, rushing sword in hand into the town, commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the Christians, which lasted without interruption for the four following days. Flames soon broke out in every direction, and speedily reduced one of the finest cities in the Levant to ashes: nine thousand men were put to the sword; the women and children were all sold as slaves; the very graves were rifled in search of concealed treasures;[2] and the bones of the dead tossed about by the infuriated conquerors among the corpses of the

[2] Gordon, i. 358, 361; Ann. Hist. v. 339, 340.

recently slain. None in the town escaped the edge of the scimitar or captivity, excepting fifteen hundred, who sought and found refuge with the consul of France, by whom they were conveyed on board two French vessels of war in the harbour.

62. General massacre in the island.

Not content with this inhuman massacre of unarmed and unoffending citizens, or seizure of innocent women and children, the Turks, on finding that the flames or the sword had left them no farther victims in the city, rushed in tumultuous bodies into the country, and commenced the work of destruction in the rural villages. Large bodies of Asiatics, lured by the light of the burning town, assembled on the opposite coast in the bay of Tchesmé, and were hourly rowed over to the devoted island, to join in the massacre. In vain the consuls of France and Austria prevailed on the Capitan Pacha to proclaim an amnesty, which was accepted by the trembling inhabitants, on condition of delivering up the chiefs of the revolt, which was immediately done. Nothing could assuage the thirst for blood, or appease the fanatical fury of the Mussulmans. Every corner of the island was ransacked; every house burned or sacked; every human being that could be found slain or carried off into captivity. Modern Europe had never witnessed such an instance of bloodshed or horror. To find a parallel to it we must go back to the storming of Syracuse or Carthage by the Romans, or the sack of Bagdad or Aleppo by the arms of Timour. All the beautiful streets and superb villas of Chios were destroyed; its entire sacred edifices ruined; ninety churches in the island burned; forty villages delivered to the flames. Nothing was to be seen in the once smiling land but heaps of ruins, and a few ghastly inhabitants wandering in a state of starvation among them:—

"Unheard, the clock repeats its hours;
Cold is the hearth within its bowers;
And should we thither roam,
Its echoes and its empty tread
Would sound like voices from the dead!"

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When the massacre finally ceased from the exhaustion of the assassins, twenty-five thousand persons, chiefly full-grown men, had been slain; forty-five thousand women and children had been dragged into slavery; and fifteen thousand had escaped into the neighbouring islands, all in the last state of destitution and misery, where the greater part of them died of grief or starvation. For several months the markets of Constantinople, Egypt, and Barbary were so stocked with slaves that their price fell a half; and purchasers were attracted from the farthest parts of Asia and Africa, whither the unhappy Greek captives were scattered.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 360, 362; Ann. Hist. v. 340, 342; Ann. Reg. 1822, 174, 179.

63. Signal retribution which befel the Turks.

But the justice of Providence neither slumbered nor slept. An awful but not undeserved retribution overtook the authors of this frightful tragedy. Its moving spring was the indignation of the human mind at such unheard-of atrocities; its instruments the heroic citizens of Hydra. Anxious spectators of the destruction of the beautiful island, so long the scene of their happiness and recreation, but yet unable to face the line-of-battle ships of the Turks in stand-up fight, the chiefs of Hydra agreed, in a council held on the subject, on an attempt to destroy the Turkish fleet by fire. Again, as in the last days of the Byzantine empire, the cause of Christendom was defended by the torch and the *Greek Fire*, become more formidable to its enemies than either its cannon or its swords. Two hundred brave men volunteered to steer the fireships; forty-eight were selected under ANDREAS MIAULIS,* Nicolas Apostoli, and Androuzzo of Spezzia—

* Andreas Miaulis, son to a Eubœan merchant, was born at Hydra, and went to sea, at the early period of seven years, in one of his father's vessels. While yet a boy, his native courage and disposition evinced itself: he was lively, passionate, and obstinate: he married, at eighteen, the daughter of a worthy priest at Hydra, and soon got a ship, and commenced voyages on his own account. On one occasion, while in command of this vessel, he fell in with a Maltese pirate of superior strength, to avoid whom he ran his vessel ashore, let his crew go, but remained alone in his vessel. After some hesitation, arising from their suspecting a trick, the pirates boarded, seized Miaulis, whom they beat in the most cruel manner to force him to reveal his money: but he

names which, for cool courage, ardent devotion, and intrepid daring, may well be placed beside any recorded in history. There, too, an English sea-officer, attracted by the sight of danger, commenced that honourable course which has for ever connected his name with the emancipation of Greece.* The volunteers chosen received the sacrament and benediction from the bishop, and stepped on board their fireships amidst the tears and prayers of their countrymen.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 363, 364; Ann. Hist. v. 342, 344.

64. Operations of the Greek fleet against the Turks. May 31.

The united fleets of Hydra and Spezzia assembled at Psarra on the 5th May, and set sail on the 10th in quest of the enemy. They amounted to fifty-six sail, the largest carrying twenty guns, among which were eight fireships. They cruised about close to the Turkish fleet, which lay at anchor in a bay on the coast of Asia for several days, and exchanged a distant cannonade with their line-of-battle ships, with little effect on either side. At length, on the evening of the 31st, an attack was resolved on by the Greek chiefs; and Miaulis, with fifteen ships of war and three fireships, entered the channel between Chios and the Asiatic coast at eight in the evening. The consternation was extreme on board the Turkish fleet; several of the ships of war engaged the line-of-battle ships, and Kara Ali, in his three-decker, had a narrow escape from a fireship, which only failed in consequence of the torch having been applied a minute too soon.[2] On this occasion the attack was unsuccessful; the islanders

[2] Ann. Hist. v. 343, 344; Gordon, i. 365, 366.

finally recovered his vessel from the pirates by the aid of some Albanian soldiers. At length his fortune increased so much that he bought the Hercules, a vessel of two hundred and fifty tons burden, with which he beat off a French brig of fourteen guns. He was once taken by Nelson, who, pleased with his frank intrepid manner, set him at liberty. In 1817 he retired from active life, having made a moderate fortune; but in 1821 he took up arms at the call of his country. His courage was *à toute épreuve*, his patriotic spirit unconquerable. Once on a critical occasion, as the sailors refused to embark, he ordered himself to be carried in his litter, as he was ill at the time, on board his brig; the sailors immediately followed. Fire and energy are his great characteristics; but he was also distinguished by deep thought, decision of character, and unconquerable perseverance.—GORDON'S *Greek Revolution*, i. 372, 374.

* Captain Frank Abney Hastings.

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retired to the road of Psarra, and the Capitan Pacha, proud of his victory, remained at anchor in the straits.

65. Successful attack on the Turkish fleet. June 19.

Having received intelligence that the Ottoman squadron had been reinforced to thirty-eight sail, and that it was soon to unite with one of nearly equal strength from Egypt, the Hydriote chiefs became convinced that unless a successful attack was made, and that speedily, their country must inevitably be destroyed. Accordingly, it was resolved, during a dark night, to send in two fireships at the northern end of the straits, while at each end two vessels cruised about to pick up such of their crews as might survive their perilous mission. CONSTANTINE CANARIS, of Psarra, a name immortal in history, and George Pepinis, of Hydra, volunteered their services, with thirty-two intrepid followers; and having partaken of the holy sacrament, they embarked at nine at night, and sailed under French and Austrian colours close to the Ottoman fleet, by whom they were hailed and desired to keep off. At midnight, a breeze from the north having sprung up, they ran in at once among the fleet. The Psarriote fireship, commanded by Canaris, grappled the prow of the Turkish admiral's ship, anchored at the head of the line, a league from the shore, and instantly set her on fire. Instantly jumping into a launch they had in tow, they passed under her poop, shouting the old war-cry of Byzantium, "Victory to the Cross!" The Hydriote fireship was with equal success fastened to the other three-decker, carrying the Reala Bey's flag and the treasure. They were then picked up by their comrades; and the thirty-four heroes, after having performed an exploit perhaps unexampled, sailed straight through the midst of the enemy's fleet, and got clear off without a wound.[1]*

[1] Gordon, i. 365, 367; Ann. Hist. v. 343, 344.

The fate of the two ships which were fired was different. The Reala Bey's crew succeeded, by great exertions, in extinguishing the flames, though not before the vessel was

* They had a barrel of gunpowder on board, determined to blow themselves up rather than be taken.—GORDON, i. 368.

66. Destruction of the admiral's ship.

rendered unfit for service, and detaching the fireship from the prow, which floated through the fleet in a state of conflagration, exciting universal consternation, and doing great damage to several vessels, until she stranded on the Asiatic coast. Not so with the admiral's ship. Canaris had fixed the grappling irons to the prow so strongly that all attempts to detach them were vain, and in a few minutes the superb three-decker was a sheet of flame. Hull, masts, rigging, all were in a blaze at the same time. The scene which ensued on board the vessel baffles all description. Two thousand three hundred persons, crowded on board a single line-of-battle ship, had no means of escaping the flames but by plunging into the waves. None would approach the burning vessel for fear of being involved in the conflagration. Kara Ali, the Capitan Pacha, refused to quit his ship; he was seized by his officers, and forcibly carried on board a boat; but a burning mast fell athwart it, and wounded him mortally on the head. He was carried ashore, and rendered up his last breath on the shores of that Chios which he had changed from a smiling garden to a howling wilderness. Meanwhile the Turks in the town beheld with feelings of profound consternation the awful spectacle. Every vessel in the fleet, many of which were on fire, was distinctly seen by the prodigious light of the burning three-decker, the flames from which rose like a pillar of fire into the heavens. At length she blew up with an explosion so tremendous that every house for miles around was shaken to its foundation, every ship in the straits rocked as in a tempest; and the awful silence which immediately ensued was broken, as in an eruption of Vesuvius, by the clatter of the spars and masts which fell upon the fleet. The Turks in Chios, overwhelmed with terror, threw themselves with their faces on the ground, imploring the mercy of the Almighty.[1] The victors returned in triumph to Ipsara, where they were received with transports of joy, crowned with garlands of flowers, and hastened to the

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 344, 345; Gordon, i. 367, 369.

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altar to return thanks to God for the deliverance of their country; while the Turks in despair took refuge in the harbour of Mitylene, abandoning to the Greeks the entire command of the Archipelago.

67. Renewed massacre in Chios. July 31.

The Turks in Chios took vengeance for their disaster by renewing the massacre of the few unhappy Greeks who yet remained in the island. Twenty thousand of them rushed into the Mastic villages, which had escaped the former devastation from the capitulation, and put every human being they could reach to the sword. In the beginning of August there were not eighteen hundred of the original inhabitants alive in the island, almost all old women, who had been concealed in caves, out of eighty-five thousand who peopled it a few months before. But the slaughter of a few thousand unarmed and starving Greeks could not affect the issue of the campaign, or diminish the weight of the blow which had been struck. Canaris, not less than Themistocles, had been the saviour of his country; the blow struck in the straits of Chios was as decisive as that formerly delivered in the bay of Salamis. By depriving the Turks in the Morea of the expected co-operation and supplies from the fleet, it exposed them to starvation and ruin in that province, and was the principal cause of the defeat of the vast armament which the Ottoman government had by great exertions got together for the subjection of southern Greece.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 352, 353; Gordon, i. 369.

68. Unsuccessful expedition of Mavrocordato into Epirus. June 4.

Aware of the great force which the Turks intended to bring against them, and justly distrustful of their own means of withstanding it, the Greek government in the Morea made every exertion to prevent the threatened invasion by raising up foes to their enemies in rear. For this purpose they despatched eight hundred men, under Mavrocordato in person, to Missolonghi, in order to lend assistance to the Souliotes, and prevent Chourchid Pacha from detaching in aid of the expedition against the Peloponnesus. The reinforcement disembarked on the 4th June at Missolonghi, amidst the cheers of the inhabitants; but very

little real good resulted from the expedition. Mavrocordato was soon found to have no talent for war: he failed in acquiring the confidence of the soldiery, from their perceiving that he did not deserve it. Several attempts made to open a communication with the Souliotes failed from the able dispositions of Omer-Vrione, who, having taken up a central position between Janina, Arta, and Prevesa, his three strongholds, at once secured his communication with each, and straitened the Souliotes, who, blockaded in their inaccessible precipices, were daily becoming more in want of provisions. Even the heroic Mark Bozzaris failed in cutting his way through to his gallant countrymen; and at length he was defeated on the 15th July, with the loss of four hundred men, by the Turks at Pelta. In this action a battalion of Philhellenes, or European sympathisers, was almost destroyed; and the survivors, disgusted with the divisions and treachery which they saw around them, retired from Greece. Disheartened by this disaster, Mavrocordato no longer thought but of the defence of Missolonghi, which it was obvious would soon be besieged by the victorious Turks; and the brave Souliotes, abandoned to themselves, were ere long so straitened for provisions that they were fairly starved into submission, and happy to accept the humane proposal of the governor of the Ionian Islands, who offered them an asylum in the British dominions, whither two thousand were transported in the end of September, with consent of Omer-Vrione, who was too happy to be delivered from such formidable antagonists.[1]

July 15.

Sept. 20.

[1] Gordon, i. 379, 395; Ann. Hist. v. 351, 361.

69. Insurrection and its suppression in Macedonia. April 1822.

While these disasters were closing everything but a guerilla warfare in Epirus, the efforts of the Greek government to effect a division in Macedonia and northern Greece were not in the end attended with better success. In the first instance, indeed, the efforts of Odysseus and other Greek chiefs, aided by the unbounded rapacity and arrogance of the Turkish pachas, excited an insurrection in the hill country of Macedonia; and in April 1822,

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six thousand gallant mountaineers were in arms in the valleys descending from the snowy summits of Mount Olympus. But the pachas of Salonica and Thessaly, having considerable forces at their command, speedily took the field against them at the head of fifteen thousand men. With this imposing array they forced the passes of the far-famed defile of Tempe; and the mountaineers having refused to surrender, and slain a Turkish officer and three priests, who bore a flag of truce, they commenced an assault on Navacta, their chief stronghold. The defence was brave and obstinate; but at length numbers prevailed. The place was stormed, and a frightful massacre ensued, which amply avenged the ferocity of the Greeks at the sack of Tripolitza. Four thousand Greeks were slain on the spot; the victorious Moslems pursued the fugitives in all directions, cutting them down without mercy; one hundred and twenty villages were delivered to the flames; and a band of Jews, who had taken no part in the action, six hundred in number, followed in the rear of the victors, merely for the pleasure of beating out the brains of the Christians with their clubs. One of them boasted that he had in this manner despatched sixty-eight victims. The Pacha of Salonica, after this victory, retired to that city, where he carried his vengeance so far as to put to death the wife of Kara Tasso, an Olympic chief, who had headed the insurrection, with frightful tortures, and massacred the whole hostages from Mount Athos who were in his hands. Kara Tasso crossed over to the island of Skopelo, where he pursued a partisan warfare, and often bathed his sword in Mahommedan blood.[1]

April 1.

[1] Gordon, i. 394, 399; Ann. Hist. v. 357, 359.

70. Grand invasion of the Morea.

Delivered by these sanguinary successes from all anxiety regarding his rear, Chourchid Pacha was enabled to concur in the grand measure of invading the Morea. The insurrection had extended to Eubœa, and that beautiful and fertile island was in the hands of the Greeks, with the exception of the fortresses of Negropont and Carysto, which were still, with the plains adjacent to them, in the

March and April.

power of the Mahommedans. It was of the last importance, therefore, to effect the conquest of the Morea as soon as possible, and thus prevent the whole of southern Greece from falling into the hands of the insurgents. Chourchid accordingly broke up from Janina on the 17th June, and having effected a junction with the pachas of Salonica and Thessaly, their united forces, thirty thousand strong, of which two-thirds were cavalry, passed the defile of Thermopylæ without resistance, and appeared before Corinth on the 18th July, where the citadel was delivered to them, though amply stored with provisions, by the treachery of a Greek priest who commanded the place. The Turks then advanced without opposition to Argos, the seat of government. The executive council, in extreme alarm, took refuge in Tripolitza, after issuing a proclamation calling on every Greek, under sixty years of age, to appear in arms at the appointed rendezvous of the chiefs. The Ottoman army, eighteen thousand strong, even after leaving strong garrisons in Corinth and Argos, proceeded on with very little opposition to Napoli di Romania, the garrison of which they reinforced so as to enable it to resume the offensive, and keep the blockading force at a distance from its walls.[1]

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June 17.

July 18.

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 357, 359; Gordon, i. 418, 423.

71. Dangerous position of the Turks, and able measures of the Greeks. Aug. 1/8.

But this was the limit of their success. The Turks found at Napoli, as the French did at Moscow, not the termination of their conquests, but the commencement of their ruin. Then appeared of what vital importance to the cause of Greek independence had been the blow struck in the straits of Chios. Instead of a powerful fleet stored with ammunition and provisions as they expected, the Turks found in Napoli nothing but a starving garrison, demanding, not capable of giving, supplies. The surrounding plains, burnt up with the heat of summer, could afford nothing for the support of their numerous cavalry, the horses of which, already broken down by their long march, were now dying by hundreds daily from want of forage. In a few days the want of provisions for the men became so great that no resource remained but

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living on the dead bodies of the horses which had perished. Meanwhile the Greek chiefs, who on this occasion showed a noble example of unanimity and firmness, were daily gathering around them. Demetrius Ipsilanti, who had the chief command, took his measures with equal skill and resolution, and soon accumulated forces which entirely cut off their communications. Colocotroni raised the siege of the citadel of Corinth, and hastened to the scene of action with three thousand men; an equal force was landed from Hydra and the islands; the mountaineers flocked together from all quarters; and the Turks found themselves straitened by twelve thousand men, who hung around them on all sides, and rendered all attempts at foraging or levying supplies impossible.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 358, 360; Gordon, i. 428, 430.

72. Disastrous retreat of the Turks. Aug. 8.

Aware of the extreme danger of their position, dreading alike starvation if they remained where they were, or destruction if they adventured on the wasted line of their former advance, the Turkish general proposed to enter into a capitulation for the evacuation of the Morea. This the Greek chiefs declined, expecting, with reason, that he would be obliged to surrender at discretion. Upon this the Turks resolved to cut their way through. To effect this object, however, they had to pass by the defile of Tretes, which was guarded by NIKETAS, one of the ablest of the Greek chiefs, at the head of three thousand men; while Colocotroni, with one thousand more, marched to St George to intercept their retreat. The natural strength of the passes was enhanced by felling trees and piling up stones on the rocky slopes, which were sent thundering down upon the enemy when they appeared. With great difficulty, and after sustaining a very heavy loss from the Greek marksmen, who, securely posted in the rocks above, sent down a shower of balls on the wearied column beneath, Mahmoud Pacha succeeded in forcing his way through to Cleonæ, leaving the defile strewed with the dead bodies of men and horses. But the seraskier who commanded the second column was not so

Aug. 9.

fortunate, for Ipsilanti and Niketas appeared on its flank, and the cavalry defiled through a long pass under a terrific fire from the overhanging heights, which they could neither bear nor return. Impatient of the danger, and seeing their comrades falling at every step around them, the horsemen drove on with frantic haste, tumbling over each other, and presenting a confused mass of men and horses, upon which every shot of the Greeks told with fatal effect. In this disastrous conflict the Turks lost five thousand men; on the preceding day two thousand had fallen, including a pacha; and the whole artillery, baggage, and stores fell into the hands of the Greeks. Altogether, when the Ottoman army left the Peloponnesus, there were not more than two thousand left to reinforce the garrison of Napoli di Romania, and seven thousand around Corinth under Jussuf Pacha, the poor remains of thirty thousand, of whom two-thirds were splendid horse, who had entered the country six weeks before.[1]

Aug. 10.

[1] Gordon, i. 433, 437; Ann. Hist. v. 359, 360.

73. Further successes of the Greeks.

This memorable defeat, so glorious to the Christians, proved decisive of the campaign over the whole of Greece. Three times Chourchid Pacha endeavoured to force the pass of Thermopylæ, in order to convey succours from Salonica to Jussuf Pacha at Corinth; but Odysseus now stood upon his defence, and defeated him with severe loss on every occasion, and forced the Turks to retreat to Larissa. Chourchid was soon after seized with dysentery, brought on partly by fatigue, partly by anxiety about his reverses; and he died on November 16th a natural death, just in time to avoid the bowstring of the Sultan, which had been sent to despatch him. The Acropolis of Athens, which had been long blockaded, at length capitulated from want of provisions on the 21st June, on conditions very favourable to the Turks, who were 1150 in number, of whom not more than a fifth were capable of bearing arms, the remainder being women and children. After the capitulation, however, had been signed, it was violated by the Greeks, who perfidiously

June 21.

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commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the prisoners, of whom four hundred were slaughtered; and the whole would have perished, had it not been for the generous interposition of the European consuls. This important conquest gave the Greeks the entire command of Attica, but it affixed a dark stain to their cause, and contributed much to weaken the interest with which it was regarded in foreign states.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 410, 415; Ann. Hist. v. 356.

74. First siege of Missolonghi.

Despite all the victories of Omer-Vrione, part of the Souliotes and Acarnanians were still in arms in the mountains of Epirus; and conceiving that they would never be thoroughly subdued as long as Missolonghi remained in the hands of the insurgents, he resolved to lay siege to that place. Accordingly, in the end of October he crossed the Achelous in two columns, and invested the place; but it was defended by Mark Bozzaris, who had communicated his own heroic spirit to the garrison, aided by a French artillery officer, who gave them the advantages of his science and experience. Though the garrison did not amount to four hundred men, with fourteen guns, Mavrocordato magnanimously threw himself into the place, saying it was there they should lay down their lives. By degrees their numbers were augmented to three thousand men by supplies received from the Morea and the islands by sea; an assault, six times renewed, was vigorously repulsed on January 5, with the loss of fifteen hundred men to the assailants; and the mountaineers having descended from their hills, and intercepted the communications in his rear, Omer-Vrione was compelled to raise the siege, abandoning his whole artillery and stores to the enemy. His losses during his retreat were extremely severe. The Mussulmans lost seven hundred men, swept away by the swollen torrent in recrossing the Achelous; and to such straits were they reduced by famine, that, after eating all their horses, they were forced to live on grass and wild herbs.[2] Finally, after losing three-fourths of his army, Omer-Vrione reached Prevesa with

Jan. 5, 1823.

Jan. 27.

[2] Gordon, i. 455, 465; Ann. Hist. v. 364, 367, vi. 526, 527.

three thousand men on 5th March, from whence he escaped alone in a boat by sea, thus abandoning the province as a fugitive which he had trampled on as a conqueror, and having lost twelve thousand men in his disastrous siege.

75. Operations in Cyprus and Crete.

The insurrection was daily assuming more formidable proportions in Cyprus and Candia. In the former of these islands, in the month of August, sixty-two villages and towns had disappeared, or existed only in ruins. Adding insult to injury, the Turks, wherever they had the power, not contented with burning the houses, destroying the crops, and rooting up the vines and olive trees, exercised the most revolting cruelties on the inhabitants. The monks were in an especial manner the objects of their vindictive persecution; they stabled their horses in the churches, and actually bridled and saddled some of these unhappy ecclesiastics, and forcing them to go on all fours, rode on them in derision till they dropt down dead of fatigue. Still the mountaineers with heroic resolution maintained the contest, and in many instances took a bloody revenge on their persecutors. In Crete the Turks were in greater strength than in any other island, and by making a general appeal to the Mussulmans to take up arms, the pacha succeeded in arraying twenty-five thousand men around his standards. But all his efforts were shattered against the resolution of the Sfakiotes, who drew the Ottomans into their defiles, where they made such havoc of them that, after sustaining a loss of three hundred men, they were obliged to shut themselves up in Canea and the other fortresses on the island, leaving the whole plains as well as mountains in the hands of the insurgents. An expedition, having five thousand troops on board, came from Egypt; but though they at first gained some success, they also were in the end driven back into the fortresses, and the campaign closed under the same circumstances as it had begun.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 368, 369; Gordon, i. 485, 500.

Operations at land in the Morea closed by a more

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76. Fall of Napoli di Romania. Dec. 12.

important conquest, in a military point of view, than the Greeks had yet achieved. This was the fall of Napoli di Romania, which was carried by escalade on the night of the 12th December. After the retreat of the Turks from the Morea, the blockade of the place was resumed by Colocotroni at the head of ten thousand Greeks, who, as usual, flocked to the anticipated scene of plunder; and having ascertained that the place was very negligently guarded on the summit of Fort Palamide, where the Turks trusted to the natural strength of the ground and height of the precipices, the Greek chiefs resolved on an assault by escalade. The garrison were already reduced to the last straits for provisions, having subsisted for weeks on refuse and garbage, and latterly on human flesh. They had no longer strength either to mount guard or work their guns. A convoy of fifteen hundred men, despatched from Corinth by Jussuf Pacha, was defeated in

Jan. 18.

the defiles of Agion-Oros by Niketas. Deprived now of all hope of succour, and exhausted by famine and sickness, the beleagured Turks refused to ascend the rocky steep of Palamide, which remained almost destitute of defenders. Aware of these circumstances, the Greeks, amidst the gloom of a dark and rainy winter night, climbed up the rocky steep, applied their scaling-ladders to the rampart, and safely mounted to the summit. At daybreak the Turks in the fortress beneath beheld with speechless horror the standard of the Cross waving on the summit of the mountain citadel. Further resistance was now impossible, for the guns from the citadel commanded every part of the town. The Ottomans therefore were too happy to conclude a capitulation, which for once was well observed, and was the first example of a return to the usages of civilisation in this frightful war. By the aid of the English frigate, the Cambrian, which fortunately was in the roads at the time, the garrison, which only contained twelve hundred men still capable of bearing arms, was transported to Asia. The Greeks found immense

military resources in the fortress. Four hundred pieces of cannon, most of them bronze, in good condition, with large stores of ammunition, fell into their hands. What was of still more importance, they had secured an impregnable fortress, a second Gibraltar, for their *place d'armes*, the harbour of which enabled them to derive full benefit from their naval superiority, and soon made it be selected for the seat of government.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 477, 480; Ann. Hist. v. 366, 377.

77. Fresh naval successes of the Greeks.

To conclude the operations of this memorable campaign, it only requires to notice the last maritime operations of the year, which were not less brilliant than those at its commencement. Irritated rather than intimidated by the bad success of their former expedition, the Divan, after appointing a new admiral, Mahomet Pacha, in lieu of Kara Ali, who had been killed, fitted out a vast armament of ninety sail, including four line-of-battle ships, in the Dardanelles, with which they set sail, bound for Napoli di Romania, with ample stores to revictual all the fortresses in the Morea. Unable to resist such a formidable fleet, the Greek squadron of sixty sail, the largest of which only carried twenty guns, contented themselves with following the enemy at a distance, and sometimes engaging in a useless cannonade, watching for an opportunity of sending in some of their fireships among the fleet. No such opportunity offered; but the Turkish admiral was so much intimidated by their sight, that he did not venture to enter the gulf of Napoli di Romania; and giving up, when within sight of it, all thoughts of revictualling that fortress, the main object of his expedition, he made sail for Suda, leaving the beleaguered fortress to its fate, which, in consequence, soon after fell into the hands of the enemy.[2]

Sept. 27.

[2] Ann. Hist. v. 361, 362; Gordon, i. 439, 446.

78. Destruction of another Turkish ship of the line.

The much-wished-for opportunity, which did not occur on this occasion, at length presented itself. On the 9th November, the Turkish fleet was lying at anchor in the bay of Tenedos, waiting orders from Constantinople, when two Turkish vessels hove in sight, closely followed by two

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Greek brigs, with whom they maintained a running fight. In effect, the chased vessels, which bore the Ottoman colours, were fireships, one of which was commanded by the intrepid Canaris, and the other by a Hydriot hero, manned by seventeen of the seamen who had burned the admiral's vessel at Chios, dressed as Turkish sailors. Not suspecting the *ruse*, the Turks, with great interest, watched the chase, and opened their line, with loud cheers, to admit their supposed countrymen into safety. In an instant Canaris was upon them. The Hydriotes ran aboard of the admiral, and the Psarriotes fastened their bark to another ship of the line, containing the treasure, while Nov. 9. Canaris called out, "Turks, you are burned, as at Chios!" The Capitan Pacha, by cutting his cables, narrowly escaped destruction; but the other two-decker was so strongly grappled by Canaris that it caught the flames, and, with sixteen hundred persons on board, blew up soon after with a terrific explosion. In utter consternation, the whole Turkish vessels cut their cables, and made for the Dardanelles in confusion; two frigates ran ashore, and were wrecked, in the flight; and the entire command of the sea was abandoned to the Greeks, who sailed from the Dardanelles, without opposition, to Alexandria. So daring did they become, that not only did they entirely intercept and ruin the Turkish commerce, but made prizes of thirteen vessels, including one with a million piastres on board, in the harbour of Damietta. This glorious result is mainly to be ascribed to the cool daring and personal prowess of Canaris, who, after he had left the fireship, and descended into his bark, seeing the fireship was not properly inflamed, went on board again alone, and set it on fire! His single arm had already in this naval campaign destroyed above three thousand of his enemies. The utmost rejoicings took place at Hydra and Ipsara for this additional success; and the former having received a gift of forty guns from a distant countryman, their rocks were bristling with cannon, and were

well-nigh impregnable. At Ipsara, Canaris was again crowned with laurel by his grateful countrymen, and the public satisfaction was wound up to the highest pitch by a declaration from the captain of the Cambrian, who was present on the occasion, that the British government, now guided in its foreign policy by the liberal hand of Mr Canning, would recognise the Greek blockades. [1]

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 362, 363; Gordon, i. 468, 471.

79. Glorious results of this campaign to the Greeks.

Such was the Greek campaign of 1822, glorious to the arms of that country, not the least memorable in the annals of the world. Never possessing the resources of more than six hundred thousand souls, they had, single-handed, confronted the strength of the Ottoman empire, having twenty millions of Mussulmans at their command, and come off victorious in the strife. Not only had they repulsed the invasion of above fifty thousand armed Turks, and destroyed four-fifths of their number, but they had made themselves masters of their principal strongholds. Notwithstanding the loss occasioned by the death of Ali Pacha, their standards still waved on the ramparts of Missolonghi; the Souliotes were yet in arms in their mountains; Athens and Tripolitza had been recovered, Napoli di Romania taken, Corinth lost only by treachery. The Morea had been delivered; from Arta on the Adriatic to Volo on the Ægean, the entire country, including the islands, had been regained to the Cross. At sea their triumphs had been still more decisive. Twice had they driven the Turks from the Ægean Sea; two ships of the line had been destroyed, several frigates stranded, innumerable merchantmen taken, by a power which had not a vessel mounting more than twenty guns at their disposal. The annals of ancient Greece contain nothing more brilliant, those of the world few events, in a moral view, more sublime.

80. Their losses.

But these successes, great as they were, had not been achieved without proportional losses; and they had been so great that, if the contest were continued much longer, it was extremely doubtful whether the territory of Greece

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would not be regained to the Crescent by the *entire* destruction of its inhabitants. Already had they been thinned in a fearful manner. The Turkish system of putting to death all the male inhabitants, and selling all the women for slaves, had told desperately on their scanty numbers. Although the contest had only continued two years, two hundred thousand Greeks—a third of the entire population of the revolted provinces—had perished by the sword or famine, or been sold as slaves. It was impossible that any people, how brave and heroic soever, could long go on under such a drain of its inhabitants. And though the losses of the Ottomans had also been very great, yet were they nothing in comparison; for, supposing fifty thousand of them had been cut off, that was a four-hundredth part of their numbers, whereas the Greeks had been weakened by a third of theirs.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 470, 471.

81. Dreadful earthquakes in Asia Minor. Aug. 13.

The losses of the Turks in this disastrous year, however, did not proceed solely from the swords or the torches of the Greeks. Nature seemed to have conspired with man for the ruin of the empire of the Osmanlis. At ten at night, on the 13th August, some smart shocks of an earthquake were felt at Aleppo and Antioch, and in a few seconds a shock took place so violent that whole streets in *both* cities were thrown down, and twelve thousand persons were buried in their ruins. This catastrophe was succeeded by several other shocks of lesser force for the next fortnight; and at length another succeeded on the

Aug. 30.

30th, of such violence as entirely ruined the city of Aleppo, and drove all its citizens who escaped instant death into the adjoining country. About the same time the *cholera morbus*, since so well known in western Europe, made its appearance in Bagdad; the Persians defeated the Turks in a pitched battle, with such loss that their army, fifty thousand strong, entirely dispersed, and the victorious Persians, meeting with no opposition, advanced to Bassora. In consequence of these disasters, and deeming the dissolution of the empire of the Osmanlis at hand, the Pacha of

Acre revolted against the Porte, and hoisted the standard of independence on his impregnable ramparts.[1] Disorders not less serious took place in Jassy, from the savage temper of the unruly janizaries, who, during the night of the 10th August, set the city on fire in several places, and immediately commenced a general massacre of the Christians. Several thousands of the latter fell under the Turkish scimitars; one hundred and sixty of their assassins, in a state of intoxication, perished in the flames which they themselves had raised; and of the entire city only one hundred and fifty houses and a part of the palace, out of two thousand, escaped destruction from the conflagration.[2]

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 372.

Aug. 10.

[2] Ann. Hist. v. 348.

82. Negotiations with Russia during the year.

An occasion such as this, when disasters of all kinds were "accumulating round a sinking throne and falling empire," was the most favourable that could possibly have been desired to advance the designs of Russia against the throne of the Sultan. Yet it passed over without any advantage having been taken by the Czar of the crisis. The Russian ambassador, who was still at Odessa, continued to use the utmost efforts to soften the cruelties of the Turks, and claimed execution of the treaties in favour of the Christians in Moldavia and Wallachia, in which he was strongly supported by those of France and England; and at length, by their united efforts, a note was presented by the Reis-Effendi, which contained the last concessions to which the Divan could be brought to accede. It announced that the Porte, in conformity with ancient usage, had named two Christian hospodars, natives of those provinces. In return for this concession, the Turks demanded the extradition of the Greek refugees, and the surrender of the disputed fortresses in Asia; and announced at the same time, that in order to put a stop to the contraband trade carried on in favour of the Greeks, all merchant vessels in the harbour of Constantinople were to be subjected to search—a provision which left the door open to interminable future disputes.[3]

July 16.

[3] Ann. Hist. v. 347, 348; Note, July 16, 1822.

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83. The Congress of Verona declines to recognise the Greek state.

An earnest application was made by the Greek government to the Congress of Verona to be admitted into the European family, and taken under the protection of the Western powers.* It met, however, with no success; the Count Metaxa, who was the bearer of it, was not even admitted to the Congress. The dread of revolutions, and risk of recognising in any shape insurgent states, was at that period so strong with the allied sovereigns, and especially the Emperor Alexander, that it rendered them deaf alike to all the feelings of humanity and all the suggestions of wisdom; for certainly so fair an opportunity never had been presented for establishing a Christian power on the shores of the Bosphorus, and rearing up a counterpoise to Russia in the very country which was the principal object of its ambition. The reason was, that it was thought this would be a dangerous concession to the revolutionary principle, to combat which in Spain and Italy was the principal object of the Congress; and such was the strength of their feeling that it rendered men blind to the fact that the movement in Greece was religious and national, not revolutionary, and that it was a war of races, not castes, which had sprung up on the shores of the Ægean Sea.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 493, 494; Chateaubriand, Congrès de Verone, i. 72, 76.

The long continuance and repeated disasters of the Greek war, increased during the course of this year the discontents of the national party in Constantinople to

* "Les sentimens de piété, d'humanité, et de justice, dont la réunion des Souverains est animée, font espérer au Gouvernement de la Grèce que sa juste demande sera convenablement accueillie. Si, contre toute attente, l'offre du Gouvernement venait à être rejetée, la présente déclaration équivaudra à une Protestation formelle que la Grèce entière dépose en ce jour au pied du trône de la Justice Divine—Protestation qu'un peuple chrétien adresse avec confiance à l'Europe et à la grande famille de la Chrétienté. Affaiblis et délaissés, les Grecs n'espèreront alors que dans le Dieu fort. Soutenus par sa main toute-puissante, ils ne fléchiront pas devant la tyrannie: Chrétiens persécutés depuis quatre siècles pour être restés fidèles à notre Sauveur et à Dieu notre Souverain Maître, nous défendrons, jusqu'au dernier, son église, nos foyers et nos tombeaux; heureux d'y descendre libres et Chrétiens, ou de vaincre comme nous avons vaincu jusqu'ici, par la seule force de notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ et par sa divine puissance."—*Adresse du Gouvernement de la Grèce aux Souverains Alliés*, Nov. 1, 1822. *Annuaire Historique*, v. 405.

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such a degree, that it became evident that a change in the ruling power in the capital had become unavoidable. Public opinion is not less, on important occasions, the tribunal of last resort in Constantinople than in the capitals of western Europe; but its oscillations are more violent, and its decisions more sudden and sanguinary. It was a constant subject of complaint with the janizaries and the Asiatic troops that the new system would prove the ruin of everything, that the treatment of the insurgents was far too gentle, and that the empire would never be righted till the old system was restored, and the infidels were everywhere destroyed with fire and sword. The ruling favourite of the Sultan, Halet Effendi, and his creature the grand-vizier, Saleh Pacha, were in an especial manner the objects of public obloquy for their supposed influence in these changes. At length, in the beginning of November, matters came to a crisis, in consequence of the appearance of a decree of the Sultan prohibiting, on the plea of the public necessities, the use of gold and silver ornaments by all Mussulmans, and requiring them to be brought to the public treasury to be melted down, where they were taken at 25 per cent below the real value. The public clamour now became so violent that the Sultan in vain endeavoured to appease it by the exhibition of a number of Christian heads, or of heads of pachas supposed to favour them, daily at the Seraglio gate. Having satisfied himself, by a nocturnal perambulation of Constantinople in disguise, that the public voice could no longer be disregarded, the Sultan resolved upon a concession; and by a decree on the 9th, the mufti and the grand-vizier were deposed, and Halet Effendi exiled. The latter, however, was too powerful a character to be allowed to rest in retirement. The new ministers, who were chosen by the janizaries, extorted an order from the Sultan for his execution; he was seized and strangled, and his head exposed at the gate of the Seraglio, with an inscription, charging him with every imaginable crime.[1]

84. Revolution at Constantinople in favour of the janizaries. Nov. 9.

Nov. 3.

Dec. 4.

[1] Ann. Hist. v. 373, 376.

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The new mufti was Sedke-Sude, the new grand-vizier Abdallah Pacha—both leaders of the janizary party, which for a time got the entire command of the government.

85. Dreadful fire at Constantinople in spring 1823. March 1.

A frightful catastrophe occurred at Constantinople in the spring of 1823, which, in the excited state of the public mind, added much to the sinister presentiments with which men's minds were filled. On 1st March a dreadful fire broke out in the vicinity of Tophani, the imperial cannon-foundry, which spread with incredible rapidity. A violent wind, which frequently changed its direction, spread the flames on all sides, and in a day the whole quarter of Pera and Galata was in flames. The losses sustained were immense; and if the wind had not providentially changed to the north, all that beautiful quarter of the city would have perished. As it was, 8000 houses were consumed; 1200 pieces of cannon, immense trains of artillery-waggons, several entire barracks, were the prey of the flames; above 1000 persons perished, and 40,000 were thrown houseless and starving on the streets. The Mussulmans, struck with consternation at the magnitude of the disaster, exclaimed, "God is with the infidels!" Others, filled with the fanaticism of the period, maintained it was a judgment for their sins, and that the only way to propitiate the Almighty was to massacre the Christians. Others, however, opened their hearts to more humane sentiments; and many voices, especially of women, were heard to exclaim, when the conflagration was at its height, that "God was avenging the innocent blood shed at Chios!"[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 516, 518.

86. Preparations of the Turks for the next campaign.

Seriously alarmed by the disastrous issue of the preceding campaign, the Sultan commenced the year with the most vigorous measures. The grand-vizier was deposed (the usual consequence of disaster), and his successor, Ali Bey, enjoined to "meditate night and day on the pressing concerns of the Morea and of Persia, so as to secure the interests of religion and of his high-

ness's entire possessions." Orders were at the same time sent to the pachas of the Danubian provinces of Macedonia and Epirus, for a general levy of all Mussulmans between fifteen and fifty years of age, to assemble in a general rendezvous in Thessaly early in May. The utmost efforts were also made to repair and fit out the fleet, and with such success, that by the end of April a powerful squadron of frigates and smaller vessels was ready for sea in the Dardanelles. The bad success of the preceding years had determined the Divan to discontinue the use of the ponderous ships of the line, which were exposed to so much danger from the Greek fireships amidst the shoals, straits, and deeply indented bays of the Archipelago. The Sultan's eldest son, Prince Ahmed, died on 16th April; but another was born a few days after, who was named Abdul-Metschid—that is, "Servant of the God of glory."[1]

April 20.

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 517, 518.

87. Destruction of part of Drama-Ali's corps by Niketas.

Despairing, after the fall of Napoli di Romania, of maintaining his ground in the citadel of Corinth, Drama-Ali, who commanded there, resolved to send to Patras all the useless mouths with which he was encumbered, and to keep only such as were essential for the defence of the Acro-Corinthus. Five thousand, accordingly, were sent, who forced the pass styled the *Achaian Gates*, though not without experiencing considerable loss. On arriving, however, at the defile of Acrata, they encountered Niketas, who had posted his men in the most advantageous manner among the rocks and bushes which overhang the strait. The Mussulmans were not aware of their presence till they were fully engaged in the defile, when a plunging fire opened on them on all sides along the whole extent of the line. Resistance being hopeless, Niketas proposed a capitulation, but it was accepted only by two hundred and fifty, who were conducted prisoners to Tripolitza. The remainder defended themselves with the courage of despair, and held out for some time; but they were at length all destroyed, or

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perished of famine, except a few who escaped, more like skeletons than men, by sea to Patras. Their whole baggage fell into the hands of the victors. Such was the termination of the grand expedition of thirty thousand men into the Morea, begun six months before with the prospect of effecting the entire conquest of Greece.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 10, 14; Ann. Hist. vi. 527, 528.

88. Divisions among the Greeks.

The successes of the Greeks had now been so great, that their independence appeared to be established on a solid basis; and if they had remained united, and been recognised as an independent state by the Congress of Verona, it is probable the contest would have ceased, and they would have been admitted into the European family at this time. But success brought, as usual, divisions in its train; the chiefs were soon at variance with each other and with the legislature, and the Greeks ere long were exposed to greater danger from their own dissensions than from the arms of the Ottomans. Not to mention jealousies innumerable between the different chiefs, there was one grand source of division which pervaded the whole persons intrusted with the administration of affairs, arising from the want of a central power, and the long extinction of any *national* spirit in the inhabitants of the country. The military chiefs desired to be independent, and to carry on the war like guerilla chiefs, each on his own account, while the civil deputies were desirous of subjecting them to the authority of a central government, chosen by the representatives of the people. To such a length did the discord come, that when the deputies of the National Assembly met in February at Astros in the Morea, they could not submit to meet in any room, but held their deliberations in a garden, where the two parties were separated from each other, and the debates, if they could be called such, were conducted by angry messages, often mingled with threats, conveyed from one to the other. Even the leaders were at variance. Mavrocordato and Ipsilanti were not on speaking terms: it was only by great exer-

tions that a small number could be secured for the executive council; and, such as it was, its authority was only really established in the islands. On the mainland the election of representatives was found to be impracticable, and the authority of the chiefs, like that of separate guerilla leaders, was alone obeyed within their respective bounds. The sittings of the legislature closed after a stormy session, in which little was done to forward the common cause against the Turks, but a considerable step made to limit the authority of the military chiefs, by a decree that the commanders-in-chief by sea and land were to hold their power only during the duration of their respective expeditions.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 527, 531; Gordon, ii. 5, 7.

89. Plan of the campaign on the part of the Turks.

The plan of the next campaign arranged by the Divan at Constantinople was on a very magnificent scale; but its execution was on a very different one, which revealed the growing weakness and decrepitude of the empire. The Pachas of Roumelia, Adrianople, Salonica, Larissa, and Eubœa, were to unite their forces, which, it was calculated, would amount to eighty thousand, to attack the Isthmus of Corinth, across which the Greeks had constructed lines of defence, in front, while a corps of Mussulmans, transported by sea, took the position in rear. Mustapha, vizier of Scodra, was ordered to undertake the siege of Missolonghi with forty thousand men; while Yussuf Pacha, Omer-Vrione, and others, were to co-operate in Thessaly and Attica; and the new Capitan Pacha, with a grand fleet of a hundred and twenty sail, was to sweep the Ægean Sea, and reduce the revolted islands to subjection. In making these plans, however, the Turks entirely overlooked two circumstances which proved of vital importance to the issue of the campaign; viz., the danger of famine for their troops, from the magnitude of the devastation which they themselves had previously committed, and the exhaustion of their own Mussulman population, from whom alone the soldiers were drawn, from the losses already sustained.[2] These

[2] Gordon, ii. 2, 3; Ann. Hist. vi. 531, 532.

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two circumstances caused their principal enterprises to miscarry, and saved the Greeks at a time when their own divisions brought them to the very verge of destruction.

90. Dispositions of the Greeks.

The Greeks were far from having an equal force at their command; but they had powerful auxiliaries in the rugged and mountainous nature of their country, the devastation produced by the preceding campaigns, the skill which the mountaineers had now acquired in the use of arms and the defence of the passes through which the invaders required to pass, and the admirable courage and ability of the seamen by whom their fleet was navigated. The Greek government decreed the formation of an army of 50,000 men; but they were so irregularly paid, and dispersed under separate leaders, that they resembled rather guerilla bands each acting on its own account, than regular troops all obeying a common direction; and nothing but the most imminent common danger could bring them to combine in any plan of united operations. By sea their armaments were more effective. With such vigour were their preparations then made, that by the beginning of May they had 98 vessels of war at sea, bearing 1760 guns, and manned by 10,560 admirable seamen.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 530, 532; Gordon, ii. 11, 14.

91. Early successes of the Greeks.

The first events of the campaign were favourable to the Greeks, and seemed to presage successes not less decisive than the last. In Epirus, the heroic Mark Bozzaris was at the head of five thousand men, with whom, after the raising of the siege of Missolonghi, he kept the Turks in Arta in check, and defeated a large body of Albanians, whom he chased to the edge of the Ambracian Gulf, and menaced Prevesa itself. In Eubœa and Thessaly the insurgents drove the pachas into the fortresses of Negropont and Carystos, and spread the insurrection to Volo, and through the plains around that place. But the completion of the Ottoman armaments, which went on very slowly, at length put a period to this auspicious

March and April.

state of things. In the middle of May the Turkish fleet, composed of sixty sail, set out from the Dardanelles, and passing within sight of Samos and Ipsara, on which it did not venture to hazard a descent, disembarked five thousand Asiatics in the island of Eubœa, who speedily raised March 17. the blockade of Negropont and Carystos, and forced the Greeks to seek refuge in the mountains. The entire population of Athens, on the approach of the Ottomans, took refuge, as on the approach of Xerxes, in the island of Salamis; the Acropolis alone, garrisoned by Ghouras with eight hundred men, still held out. After this success, the Capitan Pacha made sail for Volo, where he landed another body of five thousand men, which, uniting with the troops collected by the Pacha of Larissa, severely avenged the previous successes of the Greeks in that quarter. Odysseus, however, had taken post in Thermopylæ, and barred any passage that way into southern Greece; upon which the Turks made sail for the coasts of the Morea, and revictualled Patras and the castles of Morea and Coron, the only strongholds still held by the Turks in that quarter, and which were reduced to the last extremity from want of provisions.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 532, 533; Gordon, ii. 15, 22.

92. Victory of the Greeks on Mount Helicon.

Soon, however, a more serious danger awaited the Greek cause. The grand Ottoman army destined for the invasion of the Morea, having received intelligence of the arrival of the Turkish fleet in the bay of Patras, put itself in motion for the Isthmus of Corinth. Menaced by so great a danger, the Greek government issued a proclamation calling on all Greeks to take up arms to defend their country; and Mavrocordato, nobly sinking his superior rank, followed the army in the quality of secretary to the council. Niketas, Colocotroni, and Odysseus had united their forces, and taken post near the convent of St Lue, situated near the ruins of the ancient Ascoa, at the foot of Mount Helicon. Their united forces, however, only amounted to eight thousand men, and the Turks were thirty thousand, including a large proportion of horse, so

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that the Greeks were compelled to remain on the defensive, and maintain a desultory series of actions among their rocks and thickets. At length the Turks, having made an attack on the monastery of St Lue, where they expected to find immense treasures, a general conflict took place, in which victory, after being long undecided, at length remained with the Greeks. The Turks lost six thousand men in this disastrous affair. They were again attacked while retiring in the plain of Chæronea by the Greeks, while engaged in the passage of the Cephissus, and defeated with great slaughter. Finally, this splendid army, which was to have raised the blockade of the Acro-Corinthus and achieved the conquest of the Morea, was obliged to retire to Tricala, weakened by half its numbers, where it awaited reinforcements from Salonica. The inhabitants of Athens, now delivered from their alarm, returned from Salamis, and reoccupied their city; Attica was entirely evacuated by the Turks; the blockade of the Acro-Corinthus resumed; and that important stronghold, deprived of all hope of succour, at length surrendered by capitulation, after having exhausted all its means of subsistence.[1]

June 26 to July 3.

July 5.

Oct. 3.

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 532, 534; Gordon, ii. 18, 20.

93. Divisions among the Greeks in the Morea.

So great were their successes that, had they been duly improved by unanimity and vigour, the Greeks might have entirely delivered their territory from their oppressors; for the remaining fortresses held by the Turks, deprived of all chance of being relieved, would have become an easy prey. But the unhappy divisions which had arisen among the Greeks, from the consequences of their success, now rose to such a pitch in the Morea that the rival captains, instead of bearing their united strength against the enemy, took up arms against each other. Civil war aided in the desolation of a country afflicted by so many disasters, threatened by so many dangers. Blood was shed in the streets of Tripolitza between the adverse factions;[2] the president, Mavromichælis, despairing of being able to carry on the government, resigned his office, and

[2] Ann. Hist. vi. 535, 536.

retired to Hydra; and Colocotroni, in whom the real authority now centred, withdrew to Napoli di Romania, from whence he directed the whole military operations of continental Greece.

94. Revolt of the Albanians, and advance of the Pacha of Scodra. Aug. 12.

More glorious operations, and a more heroic spirit, signalised the campaign in Epirus and western Greece during this eventful year. Notwithstanding the successes of Mark Bozzaris in the beginning of the year, and the revolt of the Albanians in August, which delivered him from seven thousand of his most formidable enemies, he was reduced to such straits before the end of August as to render it extremely doubtful whether he should be able to keep the field. The Pacha of Scodra, a man of uncommon energy and resolution, had, in obedience to the orders of the Sultan, effected a levy in his pachalic, and approached Missolonghi at the head of twenty-five thousand men. Bozzaris had not more than three thousand at his disposal, for the revolted Albanians had all returned home. With forces so inferior it was evidently impossible to effect anything by open force; but Bozzaris and his brave companions resolved on a nocturnal attack, by which it was hoped the enemy, who kept a very bad look-out, might be surprised. He went to a Souliote battalion, well known as one of the bravest in Greece, and after unfolding to them his design, asked them if they would accompany him in his enterprise. They all expressed their determination to conquer or die. Out of them Bozzaris selected a hundred and fifty of the bravest and most active, whom he proposed to head in person, and attack the centre of the enemy's camp, while the remainder of his troops were divided into three columns, to distract him by simultaneous assaults in other quarters.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vi. 537, 539; Gordon, ii. 30, 33.

In the night of the 19th August, Bozzaris received the sacrament with his chosen adherents, and assigned as their rallying point, if they lost sight of him in the dark, the tent of the pacha. The column selected for attack

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95. Nocturnal surprise of the Turks, and death of Mark Bozzaris. Aug. 20.

was the Turkish advanced guard, five thousand strong, which was encamped in the bottom of a valley, intersected by vineyards and ditches. The action which ensued exactly resembled the nocturnal enterprises which have been immortalised in the *Iliad.* Buried in sleep, without either sentinels or intrenchments, the Turks were suddenly surprised by the swords of the Souliotes which gleamed amongst them. Above all the roar of the conflict was heard the voice of Bozzaris, who never ceased to exhort his companions to conquer. Knowing the voice, the Mussulmans, in the dark, directed all their shots to the quarter from whence it came. One took effect, and wounded him severely below the girdle. He concealed the wound, however, and continued to head his comrades, who were making the utmost carnage among the Ottomans. The attack of the other divisions completed their confusion, and before daybreak they fled in all directions. Eight hundred men were slain on the spot, a thousand prisoners, eighteen standards, seven guns, and immense military stores taken by the Souliotes, who did not lose one hundred and fifty men. But they sustained an irreparable loss in Mark Bozzaris, who was shot through the head as day began to dawn, and soon after expired. He was borne off the field by the weeping Souliotes, interred with the highest military honours at Missolonghi, and the government published a decree in his honour.[1]* Like Epaminondas, he had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy fly before he breathed his last, and he died exhorting his countrymen to shed every drop of their blood in

[1] Gordon, ii. 32, 33; Ann. Hist. vi. 538, 539.

* "Beloved Greeks! Lo, another Leonidas figures in your history. The first with three hundred companions faced the universe, and, resolving to die in obedience to the laws of Sparta, fell in the night upon myriads of foes. Our modern one, at the head of eight hundred brave soldiers, charged sword in hand and determined to conquer, and vanquished ten thousand. Eight hundred Turks, and among those Pfiapa Pacha, lay dead: few of our heroes fell a sacrifice to their faith and country. In this glorious battle died the immortal General Bozzaris, and went to the regions of eternity, to darken by the rays of his exploits the lustre of former heroes."—*The President* MAVROMICHÆLIS, Salamis, Aug. 31, 1823.

defence of their religion and their country. The annals of antiquity contain nothing more sublime.

This gallant action postponed, but could not avert the stroke of fate. The Pacha of Scodra, having recovered from the defeat experienced at Carpenitza from Bozzaris, forced with great difficulty the defiles of the mountains which separated him from Omer-Vrione, and having effected the junction of the two armies, their united forces, twenty thousand strong, sat down before Missolonghi. Its garrison consisted only of three thousand regular troops; but to these were added double that number of armed inhabitants, who were inspired with the utmost resolution, and were confident in their means of defence. The strength of Missolonghi, situated below the level of the sea, depends chiefly on the lagunæ, which, as at Venice, guard it from the approaches of the enemy. The Capitan Pacha had left three large frigates and twelve brigs in the bay, which blockaded it by sea; and the Turks, as it was now sufficiently garrisoned, resolved to commence the siege with an attack on the fort of Anatolico, a small town built on a low islet at the entrance of the lagoons, and garrisoned by five hundred men, with thrice that number of armed inhabitants, commanded by Constantine Bozzaris, brother of the fallen hero, who had inherited the mantle of his glory. The chief apprehension of the inhabitants was from failure of water, but a bomb from the besiegers having broke through the pavement, discovered a spring; which, being regarded as a divine interposition, inspired the garrison with the most sanguine hopes of success. Thus elated, the whole population worked with incessant vigour in repairing their fragile ramparts and batteries; and although the Turks kept up an incessant fire, and threw in two thousand shells, the place still held bravely out. Meanwhile the rainy season commenced, the Turkish camp was flooded; some convoys of provisions were intercepted by the mountaineers in their rear; a few additional guns arrived by

96. Commencement of the siege of Anatolico. Oct. 18.

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sea at Anatolico; the garrison refused to capitulate, and the Pacha of Scodra, despairing of success, raised the siege, and returned home, with the loss of half his army, after cutting down six thousand olive trees, destroying his ammunition, burying his cannon, and leaving all his provisions to the enemy.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 35, 37; Ann. Hist. vi. 542, 543.

97. Operations in Candia during 1823.

The plague, which raged with great violence in Canea during the whole winter of 1822, and carried off five thousand of the crowded population of that fortress, suspended all military operations in Candia during that period. In the end of May, Tombazi, who was invested with the command, landed in the island with fourteen pieces of cannon, and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. With this aid he compelled the governor of Kipamos, a fortress which had hitherto remained in the hands of the Turks, to capitulate, on condition of the garrison being conducted to Canea, which was accordingly done in safety, by the honourable humanity and courage of the Greek chiefs, who discharged a twelve-pounder into the middle of their own men, in the act of rushing on fifteen hundred of the captives for a massacre. This success extended the insurrection into the mountains around Khadeno, which had hitherto remained quiet; and five thousand men soon environed the Turks there, who with much difficulty, and after bravely cutting their way through the Greeks, effected their retreat, though with very heavy loss, to Canea. The Greeks disgraced themselves by the massacre of two hundred sick who were left behind. Stimulated to exertion by these disasters, the Turkish government sent orders to the Pacha of Egypt to send succour to Candia, and in the end of June he disembarked five thousand troops in Canea. This great reinforcement revived the drooping spirits of the Turks, and at first diffused great consternation among the Christians, insomuch that the Sfakiotes talked of surrendering. Dissensions broke out among them; they were defeated in a decisive battle at Armoughi, from whence Tombazi

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himself escaped with difficulty. Six hundred women and children, who had taken refuge after this disaster in the vast natural grotto of Stonarambella, were, after being blockaded for a month, inhumanly smoked to death like bees by the Turks, who piled up wood against the entrance, to which they set fire. The Egyptian general followed up his successes with equal vigour and cruelty; six-and-thirty villages were reduced to ashes, the defiles and inmost recesses of Mount Ida forced, and ere long three thousand Cretans were put to the sword, and seven thousand women and children sold as slaves.* So great was the destruction of human life, that Tombazi published a proclamation, that as great part of the lands in the island were without persons to cultivate them, they would be allotted to the first occupants: a temptation which attracted three thousand persons from the neighbouring islands to the scene of devastation. But notwithstanding this, it was evident that the insurrection in Candia had received its death-blow; and it had already appeared, what was so fatally proved in the sequal, that however capable of withstanding the tumultary levies of the Turks, the Greeks could not resist in the open field the disciplined battalions of Egypt.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 46, 59; Ann. Hist. vi. 546, 547.

98. Naval campaign of 1823.

The naval campaign of the Turks during this year, for which such vast preparations had been made, and from which so much had been expected, did not at all redound to the honour or advantage of their arms. Being not in sufficient strength to engage them in open fight, the Greeks were reduced to the necessity of observing them at a distance, and keeping them in a constant state of alarm by the terror of their fireships. They did this, however, so effectually, that the Ottomans derived very little advantage from their naval superiority. So far from it, Miaulis, with a small Greek flotilla, engaged the Turkish fleet, on its return from the Gulf of Patras, off Lemnos, set two frigates on fire by means of his fireships, and excited such consternation in the whole squadron

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by the sight of the flames, that they fled in confusion to the Dardanelles. In fine, as the result of the naval campaign, Carystos was relieved, Toikari reduced to subjection, and a few brigs and schooners of the Greeks taken; and with these trifling prizes the Turkish admiral re-entered the Dardanelles in the end of November. No sooner was the sea cleared than a Greek expedition of eighteen sail set out from Napoli di Romania, bearing a reinforcement of three thousand men, and large subscriptions in money from the Greeks in the Morea for Missolonghi, evidently threatened with a second siege. In their way they met the Algerine squadron, which had been left by the Capitan Pacha, and long infested the Gulf of Lepanto, defeated it, and drove a vessel laden with treasure on the cost of Zante, which they made prize.[1]

[1] Gordon, i. 61, 63; Ann. Hist. vi. 541, 544.

99. Increased dissensions in the Morea.

The domestic dissensions which had during the year paralysed the operations of the Greeks in the Morea, prevented them from taking advantage of their glorious successes. To such a length did they arise before Christmas, that the different members of the government were at open war with each other. Mavromichælis and Colocotroni, the leading members of the executive council, had drawn the whole real power into their own hands at Napoli di Romania, while the legislative assembly at Argos paid no regard to their orders. Like Napoleon, Colocotroni resolved on a *coup d'état* to get quit of his opponents. For this purpose he despatched two hundred men under his son, to whom Niketas afterwards added a band of his own. The united body reached Argos when the senate were sitting, but they were so overpowered by the majesty of the legislature, and overawed by the firm countenance of the prefect of the town, that they did not venture on a dissolution, but contented themselves with an attempt, which proved ineffectual, on the archives, which were removed on board a vessel in the night. Foiled in this manner in both objects, they returned to Napoli. The

legislative body, after this insult, retired to Cranidi, a strong fort on the Gulf of Corinth, where it declared its sittings permanent, and fulminated a decree dismissing the whole executive from their situations. Part of the Morea, Missolonghi, and the islands, adhered to Mavrocordato and the legislature, part to Colocotroni and the executive. But meanwhile the collection of the revenue entirely ceased; the public treasury was empty; the chiefs levied contributions on their own account, with which they maintained their troops; and Greece, while yet in the cradle, and painfully struggling for its existence with a powerful enemy, was exposed to the horrors and the weakness of civil war.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist, vi. 549, 550; Gordon, ii. 72, 73.

100. Increasing interest in Greece abroad. Arrival of Lord Byron at Missolonghi.

While Greece was thus in its interior undergoing the convulsions and paralysed by the weakness incident to every state emerging into freedom from former slavery, the interest of the nations of western Europe in her behalf was daily and rapidly on the increase. The learned and the reflecting were charmed with the resurrection, fraught with such recollections and bearing such names as Greece; the religious watched with interest the efforts of a gallant people to shake off the Mahommedan yoke, and restore the Christian faith; the revolutionists sympathised with the revolt of any people against their government, and beheld in the deliverance of Greece the first step towards the emancipation of mankind. The effect of this general interest and sympathy appeared in numerous public meetings in several places in England, presided over by persons of high rank and great consideration, where resolutions, expressive of the deepest interest in their behalf, were passed, and large subscriptions made in their behalf.* Similar subscriptions were made in various

* "In England, where the sublime spectacle of a nation awakening into light and freedom could not but be regarded with sympathy and admiration, a thousand proofs have been given of the interest their cause has excited. At length an association has been formed to give a practical and efficient direction to these feelings, and they now make a solemn appeal to the nation in behalf of a country associated with every sacred and sublime recollection, for a people

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places in France and Germany; and a number of ardent youths in all the three countries enrolled themselves in battalions, styled "Philhellenes," in which they proceeded to the Morea to share in the dangers and glories of Greek independence. The unsuitableness of these corps for the guerilla and partisan warfare, which was alone practicable in Greece, rendered them of little real service in the contest; but the subscriptions in money were of great moment, and powerfully contributed to uphold the resources of the infant state. At this time, also, several individuals went to Greece to tender their services in its behalf, eminent alike by their rank, their courage, and their genius. Among these must be reckoned M. Blaquière and Colonel Leicester Stanhope, whose talents and address proved of the utmost value to the Greek cause; while Lord Byron, who arrived in Argostoli, in the bay of Cephalonia, on the 3d August, brought to the cause the resources of a fortune generously bestowed, and the lustre of an immortal name.[1]

Aug. 3.

[1] Gordon, ii. 78, 81; Ann Hist. vi. 405; Ann. Reg. 1823, 276, 279.

101. Continued divisions of the Greeks.

Lord Byron, on his arrival at Missolonghi, whither he bent his steps, as the place threatened with the earliest danger, found the community so torn with internal divisions, that nothing short of an entire dissolution of society was to be apprehended from their continuance. It was no easy matter, however, even with the weight of his great name and liberal power, to accomplish this object, for the divisions of the Greek leaders had

formerly free and enlightened, but long retained by foreign despots in the chains of ignorance and barbarism. While the attempts of the Greeks were limited within a narrow circle, and it seemed probable that they would be instantly crushed by the Ottoman power, it might be doubtful how far it was prudent to encourage a struggle which might aggravate the evil it was intended to remove. But the war has now changed its character; it is clear it can end in nothing but in the independence or absolute annihilation of the Greek people. If the Turks could not put down the insurrection in its early stages, when the Greeks possessed neither arms, nor military knowledge, nor regular government, what can they do now against a renovated nation and the active sympathy of the Christian world?"—*Address of the Greek Committee*, Lord Milton in the chair, May 3, 1823. *Annual Register*, 1823, Appendix to Chron., 73. GORDON, ii. 85, 86.

reached the point of civil war. The legislative body, in order to dispossess the military faction from this stronghold, resolved to transfer the seat of government to Napoli di Romania, which, in every point of view, was the proper place for it; and they accordingly embarked on board the Hydriote fleet, which was entirely at their devotion, and arrived on the 18th March in the bay of March 18. that fortress, and summoned the garrison to open the gates; but the governor, Kanos Colocotroni, positively refused to do so. Upon this the assembly declared him a rebel, and ordered the siege of the place by sea and land. Matters had proceeded to the like extremities in Tripolitza, where Colocotroni himself held out with the whole garrison against the central government. But Niketas and other chiefs deserted his cause; the garrison of the Acro-Corinthus declared for the legislature, and the garrison of Tripolitza itself exhibited symptoms of wavering. Discouraged by these defections, Colocotroni agreed to surrender Tripolitza and retire to his country estates, which was agreed to, and the senate returned to Argos; but Panos still held out in Napoli, and the country was so divided that it was hard to say where the government really resided. At length, however, as Napoli was closely blockaded by sea and land, the garrison began to see that the sense of the country was against them, and by degrees came round to the central government. The governor of the fort of Vourtoi, one of the outworks of the place, suddenly declared for it, and Colocotroni, despairing of success, surrendered the fortress on the 19th June. Colocotroni himself soon after sent June 19. in his adhesion; Odysseus did the same; the government, with prudent moderation, accepted all their offers of submission. On the 24th June the seat of government was June 24. transferred to Napoli di Romania, and on the 14th July a general amnesty was proclaimed, which at length put a period to these disastrous dissensions.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 405, 409.

While these divisions were paralysing the strength

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and darkening the prospects of Greece, the affairs of the infant state were much more prosperous abroad. The English cruisers now, in obedience to orders received from government, admitted the Greek blockade—a step, and not an unimportant one, in the recognition of their independence; and they were highly elated by the intelligence that the English government, in consequence of some disputes with the dey as to an infraction of the subsisting treaty with that power, had declared war against Algiers. More substantial benefit was derived from the contraction of a loan of £800,000, which, by the exertions of the Greek committee in London, was obtained by the government at the rate of £59 sterling paid for £100 stock inscribed. Although the conditions of this loan were altogether so onerous that the Greek government only obtained £280,000 for £800,000 debt contracted, yet the transaction was eminently beneficial to them, and proved, in a great measure, the salvation of the republic, for in the distracted state of its government the collection of the revenue had almost entirely ceased; and but for this seasonable supply the armaments by sea and land must have been dissolved, from the want of any funds for their support.[1]

102. Contraction of the Greek loan.

Jan. 1.

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 409, 410; Gordon, ii. 90, 93; Ann. Reg. 1824, 129, 131.

And, in truth, never had Greece stood more in need of vigorous efforts for its defence, for the forces which the Ottoman government was preparing to bring against it were immense. Noways discouraged by the bad success of the preceding campaigns, the Sultan made the utmost exertions for the prosecution of the war; and, taught by its reverses, the government laid their plans with much more skill and judgment for the future. They had learned by experience to appreciate the value of the Egyptian troops, who were armed and disciplined after the European fashion; and they held out to the pacha of that country the most tempting lure to induce him to engage heartily in the contest, by the promise of the revolted provinces as an addition to his pachalic when they were

103. Preparations and plan of the campaign by the Turks.

subdued. The plan arranged was this: IBRAHIM PACHA, who already had all but subdued Candia, was to transport a large force of regular troops to the Morea, while his powerful fleet was to blockade its harbours and secure the subsistence of the troops; the fleet from Constantinople was to muster in the Dardanelles, and make a descent upon Hydra and Ipsara, which, it was hoped, might be subdued; while the Pacha of Roumelia and Omer-Vrione were to march with the whole military strength of continental Turkey against western Greece and Missolonghi. In all, above one hundred thousand men were directed by sea and land against the infant state; and as nearly twenty thousand of that number were to be the disciplined battalions of Egypt, it was easy to foresee that Greece had never run such dangers as she was now to incur.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 91; Ann. Hist. vii. 412, 413.

104. Operations of the Turks in the Archipelago.

The Capitan Pacha set sail from the Dardanelles in the middle of June, with a fleet of forty sail, having on board a large body of land troops. He first reinforced with three thousand men the garrisons of Carysto and Negropont, which Odysseus and Dramantis had reduced to the last extremity, in Eubœa, and enabled the Turks to resume the offensive; and, passing over to Attica, compelled the Greeks under Ghouras to shut themselves up in the Acropolis. While these successes were gained in that quarter, still more important operations were in progress in the southern parts of the Archipelago, where Ibrahim Pacha brought the redoubtable battalions of Egypt into action. He first proceeded to the isle of Casos; and though bravely repulsed in a first attack, he succeeded in a second, and very soon completed the subjugation of the island.[2]

June 8.
June 14.

[2] Ann. Hist. vii. 412, 413; Gordon, ii. 125, 129.

105. Attack on Spezzia and Ipsara. July 1.

The great effort of the Turks, however, in their naval campaign, was directed against the islands of Spezzia and Ipsara. The Capitan Pacha, Chosrow, had lain a month in Mitylene, where he collected twenty thousand fanatical Asiatics, thirsting for the blood of the Christians, whom he

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embarked on board his fleet, with which great reinforcement he set sail for Ipsara. The island at this period contained fifteen thousand inhabitants, of whom a third bore arms. It is a small and sterile island, containing beyond the town only a few acres of ground; but, being the abode of liberty and independence, it had attained a very high degree of prosperity. Two hundred cannon were mounted on the island; a line of telegraphs was established round it; the inhabitants, relying on their past victories, were confident of success, and even impatient for the attack; and a beautiful flotilla of schooners, brigs, and fireships lay ready in the port to resist the enemy. Relying on these circumstances, the Psarriotes refused all offers of accommodation, and bravely determined to resist to the last extremity. Yet were their means of defence more specious than real; for they possessed no regular citadel or fort, and the defence of the island rested entirely on a number of detached batteries, the loss of any one of which would endanger the whole.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 133, 134; Ann. Hist. vii. 416, 417.

106. Capture and destruction of Ipsara. July 3.

On the 1st July the armada of the Turks hove in sight, and soon surrounded the island. It consisted of an eighty-gun ship, two of sixty-four guns, six frigates, ten corvettes, and twenty brigs, with thirty transports having on board fourteen thousand regular troops, besides a crowd of fierce Asiatics. When this immense armament was seen, a council of war was held, at which Canaris, like Themistocles, strongly advised them to combat by sea. Unfortunately his advice was overruled; and the magistrates, afraid of being deserted by the sailors, not only doomed the navy to total inaction, but landed part of the crews to make them co-operate in the defence of the place. The consequences were fatal. The Turks, on the 3d July, drew in their vessels to the mouth of the harbour, where they commenced a furious cannonade on the town, which was returned with great spirit and no disadvantage by the islanders, both from their ships and

batteries. It was obvious from this sea-fight that, if the principal defence had been made there, the Greeks would have had the advantage; but as the rudders had been taken out of the vessels by order of the magistrates, to prevent the sailors deserting, they could not manœuvre at sea, which deprived them of their principal advantage; and meanwhile, under cover of the smoke, the Turks unobserved landed a body of troops on a little cove at the north-west angle of the island. They then stormed a redoubt with three guns, and, rushing forward with frightful yells, gained possession of the rocks which overlook the town, on which they immediately hoisted the Ottoman standard. At the sight of this a cry of horror rose among the more timid of the islanders, and several batteries were abandoned. The bravest now saw that the fate of their country was decided, and a general rush took place towards the boats, where multitudes perished by drowning, through the numbers crowding in, or the boats being sent to the bottom by the Turkish guns. All resistance then ceased in the town, which was sacked and burnt, and the whole inhabitants put to the sword.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 414, 415; Gordon, ii. 135, 137.

107. Glorious resistance of the Psariotes.

Like Chios, Ipsara sank in flames and blood; but its closing scene was very different, and worthy of the heroic character of its inhabitants. A certain number, comprising the principal citizens, escaped on board nineteen brigs, carrying away such of the fugitives as they could pick up from the waves, and conveyed them in safety to Hydra, where they were received with generous hospitality. Six hundred Macedonians threw themselves, with their wives and children, into the fortified convent of St Nicholas, on which were mounted twenty-four pieces of cannon. With these they defended themselves with such resolution that they were still masters of it at night; and on the following morning the Capitan Pacha renewed the assault with his whole troops. Several attacks were repulsed

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with prodigious slaughter; but at length the garrison, hopeless of relief, and having lost two-thirds of their number, determined to perish like the three hundred at Thermopylæ. They sent a soldier with a lighted torch to fire a powder magazine outside the walls; and as he fell, pierced by several balls, before reaching it, five others were sent on a similar errand, and all shared the same fate. Upon this the Greeks resolved to blow themselves up with the powder they had within the monastery, but in such a way as to involve their enemies in their ruin. They ceased firing, accordingly, for some time; and the Turks, thinking the defenders had all fallen, after a pause rushed tumultuously forward to the assault of the walls, which were scaled on every side. Suddenly the Hellenic flag was lowered; a white flag, bearing the words "Liberty or death," waved in the air; a signal-gun was discharged, and immediately after, a rumbling noise, followed by a loud explosion, was heard, and the monastery, with its whole defenders, and thousands of the assailants, were blown into the air. Two only of the Greeks were extricated alive from the ruins; of the assailants three thousand perished during the storm or in the explosion.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 137, 139; Ann. Hist. vii. 415, 417.

108. Immense spoil made by the Turks in Ipsara.

The military spoil made by the Turks in Ipsara was immense, and the blow to the Hellenic cause from its loss so great as to justify the saying at the time in the islands, that one of the eyes of Greece was put out. Two hundred pieces of cannon, great stores of powder, and a beautiful flotilla of ninety vessels, fell into the hands of the Ottomans. The inhabitants of the island, with the exception of those who had saved themselves in boats the evening before, and a few hundreds who hid themselves in caves in the island, were destroyed. Among those who escaped was the heroic Canaris, who, after displaying the utmost valour in the defence, threw himself into a boat and got off. The Turks, highly elated with their victory, sent five

hundred heads and eleven hundred ears to Constantinople, which, with thirty-three standards taken, were displayed in ghastly rows at the gate of the Seraglio, and excited the people to the highest pitch of fanatical exultation. Ten females only were made slaves; for the Psarriote women, in a heroic spirit, drowned themselves, with their infants, to avoid becoming the spoil of the victors.[1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 416, 417; Gordon, ii. 138, 139.

109. Gallant conduct of the Greeks after this disaster.

The destruction of Ipsara, with the heroic termination, made a prodigious sensation in Christendom, and much strengthened the general conviction that some intervention of the Western powers had become indispensable, if a Christian state was to be rescued from utter destruction at the hands of the Mahommedans. But in the immediate neighbourhood it had no such depressing effect; the result was rather the reverse. The council of Hydra acted a noble part on the occasion. So far from thinking of submitting, they fitted out every disposable vessel, and soon had two squadrons at sea, one of which, under Miaulis, went to the south to watch the Egyptian fleet, which was approaching; while another under Canaris made for Samos, which was menaced with the fate of Chios and Ipsara. The danger to that island was imminent, for twenty thousand Asiatics, flushed with the blood of the Christians whom they had massacred at New Echelles, in Asia Minor, awaited only the approach of the fleet to embark and exterminate the inhabitants of Samos. Meanwhile Odysseus and the other chiefs of eastern Greece, burying their divisions in oblivion, sent twelve hundred excellent troops to strengthen the garrison of Hydra,

* "Les infidèles Arnautes, que les rebelles Ipsariotes avaient appelés à leur secours, ont été tous passés au fil de l'épée, et ont ainsi fait l'épreuve de la Puissance Musulmane. Dix des chefs de l'insurrection, et environ 300 hommes, ont été faits prisonniers; 110 bâtimens, et plus de 100 pièces de canon, sont tombés en notre pouvoir; enfin, toute l'île d'Ipsara a été soumise par la grâce du Tout-Puissant. Plus de 500 têtes d'Infidèles, plus de 1100 oreilles et 33 drapeaux, ont été envoyés à la Sublime Porte par le dit Pacha, et jetés à terre avec mépris."—*Inscription (Jafta), July 24, 1824, à Constantinople aux Portes du Seraglio. Annuaire Historique*, vii. 417.

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which became so strong as to be able not only to defy attack, but even resume the offensive. An expedition

July 15. was fitted out to retake Ipsara, where a garrison of one thousand men had been left by the Capitan Pacha. It landed in the same bay where the Turks had effected their descent, defeated and made prisoner the garrison, and captured or destroyed all the gunboats in the harbour, thirty in number. Finding the island entirely destroyed, and two hundred wretches merely wandering among the ruins, they entirely evacuated it, taking away this remnant of the inhabitants to Hydra.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 417, 418; Gordon, ii. 140, 142.

110. Defeat of the Turks in the straits of Samos.

Menaced with an immediate descent and utter ruin, the inhabitants of Samos prepared vigorously for their defence. Having received assurances of support from the government at Napoli di Romania, Lycurgus, the governor, assembled all the male population of the island capable of bearing arms, twelve thousand in number, on the coast; and having sent all the women and children to the mountains, every preparation was made for a vigorous defence. It depended, however, mainly on the naval force, assembled for the protection of the island; for if the Turks once effected a landing, it was easy to foresee it would undergo the fate of Chios and Ipsara. The combined fleet of Spezzia and Hydra, of forty sail, ere long made its

Aug. 12. appearance, under the command of Sakhtouri; and the Ottoman fleet, also of forty sail, but much larger vessels, soon hove in sight. After several indecisive actions in

Aug. 15. the straits, in one of which Canaris advanced with his fireship into the middle of the enemy's fleet, and threw them into such consternation that they all took to flight,

Aug. 17. the Turkish admiral on the 17th made a grand attack. The moment was terrible: forty ships on each side the straits, between Samos and the Asiatic shore, lay facing each other; on the opposite shores sixty thousand combatants stood watching the conflict; and on the hills in the island a trembling crowd of thirty thousand

women and children gazed with speechless anxiety on the issue of a conflict on which the lives and liberties of all were dependent. At ten in the morning the fireships were launched: the Hydriote ones failed from the pusillanimity of the crews, who abandoned them before they reached the enemy; but Canaris was at hand to repair the loss. Steering his fireship direct on a frigate of fifty-four guns, he grappled her so strongly that all attempts to separate the ships were vain; the Turks, six hundred in number, all leapt overboard, and soon after the vessel blew up with an explosion so terrible that twelve boats around it were destroyed, and several persons even on shore were killed by the falling of the spars and masts. Two other schooners, carrying twenty and thirty guns, were soon after burned by the Hydriote vessels; and at five in the evening the whole Turkish fleet moved off to the southward, with the loss of three fine vessels, one hundred guns, and twelve hundred killed and wounded. Samos was delivered, and the inhabitants returned to their houses, and crowded to the churches to return thanks to Heaven for their deliverance.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 147, 149; Ann. Hist. vii. 420, 422.

III. Junction of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets.

The object of the Turkish admiral, after his repulse at Samos, was to join the Egyptian fleet, and with the combined forces make a descent upon the Morea. The Egyptian fleet set sail from Alexandria on the 19th July, having been detained two months later than was expected, in consequence of a dreadful fire in the barracks at Cairo, which destroyed immense military stores, and in which four thousand persons lost their lives. The armament, however, when it did set sail from Alexandria, was very formidable, and the most numerous which had appeared in the Mediterranean since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. The combined fleets effected a junction in the gulf of Boudroum, the ancient Halicarnassus, on the 25th August, and they were then found to amount to one line-of-battle ship, 25 frigates, 25 corvettes, each mounting from 24 to 28 guns, 50 brigs and schooners, many of them carrying 18 or 24 guns,

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and 240 transports. The land forces consisted of 12,000 regular infantry, drilled and organised after the European fashion, 2000 Albanian light infantry, 2000 cavalry, 700 gunners and sappers, and 150 pieces of heavy or field artillery. Altogether the armament had on board 80,000 sailors and soldiers, and above 2500 cannon; a force almost as great as that with which England made the descent on Walcheren in 1809. To oppose this crusade, the Greek admiral had only 70 sail, manned by 5000 sailors, and bearing at the utmost 800 guns.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 147, 153; Ann. Hist. vii. 422, 423.

112. Naval victories of the Greeks.

With admirable gallantry Miaulis, notwithstanding this grievous disproportion of force, advanced to meet the enemy; and several actions without any decisive effect took place in the beginning of September. At length, on the 12th September, the Hydriot Papantoni laid his fireship alongside of the Tunisian admiral's frigate of forty-

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four guns, and 750 men, all of whom, when she took fire, leapt overboard. Soon after the admiral was picked up by the Greeks, and made prisoner. This success so intimidated the Ottomans that they sheered off, and the combat ceased. Such was the terror which the Greek fireships inspired that the Capitan Pacha stood aloof altogether; and it was a common saying in the fleet, that he might as

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well have been at Constantinople. On the 19th, Miaulis succeeded in burning two Turkish vessels, mounting, the one nineteen, the other twelve guns, after which the Capitan Pacha ran into the Dardanelles. The two fleets were al-

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most constantly engaged daily until the 13th November, when Miaulis, notwithstanding his inferiority of force, ventured to engage the whole Egyptian squadron in a general battle, and with such success that a fine frigate and twelve lesser vessels, with fifteen transports, were

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burned or destroyed, and Ibrahim fairly fled out of the Archipelago with his ships of war, leaving his transports to follow the best way they could. They steered for Rhodes, and put up in the bay of Marmorice for the winter. He was then able to calculate his losses in this

naval campaign, which was incomparably the most disastrous at sea which the Mahommedans had yet sustained. They had two fine frigates, two corvettes, and two brigs blown up, one corvette wrecked, fifty sail of transports taken or destroyed, an admiral and four thousand seamen slain, and five hundred Arabs carried prisoners to Napoli. Including those who fell at Ipsara and died of sickness, this naval campaign had cost the Turks not less than fifteen thousand men, without any advantage but the destruction of that island. The Hellenic government with reason expressed in several decrees their high sense of the services of Admiral Miaulis and his brave followers, and they were welcomed on their return to Hydra with the honours due to valour, zeal, and perseverance.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 153, 164; Ann. Hist. vii. 424, 429.

113. Land operations in eastern Greece.

The campaign of the Greeks by land this year, though distinguished by honourable events, was by no means unchequered by disaster. The Sultan had given orders to the Pacha of Widdin to raise thirty thousand men for the conquest of eastern Greece; but the Turks had become so disinclined to a service which experience had taught them was fraught with so many dangers, that he never was able to bring five thousand men into the field. On the 18th July, Ghouras defeated two thousand janizaries, who had come across from Negropont, at *Marathon*, and delivered Attica for a time from the incursions of the Turks in Negropont—an event which naturally excited a great sensation in western Europe. The Turks, however, being soon after reinforced by a large body of horse from Bœotia, Ghouras took refuge in the Acropolis, and the Athenians again migrated to Salamis. Upon this, Roumisia Valesi, who had received the most pressing orders from the Sultan to proceed to Lepanto, and co-operate with Omer-Vrione in the attack on Missolonghi, having collected ten thousand men, endeavoured to force the defiles near Gravia, which were occupied by four thousand Greeks; but he was repulsed with great slaughter, and the loss of two guns and seven standards.

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July 26.

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The Ottomans, after this check, endeavoured to reach Salona and the Gulf of Lepanto, by crossing the highest passes of Mount Parnassus; but here again they found the Greeks strongly posted, and were repulsed. Upon this the pacha fell back to Salonica, and the Turks who occupied Athens, being unable to find provisions, retired from that city and Attica, and the Greeks returned from Salamis to their houses and shops around the Acropolis. Deprived of this powerful aid, Omer-Vrione was unable to undertake any serious operations against Missolonghi; and the campaign in Epirus consisted of nothing but a series of skirmishes, most of which terminated to the advantage of the Greeks.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 166, 171; Ann. Hist. vii. 427, 428.

114. Results of the campaign by sea and land.

Thus had the Greeks the glory, in this the fourth year of the war, of repelling, by sea and land, the assault of above a hundred and twenty thousand Moslems, including the disciplined battalions of Egypt, and that with forces not a fourth part of their amount. Great, indeed, must have been the spirit, indomitable the perseverance, unconquerable the courage, which could enable a body of Christians, not now numbering, after the losses they had sustained, above five hundred thousand souls, without foreign aid, to contend so long with an empire having the resources of thirty-five millions of men at command. But such a contest, however glorious, could not continue for such a length of time without wearing out the national resources; and the risk was now great, that, from the very magnitude of their sacrifices, the greatness of their triumphs, the Greeks would be involved in ultimate ruin. Crushed for centuries by the severities of Mahommedan exaction, the Greeks had no reserved stores of wealth, either public or private, to fall back upon, to maintain the contest. The treasury was empty, the troops for the most part unpaid, the taxes incapable of collection. The naval armament which saved Samos and repulsed Ibrahim's invasion, had been mainly fitted out by the fragment of the Greek loan which

Christian cupidity had permitted to reach the shores of the Archipelago. From an official report laid before the National Assembly this year, it appeared that the whole surface of western Hellas, from the mountains of Agrapho to the gates of Missolonghi, was one vast scene of desolation, presenting to the eye only uncultivated fields and burnt hamlets; and the petty revenue derived from the fisheries and customhouse barely sufficed for the humble expenses of Mavrocordato's household. The mountains of Thessaly and Bœotia had become a perfect wilderness; its inhabitants, reduced to half their former number, were peculiarly deficient in men—a want which, even to this day, is severely felt. Experience had proved that a regular army and navy were indispensable, since the powerful fleet and disciplined battalions of Egypt had been brought into action; but how was either to be maintained without a treasury, without taxes, without resources? Yet, in spite of all these disheartening circumstances, and when bleeding at every pore from the ghastly wounds of former years, the Greeks nobly maintained the contest. Amidst all their misfortunes, not a voice was ever raised for capitulation; and under circumstances when reason might have despaired of success, and wisdom counselled submission, they still bore aloft the standard of religion and independence.[1]

[1] Report to Government, April 14, 1824; Gordon, ii. 172.

115. Renewed dissensions in Greece.

But in the midst of these glorious external efforts, internal faction was again rearing its hydra head; and the people, who were daily threatened with extermination from without, turned their suicidal arms against each other. In truth, the democratic government, established by the constitution, was so ill suited to the dispositions and wants of the people that dissensions were unavoidable. Colocotroni and the military chiefs, in whom power in continental Greece was really vested, had only dissembled in their submission to the executive council; they waited merely till the third annual election of the legislature might give, as they hoped, a majority to their adherents.

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1825. In this hope they were disappointed; the election, in September 1824, again gave a majority to the executive council, and they, in consequence, named Panuzzo Notara president, and the Archbishop Theodorito vice-president, of the legislative council. The composition of the executive council, in like manner, was favourable to the democratic party, and entirely adverse to the views of the military chiefs. This was the signal for the recommencement of the civil war. Colocotroni declared against the executive council near Tripolitza; several chiefs either joined him or disbanded their followers. A conflict ensued, which, however, was neither so long nor so serious as the former had been. After several actions the rebels were defeated, and Colocotroni obliged, with his sons, to deliver himself up to the executive council at Napoli, by whom they were sent state-prisoners to Hydra, where they were confined in the monastery of St Elias. This success completely re-established the authority of the executive council and the legislative assembly; but the contest, while it lasted, proved eminently prejudicial to the Greeks, for it nipped in the bud the rising prosperity of the Morea, in which it was estimated that, during the two years it had been free from the ravages of war and the oppression of the Ottomans, one-third of new land had been brought into cultivation. [1]

Nov. 15.

Jan. 10, 1825.

[1] Gordon, ii. 177, 180; Ann. Hist. vii. 431, 434.

116. Death of Odysseus.

Ghouras, who had been mainly instrumental in quelling the insurrection in eastern Greece, was so elated with his success that he gave mortal offence to Odysseus, whom he suspected of leaning in secret to the side of the malcontents, and to whom he refused both pay and rations for his troops. The consequence was, that the Greek captain, driven to desperation, entered into secret negotiations with the Turks, with whom, of his own authority, he concluded a truce for the province of Livadia. Subsequent public acts having strengthened the suspicion that he was in secret allying himself with the Crescent, his officers and men, who, amidst all their divisions, were true

Feb. 25.

to their faith and country, all abandoned him. Aware of the habitual treachery of the Turks, he rejected all the offers of an asylum offered him by their chiefs, and in preference surrendered himself to Ghouras, by whom he was committed a close prisoner to a tower in the Acropolis of Athens. His family were lodged, before his surrender, in an inaccessible cavern in Mount Parnassus. Ghouras tried to save the life of his former comrade and friend, and long delayed his execution; but at length the clamour against him in Athens became so violent that he was obliged to consent to his being strangled in prison. On the 17th June the body of Odysseus was discovered dead at the foot of the tower where he had been confined. It was given out that he had been killed by a fall in attempting to escape; but no one doubted that he had been strangled in prison, and thrown out. Ghouras afterwards never heard, without pain, the mention of his name, and often said, with a sigh, "In that business I was misled." The cavern in Parnassus was afterwards given up to government, and an amnesty granted to Odysseus's family.[1]

June 17.

[1] Gordon, ii. 153, 183; Ann. Hist. viii. 401, 402.

117. Curious statistics of Athens and Attica.

A curious and valuable statistical document was published at this time by the Greek government, singularly descriptive of the desperate tyranny of the Turkish government. According to a census taken in November 1824, the population of Athens was 9040 souls, and the gross revenue of Attica, collected in eight months, from July 1824 to February 1825, only £2000! In the days of Pericles, Athens contained 21,000 freemen and 400,000 slaves; and the gross revenue of Athens after the battle of Chæronea, when all its foreign colonies had been lost, was £220,000, equivalent to at least £500,000 a-year of our money. The population of Athens is now (1854) 30,000, and it is annually and rapidly increasing. Facts such as these require no comment: they speak volumes, and accuse alike the tyranny of the Mahommedan and the selfishness of the Christian powers of western Europe.[2]

[2] Gordon, ii. 183; Report, Dec. 14, 1824.

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118. Favourable prospects of Greece in the opening of 1825.

The year 1825 opened under brighter auspices to the Hellenic cause than had hitherto shone upon it. The authority of the central government was firmly established, the discord between it and the military chiefs had ceased, and the energies of the state might be turned with united strength against its foreign enemies. A new loan had been contracted for in London of £2,000,000, at the rate of £55½ paid for £100 of debt acknowledged, so that money was not likely to prove awanting. This ample fund, however, was so mismanaged and frittered away by the Greek committee in London, that it proved of much less real service to the Greek cause than might have been expected. Sensible from the experience they had had in Candia of the formidable nature of the Egyptian regular troops, the government established several corps, which were to receive pay, and act as regular soldiers; but the jealousies of the chiefs, and the disinclination of the peasantry to lengthened service, made the recruiting go on very slowly. Proud, with reason, of their glorious successes in the preceding campaign, the Greeks entertained a sovereign contempt for the Arabs and Egyptians; and as it had become evident that the Turks on the mainland would not turn out any more to attack them, they deemed their dangers entirely surmounted. All eyes were turned to Patras, which had been long closely blockaded by sea and land, and was now reduced to great extremities from want of provisions. At sea they divided their ships, as last season, into two fleets, one of which watched the Dardanelles, while the other was intended to keep an eye on the Egyptian fleet.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 190, 193; Ann. Hist. viii. 401, 403.

119. Preparations of the Turks.

The Mahommedans turned the winter to much better account, equipping ships, levying men, laying up magazines of ammunition and provisions, and making every preparation for a vigorous campaign. Numbers of French officers had taken service in the army of the Pacha of Egypt, and brought to it the knowledge and the resources of modern military art; and the force which he was now

prepared to put at the disposal of his son, Ibrahim Pacha, was immense. Thirty thousand Arabs had been trained and disciplined under foreign officers in the European manner, and had attained extraordinary perfection both in the use of fire-arms, and in steadiness of movement in large masses. Three expeditions, each consisting of eight thousand men, were successively to sail from Alexandria to convey this force to Candia and Rhodes; and such was the magnitude of the naval force at his disposal, that it was not anticipated that the Greeks could make any serious resistance to the passage of the land force. The efforts of the Turks by land were to be entirely confined to the siege of Missolonghi, the bulwark of western Greece, for the prosecution of which twenty thousand men were to be placed at the disposal of Redschid Pacha by the concurring efforts of all the surrounding pachas; and they were to be aided, if necessary, by a detachment from Ibrahim Pacha's Egyptians, after they had completed the conquest of the Morea. No attempt was to be made to reduce that province by invasion from the land side, as experience had proved that, in the wasted condition of the country, any army adequate to the undertaking would perish from want of provisions, or fall under the deadly fire of the Greek musketeers.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 403; Gordon, ii. 193, 194.

120. Landing of Ibrahim Pacha at Modon. Feb. 24.

As was anticipated, the expedition succeeded in crossing the sea without opposition. The first division, conveying seven thousand troops, sailed from Alexandria on the 20th, and appeared, to the amount of fifty sail, under the walls of Modon on the 24th February. Ibrahim immediately disembarked four thousand foot and four hundred horse, which he encamped around the fortress, and the same day reconnoitred Old Navarino, which is only two leagues distant. He next ordered back the ships to Suda for reinforcements, and on 21st March seven thousand more landed at Modon, the Greeks meanwhile not being in sufficient strength to disturb his encampment. Feeling himself strong enough to undertake the siege of

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Navarino, Ibrahim took a position before it on the 21st with twelve thousand men. Upon this the Greek government, at last fully awakened to a sense of the impending danger, appointed Condurriottis general-in-chief in the Morea, left Missolonghi to its own junta, appointed Ghouras to combat Odysseus, whose fidelity by this time was more than suspected, and directed one division of the fleet to cruise off the Dardanelles to watch the Capitan Pacha, and the other to proceed to Suda to watch the Egyptian squadron. Condurriottis, who had Mavrocordato with him, having collected twelve thousand men from all parts of the Morea, took post between Navarino and Modon, in order to intercept the communications of the Egyptians between the two places.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 403, 405; Gordon, ii. 194, 196.

121. Defeat of the Greeks by Ibrahim Pacha. April 19.

Ibrahim, well aware of the influence of early success in all wars, but especially in wars of opinion, resolved upon immediately commencing operations. Accordingly, on the 19th, he attacked the Greeks with four thousand infantry and five hundred horse, and then, for the first time, the superiority of the Egyptian arms and discipline became apparent. The Greeks were disposed in a semicircle, with Kara Tasso on the right, and Corta Bozzaris on the left, and for some time made a spirited resistance. At length, however, Ibrahim, at the head of one thousand men, pierced their centre with fixed bayonets, a weapon to which, strange to say, the Greeks were hitherto strangers, while at the same time the horse, dashing up a ravine deemed inaccessible, completed their rout. Corta Bozzaris cut his way through with great difficulty; but most of his brave followers were slain in rescuing him, and the Greeks left six hundred dead on the field. This battle, though the forces engaged on neither side amounted to five thousand men, had a decisive effect on the issue of the campaign. It established the superiority of the Egyptian troops, and the inability of the Greeks to contend with them in the open field; and by relieving Ibrahim of all apprehensions of being disturbed during the

progress of the siege of Navarino, mainly led to the reduction of that place, and the establishment of the Egyptian forces in a solid way in the Morea. At the same time the consternation of the Greeks was increased by the receipt of intelligence that Redschid Pacha had seized the defiles of Mæri-Noros, and appeared with all his forces before Missolonghi, which was already invested.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. vii. 405, 406; Gordon, ii. 199, 200.

Such was the consternation among the Greeks produced by these concurring events, that Ibrahim next day attempted to carry the place by escalade; but he was repulsed, and compelled to commence his operations against it in regular form. With this view, he directed his attack in the first instance against the isle of *Sphacteria*, immortalised by Thucydides in his narrative of the Peloponnesian war. Towards success in this enterprise it was indispensable to acquire a naval superiority, and this was soon secured by the arrival, on 1st May, of the Egyptian fleet of ninety sail, including ten frigates, whom Miaulis, with seventeen sloops, in vain endeavoured to resist, which disembarked four thousand men, with ample stores and ammunition, to aid the besiegers. The Egyptian fleet, fivefold superior in force to the Greek, surrounded Sphacteria, and established a barrier of fifty sail between it and Miaulis, who cruised in the offing, watching in vain for an opportunity of sending in his fireships, or assisting his beleaguered countrymen. The island itself was accessible only at a single point on the west side, which was defended by a battery of three guns, manned by two hundred men under General Anagnostoras, with three hundred Hydriote sailors to work the guns. The little garrison defended itself for long with heroic courage; but fifty vessels of war surrounded it, and by landing one body of troops after another, at length succeeded in overpowering it. They were all slain, bravely combating to the last: Anagnostoras and Sohahini, the Hydriote commanders, were found among the thickest of the slain. The brig of

Capture of Sphacteria by Ibrahim May 8.

May 1.

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Psamado remained in the harbour of the island to bring away its captain, the Prince Mavrocordato. The boat sent for this purpose, however, was sunk by the multitude which crowded in, and Psamado, left on the shore grievously wounded, was last seen with one hand waving his cap to encourage his crew, with the other brandishing his scimitar in the face of his enemies. The condition of the brig itself seemed now altogether desperate, for after having lost half its crew, it had to fight its way with only eighteen guns through the enemy's fleet of fifty sail, mounting fifteen hundred! But then was seen what, in circumstances the most hopeless, human heroism can effect. With consummate skill and undaunted courage, the crew, disdaining all summonses to surrender, succeeded in steering their devious course through the forest of their enemies' masts, and bore to Hydra, with the standard of the Cross still flying, the intelligence of a disaster which had inflicted a greater loss on that island than they had sustained in the four preceding campaigns. What mainly contributed to the success of the brig in this marvellous action, was the knowledge which the enemy had of the resolution of the crew to blow her up rather than be taken, which deterred them from coming to close quarters.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 407, 409; Gordon, ii. 200, 203.

123. Capture of Navarino. May 18.

The capture of Sphacteria determined the fate of Navarino in the days of Ibrahim, as it had done in those of Pericles. Ibrahim next directed his efforts against Zanchio, a castle in the bay inside of the island, situated on a sandy tongue of land, and garrisoned by nine hundred men. After a gallant resistance it was forced to

May 9.

capitulate, after the walls had been reduced to a heap of loose stones, and the terms were honourably observed by Ibrahim; but Gregory, Bishop of Modon, who was taken prisoner in a sally, was treated with every indignity, his beard being plucked out by the roots, and he died in a dungeon some months afterwards. Master of this castle and the island, Ibrahim redoubled his efforts against *Neo Castron*, or New Navarino, the garrison of which had

but a scanty supply of provisions and twenty barrels of gunpowder left. Having exhausted these, and seeing no hopes of being relieved by sea, they were obliged to capitulate, which they did on condition that they should be transported to Calamata, under protection of a French and Austrian vessel. Ibrahim religiously observed the capitulation, and the garrison, which still consisted of eleven hundred men, was conveyed in safety to the place agreed on. Forty-six guns fell into Ibrahim's hands in the place. He treated the prisoners kindly, and offered them every inducement to enter his service; but, to the honour of the Greeks be it spoken, not one man proved unfaithful to his religion and his country.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 204, 208; Ann. Hist. viii. 410, 411.

124. Naval successes of the Greeks. May 13.

Although the Greek fleet were not able to prevent the fall of Navarino, yet they performed several shining exploits in endeavouring to relieve it, which presaged in a manner the disaster so terrible to the Crescent of which its bay was destined to be the theatre. On the evening of the 13th, Miaulis, taking advantage of a favourable wind, glided, with twenty-eight ships, into the channel between the isles of Cabrera and Sapienza and the coast, and approached the Egyptian fleet lying at anchor under the walls of Modon. Keeping the enemy in check with part of his squadron, Miaulis launched, with the aid of the rest, six of his fireships against the ships in the roads. They proved entirely successful. One of them grappled the Asia, of fifty-four guns; others fastened on two corvettes and three brigs of twenty-four guns each, all of which, with twenty transports, were in flames in a few minutes, and totally consumed. The burning vessels, which cast a broad light over the bay, were drifted into the harbour, and it was only by the utmost exertions that Ibrahim succeeded in saving the remainder of the fleet, and all the stores and magazines of the army which were there deposited, from destruction. As it was, the fire communicated to a large magazine of provisions in the town, which was entirely consumed.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. viii. 409, 410; Gordon, ii. 203, 204.

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125. Victory of Sakhtouri over the Capitan Pacha. June 1.

Another naval victory of still greater magnitude graced the annals of the Greek navy at this period. On the 24th May, the Capitan Pacha put to sea from the Dardanelles with the Turkish squadron, consisting of a ship of the line of sixty-six guns, two frigates, six corvettes, and fifty brigs and transports, many of which bore the *Austrian* colours. As they had on board a vast quantity of ammunition, shells, projectiles, scaling-ladders, and platforms, it was supposed their destination was Hydra or Samos. In reality, however, they were intended for the siege of Missolonghi, on the vigorous prosecution of which the Divan were now intent. Sakhtouri no sooner heard of the approach of the Ottoman fleet than he set sail from Hydra, and came up with them as they were beating through the straits between Andros and Eubœa, and, instantly breaking their line, sent the dreaded fireships among them. Two of them grappled the sixty-six-gun ship, and blew her up, with eight hundred men on board, the whole treasure of the fleet, and the Capitan Pacha's flag. He himself narrowly escaped, by getting into a smaller vessel a few minutes before the explosion took place. Another frigate of thirty-four guns was at the same time burnt by the fireships on the left. Upon this the Turkish fleet fled in all directions; twenty found refuge in Carysto and Suda, but five Austrian transports were taken, with thirteen hundred barrels of powder and great military stores; and another corvette, chased by two Greek brigs, was run ashore on the rocks of Syra, and burned by her crew, who afterwards surrendered to the unwarlike inhabitants of the island. So much were the Greeks elated and the Turks depressed by these advantages, that the former proceeded to blockade Suda, and drove the Ottoman fleet of forty sail into the harbour, after burning a fine corvette of twenty-eight guns.[1] But a storm having dispersed the Greek fleet, the Capitan Pacha weighed anchor on the 23d, and reached Navarino on the 4th July, where he disembarked four thousand Albanians,

[1] Gordon, 208, 209; 211; Ann. Hist. viii. 414.

six hundred horse, and twelve hundred pioneers, who proved of the utmost value to the land forces in the Morea. CHAP. XIV. 1825.

126. Successes of Ibrahim, and gallant resistance near Arcadia.

By the acquisition of Navarino, Ibrahim had secured an excellent base of operations resting on that place, Coron, and Modon, and communicating readily by sea with his reserves in Suda and Alexandria. Having gained this advantage, his next move was to extend himself in the interior; and for this purpose he advanced against Arcadia in two columns. The first succeeded in surprising and sacking Arcadia; but Ibrahim's own column, which took the road over the mountains of Aya, sustained a ruder encounter. In the pass of Pedimon they met Papa Flessa, one of the bravest chiefs of the Morea, who, although deserted by eight hundred of his troops, nobly stood his ground, like another Leonidas, at the head of three hundred resolute men. They long made good the pass, and repulsed all the attacks of the Mussulmans, ten times more numerous; until at length Ibrahim, drawing his scimitar, himself headed a general charge of his Arabs on the Greeks, whose ammunition was now exhausted. In the desperate hand-to-hand struggle which ensued with sabres, bayonets, and the but-ends of muskets, all the Greeks were slain except two, who, severely wounded, passed for dead among the dead bodies of their countrymen. The corpses were assembled in a heap by the victorious Arabs, who cut off the heads of their antagonists:[1] on their tumulus, as on that of their predecessors at Thermopylæ, might be placed the well-known lines—

June 3.

[1] Gordon, ii. 215, 216; Ann. Hist. viii. 415, 416.

> "Go, stranger, and at Lacedæmon tell
> That here, obedient to her laws, we fell."

After this success, the army of Ibrahim was mustered to ascertain its strength, with a view to future operations. It was found to consist of seven thousand eight hundred combatants, the remains of fifteen thousand who had landed in the Morea; to such a degree had sickness,

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famine, and the sword of the Greeks diminished his formidable battalions. Ibrahim, however, was not a man to halt in the career of success; and, profiting by the terror which his victories had inspired, he resolved to push his advantages to the utmost, and advance upon Tripolitza. Colocotroni, on his side, had collected seven thousand mountaineers, with whom he tried to arrest the enemy in the defiles. After a vigorous resistance, however, Ibrahim succeeded in turning the Greeks, and forcing them to abandon their posts; and the road to Tripolitza being now open, Colocotroni sent orders to the inhabitants to burn their houses and evacuate the place, which was accordingly done, and it was occupied by the Egyptians without resistance on the 23d. Having placed a garrison there, and given his troops a few hours' rest, Ibrahim continued his march towards Napoli di Romania. From a lofty point of the road he caught a view of Hydra, and, stretching out his hand, exclaimed, "Ah! little England, how long wilt thou escape me?" So rapid was his march, so unexpected his approach, that no preparations had been made in the capital for defence; and had he at once advanced to the gates, he would in all probability have made himself master of it. Ipsilanti, however, took post with two hundred and fifty men at the important position of Myli (Mills), where the chief magazines of the government were placed, and defended it with such resolution that the Arabs were forced to retire with the loss of four hundred men, and Napoli was saved. Ibrahim, finding that his *coup-de-main* on the capital had failed, and not being in sufficient strength to attempt its reduction in form, turned aside to Argos, which was burned and abandoned at his approach.[1]

127. Further successes of Ibrahim, and capture of Tripolitza. June 20.

June 25.

[1] Gordon, ii. 216, 219; Ann. Hist. viii. 416, 419.

When Ibrahim made his dash at Napoli di Romania, Colocotroni and the other chiefs of the Morea assembled with twelve thousand men in his rear, with a view to cut off his communication with Navarino. As he was without magazines, and the country was entirely wasted, they

128. Fresh defeat of the Greeks, July 5.

hoped to reduce him to the necessity of capitulating, as they had done Dramalis' men two years before. But they soon found they had a very different enemy to deal with from his confused rabble of Osmanli horsemen. The Greek generals stood firm at Tricorphæ, through which Ibrahim required to pass in his retreat, and this brought on a general action. It was long contested with the utmost bravery on both sides; but at length a body of horse having appeared in the rear of Tricorphæ, and getting into the rear of the Corinthians, they took to flight, and their rout drew after it that of the whole army. Four hundred were slain on the spot, including thirteen chiefs of note, and eight hundred made prisoners. Old Colocotroni himself, after having done all he could to rally his men, with difficulty saved himself on a baggage-mule. Such was the terror inspired by this victory, that the soldiers of the Morea never again ventured to face the Egyptians in the open field; and such was the ascendancy which they had acquired, that on the morning of the 21st, Ipsilanti's corps, four thousand strong, dispersed at the sight of an Egyptian battalion and a few horsemen. After this, the campaign, in a military point of view, in the Morea, was at an end, as the Greek chiefs never ventured again to meet the enemy in large bodies; but they occupied the mountains, and cut off several Arab detachments which were ravaging the plains, from which Ibrahim, after burning the houses, drove away the inhabitants as slaves without mercy. A market was opened at Modon for the sale of captives of both sexes, who were crowded in dungeons, loaded with irons, unmercifully beaten by their guards, and often murdered in pure wanton cruelty during the night. Such, indeed, was the severity with which they were treated, that, in comparison of it, the old Turkish system of beheading or blowing from the mouth of a gun every male prisoner above sixteen years of age, might be considered as merciful.[1]

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July 21.

[1] Gordon, ii. 219, 225; Ann. Hist. viii. 420, 422; Colocotroni's Despatch, July 8/20, 1825.

While these successes were shaking the Greek power

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129. Commencement of the second siege of Missolonghi, and description of the place. April 17.

in the Morea, and establishing Ibrahim in a solid manner in that peninsula, Redschid Pacha had commenced his operations before Missolonghi, and that memorable siege had begun which has given that town a name beside Numantia and Saragossa in the archives of the human race. Redschid, whose manners were as popular as his abilities were distinguished, established himself at Janina early in January, where he began paying assiduous court to the Albanians, many of whom he induced to join his standard. Deeming himself in sufficient strength to undertake the siege, he suddenly appeared before Missolonghi on the 17th April. That town, built on the edge of a marshy plain, bounded by the hills of Zygos, is protected towards the sea by shallow lagoons, extending ten miles along the coast, and five miles broad, and, like the lagunæ of Venice, navigable, save in a few tortuous channels, only in the flat-bottomed boats of the natives, who derive abundant wealth from the produce of their ample fisheries. The main channel to the south is commanded by the mud-bank and blockhouse of Vassalidi; those to the north by the fortified islets of Poros and Anatolicon. Under Lord Byron's direction (who unhappily died on April 19, 1824), and with the aid of the funds his generosity contributed, the Greeks had applied themselves diligently to strengthening the fortifications of the place, and something like bastions, ravelins, and lunettes had been constructed in advance of the mud rampart faced with stone, which, with a ditch in front, constituted the sole original protection of the place. But they were far from being complete; for the entire artillery mounted on the fortress, exclusive of those on Vassalidi and Anatolicon, was only forty-eight guns and four howitzers. But the garrison swelled to five thousand fighting men by the influx of the armed peasants flying before the approach of the Turks, and, directed by Nothi Bozzaris and Niketas,[1] was animated by the best spirit; and, recollecting with conscious pride its successful defence during

[1] Gordon, ii. 231, 232.

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the first siege, anticipated nothing but triumph from the result of the second.

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For ten days after the arrival of the Turks, the operations on both sides consisted of petty skirmishes only; but on the 7th May the first parallel was opened at the distance of six hundred paces from the east of the town. During the remainder of May and June, Redschid, who had by no means the skill in sieges of Marlborough or Berwick, continued to push his approaches under an incessant fire from the guns of the place. On 2d July the besieged sprung a mine, and, sallying out, gained considerable success, and took seven standards; but a week after their hopes were cruelly dashed by the appearance of the Capitan Pacha in the bay with fifty-five sail, carrying five thousand men, and great stores of siege equipage, which, notwithstanding the losses he had sustained in the conflicts in the Archipelago, he had contrived to bring through. Animated by this reinforcement, the siege was prosecuted with redoubled activity; and although they bravely repulsed several assaults, the situation of the garrison was by the middle of July well-nigh desperate from want of provisions. Their only hope was in the Hellenic marine, which at length made its appearance on the 29th under Sakhtouri and Miaulis. Apprehensive that the Greeks would succeed in throwing supplies into the place, the Turkish commander resolved on an immediate assault, which was delivered on August 2. For two hours and a half a terrible fire of all arms was kept up on the breaches, a mine having been sprung under a battery, and the Turks advanced in five columns with such resolution that twenty standards were planted on the ruins of the work. The Greeks, however, returned to the charge, bayoneted all the Turks who had got in, and ultimately repulsed the assault at all points, with a loss of fifteen hundred men to the besiegers.[1]

130. First operations of the siege. May, June, July.

July 2.

July 10.

July 29.

Aug. 2.

[1] Gordon, ii. 235, 236; Ann. Hist. viii. 428, 429.

This success was followed by an advantage still more important, gained next day at sea. Notwithstanding

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their great inferiority of forces, the Greeks, led by Miaulis and Sakhtouri, boldly advanced against the Turkish fleet; and after exchanging a few broadsides, three fireships made a dash at the Capitan Pacha. He was so terrified at their approach that he crowded all sail to escape; the whole fleet followed his example, and such was the general terror that, in passing Zante on the 5th May, they hauled their wind to avoid an encounter with seven Greek brigs, and never ceased their flight till they found shelter in the harbour of Alexandria. Encouraged by this brilliant success, and entirely relieved from want by the supplies which the Greek fleet threw in on the following day, the garrison concerted a general attack on the Turkish lines with the commanders of the squadron. The Greek launches, accordingly, well manned, entered the lagoons by the Vassalidi channel, captured five Turkish boats, and drove Jussuf Pacha himself ashore. At the same time fifteen hundred chosen men made a sally from the town, carried four batteries by assault, and returned to their walls, after a bloody contest of four hours, with arms, twelve standards, and some hundred prisoners.[1]

131. Raising of the blockade of Missolonghi by sea. Aug. 3.

[1] Gordon, ii. 236, 237; Ann. Hist. viii. 430, 431.

132. Attack on the town by a mound, and its defeat.

This succession of adverse events made no impression on the stern and resolute soul of Redschid Pacha. Having failed in taking the town either by famine or assault, he resolved upon a plan akin to that by which Alexander reduced Tyre in ancient, and Richelieu, Rochelle in modern times. He began constructing a vast mound of earth, which he pushed forward from his lines towards the Franklin battery. It was soon one hundred and sixty yards long and twelve broad, and entirely bestrode the intervening gulf; and the advanced end of it being higher than the battery, his troops commanded it, and, firing down, slew nine Greeks. The battery thus became untenable, and the Turks effected a lodgment in it, where they immediately intrenched themselves. The Greeks upon this retrenched themselves on each side of the battery, and for fifteen days both parties laboured assiduously in laying

sandbags, fascines, and gabions, and heightening their respective bulwarks. At length, however, the Turks solidly established themselves in the Franklin battery, and, sinking three mines, threatened to blow up the inner retrenchments. The Greeks, seeing that if this was done they would soon be masters of the place, prepared a fougasse with three of their largest bombs under the head of the sap, which they fired on the 31st. The explosion, which was very violent, was the signal for a general rush of the Greeks into the battery, which was as stoutly defended by the Turks. At length, after a bloody contest, which lasted till midnight, and in the course of which the bastion was taken and retaken seven times, it finally remained in the hands of the Christians, who not only regained their own work, but destroyed the entire head of the mound, by which it had been so seriously endangered.[1]

Aug. 27.

Aug. 31.

[1] Gordon, ii. 237, 239; Ann. Hist. viii. 429, 430.

133. A third assault is repulsed.

Though the losses of the besieged during the last month in these repeated and sanguinary assaults had been very severe, yet they had been nearly made up by supplies of men from the country, the communication with which was still kept open, and, since the naval blockade had been raised, by succours thrown in by sea. In the beginning of September the garrison was still four thousand strong, and fourteen thousand rations were daily distributed to them and their families. The losses, on the other hand, of the besiegers had been fully as great as those of the besieged, and it was hard to say which stood in the most perilous situation, for the mountaineers hung in rear of the Ottoman army, and on the least reverse their hostility might be expected to be most formidable. The Greek journals were already raising the shout of victory, and anticipating the speedy abandonment of the siege by Redschid Pacha, and with a commander of less resolution and firmness this would probably have been the case; but he was not less persevering than his opponents—difficulties only the more strongly roused his ardent soul. With

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incredible diligence he again collected his scattered materials, and pushed forward his mole a second time towards the Franklin battery. Again the Greeks worked out a mine under its head, which they loaded with a fougasse, and exploded when the Turks were within the bastion. The battery, the head of the mole, and a crowd of Mahommedans upon it, were at once blown into the air: a storm of grape and musketry completed the destruction of the entire front of the column, and the remainder took to flight, leaving twelve hundred of the bravest of their number slain or badly wounded on the mound.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 239, 240; Ann. Hist. viii. 430.

134. Critical position of the Turks, and preparations of the Sultan.

Such was the loss of Redschid Pacha in these desperate assaults, that his army, by the end of October, had dwindled to three thousand men, a force not larger than that of the besieged. Withdrawing, therefore, entirely his advanced works, he merely strengthened his lines round his magazines, in order to maintain his ground near the place till the return of spring enabled the Capitan Pacha to bring him reinforcements. The Greeks were in the highest spirits; their cruisers were constantly in sight; not an enemy's flag was to be seen; ample supplies of provisions were brought in from Zante in flat-bottomed boats; and they were already planning a combined attack by sea and land on the Turks, which the strength of the works erected by them around their magazines alone prevented them from carrying into effect. But the Sultan, irritated rather than intimidated by this succession of disasters, and regarding the fall of Missolonghi as an event with which the termination of the Greek war, and possibly the existence of his own empire, was wound up, was at the same time making the most formidable preparations for its subjugation. He determined on a combined attack on the place with the whole forces of Turkey, Egypt, and Barbary. With this view the Capitan Pacha received orders to put to sea directly from Alexandria, with all the troops the Pacha of Egypt could collect, which were to be placed under the

command of Ibrahim, who was to bring up all he could assemble from the Morea. Ten thousand infantry, eight hundred regulars, and twelve hundred irregulars, were embarked on board a fleet of one hundred and thirty-five vessels, of which seventy-nine were of war, including nine frigates, and with these formidable forces he cast anchor in the bay of Navarino on the 5th November. Meanwhile Ibrahim, with four thousand men, proceeding towards Missolonghi by land, forced with heavy loss the marshes of the Alpheus, and fighting all the way, often at great disadvantage, at length united his forces to those of Redschid in the middle of December. Meanwhile the Greeks on their side had also received a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men, and large supplies of provisions and ammunition, which Miaulis brought up, and with great skill and valour threw in, despite the Turkish blockade. This so raised their spirits that they anxiously expected the general assault with which they were threatened from the combined forces of Turkey and Egypt, now mustering twenty-five thousand land troops, besides the sea forces.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 437; Gordon, ii. 243, 245, 249, ix. 407.

135. Heroic spirit of the garrison.

During these prolonged operations the garrison of Missolonghi had evinced the most unshaken fortitude. Between sickness, famine, and the sword, they had buried fifteen hundred of their number; the town was in ruins, the walls and bastions breached in almost every quarter, and the strength of the survivors of the garrison exhausted by incessant watching and combating for nine months; and in spite of the supplies they had received, provisions were again becoming scarce, and they were threatened with the horrors of famine in addition to their other calamities. Yet even in these desperate circumstances they had never flinched for an instant—not a thought of surrender had ever crossed their minds; the standard of the Cross waved as proudly on their ruined ramparts as ever it had done in the days of their triumph and festivity. As far as their eyes could reach, the sea was covered with Mussulman pendants; and the daily increasing number of bat-

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teries and field-works in the plain, studded with the wreck of the siege, gave fearful note of the preparations making against them; while a priest, two women, and several children, impaled alive in front of the besiegers' lines, told but too plainly the fate which awaited themselves if they fell into the hands of their ruthless enemies. Yet even in these awful circumstances, and when threatened with an assault from twenty thousand ferocious barbarians, they had the resolution to refuse an offer of capitulation, even when transmitted by a British naval officer, whose vessel was at anchor in the bay.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 254, 256.

136. Progress of the Turks.

The whole of February and March was spent in a succession of conflicts, at different outworks, between the contending parties, in which, though success was various, and the besieged always combated with the most heroic courage, the scales upon the whole preponderated in favour of the besiegers. The islet of Vassalidi was first stormed, the battery of Dolma next carried, and at length the garrison of Anatolicon, having exhausted all their means of defence, capitulated, and were conveyed to Arta, stipulating only for their lives. The convent of the Holy Trinity, a fortified post half a mile to the south-east of Missolonghi, was next carried, after a frightful assault, in which one thousand Turks and Arabs fell, and their dead bodies floated about in the lagunæ, and literally stained their waters with blood. Such was the consternation of the Moslems at this bloody conquest, that if the besieged had thought fit to evacuate the place the following night they would have encountered no opposition. But they were sustained amidst all their disasters by their heroic spirit, and entertained hopes of being relieved by the Greek fleet; so they held by their ruined and blood-stained battlements.[2]

March 9.

March 12.

April 6.

[2] Ann. Hist. ix. 411, 412; Gordon, ii. 256, 259.

In this hope, however, they were disappointed. Miaulis, with the Greek flotilla, consisting of forty sail, hove in sight, and by means of a narrow creek concealed by reeds contrived to communicate with the garrison, from

whom he learned their extreme distress. But the force of the Turks was such as to exclude the possibility of a direct attack; and he had not sufficient small craft to force his passage, now that Vassalidi was lost, up to the town; he was forced to write to Napoli for more small craft to execute his project. But ere he could do so the fate of Missolonghi was decided; the last act of the glorious tragedy had arrived. Since the 1st April no rations had been distributed; the firing had driven away every kind of fish, and the people subsisted on cats, rats, raw hides, and sea-weed. But even these deplorable resources were ere long exhausted; absolute famine stared the wretched inhabitants, with their wives and children, in the face; the earth was strewed with the wounded, the sick, the famished, and the dying, for whom there was neither food, nor beds, nor medicines, nor assistance. Three days more, and not a living soul would remain within the walls from absolute famine. Yet even in these desperate circumstances they again refused to capitulate on the same terms which Anatolicon had accepted, and determined that if they were forced to abandon the place it should be with arms in their hands. They resolved on the desperate attempt to cut their way through the enemy's lines with their wives and children, and if they could not escape, at least die with arms in their hands, combating for their religion, their country, and their hearths.[1]

137. Noble final resolution of the garrison. April 12.

April 20.

[1] Gordon, ii. 259, 261; Ann. Hist. ix. 412, 414.

Between the 10th and 20th April great numbers of persons in the town died of famine, and the rapid diminution of the miserable means of subsistence proved that the desperate attempt could no longer be delayed. An attempt of Colonel Fabvier to disturb the besiegers in rear, with fifteen hundred men from Attica, was defeated. Miaulis in vain strove to force the maritime blockade with a third of the forces of his opponents. In these circumstances a census was taken of the remaining inhabitants, and it was found there were three thousand men capable of bearing arms, a thousand unfit to wield them,

138. Greek plan of a general sortie.

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and five thousand women and children. It was agreed that the sortie should take place on the night of the 22d, and be executed in the following manner: The three thousand fighting men, with all the convalescents, were to throw themselves headlong on the besiegers' lines, force a way through, and open a passage for the non-combatants, women, and children; and then the whole, issuing silently from the eastern face of the rampart, should lie prostrate till they received a signal from their friends without: they were then to break into two divisions, each headed by fifteen hundred fighting men, and endeavour to force their way through Ibrahim's camp, and reunite in a vine-yard a league and a half from Missolonghi, and pursue their way together towards Salona.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 260, 261; Ann. Hist. ix. 414, 415.

139. Commencement of the sortie. April 22.

This extraordinary and heroic attempt met with a success which could hardly have been anticipated. The women generally put on male attire, and carried pistols and daggers in their girdles, and weapons were given to such of the boys as had strength to use them. The gunners were ordered to spike and overturn their guns before leaving the ramparts. The hopes of the besieged were high, and their courage equal to any trial; but the difficulties they had to encounter were much greater than had been anticipated, owing to a Bulgarian deserter having revealed the design to Ibrahim, who made every disposition to frustrate it. At the appointed hour, the garrison, with their wives and children, assembled at night, crossed the moat in silence, and lay quiet, with their faces on the earth, on the opposite bank. Presently, however, the nailing of the bridges over the moat, and the wailing of the women and children at leaving their homes, attracted Ibrahim's attention to the quarter where the sortie was to be made, and a violent fire of grape and musketry was directed against it, which killed and wounded several. For an hour they lay prostrate in the dark under this galling fire, waiting for a signal from Karaiskaski without, who had been warned of the project, and was to aid

it by an attack on the besiegers' lines with his Albanians; but none such was heard, and at length their situation became intolerable, and farther suspense impossible. A bright moon shone forth, light whispers ran through the ranks, and up they sprang with a loud shout, "On, on! Death to the barbarians!" The onset was irresistible. Neither ditch nor breastwork, the fire of grape and musketry, nor the bayonets of the Arabs, could resist the desperate shock. In a few minutes the trenches were passed, the infantry broken, the batteries silenced, and the artillerymen slaughtered at their guns. A wide opening was made in the besiegers' lines, through which the helpless crowd in rear immediately began to pour in great numbers, and sanguine hopes were entertained that the passage was secured and the danger over.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 262, 263; Ann. Hist. ix. 415, 416.

140. Issue of the sortie.

In this hope, however, they were disappointed. In the enthusiasm of victory, the warriors, instead of dividing into two columns, as they had been ordered, pushed across the plain in one solid mass, and defeated with great slaughter a body of five hundred Mahommedan horse who tried to obstruct them. The cavalry, however, fell on the unarmed multitude in rear, and cut many to pieces. In the confusion, a cry arose, "Back to the batteries!" and great numbers rushed in wild despair again to the town, which they entered at the same time as the besiegers, who were now rushing in on all sides. A general massacre immediately commenced of all who were found within the walls; and the universal consternation was increased at midnight by the blowing up of the grand powder-magazine under the bastion of Bozzaris, which was fired by the Greeks, and destroyed several hundred Turks who had crowded into it. Indeed, such was the desperation with which the Greeks fought, that the loss of the Turks in that awful night was fully equal to their own. Of the column which issued, eighteen hundred, including two hundred women, forced their way through every obstacle, and, after undergoing incredible hardships,

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reached Salona in safety, where they were received with transports by the inhabitants. Ibrahim boasted that he had collected three thousand heads, and sold four thousand women and children; but great numbers of the latter were purchased and restored to their families by the benevolence of the Christians, which was strongly aroused over all Europe by this memorable enterprise, closing, as it did, a siege of immortal glory.[1] *

[1] Gordon, ii. 264, 267; Ann. Hist. ix. 416, 418.

141. Vast effects of the siege of Missolonghi, and general despondence in Greece.

Thus fell Missolonghi; but its heroic resistance had not been made in vain. It laid the foundation of Greek independence; for it preserved that blessing during a period of despondence and doubt, when its very existence had come to be endangered. By drawing the whole forces of the Ottoman empire upon themselves, its heroic garrison allowed the nation to remain undisturbed in other quarters, and prevented the entire reduction of the Morea, which was threatened during the first moments of consternation consequent on Ibrahim's success. By holding

* The following is the statement of the losses of the Greeks during the siege and sortie, by an eyewitness:—

Killed in the town,	2,100
Killed in the sortie,	500
Men made prisoners,	150
Women killed,	1,500
Women and children who drowned themselves,	800
Women and children made prisoners,	3,400
	8,450

—*Histoire du Siège de Missolonghi*, 76, 84. Par M. Augustine Fabre.

The following letter, happily preserved, was written by E. Meyer, a few days before the sortie:—

"The labours we are undergoing, and a wound in the shoulder, have hitherto prevented my writing to you. We are reduced to the necessity of feeding on the most unclean animals; we suffer horribly from hunger and thirst, and disease adds much to our calamities. 1740 of our comrades are dead; 100,000 shot and shells have overturned our bastions and houses; we are in want of firewood, and pinched by cold. It is an exhilarating spectacle to behold the devotion of the garrison under so many privations. Yet a few days, and those heroes will be incorporeal spirits. In the name of Nothi Bozzaris and our brave soldiers, I declare to you that we have sworn to defend Missolonghi foot by foot, to listen to no capitulation, and to bury ourselves in its ruins. Our last hour approaches! History will do us justice, and posterity will weep our misfortunes. May the relation I have drawn up of the siege survive me." The author of this letter was cut down in the sortie, and his wife and child taken: his description of the siege was lost.—Gordon, ii. 268.

out so long, and with such resolute perseverance, they not only inflicted a loss upon the enemy greater than they themselves experienced, but superior to the whole garrison of the place put together. The Western nations watched the struggle with breathless interest, and when at last it terminated in the daring sally, and the cutting through of the enemy's lines by a body of intrepid men, fighting for themselves, their wives, and children, the public enthusiasm knew no bounds. It will appear immediately that it was this warm sympathy which mainly contributed to the success of the Philhellenic societies which had sprung up in every country of Europe, and ultimately rendered public opinion so strong as to lead to the treaty of July, the battle of Navarino, and establishment of Greek independence.

142. Deplorable condition of Greece in the end of 1825 and opening of 1826.

The Hellenic cause stood much in need of the breathing-time and interest awakened by this memorable siege, for never since the commencement of the contest had it been placed in such danger as at this time. A feeling of despondence pervaded all classes, arising from the apparently interminable nature of the contest, and the experienced inability of their troops to withstand in the open field the disciplined battalions which Ibrahim had now brought to bear upon them. The male population of the country was sorely reduced by six campaigns, which, however glorious, had been attended with an immense consumption of human life, and money in every department was still more awanting than men. Considerable loans, indeed, had been contracted for their behoof in London, but very little of the money had reached the Hellenic shores, and the collection of revenue in Greece itself had become wholly impossible. Lord Cochrane had, indeed, been prevailed on by the Hellenic committee, and the promise of £37,000 paid down, and £20,000 more when the independence of the country was secured, to devote his splendid nautical talents to their cause; but even his vigour and capacity were paralysed by the inefficiency or cupidity of inferior

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agents.* Thus the weight of the contest still fell with undiminished force on the Greeks themselves; and so strong and general, in consequence, were the feelings of despondency which prevailed, that the representatives of the nation signed a solemn act, placing the nation under the absolute protection of Great Britain.[1] †

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 113; Gordon, ii. 274, 277.

143. Commencement of the negotiations for the independence of Greece.

But meanwhile the defence of Missolonghi stood the Greeks in good stead during the anxious period which preceded and followed its fall. The public voice in England, France, and Germany had become so strong that it could no longer be resisted; and it met with a responsive echo in the breast of Mr Canning, whose ardent mind, always enthusiastic in the cause of Greece, was now still more strongly impelled by obvious considerations of policy. The memorial of the Hellenic government had requested that Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg might be appointed sovereign of Greece. The memorial was received; and although no immediate answer was returned, it soon became evident how agreeable the proposal was to the British government. In the beginning

Jan. 9.

of January 1826, Mr Stratford Canning, nominated to the embassy at Constantinople, had a secret interview with Mavrocordato in an island near Hydra, at which terms of accommodation were agreed on to the satisfaction of both parties. These were an entire separation of the Greeks and Turks in the revolted districts, and the recog-

[2] Gordon, ii. 278, 279.

nition of the Sultan's supremacy, on payment of a fixed tribute, to be collected by the Greeks themselves.[2]

The death of the Emperor Alexander, and accession of

* Near £400,000 of Greek money was spent on the building of two frigates, and in defraying the cost of Lord Cochrane's six steam-boats, which ought to have been at Napoli before the end of 1825; whereas the first reached Greece in September in 1826, the Hellas frigate in December of that year, Lord Cochrane in March 1827, a second steamer in September 1827, and a third and last in September 1828.—GORDON, ii. 276.

† "1. In virtue of the present act, the Greek nation places the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence under the *absolute* protection of Great Britain.

"2. The President of the Council shall immediately execute the present law. Napoli, July 2/Aug. 1, 1825."—*Ann. Hist.* viii. 113.

Nicholas, in the end of December 1825, made a great difference on this question. Not only was a formidable and persevering enemy to the cause of Greek independence removed by that event, but his successor upon the throne might reasonably be presumed to be actuated by very different sentiments. Nicholas was eminently *national* in his feelings and ideas, and the national object of Russia for a century and a half has been to advance the Muscovite standards into Turkey, and place the cross upon the dome of St Sophia. The public feeling had been strongly manifested on many occasions: even the restraints of discipline and the presence of the Emperor had been unable to prevent a tumultuous expression of this feeling at a great review of the guards in September 1824; and nothing but the personal weight and known opinions of the old Emperor had prevented the public voice manifesting itself in a way still more serious and unmistakable. It was not to be supposed that a new Emperor would any longer resist the national voice, or that he would forego the present fair opportunity of realising all the ancient projects of the Cabinet of St Petersburg for the destruction of the Turkish empire. Impressed with these ideas, the British government most properly resolved to take the initiative in the transaction, and by making the liberation of Greece the *joint* act of the maritime powers, to prevent it from falling under the exclusive protection of one of their number. Accordingly, while Mr Stratford Canning was directed to do everything possible to mollify the Turks, the Duke of Wellington was sent to St Petersburg, professedly to congratulate the young Czar upon his accession, but really to arrange the terms of a convention for the protection of Greece. This was accomplished by a protocol, signed on 4th April by the Duke of Wellington, Prince Lieven, and Count Nesselrode, which may be considered as the corner-stone of Greek independence.[1]

144. Conclusion of the first protocol in favour of the Greeks. April 4.

[1] Ann. Reg. 1826, p. 74; Gordon, ii. 280, 281.

By this deed it was stipulated that his Britannic

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145. Its provisions.

Majesty, in consequence of an application from the Greeks, consented to interpose his good offices to put an end to the contest with the Turks; and, desiring to concert measures with the Emperor of Russia, it was agreed that Greece should be a dependence of the Ottoman empire, paying an annual tribute, and governed by native authorities, in whose nomination the Porte was to have a voice, enjoying liberty of conscience and freedom of trade; and the two high contracting parties invited the courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin to concur in this protocol, and interpose their guarantee. But although Nicholas eagerly closed with this proposal for erecting Greece into a semi-independent state, he declined admitting of any mediation of the other powers in regard to his own differences with the Porte, which, he alleged with reason, Russia was able to adjust for herself.[1]

[1] Protocol, April 4, 1826; Parl. Deb. 1826, 744.

146. Operations in Attica.

Sept. 22, 1825.

Feb. 24.

The experienced superiority of Ibrahim's disciplined troops to the levies *en masse* in the Morea, led to the Hellenic government taking some steps for the formation of a regular army. A law was passed by the legislature establishing a conscription, and with the force thus obtained Colonel Fabvier succeeded in organising a body of three thousand troops, of whom five hundred were stationed at Napoli, and two thousand five hundred at Athens. With the latter force he marched out of that city, in order to reduce the fortresses in the island of Eubœa, which still remained in the hands of the Ottomans. But the success of the enterprise was far from corresponding to the expectations which had been formed of it. After being baffled in several encounters, Fabvier was obliged to re-embark his troops after sustaining a loss of two hundred men; and so discouraged were the remainder with the bad success of the expedition that one-half of them deserted. Encouraged by this success, the Turkish commanders invaded Attica, and laid siege to the Acropolis of Athens, which operation lasted a long time, and led to several expeditions being set on foot to raise the siege, all of which failed of effect.[2]

[2] Gordon, ii. 289, 295; Ann. Hist. ix. 437, 439.

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147. Deplorable situation of Greece at this period.

Never since the revolution commenced had so deep a gloom hung over the nation as in the end of 1826, and the liveliness of Hellenic fancy magnifying the danger, it was expected that in a few days Ibrahim would encamp under the walls of Napoli, and the Capitan Pacha repeat at Hydra the tragedies of Ipsara. The force employed in the reduction of Missolonghi had been dislocated after the fall of that place; and Ibrahim himself, with six thousand men, had returned to the Morea, where no force existed capable of keeping the field against him. Indeed, the Greek chiefs, taught by experience, did not attempt it, but wisely took post in the defiles of the mountains, where the superiority of his regular troops would be less felt, and in that desultory warfare they frequently gained considerable advantages. The government was in the most miserable state; the treasury contained only sixteen piastres—about five shillings. The public revenue, which in 1825 had been 5,500,000 piastres (£90,000), sunk in 1826 to 1,650,000 piastres, or £25,000. Some generous loans received from the Philhellenes in western Europe alone kept the armaments on foot. The sailors, receiving no pay, were in a state of open mutiny; the regular troops had nearly all disbanded; and Colocotroni could only muster two thousand men in the mountains of the Morea. The primates of Hydra and Spezzia were taking steps to send away their hidden wealth, while the populace, suspecting their design, kept sullen watch at the harbour, declaring that their own fate should be the fate of all.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 298, 299, 303, 304.

148. Naval operations.

In the beginning of July, the fleet of the Capitan Pacha set sail from the Dardanelles in such strength that the Greeks had no force whatever capable of opposing it. It embraced two line-of-battle ships and six large frigates. One division coasted round the Morea, and cast anchor in the bay of Navarino, with succours of all kinds for Ibrahim, who was now reduced to the most miserable state by the interminable warfare. Of twenty-four thousand Arabs who

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had been shipped off from Alexandria within two years, only eight thousand were alive, and fifteen hundred of these were in hospital; his magazines were exhausted, his military chest empty, and his Africans, without pay, were becoming mutinous and unruly. The other division of the Ottoman fleet, consisting of the two line-of-battle ships and twenty-seven frigates and brigs, crept down along the coast towards Samos, and excited the utmost alarm in Spezzia, the whole population of which took refuge in Hydra, where the preparations were so complete as to

Aug. 30.

defy attack. The Greek fleet hove in sight, and Canaris, with his usual daring, advanced alone in his fireship into the midst of the enemy's squadron. He had almost grappled a frigate, when, two shots striking him between wind and water, his vessel began to sink; and two Turkish launches approaching, he lighted the train, and took to his long-boat. One of the Turkish launches was burnt by the fireship, but the other overtook Canaris, and although he extricated himself from their grasp, it was only after

Sept. 11.

being severely wounded. On the 11th September, Miaulis having come up with twenty sail, a general action ensued, in which the Greeks had the advantage; and such was the terror which they inspired among their opponents that

Oct. 7.

on 7th October their whole fleet, consisting of forty sail, fled from fourteen Greek vessels; and in the middle of

Nov. 17.

November the Capitan Pacha re-entered the Dardanelles, and laid up his ships in the Golden Horn. Justly elated with this glorious campaign, and with having a second time saved Samos from destruction, the Greek fleet returned to Hydra, and were received with the transports due to their important deeds.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 321, 325; Ann. Hist. ix. 439, 440.

149. Progress of the siege of Athens.

Meanwhile the Turks, more fortunate at land than sea, were actively pressing the siege of the Acropolis, where Ghouras had shut himself up with five hundred men. By drawing the garrisons from Negropont and other places in his rear, Kalahi had collected ten thousand men for the siege, with twenty guns and six mortars,

harnessed in a way which would have done credit to any battering-train in Europe. As the slender resources at the disposal of Ghouras were wholly inadequate to resist such formidable forces, the greatest exertions were made to raise the siege. Karaiskaski received the command of the troops destined for that end, and he soon collected fourteen hundred men, and, including the remnant of Fabvier's regulars, the whole force was about three thousand five hundred men. On the 17th September a general action took place, which terminated to the advantage of the Greeks; and if Fabvier's advice to march direct upon Athens when it was over had been taken, the siege would probably have been raised. But the favourable moment was allowed to pass without attempting that decisive movement; and two days after, Redschid Pacha himself attacked the Greeks. An obstinate and bloody action took place, in which, though no decisive success was gained on either side, yet the advantage, upon the whole, was with the Turks, as they kept their ground, and the siege was not raised. Ghouras was soon after killed, as he was going his rounds at night, by a chance shot from the Turkish lines; but the spirits of the besieged were ere long raised to the highest pitch by the safe arrival of four hundred and fifty Roumeliots, who with great skill were thrown into the fortress. A supply of powder was soon after introduced, with equal skill and daring, by Karaiskaski; and in December he entirely defeated a body of fifteen hundred Albanians, near Daulis, destroying twelve hundred of their number. He soon after routed the garrison of Lepanto, an event which so elated the peasantry that they flocked in crowds to his standard, and the flag of independence once more waved along all the hills of northern Greece.[1]

Sept. 17.

Sept. 19.

[1] Gordon, ii. 330, 331; Ann. Hist. ix. 441, 443.

But these partial successes and disasters determined nothing, except to increase the mutual exhaustion of the contending parties. The Greeks at this period had twenty-eight thousand men under arms, a force small

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indeed, but nearly equal to that of their opponents, for Ibrahim had not above eight thousand men around his standards; and such was the horror at the Greek war which pervaded all classes of the Ottomans, that all corps marched overland into the country melted away by desertion before they arrived at the scene of action. The campaign, so far as the land forces were concerned, depended entirely on the siege of Athens, and accordingly the utmost efforts were made by both parties for its prosecution or interruption. For this purpose, a combined attack was arranged between Karaiskaski's and General Church's men, whom Lord Cochrane had disembarked from his frigate, the Hellas, in the Piræus. On the 27th April the convent of Saint Spiridion, after gallantly braving a terrible bombardment from the guns of the Hellas and those of Church, capitulated; but the terms were violated by the infuriated Greeks, who massacred half the garrison. In the night of the 5th May, General Church disembarked three thousand five hundred men, in part regulars; but they were totally defeated, with the loss of two thousand men. So complete was the rout, so swift the sabres of the Turks, that Lord Cochrane owed his escape to a precipitate flight, and had the utmost difficulty in regaining his ship by swimming. This disaster necessarily drew after it the surrender of the Acropolis; their provisions were entirely exhausted, and ammunition was becoming extremely scarce. A capitulation was accordingly agreed to, under the auspices of General Church; the garrison marched out with their arms in their hands, so great an object to all soldiers, especially the Oriental, and the standard of Mahomet once more waved on the battlements of the Acropolis.[1]

150. Unsuccessful attempts to raise the siege of Athens, and its fall.

April 27.

May 5.

May 17.

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 302, 303; Ann. Hist. x. 383, 386.

But the time had now arrived when the vengeance of the Almighty was to overtake the oppressors, and the cry of an injured race was to ascend to Heaven, and find mercy at the Throne of Grace. For seven long years had the Greeks, now reduced to half their number, contended

151. Treaty of 6th July.

single-handed with the whole force of the Ottoman empire, and come off victorious. If they had latterly suffered many reverses, and were now in a condition all but desperate, it was not from their inability to contend single-handed with the Turks, but from the overwhelming weight of the Egyptians, whose regular disciplined bands had interfered with decisive effect in the close of the struggle. But if the Turks had brought one powerful ally to bear upon the Greeks, the Christians brought another to their assistance. The protocol signed by Russia and England, on the 4th April 1826, was not allowed to remain a dead letter. The generous heart and ardent soul of Mr Canning laboured incessantly to effect such an alliance as should render it a matter of impossibility for the Ottoman government to resist the terms which they might impose. In this he was energetically aided by the French government, which justly felt the necessity of taking active steps to prevent the great work of Grecian emancipation from falling exclusively into the hands of the Russians. The result was the conclusion of the TREATY OF 6TH JULY 1827, between England, France, and Russia, the corner-stone of Greek independence, and one of the most glorious diplomatic acts of which modern Europe can boast.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 309.

152. Its provisions.

By the preamble of this celebrated treaty, it was declared that the motives which led the high contracting parties to interfere, was "the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest, which, by delivering up the Greek provinces and the isles of the Archipelago to the disorders of anarchy, produces daily fresh impediments to the commerce of the European states, and gives occasion to piracy, which not only exposes the subjects of the contracting parties to considerable losses, but renders necessary burdensome measures of suppression and protection." The object of the treaty was declared to be "the reconciliation of the Greeks and Turks." For this purpose, so soon as the treaty was ratified, the mediation of the

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three powers was to be offered to the Sultan, in a joint note signed by all their ministers at Constantinople; but an armistice was to be absolutely insisted on by both parties as a preliminary to the opening of any negotiation. The terms proposed to the Sultan were, that he should still retain a nominal sovereignty over Greece, but receive from them a fixed annual tribute, to be collected by the Greek authorities, in the nomination of whom the Sultan was to have a voice. All the Mussulman property in Greece was to be abandoned upon receiving an indemnity, and the fortresses were to be given up to the Greek troops. If the Porte did not, within a month, declare its acceptance of these terms, he was to be informed that the state of things which had reigned six years in Greece, and to which the Sultan seemed unable, by his own resources, to put an end, made it imperative upon them, for their own security, "to come to an approximation with the Greeks, which was to consist in establishing commercial relations with Greece, and receiving from them consular agents;" in other words, acknowledging their independence.[1]

[1] Treaty, 6th July 1827; Ann. Reg. 1827; Public Documents, 403, 409; Ann. Hist. x. 102; Doc. Hist.

153. Counter manifesto of the Porte.

When this treaty was intimated to the Sultan, he manifested, not without reason, the utmost astonishment and indignation at its contents, and declared his fixed determination to adhere to the last in his endeavours to reduce his rebellious subjects to submission. He replied in a manifesto—"The Greeks, who form part of the countries conquered ages ago by the Ottoman arms, and who from generation to generation have been tributary subjects of the Sublime Porte, have, like the other nations that since the origin of Islamism remained faithfully in submission, always enjoyed perfect repose and tranquillity under the ægis of our legislation. It is notorious that the Greeks have been treated like Mussulmans in every respect; and as to everything which regards their property, the maintenance of their personal security, and the defence of their honour, that they have been, especially

under the glorious reign of the present sovereign, loaded with benefits far exceeding those which their ancestors enjoyed. It is precisely this great degree of favour, this height of comfort and tranquillity, that has been the cause of the revolt, excited by malignant men incapable of appreciating the value of such marks of benevolence. Yielding to the delusions of heated imaginations, they have dared to raise the standard of revolt, not only against their benefactor and legitimate sovereign, but also against all the Mussulman people, by committing the most horrible excesses, sacrificing to their vengeance defenceless women and innocent children with unexampled ferocity.

154. Continued.

"The Sublime Porte being engaged in punishing, in its own territory, and in conformity with its sacred law, such of its turbulent subjects as have revolted, can never admit the right of any other power to interfere with it. The Ottoman government must consider those who address such proposals to it as intending to give consequence to a troop of brigands. A Greek government is spoken of, which is to be recognised in case the Sublime Porte does not consent to some arrangement; and it has even been proposed to conclude a treaty with the rebels. Has not the Sublime Porte great reason to be struck with astonishment at hearing such language from friendly powers? for history offers no example of conduct in all respects so opposite to the principles and duties of government. The Sublime Porte, therefore, can never listen to such propositions, which it will neither hear nor understand, so long as the country inhabited by Greeks forms part of the Ottoman dominions; and they are tributary subjects of the Porte, which will never renounce its rights. If, with the aid of the Almighty, the Sublime Porte resumes full possession of that country, it will then act, as well for the present as the future, in conformity with the ordinances which its holy law prescribes with respect to its subjects."[1]

[1] Manifesto, 10th June, 1827; Ann. Reg. 406, 410.

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It soon appeared, however, that the allied powers were not to allow the treaty of 6th July to remain a dead letter. A British squadron, of four ships of the line,

155. Strength of the allied squadron.

under Admiral SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON, was already in the Levant, and a French squadron, of equal strength, under Admiral DE RIGNY. So eager was the Czar to take a leading part in the approaching conflict, that he despatched eight ships of the line, under Admiral Heiden, from the Baltic; but as this proportion was deemed excessive on the part of Russia, four of them returned to Cronstadt, and the remainder only proceeded to the general rendezvous in the Ægean Sea.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 310.

156. Preparations of the Porte.

Meanwhile the Porte was not remiss in measures of defence; on the contrary, the preparations, both for the reduction of the Greeks and the general defence of the empire, went on with redoubled activity. Heavy cannon, directed by European officers, were mounted on the castles of the Dardanelles and the Hellespont; the garrison of the isle of Tenedos, at the entrance of the Straits, was greatly strengthened, and the utmost efforts were made to increase Ibrahim's force in the Morea, who received orders to prosecute with the greatest vigour the war of extermination in which he was engaged. These exertions met with entire success. The grand Egyptian fleet, consisting of two line-of-battle ships of eighty-four guns each, twelve frigates, four of which carried sixty-four guns, and forty-one transports, having on board five thousand regular troops, arrived in the bay of Navarino in the end of August. Ibrahim immediately landed the soldiers, and, thus reinforced, prepared for the resumption of hostilities on a great scale on shore. The European admirals were there with their fleet, but as the Porte had not, to their knowledge, declined the terms of the allied powers, no resistance was made to the landing of the troops; but it was intimated to him that, if he attempted to leave the bay of Navarino, he would be resisted.[2] Ibrahim replied, as became a good soldier, that he would not be the first

[2] Ann. Reg. 1827, 310, 312.

to commence hostilities; but that, if he received orders from his sovereign to sail and attack Hydra, he would at all hazards obey his instructions.

157. Final note of the Allies to the Porte. Aug. 16.

Meanwhile the ambassadors of the allied powers, on the 16th August, presented a final note to the Turkish government. They intimated the treaty, and required the Sultan to conform to it. They formally offered to mediate between him and his revolted subjects, and demanded a categorical answer within fifteen days; adding, "that it was their duty not to conceal from the Reis-Effendi that a new refusal, an evasive or insufficient answer, even a total silence on the part of the government, would place the allied courts under the necessity of recurring to such measures as they should judge most efficacious for putting an end to a state of things which had become incompatible even with the true interests of the Sublime Porte, with the security of commerce in general, and with the general tranquillity of Europe." On the 30th August, as the period allowed for giving an answer had expired, the ambassadors demanded an answer. It was given verbally, and repeated, in the most decided terms, the refusal to admit the interference of foreign powers in the Greek contest, referring to the manifesto of 9th June as containing the deliberate and firm determination of the Porte. The ambassadors then presented an additional note, informing the Porte that, in consequence of its refusal, their sovereigns would take the necessary steps to carry the treaty into execution, and enforce a suspension of hostilities, without in any manner interrupting the friendly relations between them and the Sublime Porte.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 310, 311.

158. Ibrahim's war of extermination in the Morea.

Meanwhile Ibrahim was not slow in prosecuting the war of extermination in the Morea, which he had received orders from the Porte to undertake. On 19th October he marched a corps of six thousand men to Calamata, and another of three thousand to Arcadia, while he himself, at the head of an equal force, marched against

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Marna. His footsteps were marked by desolation. He issued orders to put every one to death in the villages where resistance was attempted; and in several this was actually done. The whole olive and fruit trees, the growth of centuries, and sole resource in many places of the inhabitants, were cut down or burnt. The women and children were all carried off to be sold as slaves, the men slain, the houses burnt, and continual clouds of smoke around the gulf of Coron bore frightful testimony to the devastation that was going forward. The miserable survivors, who escaped the edge of the scimitar by flying to the mountains, wandered about half starved, and in many instances perished only by a more lingering and painful death than being put to the sword, or blown from the mouth of a cannon—the usual fate of all Ibrahim's male prisoners above sixteen years of age.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 316; Gordon, ii. 417, 413.

159. Plans of the admirals in consequence. Oct. 18.

Informed of this devastation, and seeing Ibrahim's determination to set the proposed armistice at defiance, the allied admirals held a consultation off Navarino, and unanimously came to the opinion that they had only one of three courses to adopt—either to continue the blockade of Navarino during the winter, which would certainly be difficult, perhaps impossible; or to unite the squadrons in Navarino itself, and by their presence in that secure anchorage compel the inactivity of the Ottoman squadron; or to enter Navarino, and there renew to Ibrahim propositions entering into the spirit of the treaty. This last mode was the one unanimously adopted; and it obviously meant, that they were to call on Ibrahim to desist from hostilities, under pain of being attacked in case of refusal. Having adopted this resolution on the 18th October, they proceeded to carry it into execution on the 18th, and thus brought on one of the most glorious events in the annals of Christendom.[2]

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[2] Ann. Reg. 1827, 316, 317; Gordon, ii. 419, 421.

The forces of the Allies consisted of ten ships of the line, ten frigates and a brig, and a few smaller vessels; in all, twenty-six sail, carrying 1324 guns. Of these,

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160. Forces on both sides.

three line-of-battle ships—viz., the Asia, of eighty-four guns, which bore Sir Edward Codrington's flag, the Albion, of seventy-four guns, and the Genoa, seventy-four —were English; three French, viz., the Sirène, which bore the flag of Admiral de Rigny, the Scipio, and the Breslau; and four Russian, under Admiral Heyden, whose flag was hoisted on board the Azoff. The Ottoman force consisted of seventy-nine vessels, of which four were of the line, nineteen frigates, and twenty-nine corvettes, besides lesser vessels, armed with 2240 guns; so that, independent of the batteries and forts on shore, which were very formidable, they had nine hundred guns more than the Christians. There can be no doubt, however, that, as the latter had a great superiority in sail of the line, having ten to four, they were, upon the whole, superior in strength; and if the battle had been fought at open sea, it probably would not have lasted an hour. But the advantage arising from this superiority of force was very much lost by the position of the enemy, crowded into the bay of Navarino, where they lay under the guns of the batteries in the form of a vast semicircle, having their broadsides turned towards the centre of the bay, and so near each other as to resemble rather a huge floating battery than a fleet of detached vessels.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 357, 358; Gordon, ii. 431; Sir E. Codrington's Despatch, Oct. 21; Ann. Reg. 1827, 410, 411.

161. Commencement of the battle. Oct. 20.

The combined fleet entered the bay at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th October. Sir Edward Codrington led the van in the Asia, followed by the Genoa and Albion; next came Admiral de Rigny in the Sirène, followed by the Scipio and the Breslau; Admiral Heyden, in the Azoff, brought up the rear, with his three other line-of-battle ships. The six leading ships passed the batteries at the entrance of the bay, within pistol-shot, without opposition, and took up their stations directly opposite to the heaviest vessels in the enemy's line; the Russians, in the rear, were placed abreast of the batteries; and the frigates of the squadron were directed to look after the enemy's frigates and fireships. Nothing

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could exceed the precision with which the different vessels came in, and took up their respective positions. The Asia passed close to the ship of Moharem Bey, and with silent and awful grandeur clewed up her topsails, rounded to, and let go her small bower-anchor on the larboard of the Capitan Pacha's ship of equal size. The Capitan Bey said to his colleagues as they came in, "The die is now cast. I told you the English were not to be trifled with." Strict orders had been given not to fire; and although all the ships on both sides were cleared for action, and every preparation made, not a shot was discharged, until the Dartmouth sent a boat to one of the fire-ships, which was fired upon, as it was supposed they were coming to board. Several men were wounded by this discharge, which immediately induced a defensive fire from the Dartmouth, which became extremely warm. At the same time, an officer bearing a flag of truce, sent by Sir Edward Codrington to the Turkish admiral's ship, was slain; and a cannon-shot was fired at Admiral de Rigny's ship from one of the Egyptian vessels. This brought on a return from the Asia and Sirène; and immediately the fire became general along the whole line.[1]

[1] Sir E. Codrington's Despatch; Ann. Reg. 411; Ann. Hist. x. 358, 359; Brenton, ii. 616, 617.

162. The battle, and defeat of the Turks.

With characteristic hardihood, Sir E. Codrington anchored his vessel between the ships of the Capitan Bey, the Turkish, and Moharem Bey, the Egyptian admiral, and immediately began a tremendous fire, right and left, on his antagonists. The Asia at the same time was exposed to a raking fire from the frigates in the second and third line, which carried away her mizen-mast by the board, disabled several of the guns, and killed and wounded numbers of the crew. Despite these disadvantages, however, the fire of the Asia was kept up with such vigour and precision that the two admirals' ships were soon silenced, and floated away mere wrecks. Meanwhile the Genoa and Albion took up their positions in the most beautiful manner, and commenced the action with the utmost vigour; while the French and Russian admirals,

aided by their respective crews, took their ground, and rivalled the British seamen in skill and daring. The Sirène ran the greatest risk of being burned by the fire-ships which were launched against her by the Egyptians; but she was saved by the able exertions of Captain Fellows of the Dartmouth. By degrees the superiority of the Christian fire became very apparent; most of the vessels in the enemy's line were either sunk, silenced, or in flames, and such of the crew as could escape threw themselves into the sea and made for the shore, after setting fire to their respective ships. The Asia was for long so enveloped in smoke that her flag only could be seen at the mast-head, and when a frigate near her blew up, it was thought she had exploded; but in a few minutes, the smoke clearing away, she was seen still maintaining the fight with untiring energy, and a general shout along the whole fleet announced the joyous discovery. The battle lasted four hours, at the close of which time the whole Ottoman ships were burnt, sunk, or destroyed, with the exception of twenty-eight of the smallest, which were cast ashore, or still afloat, and were spared by the conquerors. Fifty-one vessels, including the four line-of-battle ships, nineteen frigates, and twenty-nine corvettes, were destroyed, with seven thousand of their crews. History has scarcely preserved the record of so complete a conquest, or so awful a devastation.[1]*

[1] Admiral Codrington's Despatch, Ann. Reg. 410, 412; Ann. Hist. x. 358, 359; Brenton, ii. 618.

Indescribably sublime was the scene which presented itself at the close of the action, when the sun declined,

* Ibrahim Pacha's own account of the circumstances which led to the battle of Navarino is substantially the same as that given above on the authority of the allied admirals:—

"I had returned, and again left Navarino for some days, when the English, French, and Russian squadrons hove in sight. A frigate and an English brig entered the harbour without showing their colours, and, after making several tacks in the bay, again left it without hoisting a flag; conduct which I can neither justify nor account for. On the 20th the pacha who commanded in my absence, observing the allied fleet bearing down on Navarino in order of battle, and with apparently hostile intentions, sent a boat on board the English admiral, and delivered to him the following communication—viz., that the pacha would be sorry to see so large an armament enter the port of Navarino during the

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163. Results of the action.

serene and unclouded, over this theatre of carnage. The line of the Ottomans had disappeared; a few floating wrecks alone were to be seen in the bay, clustered round their conquerors; flames were bursting out on all sides, and the sea was covered with fragments of burning vessels, upon some of which the standard of the Prophet was still to be seen, unsubdued even in ruin. Calamitous beyond measure to the vanquished,

absence of Ibrahim; but that if the Allies had any occasion to communicate with the shore, they could do so with perfect security, and that part or parts of each squadron could enter without endangering the peace. I appeal to you, sir—do you observe anything calculated to give offence in a similar request? Was it not natural for the commander to object to the presence of so powerful a force, and protest against its entering the port, especially as that force was four or five times superior to the Turkish, and likely by its warlike presence to provoke hostilities? The English admiral sent back the boat with the insulting answer, that he came to give orders, and not receive advice; while the combined fleet continued to bear down on Navarino in line of battle. At two o'clock P.M. the three squadrons entered the harbour, and immediately took up their berths within pistol-shot of the Turkish fleet. In the meanwhile a frigate detached itself from the fleet, and anchored athwart two fireships which were moored at the mouth of the harbour: the French and Russian squadrons followed the English admiral, and imitated his manœuvres. The Turkish admiral sent a boat a second time on board the English flag-ship, to demand some explanation of these hostile proceedings; but the messenger was driven back in a manner equally insulting and unjustifiable, while the frigate above mentioned sent her boats to seize on the fireships athwart which she had taken up her berth. At this moment a discharge of musketry took place, which proved to be the signal for a general action—an action which was only terminated by the approach of night, and the utter destruction of our squadron. The Turkish squadron was composed of three line-of-battle ships, fifteen frigates, and several transports, and was not prepared for action; while the fleet which it had to contend with consisted of ten line-of-battle ships, besides a number of frigates and corvettes. This being the case, do the three admirals really think that they have reaped a rich harvest of glory, by crushing with their superior forces an opponent who neither expected nor had given cause for such an attack, and who was not prepared for action, nor had taken the precautions of defence? But to return to the subject, and state who began the action, and who has the blame or merit of having fired the first shot. On this point each party is anxious to exculpate itself. What, however, is positively known on the subject is, that the English frigate, without reason or provocation, endeavoured to take possession of some fireships, and that the just resistance made by the fireships caused the first shot to be fired. To conclude, sir—being conscious of having given no offence, I avow that I am still ignorant of the motive which gave occasion for this unaccountable conduct. The high powers profess a wish to prevent the further effusion of blood in the Levant, while, behold! their admirals crimson the waters of Navarino with blood, and cover the entire bay with floating corpses."—IBRAHIM'S *Despatch*, October 26, 1827; *Dublin Review*, April 1837.

the victory was by no means bloodless to the conquerors, for the Mussulmans fought with their wonted valour, and neither asked nor accepted quarter. The loss on the part of the Allies was severest in the British squadron —a sure proof upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and with whom its principal honour should rest: it amounted to 75 killed, and 197 wounded; the French to 43 killed, and 117 wounded. The Russian loss is unknown—a certain sign it was not great. Sixteen of the killed and 26 of the wounded were in the Asia alone; among the former was a son of the admiral. She had 28 shot in her mainmast. The Asia, Albion, and Genoa, were so much damaged in the fight that they were sent home by Sir E. Codrington, after having been so far repaired at Malta as to be able to bear the voyage. Captain Bathurst, of the Genoa, nobly fell at the commencement of the action. Sir E. Codrington was on the poop the whole time; his clothes were in several places perforated by balls: it was almost a miracle how he escaped unhurt.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 319; Admiral Codrington's Despatch, ibid., 412, 413; De Rigny's Despatch, Ann. Hist. x. 107; Moniteur, Nov. 9, 1827; Brenton, ii. 619.

164. Ibrahim's proceedings after the battle.

Ibrahim was absent on an excursion towards Ryogos at the time this disaster was incurred; but he arrived at Neocastron on the 21st, in time to see the shattered and smoking fragments of his navy. As soon as the battle had ceased, the correspondence with the admirals was renewed: it was agreed there should be no further hostilities; and indeed they were not to be apprehended, for the Ottomans had no longer the means of carrying on the contest. Seeing at once that all his visions of Grecian conquest were at an end, Ibrahim wisely applied himself to securing the means of exit from a country, the warfare in which had proved so disastrous to his house. He set about repairing such of his transports as had escaped the conflagration, and in the beginning of December he took the first steps towards the evacuation of the country, by despatching his harem, and five thousand sick and wounded soldiers,[2] who arrived safe in the harbour of

[2] Ann. Hist. x. 404, 405; Ann. Reg. 1827, 120, 122; Gordon, ii. 434, 435.

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Alexandria in a few days. They were much required in Egypt, for a fresh war had broken out there with the Wahabites, which severely taxed the resources of the country, already strained to the uttermost by the Grecian contest.

165. Final rupture of the Turks with the allied powers.

Great apprehensions were entertained that when the intelligence of the disaster at Navarino was heard at Constantinople, the rage of the Sultan would burst forth in the most dangerous manner upon the European residents, and even the representatives of the allied powers. It proved otherwise, however, and the crisis passed over with less violence than could have been expected. The firm attitude of the Divan, however, was not in the least shaken by the news of the misfortune, and the allied ministers having pressed for an answer to their note of 16th August, which had never yet received one, the Sultan replied by the Reis-Effendi, "My positive, absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will persist in its own will regarding them even to the day of the last judgment." The Divan even went so far as to demand, as their final terms, after the catastrophe of Navarino, that they should receive a compensation for the destruction of their fleet, and satisfaction for the insult offered to them by the attack made upon it, and that the Allies should abstain from all interference in the affairs of Greece. To these demands the allied ambassadors returned for answer, that the treaty of 6th July obliged them to defend Greece; that the Turks had no claim for reparation on account of Navarino, as they began the battle; and that the Porte had still less reason to complain, as it had been warned that such an event would probably follow the rejection of the terms proposed by the allied powers.[1] Accommodation was now obviously hopeless; the ambassadors left Constantinople on December 8th, and soon after Count Capo d'Istria, who had been elected President of Greece, took

[1] Ann. Reg. 1827, 321, 322; Gordon, ii. 434, 444.

possession of his new dominions, and issued a proclamation, declaring the Ottoman yoke for ever broken, and the independence of Greece established.

166. Universal transports in Greece at the battle.

No words can convey an idea of the transports of joy which pervaded entire Greece when the intelligence of the battle of Navarino was received. Fast as the flaming beacon which conveyed the news of the fall of Troy to Argos, the joyous tidings were transmitted from mountain to mountain, from crag to crag, from isle to isle, and one throb of exultation and thankfulness was felt in every bosom. Never since the defeat of Hasdrubal by the consul Nero, on the banks of the Metauris, had such a sensation pervaded the heart of a nation. Every one felt as if he himself were delivered from captivity or death. The terrible contest of seven years' duration, upon which their lives, those of their families and their property had been staked, was brought to a close. Christendom had come to the rescue; again, as in the days of the Crusades, the Cross had been triumphant over the Crescent. True, their numbers had been halved during the struggle, their wives and daughters sold as slaves, their houses burned, their fields wasted—what then? These evils had ceased: their sons would now be secure from the Turkish scimitar, their daughters from the Turkish harems; industry would revive, property be rendered secure, and freedom, spreading its blessings over their hills and valleys, would restore the days of their ancient glory.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 438, 439.

167. Immense sensation produced by the news over Christendom.

Equally great was the sensation produced by this memorable event over entire Christendom. Never, save by the taking of Jerusalem in 1199 by the crusading warriors under Godfrey of Bouillon, had so unanimous a feeling of exultation pervaded the Christian world: it exceeded that felt at the battle of Lepanto, gained by Don John of Austria; for that triumph only averted a remote danger from Europe generally, but this rescued one of its most interesting peoples from the jaws of instant

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destruction. Opinions in England were somewhat divided, from the obvious increase which it gave to the preponderance of Russia in the East; but on the Continent the rejoicing was universal. Slow, but certain, had been the march of Divine justice; the final blow was not struck till many opportunities of repentance had been neglected, and many occasions of restitution thrown away: but when it was delivered, the balance was at once righted; an entire people rose from the grave; the blood of Chios was avenged by the flames of Navarino. No further resistance was practicable; the fleets of Asia had been sunk in the deep, and its armies had wasted away in the struggle; a single day had secured the independence of Greece, and restored her to her place in the European family. Such a result was felt by every generous bosom to be the fit subject of exultation. In vain did political considerations intervene; in vain did the caution of statesmen stigmatise this glorious achievement as "an untoward event." The chilling phrase, the unworthy sentiment, was drowned in the universal shout of Christendom. A voice superior to worldly wisdom made itself heard; a feeling deeper than the desire for national advantage was generally experienced. The cause of religion and humanity was felt to have been at stake, and men were thankful that, after so many alliances had been formed for the purposes of ambition and national rivalry, one at last had been found, where nations were banded together in defence of the oppressed, and the sword of Christendom had been drawn to rescue one of its families from destruction.

168. Who was the aggressor at Navarino?

Much discussion took place at the time, as to which of the contending parties was the aggressor at Navarino, and, as usual in such cases, contradictory accounts appeared as to which of the parties fired the first shot. Such special pleading is unworthy of the cause in which Europe was engaged on that occasion. The Allies undoubtedly were the aggressors in *the battle;* the sailing in a hostile guise into the bay was, as Lord Eldon justly

remarked, a hostile act, which authorised the Ottomans to repel them by force. But as clearly as the Allies were the aggressors in the action, were the Turks the aggressors in *the war;* for they refused to accede to the terms of pacification proposed to them by the Allies for the settlement of the Greek question, and had made up their minds to brave the united hostility of Christendom rather than suspend the war of extermination Ibrahim was waging in the Morea. It is true, that war was one waged against their own revolted subjects; it is true that no stranger has a right, in the general case, to interfere in such a contest; and it is not less true that such interference came with a peculiarly bad grace from the Allies at that time, seeing they had recently interfered with decisive effect in Spain and Italy, not to support, but to put down revolutions. But that consideration only brings out the more clearly the justice of their interference the other way in the present instance, and the vital distinction between the contest closed by the flames of Navarino, and that terminated by the capitulation of Cadiz.

169. The Greek war was a strife of religion and race, not principles.

Though unfortunately confounded with them by the Emperor Alexander, the Greek war was, both in principle and object, essentially different from the revolutions of Riego or Pepe. It was not a social, but a national contest; it was not a war of principles or privileges, but of religion and race. The statesmen of western Europe, whose vision was blinded on both sides by the social convulsions so strongly raging among themselves at the time, mistook the signs of the times in the Eastern world; they thought they saw the marks of revolution in Peloponnesus, when, in fact, it was the contest, as old as the Trojan war, of Europe against Asia, which was then raging; it was the spirit of Richard against Saladin which had really been elicited. The conduct of the Turks throughout the whole of this contest had been so atrocious; their cruelty, their massacres, their bloodthirstiness, had been so infamous that they had cast

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themselves out of the pale of civilisation: like Robespierre, they had been declared, and rightly so, *hors la loi* by the human race. Beyond all question, non-interference is the rule, and interference the exception; but there are cases, as in the instances of the French and Spanish revolutions, where a different principle must be established, when the interests of humanity require interference with a nation abusing the right of the strongest within itself, as of a man threatening with death his wife or children. And if ever there was a nation which had brought itself within the exception, it was that which had perpetrated the massacre of Chios, and was yet reeking with the slaughter of Missolonghi.

170. The great error committed was, that the European nations did not sooner interfere, and in behalf of the Greeks.

In truth, so far from the treaty of 6th July 1827 having been an unjustifiable interference with the rights of the Ottoman government as an independent power, it was just the reverse; and the only thing to be regretted is that the Christian powers did not interfere earlier in the contest, and with far more extensive views, for the restoration of the Greek empire. After the massacre of Chios, the Turks had thrown themselves out of the pale of civilisation; they had proved themselves to be pirates, enemies of the human race, and no longer entitled to toleration from the European family. Expulsion from Europe was the natural and legitimate consequence of their flagrant violation of its usages in war. Had this been done in 1822—had the Congress of Verona acceded to the prayers of the Greeks, and restored the Christian empire of the East under the guarantee of the allied powers—what an ocean of blood would have been dried up, what boundless misery prevented, what prospects of felicity to the human race opened! A Christian monarchy of 10,000,000 of souls, with Constantinople for its capital, would ere this have added a half to its population, wealth, and all the elements of national strength. The rapid growth, since the Crescent was expelled from their

territories, of Servia, Greece, the isles of the Archipelago, Wallachia and Moldavia, and of the Christian inhabitants in all parts of the country, proves what might have been expected had all Turkey in Europe been blessed by a similar liberation. The fairest portion of Europe would have been restored to the rule of religion, liberty, and civilisation, and a barrier erected by European freedom against Asiatic despotism in the regions where it was first successfully combated.

171. Difficulty of the Eastern question.

What is the grand difficulty that now surrounds the Eastern question, which has rendered it all but insoluble even to the most far-seeing statesmen, and has compelled the Western powers, for their own sake, to ally themselves with a state which they would all gladly, were it practicable without general danger, see expelled from Europe? Is it not that the Ottoman empire is the only barrier which exists against the encroachments of Russia, and that if it is destroyed the independence of every European state is endangered by the extension of the Muscovite power from the Baltic to the Mediterranean? All see the necessity of this barrier, yet all are sensible of its weakness, and feel that it is one which is daily becoming more feeble, and must in the progress of time be swept away. This difficulty is entirely of our own creation; it might have been obviated, and a firm bulwark erected in the East, against which all the surges of Muscovite ambition would have beat in vain. Had the dictates of humanity, justice, and policy been listened to in 1822, and a *Christian* monarchy been erected in European Turkey, under the guarantee of Austria, France, and England, the whole difficulties of the Eastern question would have been obviated, and European independence would have found an additional security in the very quarter where it is now most seriously menaced. Instead of the living being allied to the dead, they would have been linked to the living; and a barrier against Eastern conquest erected

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on the shores of the Hellespont, not with the worn-out materials of Mahommedan despotism, but with the rising energy of Christian civilisation.

172. The division of race and religion in Turkey is no bar to the establishment of a Christian monarchy.

But modern Turkey, it is said, is divided by race, religion, and situation; three-fourths of it are Christian, one-fourth Mahommedan; there are six millions of Sclavonians, four millions of Bulgarians, two millions and a half of Turks, and only one million of Greeks;—how can a united and powerful empire be formed of such materials? Most true; and in what state was Greece anterior to the Persian invasion: Italy before the Punic wars; England during the Heptarchy; Spain in the time of the Moors; France during its civil wars? Has the existence of such apparently fatal elements of division prevented these countries from becoming the most renowned, the most powerful, the most prosperous communities upon earth? In truth, diversity of race, so far from being an element of weakness, is, when duly coerced, the most prolific source of strength: it is to the body politic what the intermixture of soils is to the richness of the earth. It is the meagreness of unmingled race which is the real source of weakness; for it leaves hereditary maladies unchanged, hereditary defects unsupplied. Witness the unchanging ferocity in every age of the Ishmaelite, the irremediable indolence of the Irish, the incurable arrogance of the Turk; while the mingled blood of the Briton, the Roman, the Saxon, the Dane, and the Norman, has produced the race to which is destined the sceptre of half the globe.

173. Prosperous condition of Greece since its independence.

Such was the resurrection of Greece; thus did old Hellas rise from the grave of nations. Scorched by fire, riddled by shot, baptised in blood, she emerged victorious from the contest: she achieved her independence because she proved herself worthy of it: she was trained to manhood in the only school of real improvement, the school of suffering. Twenty-five years have elapsed since her independence was sealed by the battle of Navarino, and

already the warmest hopes of her friends have been realised. Her capital, Athens, now contains thirty thousand inhabitants, quadruple what it did when the contest terminated; its commerce has doubled, and all the signs of rapidly advancing prosperity are to be seen on the land. The inhabitants have increased fifty per cent; they are now above seven hundred thousand; but the fatal chasms produced by the war, especially in the male population, are still in a great measure unsupplied, and vast tracts of fertile land, spread with the bones of its defenders, await in every part of the country the robust arm of industry for their cultivation. The Greeks, indeed, have not all the virtues of freemen; perhaps they are never destined to exhibit them. Like the Muscovites, and from the same cause, they are often cunning, fraudulent, deceitful: slaves always are such; and a nation is not crushed by a thousand years of Byzantine despotism, and four hundred of Mahommedan oppression, without having some of the features of the servile character impressed upon it. But they exhibit also the cheering symptoms of social improvement; they have proved they still possess the qualities to which their ancestors' greatness was owing. They are lively, ardent, and persevering, passionately desirous of knowledge, and indefatigable in the pursuit of it. The whole life which yet animates the Ottoman empire is owing to their intelligence and activity. The stagnation of despotism is unknown among them; if the union of civilisation is unhappily equally unknown, that is a virtue of the manhood, and not to be looked for in the infancy of nations. The consciousness of deficiencies is the first step to their removal; the pride of barbarism, the self-sufficiency of ignorance, is the real bar to improvement; and a nation which is capable of making the efforts for improvement which the Greeks are doing, if not in possession of political greatness, is on the road to it.

CHAPTER XV.

RUSSIA AND TURKEY, FROM THE ACCESSION OF NICHOLAS IN 1825, TO THE PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE IN 1829.

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1. All the wars of Europe, from 1815 to 1830, were wars with the Mahommedans.

It is a markworthy circumstance, that all the serious wars in Europe, between 1815 and 1830, occurred between the Christians and the Mahommedans. The English attack on Algiers in 1816, the French capture of the same place in 1830, the Greek revolution and its seven bloody campaigns, the war of 1826 between the Russians and the Persians, that of 1828 between the Russians and Turks, all partook of this character. Even the distant contests of the English in India were at last of the same description; the Mussulman soldiers were not the least formidable that the English had to encounter on the ramparts of Bhurtpore, and on the plains of the Doab; and they never encountered such danger as when they approached Ghuznee, the cradle of Mahommedan power in Central Asia. It would seem that, when the social contests of Europe itself are hushed, the ancient and indelible hostility of the European to the barbarian breaks forth; and that, when all domestic grounds of dissension have been removed from civilised man, the inherent causes of discord, arising from difference of race, religion, and physical circumstances between him and more savage tribes, never fail to arm one part of the species against the other.

Placed on the confines of Europe and Asia, the hereditary enemy, in every age, of the Mahommedan faith, it

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was impossible that Russia could long escape this general antagonist movement of Islamism and Christianity, which followed the closing the wars of the French Revolution. The pacific habits of the Emperor Alexander, indeed, and the strong direction of his mind, in his later years, to mystical objects, and the establishment of the reign of peace and benevolence among mankind, long prevented the collision, and averted the conflict of the Cross and the Crescent, under circumstances when it otherwise would have become unavoidable. But with the accession of a new emperor this state of strained and unnatural pacification terminated. His character and feelings were essentially national; the frightful civil war which had preceded his accession to the throne rendered him doubly anxious to direct the popular passion to external objects; and the warm sympathy of the entire nation, and in an especial manner the army, with the religious struggle of the Greeks, rendered it not doubtful in what manner this direction might most effectually be given. No one, therefore, entered more cordially than the new Czar into the advances of the British government towards effecting a settlement of the Eastern question, by securing the virtual independence of Greece; and the protocol of 4th April 1826, signed by the Duke of Wellington and Count Nesselrode, which, as already mentioned, laid the foundation of that independence, was one of the most popular and agreeable acts of the new reign.[1]

2. Rupture with the Mahommedan powers on the accession of Nicholas.

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 358; Ante, c. xiv., § 144.

The last treaty between Russia and Persia, concluded on 24th October 1813, under the mediation of Great Britain, had recognised the principle of *uti possedetis*; and so largely had Russia been a gainer by previous hostilities that she acquired a very great accession both of territory and influence on that occasion. She had crossed the ridge of the Caucasus, established herself in a solid way between the Caspian and the Black Sea, and spread her dominion far to the south in the vast province of Grandscha, better known under the name of Georgia.

3. Advantages gained by Russia over Persia.

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The influence of Russia, however, by these acquisitions, was ere long felt by the Persian government to be too great for a lasting pacification; various disputed questions of territory still remained unadjusted; they had, under the terror of their new and formidable neighbour, drawn more closely their connection with the British government; and a considerable number of English officers had communicated to the tumultuary array of Teheran, in a certain degree, the consistency of European organisation and discipline. Aware of these hostile preparations, the Emperor Nicholas, soon after his brother's death, despatched Prince Menschikoff upon a friendly mission, ostensibly to notify his accession to the throne, really to endeavour to effect an arrangement of the disputed points of territory. But this mission proved unavailing; the Prince Abbas Mirza was intoxicated with the thought of commanding an army of fifty thousand men, armed and disciplined in the European method; and so strong did the war party become that hostilities were commenced, and a considerable part of the territories occupied by the Russians to the south of the Caucasus wrested from them, before any declaration of war had been made between the two countries.[1]

[1] Fonton, 164, 166; Ann. Hist. ix. 362, 363.

4. Repeated defeats of the Persians by the Russians.

The intelligence of the commencement of these hostilities reached the Emperor Nicholas during the festivities of his coronation at Moscow, in August 1826; but it related to too distant a province to occasion any interruption to that joyous event. Orders were sent to General Yermoloff, who commanded the troops beyond the Caucasus, to concentrate his men, and attack the enemy; and these orders were executed by that able general with

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decisive effect. On the 2/14 September he attacked Abbas Mirza, who was at the head of eight thousand soldiers, and so entirely defeated him that nearly his whole army dispersed. The victorious general, after this success, advanced with his little army, consisting of six thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and twelve

guns, against the main Persian army, composed of twenty thousand regular infantry, twelve thousand horse, eight thousand irregulars, and twenty-four guns, who were posted at the distance of four miles from Elizabethpol, on the banks of the little river Djcham. Though the forces were so unequal, the contest was of very short duration; and it soon appeared, as had so often been proved in India, how little the Asiatics have gained by the attempt to engraft European steadiness and discipline on their fiery squadrons. They were totally defeated, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners, and double that number killed and wounded; while the loss of the Russians was under three hundred men. In consequence of this check, the Persians retreated across the Araxes; and the Russian army on the right having gained similar advantages, the Russians again recovered and received the submission of the whole provinces which they had occupied before the war.[1]

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Sept. 21.

Nov. 6.

[1] Fonton, 174, 179; Ann. Hist. ix. 366, 368.

5. Statistics of Russia at this period.

Some idea of the strength of the Russian empire at this period may be formed from the result of a general survey and enumeration of the inhabitants, which took place in the course of this year. From this it appeared that the entire superficies of the empire in Europe, Asia, and America, consisted of 375,154 square German miles (sixteen to an English); the population to 59,534,000; the excess of births over deaths to 700,000; and the army to 1,039,000 men, of whom, however, not more than 600,000 could be relied on as effective; and the revenue amounted to 388,000,000 francs, or £11,500,000.* Various important regulations were at the same time made for the establishment of military colonies,[2] especially in the

[2] Ann. Hist. ix. 369.

	Square German miles (sixteen to an English.)	Population.
*Russia in Europe,	72,861	44,118,600
Poland,	2,293	3,702,300
Russia in Asia,	276,000	11,663,100
Russia in America,	24,000	50,000
	375,154	59,534,000

—*Rapport semi-officiel*, Dec. 30, 1826. *Annuaire Historique*, ix. 369.

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newly-acquired territories beyond the Caucasus, which promised at length to give consistency to the Russian dominion in those vast recent acquisitions.

6. State of the negotiations between Russia and Turkey. May 14.

The interminable negotiations between the Russian and Turkish governments regarding the subjects of complaint which the former had against the latter for violating the clause in favour of its Christian subjects, contained in the treaties of Kainardji and Bucharest, appeared this year to have reached an extraordinary and unlooked-for issue. The Ottoman government, impatient to bring the Greek war to a termination, and intent on the prosecution of the siege of Missolonghi, resolved to dissemble, and avert the threatened invasion of a hundred thousand Russians from Bessarabia by a temporary submission. M. Miniacki, the Russian *chargé-d'affaires*, had on 5th April presented a note, in which he recapitulated the demands of his imperial master, and required their unconditional acceptance within six weeks, failing which, hostilities were to commence. These conditions were — 1. The immediate re-establishment of the two principalities and Servia in the condition in which they were prior to the commencement of the troubles of 1821; 2. The instant redress of all their grievances, conformable to the treaty of Bucharest in 1812; 3. The evacuation of these provinces by the Ottoman troops, and the liberation of the Servian deputies, whom they still held in detention; and, 4. An entire satisfaction to Russia for the insult offered to her by the silence observed in regard to former notes. Contrary to all expectation, the Divan, at the expiration of the prescribed period, gave in their entire and unqualified adherence to the demands of the cabinet of St Petersburg; the Servian deputies were immediately set at liberty, and orders despatched for the instant evacuation of the principalities and Servia.[1]

May 14. [1] Ann. Hist. ix. 374, 376; Miniacki's Note, April 5, 1826, and Answer, May 13; Ann. Hist. 94, 96; Doc. Hist.

This sudden acquiescence in the demands of Russia,

and departure from the old procrastinating policy of the Turkish government, excited at the time general surprise in Europe; but it soon appeared that it was the result of a deep-laid design, and formed part of a change of policy long contemplated in Turkey, and which its government now considered itself strong enough to carry into effect. The janizaries had for ages been the terror of the government at Constantinople, and more than once they had prescribed their own terms to the Sultan, and even imbrued their hands in his blood. Various projects had at different times been formed for the breaking of their pride and the curtailing of their influence; but they all had hitherto proved abortive, from the want of any adequate armed force at hand to restrain the hostility and coerce the excesses of these unruly defenders. The present Sultan, whose predecessor, Selim, had been dethroned and murdered in his attempt to shake off the authority of these imperious masters, had been obliged at the commencement of his reign to dissemble, and he had not only been forced to abolish the *Nizam Djedib*, or new troops, but to swear to preserve all the privileges of the janizaries, and even to enrol himself in one of their regiments or *ortas*, for his service in which he regularly drew pay. But his determination was not the less irrevocably taken; he was only dissembling, to gain time for their destruction. During the interval he was indefatigable in his efforts to gain the confidence of the *Oulemas*, or learned and legal bodies; and the long wars with Ali Pacha and the Greeks had both afforded evidence of the necessity of putting the military force on a new footing, and given time for the formation of a very considerable body of men, who might be relied on in the convulsion which was approaching. The preparations were now so far advanced that, though the janizaries saw their danger, they did not feel themselves in sufficient strength openly to take steps against it. Fourteen thousand *topjees* or artillerymen had been distributed in the barracks in and

1826. 7. Measures contemplated against the janizaries.

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around Constantinople; and as they were the avowed rivals of the janizaries, and had been enrolled to coerce them, the utmost pains had been taken to secure their fidelity by every possible means. The pacha who commanded them, as well as the Grand Vizier, Capitan Pacha, and their own aga or general, were all devoted to Sultan Mahmoud, who had also secured the support of the muftis, and the powerful body of the Oulema.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist; ix. 377, 379; Gordon, ii. 310, 311.

8. New statute regarding the janizaries. May 28.

In the end of May, after the differences with Russia had been adjusted, government took the first step in the proposed reform of the janizaries, by the promulgation of a new plan of organisation, which, although cautiously conceived, to avoid exciting their jealousy, was yet calculated, when carried into full effect, to give a fatal blow to their influence. Their statutes and privileges were preserved entire, and all those who drew pay or emoluments allowed to continue them during their lives; but the existing holders of these immunities were not to be permitted to sell or alienate them, and at their demise they were entirely to cease. From the *ortas*, or regiments, a hundred and ninety-six in number, fifty were to be selected to furnish a hundred and fifty men each, who were to be incorporated with the new troops, and clothed and disciplined after the European fashion. This hatti-sheriff was sanctioned by the signature of the Sultan, and of all the dignitaries of the state, and instantly proclaimed in all the mosques and places of public resort in the capital and chief cities of the empire. The pay of the new troops was raised to thirty *paras* a-day for private men, and to the officers in proportion. In addition to this, they were to receive dress and arms complete from the government,—the latter consisting of a musket, sabre, and bayonet to each man; the former of a vest of red cloth, a pair of pantaloons of blue, and a cap of green cloth, edged with black sheepskin.[2] Notwithstanding the magnitude of these changes, they had been so prepared, with the consent of the muftis, oulemas, and several of the chiefs of the jani-

[2] Gordon, ii. 311; Ann. Hist. ix. 379, 380; Ann. Reg. 1826, 172, 174.

zaries themselves, that no resistance was at first experienced; the decree was read in the mosques without opposition; Egyptian officers began to drill the selected men; the clothing was served out; and as no new impost was imposed, the people remained quiet, and seemed disposed to acquiesce without opposition in the new order of things.

9. Insurrection of the janizaries. June 14.

This state of things continued for the first fortnight, and it was hoped the danger had blown over; but it soon appeared that these hopes were fallacious, and that a desperate conflict awaited the government in their attempt to introduce the new regulations. The furnishing of the hundred and fifty men from the selected ortas went on without difficulty in the capital and neighbouring towns; but when the recruits began to be drilled and marched in the European fashion, the discontents at once broke out. On the evening of the 14th of June the ill-humour of the troops assumed the form of open mutiny: the new regulations were stigmatised as a violation of the law of the Prophet, and the men were worked up to such a pitch that they burst in a tumultuous manner from their barracks, assailed the palace of the Grand Vizier, the Capitan Pacha, their own Aga, and the Pacha of Egypt's diplomatic agent, which they plundered in the most shameful manner. These exalted functionaries only saved themselves by a precipitate flight; and if the insurgents had been conducted with more ability, and marched in the first moment of alarm on the Sultan's palace and the batteries, they would in all probability have proved successful, and might without difficulty have imposed their own terms on the government. But being destitute of leaders, of prudence, or foresight, they neglected these obvious and necessary measures; and instead of improving their victory, when only half gained they thought of enjoying its fruits. Accordingly, after the pillage of the palaces they dispersed among the wine-vaults in the neighbourhood, and gave themselves up to the most revolting excesses.[1]

[1] Gordon, ii. 311, 312; Ann. Hist. ix. 331.

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10. Vigorous measures of Sultan Mahmoud.

The Sultan and his ministers turned to much better account the breathing-time afforded by the intoxication of their antagonists. The Grand Seignior hastened to Constantinople from his beautiful palace of Benhicktash, on the shores of the Bosphorus, and put himself at the head of the topjees or artillerymen, and faithful troops of every description, which were directed from all quarters upon the capital. A large park of artillery was brought from the arsenal of Topkhana, the gunners of which were entirely at his devotion; and the Sultan, whose gallant bearing animated the courage of all his adherents, soon found himself at the head of the chief civil functionaries and principal military authorities of the empire. By their advice—indeed, by their express orders—the famous *Sandjak Sheriff*, or sacred standard, said to be composed of part of the dress actually worn by the Prophet, was brought forth from the sacred treasury, where it had so long lain, shrouded from the eyes of the faithful, and conveyed to the mosque of Sultan Achmet, with the whole solemnities practised on such occasions, which is of the rarest occurrence, and only resorted to on the most extreme danger. At the same time the public criers in every quarter published a proclamation denouncing the janizaries as enemies to the Prophet and his holy religion, and calling on every true believer to rally without delay around the standard of Mahomet.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 382, 383; Gordon, ii. 311, 312.

11. Defeat of the janizaries.

These decisive measures had an instantaneous effect. The streets were immediately filled with a prodigious crowd of Mussulmans, of all ages and descriptions, fully armed, and inspired with the utmost zeal, who hastened to the various rallying-points assigned them, to swell the array of the followers of the Prophet. The regular force assembled amounted to ten thousand men; and the preparations being deemed complete, the rebels were three times summoned to lay down their arms, and return to their allegiance to Mahomet and his vicegerent the Sultan. They positively refused, until they had received the heads

of the Grand Vizier, of their own aga, of Hussein Pacha, and of Redschid-Effendi. These demands being of course refused, a decree was hastily passed declaring the abolition of the janizaries, and ordering Hussein Pacha to march against the rebels. They, on their side, prepared for the most vigorous resistance; the Atmeidan was filled with ferocious bands, whose cheering was incessant; and the overturning of all their camp-kettles, the well-known signal of determined revolt, told but too plainly that they were resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible. The combat, when the topjees approached, was brief but terrible. The janizaries commenced an immediate discharge of small-arms, which was kept up with great rapidity, and resolutely withstood several rounds of grape-shot at point-blank range from the artillery. At length, however, a large number having been mowed down, the remainder retired, but still in good order, and firing steadily on their pursuers, to their barracks, where they had prepared the means of the most determined resistance. But an awful catastrophe, almost unparalleled in civil warfare, there awaited them. Without attempting to force the gates, the Turkish commanders contented themselves with incessantly throwing shells into the building, which was speedily set on fire, and firing grape on the gates by which alone egress could be obtained. In these frightful circumstances the rebels offered to submit, but it was too late. Their petition was sternly refused, and the shells continued to fall and the grape to be discharged till the barracks were totally consumed; and the whole insurgents, four thousand in number, had perished in the flames, or been cut down in endeavouring to force their way out of them.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 381, 383; Gordon, ii. 311, 312; Ann. Reg. 1826, 188.

12. Cruel executions in Constantinople.

The victory of the Sultan was complete, but the strength of the party of the janizaries, both in the capital and the provinces, was too well known, and their innumerable deeds of violence too fresh in recollection, not to make the government determined to push its advantages

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to the utmost, and utterly exterminate the unruly body which had now become as formidable to the throne as they had formerly been to its enemies. A summary court, composed of the principal officers of state, was formed in the Atmeidan, before whom all the janizaries who could be hunted out were brought, and on being identified as belonging to the obnoxious body, instantly sentenced to be executed. Above a thousand were put to death daily for several weeks. When the Sultan went to return thanks at the mosque of Sultan Achmet, it was observed that he was attended only by the topjees, and that the janizaries were entirely discarded. It soon appeared not only that all those engaged in the revolt were to be sacrificed, but that the insurrection was to be made a pretext for the destruction of the entire body throughout the whole empire. The sandjak-sheriff was

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carried with great pomp to the Seraglio, where it was deposited in one of the inner courts, in token of the public danger, and the Sultan and all his attendants lived in the outer courts, encamped and in tents, as in presence of the enemy. During three months they remained in that situation, constantly engaged in examining spies and informers, and taking depositions and issuing orders for the execution of the janizaries in every part of the empire. It was calculated that, before the executions ceased by the exhaustion of their victims, above forty thousand had perished, besides an equal number driven into exile. In addition to this, the most severe measures were adopted against the whole body. Their name was proscribed, their barracks demolished, their camp-kettles, so often the signal of revolt, broken to pieces, their standards destroyed, and their whole duties transferred to a new corps of regular troops, to whom the defence of the city and empire was intrusted. The eighty gates of the capital, which it had been their privilege to guard, were intrusted to the topjees and bostandjis. The Sultan with his whole court assumed the Egyptian military dress; the old costumes were forbidden; the command of the

entire new force given to Hussein Pacha, who established his headquarters at the old Seraglio, which he fortified in the strongest manner; the beauties of the harem who formerly inhabited it were transferred to the new Seraglio; and on the 3d September, as the pacification was deemed complete, the sandjak-sheriff was with great pomp carried back to its place of sacred deposit, in the mosque of Sultan Achmet.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 385, 390; Ann. Reg. 1826, 192, 196; Gordon, ii. 313, 314.

13. Effect of this revolution on the negotiations with Russia.

This great and sanguinary revolution, which produced such lasting effects upon the Ottoman empire, and was intimately interwoven with its whole future destinies, produced an immediate effect, very different from what had been foreseen, on the negotiation between the Porte and Russia. Sultan Mahmoud had very magnificent ideas regarding the new military force which he was to raise; and he already contemplated the formation of a regular standing army of two hundred and fifty thousand men. But he soon found that it is easier to destroy one military force than raise up another, and that the destruction of so numerous, ancient, and venerated a body as the janizaries, could not be effected without endangering the very existence of the empire. He received repeated warnings how deeply the public mind had been stirred on the occasion; a dreadful fire broke out, in August, in Constantinople, the work of incendiaries, which in a few hours consumed six thousand houses. On several occasions, when he appeared in public, he was received with unequivocal marks of displeasure; and instead of two hundred and fifty thousand recruits, not fifteen thousand were arrayed round the standard of the Prophet. The losses occasioned by the conflagration were immense; they were estimated at 140,000,000 francs (£5,800,000.) So great did the public discontent become, that a proclamation was at length issued, denouncing the instant penalty, the men by being beheaded, the women by being sewn up in a sack and thrown into the sea,[2] against whoever spread reports or used expressions tending to disturb the public

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[2] Ann. Hist. 392, 393; Ann. Reg. 1826, 164, 167.

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peace; and these terrible denunciations were the very next day carried into execution in every quarter of the city with unrelenting severity.

14. Civil reforms of the Sultan.

Nowise deterred by these alarming proofs of the public discontent, the Sultan pursued his plans of reform and regeneration with the utmost vigour. Inexorable in the destruction of all such as opposed his determination—terrible in the punishments he inflicted on all such as were suspected even of exciting the public mind against him, he rewarded generously such as adhered to his fortunes, and distributed frequent largesses among the troops, to reconcile them to the new exercise and uniform. He was equally vigorous in the prosecution of civil reforms, which he was well aware were, even more than military, essential to the restoration of the empire; and two important decrees, introducing a very different system of administration, date from this period. He first abolished the confiscation of the movable estate, which had hitherto invariably followed every execution by orders of the Porte, and forbade the officers of justice to interfere with the estate in the event of the heirs being minors; the second enjoined on all the cadis and mollahs the most strict and rigorous administration of justice, and recommended the immediate prosecution of false witnesses, and all disturbers of the right course of the law—all steps, and not unimportant ones, in the amelioration of the internal economy of the state, but the success of which too soon demonstrated that more depends on national feelings and habits than on any regulations that can be made for the direction of the people. And at the same time the Divan gave the strongest proof that they had no inclination to abate by far the greatest social evil—the distinction of races and religions—which afflicted the empire; for, by a decree published in the end of September, the whole population of the country other than the Mussulmans was enjoined to wear the ancient dresses, both in form and colour, and not to venture on those reserved for the followers of the Prophet.[1]

Sept. 30.

[1] Decree, Sept. 30, 1826; Ann. Hist. ix. 391, 393.

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15. Conferences at Ackerman, and demands of Russia.

The first effect of the destruction of the janizaries appeared in the negotiations between Russia and the Porte, which, as a humiliation to Ottoman pride, the Emperor Nicholas had directed to be transferred to Ackerman, a town of Bessarabia, in the Russian dominions. The conference began on the 1st of August. Great difficulty was experienced in the outset, as might have been expected, when the pride of the Osmanlis was compelled to yield to the stern necessity of the times, and the Russians made the most of the extraordinary advantages which circumstances had thrown in their way to exact the most rigorous terms from their ancient antagonists. The demands of Russia related chiefly to three points: 1st, The immediate restitution of the whole six fortresses in Asia, which the Turks were bound to cede to the Russians by the last pacification, but of which they had only given up two; 2d, The relations and legal privileges of the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia, of which the emperor had been declared the guardian by the treaties of Kainardji and Bucharest; 3d, The political emancipation of the Servians, whose present chief, Prince Molosch, had obtained his appointment contrary to the wishes of Russia, to the partisans of which he had showed himself peculiarly hostile. At the receipt of these demands, which were rendered more peremptory from a requisition that a categorical answer should be returned by the 25th September, the Turkish commissioners were so indignant that, in the first burst of indignation, they threatened instantly to leave Ackerman. But the Russians, who desired nothing better than to commence hostilities when the janizaries were destroyed, and no other military force had been organised to supply their place, having at once offered them an escort to conduct them beyond the frontier, they deemed it best to temporise, under pretence of sending to Constantinople to obtain fresh instructions. They agreed, accordingly, to prolong the period for giving an answer to the 7th October,[1] receiving intimation, how-

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 395, 397.

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ever, that if they were not then acceded to without reservation the Russian troops would cross the Pruth.

16. The Russian demands are acceded to without reservation.

Such was the situation of the Turkish empire that, hard and even insulting as these propositions were, the Divan had no alternative but submission. The Greek insurrection, like a devouring fire, was consuming the vitals of the state, and entirely absorbed the resources of Egypt, the only part of it which could be relied on for military aid. The janizaries, who had for centuries formed the chief strength of the empire, were in part destroyed, and the survivors were animated with such an unextinguishable animosity against the government, that if armed they might be regarded as its most formidable enemies. Of the new levies, from which so much had been expected, not fifteen thousand were as yet grouped round the Sultan's standard, and even they were as yet imperfectly disciplined. The English and French ambassadors had intimated the intention of their respective courts to take an active part in the intervention in favour of Greece, and throw into the scale in the conflict with that power the weight of their arms and the terror of their name. Pressed by so many dangers, the Ottoman government, though with no intention, as it ultimately appeared, of adhering to their engagements, resolved on submission; and, on the last day allowed, Oc. 8. their plenipotentiaries signed the celebrated *Convention of Ackerman*, which has ever since occupied so prominent a place in the diplomacy of the East. Some delay occurred in the ratification of the Sultan, but at length it too was adhibited, and the act became part of the international law of the two empires.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 396, 397; Ann. Reg. 1826, 174.

17. Its provisions.

By the treaty, which was reduced into the form of two conventions, it was stipulated—1. That the whole provisions of the treaty of Bucharest, of 17th June 1812, were ratified and confirmed in their fullest extent. 2. Certain stipulations favourable to Russia, in regard to two large islands in the mouth of the Danube, contained in a convention between the two powers on 22d August 1817,

were ratified and renewed. 3. The Sublime Porte solemnly engaged to observe all the treaties, privileges, and acts, on every occasion, in favour of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, contained in the treaty of Bucharest, as also the hatti-sheriff of 1802, which enumerated these privileges. 4. The frontiers of the two empires in Asia were fixed as they were at the moment of signing the treaty. 5. The privileges and concerns of the Servian nation shall be regulated by a hatti-sheriff, which shall be issued at latest in the period of eighteen months. 6. Commissioners were appointed on both sides to determine the compensation which was to be awarded to the Russian subjects who had suffered under the depredations of the Barbary pirates, for which the Porte was held responsible, and to restrain all such acts of piracy in future. 7. The hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia shall be chosen, agreeably to ancient usage, by the boyards of those provinces respectively, subject to the consent and approbation of the Sublime Porte, the period of their enjoyment of power being in every instance seven years. 8. No hospodar was to be dismissed from office without notification to the Russian ambassador; but if no cause of complaint has been stated by that power, he may be re-elected, after notification to the Russian ambassador, for a second term of seven years. 9. The confiscated properties in the two provinces shall be restored to the former proprietors, and those implicated in the troubles of 1821 are to be permitted to return without being molested or disquieted in any particular. 10. All taxes and impositions were to be remitted to the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia for the period of two years, and entire freedom of commerce and exportation of the produce of their industry to any part of the world.[1]

[1] Convention, Oct. 7, 1826; Ann. Hist. ix. 100, 105; Doc. Hist.

Considered in themselves, and with reference only to present results, there was nothing in these conditions which appeared very detrimental to the Turkish empire. There were neither provinces ceded, nor fortresses surrendered, nor alliances imposed. But viewed in reference

18. Their disastrous consequences to Turkey.

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to ultimate consequences, the case was very different. By solemnly recognising the provisions in the treaties of Bucharest and Kainardji, which gave Russia a right of interference in behalf of the members of the Greek Church in certain parts of the empire, it established a RIGHT OF PROTECTORATE in a foreign power inconsistent with national independence, and which opened the door to perpetual foreign interposition. By the impunity which it stipulated for the rebels in Wallachia and Moldavia, the immunities provided to Servia, and the important right of free exportation of their produce, which it secured to all these provinces, it gave a striking example of the benefits which those sheltered by this protectorate might expect from its influence. A large part of the inhabitants of the country were taught to look to a foreign court for protection and redress of grievances. The ruling power was felt to be elsewhere than at Constantinople. We may form some idea of the effects of such a foreign protectorate in dissolving an empire, from what we have ourselves done in India, and might assuredly expect if a similar system were turned against ourselves by France or Russia in Ireland.

19. Sultan Mahmoud continues his reforms.

Undeterred by the prospect of these remote dangers, or rather secretly resolved to avert them, by breaking the treaties when the proper moment arrived, Sultan Mahmoud continued, without intermission, his military and civil reforms. The Seraglio, so long the seat only of indolence or pleasure, resounded with the din of arms; military officers were seen hurrying to and fro in every direction, bearing orders or despatches, as at the headquarters of a great army; and the Sultan himself was constantly engaged in the organising of fresh battalions, and the instructing the troops in the new exercises. Notwithstanding all his exertions, however, the raising of the new force proceeded but slowly; and it soon appeared that it had been a matter of absolute necessity to submit to the terms dictated at Ackerman: Before the end of

the year, not more than twenty thousand men were assembled who had been instructed in the new exercises; and as they constituted the whole regular military strength of the empire, it may easily be figured to what perilous straits it was reduced, and what an opportunity was afforded to Russia for prosecuting her long-cherished projects of ambition on the shores of the Bosphorus.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 398, 400.

20. Internal reforms of Nicholas in Russia.

Secured, in the mean time, in a great advantage, on the side of Turkey, by this convention, Nicholas pursued, during the next year, the projects of social amelioration which he had so much at heart, and the necessity of which the revelations made, during and after the great conspiracy of 1825, had so clearly demonstrated. Such was the activity which he communicated to the judicial department that, in the course of the year 1826, no less than 2,850,000 causes were decided in the ordinary tribunals; and out of 127,000 persons under arrest when he came to the throne, only 4900 remained in detention in the beginning of 1827. A report to the Emperor, in the beginning of 1827, however, showed that there were still sixty thousand processes in arrear—a state of things which gave him so much concern that he immediately issued a fresh commission to despatch them; and the Minister of Justice, Prince Labanoff-Rastowsky, received intimation that he might retire to his estates, and he was succeeded in his functions by Prince Dolgorowsky. A ukase of 5th March abolished a cruel species of torture, long practised among the Cossacks of the Don, which consisted in attaching the feet of a victim to huge blocks of stone in a room, while his hands were fastened at extreme tension to the ceiling, and leaving him in that position till he often expired. But amidst these noble cares, the vigilance of internal administration was in no respect lessened; and the increase of the exiles of Siberia, during the course of 1826, from nine thousand to twelve thousand, proved how widespread had been the conspiracy of the preceding year, and how strongly government felt

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the necessity of extirpating, root and branch, so formidable a combination. The Polish patriots, in the course of the same year, were discovered to have been engaged in a great conspiracy, veiled under the name, and conducted by the fraternity of Free Masons, which seriously attracted the attention of government. A commission of inquiry was issued, which published an elaborate report, and a great number of noble Poles were arrested; but happily the proceedings against them were distinguished by unusual mildness, as the evidence against them was found to be insufficient; for, after a few months' detention, they were all set at liberty.[1]

[1] Rapport, Jan. 3, 1827; Ann. Hist. x. 314, 319.

21. Operations in Persia.

Notwithstanding the victories of the preceding campaign in Persia, the Russian government was far from being satisfied with the general result of the operations. Little durable advantage had been gained from all these successes, chiefly from the want of foresight in providing magazines, which rendered it impossible to move the troops in advance, whatever victories they had achieved. General Yermoloff, in consequence, whose talents, however great, had not proved equal to the emergency, was deprived of the command, which was bestowed on GENERAL PASKEWITCH, who had greatly distinguished himself in the preceding campaign in the capacity of aide-de-camp, and who was intrusted with the supreme command in Georgia. Great exertions were made to augment the military force at his disposal, which was increased to seventy thousand men and eighty-six guns—by far the largest Christian and disciplined body of men which had yet appeared to the south of the Caucasus. The campaign began, in the beginning of April, by an advance on the fortified convent of Elschmiadzine, long celebrated from its strength and commanding position, but which was now abandoned by the Persians without opposition. On the 17th May, having got up the requisite supplies and reinforcements, General Benkendorf moved in the direction of ERIVAN, a fortress of great strength, deemed

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17th May.

impregnable, and justly regarded as the bulwark of northern Persia. The fort of Abbasabad lay on the road, and was the first object of attack. A brilliant cavalry action took place on the 20th June, when seven thousand horse, under the command of Hassan Khan, were defeated by the Russian dragoons, on the banks of the Araxes. This was the prelude to the siege of the fortress of Abbasabad, which was invested, in the middle of July, by Paskewitch in person.[1]

June 20.

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 324, 325.

22. Battle of Djevan-Boulak. July 18.

Informed of the danger of this important frontier fortress, Abbas Mirza advanced at the head of forty thousand men, the chosen troops of the monarchy, to raise the siege; and the Sardar of Erivan joined him with a large body of irregular horse. The Russian general resolved to anticipate the attack; and, leaving eight battalions and a few guns to observe the fortress, passed the Araxes by a ford, by means of hides forming air-bladders, adopted from the Orientals by Paskewitch for the occasion. He found the Persians in a strong position outflanking his right, and supported on their left by an imposing mass of five thousand irregular horse. The enemy appeared in great strength, and the position extremely formidable; but a headlong charge of the dragoons of Nijni-Novgorod and a body of Cossacks having checked the horse on the left, the infantry in the centre succeeded in making themselves masters of an elevated plateau in their front, from which their guns commanded the whole field of battle. The Persians, seeing their centre forced, and their left in disorder, broke and fled on all sides. It was no longer a battle, but a rout; and before the Russians sheathed their victorious swords, the Persians had lost five thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, several standards, and nearly their whole artillery. Abbas Mirza himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner, and owed his escape entirely to the fleetness of his horse.[2] The loss of the Russians was only forty-nine men; and Paskewitch soon after reaped the substantial

[2] Ann. Hist. x. 324, 327.

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fruits of victory by the acquisition of Abbasabad, which surrendered on 31st July.

23. Battle of the Abbarane.

The Persians, however, were not discouraged by this defeat, which was, in truth, rather a "battle of the spurs" than a regular action. They made a vigorous attack on General Sipiagine, who was conducting a considerable park of artillery to Krasowsky; and though he succeeded in effecting the junction, it was only after repeated assaults, and a very severe loss. They next laid siege to the monastery of Elschmiadzine, which was soon seriously endangered by the fire of their batteries. Upon this Krasowsky took the field to raise the siege; but so weakened was the Russian force by detachments, that it was only with four battalions of infantry, five hundred Cossacks, and twelve guns—in all scarce four thousand men. He was met by Abbas Mirza at the head of five thousand infantry and five thousand irregular horse, with twenty-eight guns. Notwithstanding this great disparity of force, the Russian general, moved by the danger of the beleaguered stronghold, resolved on an attack. The combat which ensued, though in the end favourable to the Russians, was extremely bloody, and evinced a degree of discipline and organisation in the Persian army much beyond what had been hitherto encountered. The Russians, without much difficulty, made themselves masters of the Persian position, which was the summit of a rocky ridge. But when they were there, they found the reverse side to consist of steep precipices, almost impracticable for artillery; and while hesitating what to do next, the Persians attacked them with the utmost impetuosity on all sides, while their artillery, which was admirably served, made fatal ravages in their ranks. At length the enemy were repulsed, but not before they had inflicted on the Russians a loss of twelve hundred men in killed, prisoners, and wounded, Krasowsky himself being among the latter. The Persians were weakened by nearly two thousand men.[1] It was remarkable, in this well-contested action,

Aug. 29.

[1] Krasowsky's Bulletin, Aug. 30, 1827; Ann. Hist. x. 326, 327.

that two Persian battalions charged two of the Russian guard, and came off victorious.

Informed of the narrow escape of this corps from destruction, Paskewitch hastened to the support of his lieutenant with all the forces which he could collect, and obliged Abbas Mirza to retire to the right bank of the Araxes; after which he undertook the siege of Sardar-abad, the reduction of which was necessary before undertaking the siege of Erivan. It yielded after a siege of only four days, and Paskewitch immediately sat down before Erivan. The garrison, which was three thousand strong, made a gallant defence, and repulsed several attacks; but such was the consternation of the inhabitants, that they could not be brought to take any efficient part in the defence; and on the 13th October, when a battalion of the imperial guard had already mounted the breach, they insisted on the governor imploring the clemency of the conqueror. The garrison, consisting of three disciplined battalions, the governor, and seven other khans, were made prisoners of war; the whole artillery of the fortress, with immense stores of ammunition and provisions, fell into the hands of the Russians; and the bulwark of Persia, regarded over all Asia as impregnable, fell into the hands, and permanently remained under the power of the Muscovites. Though the place had been in a manner taken by assault, no disorders of any kind were committed by the besiegers. The Russians were received rather as deliverers than enemies, and victors and vanquished met together in peace within its formidable ramparts. With great but not undeserved pride, Paskewitch addressed to his brave companions in arms a proclamation, which recalled the bulletins of Napoleon in his Italian campaigns: "Brave comrades! you have conquered in this campaign two provinces, taken eight standards, fifty guns, two sirdars, twenty khans, six thousand prisoners in arms, ten thousand who had cast them away, and great stores of provisions: such are your trophies!"[1]

24. Fall of Sardar-abad and Erivan. Oct. 13.

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 328, 330; Paske-witch's Despatch.

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25. Capture of Tauris. Oct. 25.

The remainder of the campaign was nothing but a series of easy successes, which cost the Russians more fatigue than blood. Prince Eristoff, whom Paskewitch had detached upon that service, occupied Ourdabad on 7th October, passed the Araxes on the 10th, the rugged defiles of Daradis on the 13th, and received the submission of all the tribes on the south of the Araxes. Such was the terror which the fall of Erivan inspired, that scarce any resistance was anywhere attempted; and before the end of October, Abbas Mirza found himself deserted by all his forces except five thousand horse and fifteen hundred foot, with which, and twelve light guns, he retired in haste towards Khoi. Eristoff having received intelligence that Abbas Mirza was preparing to destroy the important magazines in Tauris, the second city in the empire, and the residence of the heir-apparent to the throne, moved by forced marches upon that town. It formerly contained 250,000 inhabitants, now reduced by Mahommedan tyranny to 40,000; but it was still, next to the capital, the most important place in the kingdom. At the first news of the approach of the Russians, five thousand of the troops in the garrison left the town and disbanded. This disgraceful defection left the governor, Ali-Yar, only two battalions, with which it was impossible to defend a town of such extent. With this handful of men, however, he endeavoured to defend the ramparts; but he was deserted in presence of the enemy even by them, and compelled to seek safety in flight attended only by two followers. He was soon made prisoner; and the town, with its whole artillery, having been taken, Prince Eristoff next day, being the birthday of the Empress, celebrated

Oct. 26.

a solemn service of thanksgiving in the great square of the place. The English consul and all his suite were present on the occasion. Two days afterwards Paskewitch made his solemn entry into Tauris, where he was received with great solemnity by the whole dignitaries of the Armenian Church, accompanied by an immense con-

course of people, who rent the air with their acclamations, and strewed the road with flowers; and the Russian general immediately set about the organisation of the conquered provinces as part of Russia, and established a landwehr, as a lasting barrier against their Mahommedan enemies.[1]

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[1] Ann. Hist. x. 330, 332.

26. Peace with Persia. Nov. 9.

These repeated disasters convinced the Persians at length of the necessity of coming to terms. On 29th October the governor of the province of Tauris sent in offers of accommodation; and Paskewitch having stated the conditions on which he was empowered to treat, and accorded a delay of six days, within which they might be accepted, the Persian government sent in their unqualified submission on the 9th November. The Persians agreed to everything that the conquerors demanded, and the Russians were forthwith put in possession of the ceded territories, which were very considerable, including the fortress of Erivan, and the province in which it is situated. Prince Abbas Mirza did the most flattering homage to the Muscovites by repairing in person to their camp, and commissioners were appointed to arrange the terms of a definitive treaty.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. x. 335, 337.

27. Preparations of Russia for a war with Turkey.

Hardly was the war with Persia at an end when Russia engaged in another. In the beginning of September the Emperor Nicholas gave the most decisive proof of his warlike intentions by a ukase, which ordered the levy of two males in every five hundred over the whole extent of the empire. By another ukase, published on the same day, the Jews were, for the first time, subjected to the military conscription. The departure shortly before of the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Count Capo d'Istria, with great pomp, to take possession of the presidency of Greece, indicated not less clearly in what direction the views of the cabinet of St Petersburg were set; and the battle of Navarino, which occurred in the end of October, naturally led to violent recriminations on the part of the Porte, and brought the two empires into a state of scarcely

Sept. 7.

Oct. 20.

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disguised hostility with each other. It was soon apparent that war had been resolved on on both sides. Military preparations on a great scale were commenced in all the harbours both of the Baltic and the Black Sea, immense magazines were formed in Bessarabia and at the mouth of the Danube, and every preparation was made for the crossing of the Pruth and invasion of the Principalities by an army of eighty thousand men.[1]

[1] Valentini, 221, 222; Ann. Hist. x. 337, 338.

28. Fresh rupture with Persia, and conclusion of the peace at Tourkmantchai. Feb. 22, 1828.

But when all eyes were turned from the Araxes to the Bosphorus, and a new war was hourly anticipated with Turkey, advices were received at St Petersburg that hostilities had been suddenly resumed on the side of Persia. In effect, the court of Teheran, informed of the battle of Navarino, and foreseeing an approaching rupture between the Muscovites and Ottomans, deemed the opportunity too favourable to be lost, and resolved upon recommencing hostilities when the strength of Russia was mainly directed to the Danube. They refused accordingly to ratify the preliminaries agreed to, and insisted on the Russians retiring behind the Araxes before they paid any of the promised indemnity. But they did so too soon, before any Russian battalions had been withdrawn from the banks of the Araxes, and met, in consequence, nothing but disaster. In the middle of winter, and during a most rigorous season, Paskewitch resumed hostilities; General Pankratieff, in the middle of January, occupied Urumiyah; while Count Suchtelen moved upon Ardabil, where two sons of Abbas Mirza had taken refuge with two thousand men, who were obliged to capitulate. These disasters convinced the court of Teheran that Russia was still too strong for their forces, and they determined to yield to necessity. The treaty was signed at Tourkmantchai, on terms even more rigorous than the preliminaries. It stipulated the payment of 20,000,000 silver rubles (£3,200,000) towards the expenses of the war, and the cession of the provinces of Erivan and Nakhitchevan, with the fortress of the first name, and a

Jan. 27.

Feb. 5.

Feb. 22.

military frontier which commanded the entire north of Persia. That power lost by this treaty, which was justly regarded as a glorious triumph at St Petersburg, the only defensible frontier towards Russia, and all means of resisting its encroachments; for which it obtained a poor compensation in the guarantee of the succession of Abbas Mirza to the throne.[1]

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[1] Treaty, Feb. 22, 1828; Ann. Hist. xi. 72, 75; Docum. Hist. 365.

29. Mutual recriminations of the Russians and Turks.

This outbreak in Asia hardly suspended for a moment the approaching hostilities in Europe. As usual in such cases, the hostile powers published manifestoes, in which they mutually accused each other of having given occasion for the rupture of pacific relations. There was too much truth in both sets of complaint. The Porte accused the Russians of having secretly fomented the insurrection of Greece, and openly attacked and destroyed their fleet at Navarino, with having violated the treaties of Bucharest and Ackerman, and established connections with the malcontents in every part of the empire. The Russians replied by accusing the Porte of having excited the mountaineers of Caucasus to revolt, and invited them to embrace Islamism; with having violated or delayed the execution of all the treaties in favour of its Christian subjects, and arbitrarily closed the Bosphorus on various occasions, and deeply injured thereby the southern provinces of the empire. It must be confessed that the balance of injuries inflicted was here decidedly in favour of Russia, as might have been anticipated in a contest between the superior and the weaker power; but, what was really extraordinary, and perhaps unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy, the Turks had the candour to admit, in a published declaration, that they had signed the treaty of Ackerman without any intention of performing its conditions, and merely to gain time,—a thing often done, but rarely confessed.[2] *

[2] Ann. Hist. xi. 367, 368; Turkish Declaration of War, Dec. 20, 1827; Russian Declaration, April 26, 1828; Ann. Hist. xi. 76.

* "Les demandes faites par les Russes, l'an passé à Ackerman, au sujet des indemnités, et surtout à l'égard des Serviens, *ne furent aucunement susceptibles d'être admises;* néanmoins, les circonstances étant pressantes, on y

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30. Forces of the Russians.

Although hostilities had thus been determined on on both sides, yet it was not till the beginning of April that they actually commenced. The vast extent of the Russian empire renders it a matter of absolute necessity to have several months, generally half a year, to complete their preparations and bring up their forces. When most of the troops have a thousand or fifteen hundred miles to march before they reach the theatre of war, it may readily be conceived how long a time must elapse before any considerable concentration can take place. Every preparation, however, was made during the spring months to augment the military forces of the empire, and communicate a warlike spirit to the inhabitants. The army stationed in Poland was in great part moved to the Pruth, and the troops there augmented by a fresh levy of twenty-five thousand men, calculated, with the forty thousand already in arms in that kingdom, to form an imposing reserve. General DIEBITCH was appointed adjutant-general of the army on the Danube, which by the beginning of April mustered on paper 108,000 men, though its effective force probably never exceeded 100,000, and it certainly never produced 80,000 men in the field. This force was augmented by the guards and 2d corps, which arrived in the end of August, in all, to 158,800. A grand review of the guards in presence of the Emperor, the Prince-royal of Prussia, and the Prince of Orange, took place in St Petersburg in the beginning of April, at which the most unbounded enthusiasm was evinced. They defiled, with the Grand-duke Constantine at their head, amidst the cheers of an innumerable crowd of spectators, and took their departure for their distant destination to defend "the holy cause in which they were engaged," amidst the tears and enthusiasm of the entire inhabitants.[1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 367, 368; Valentini, 223.

acquiesça bon gré mal gré, et par nécessité, afin de saisir l'occasion de conclure un traité pour le salut de la nation Mahométane."—*Circulaire aux Ayams de l'Europe et d'Asie*, 20 Decembre, 1827. *Ann. Hist.* x. 120; *Documens Historiques.*

* Wittgenstein's army consisted of three corps d'armée and a reserve, in all eight divisions of infantry and five of cavalry, which should have presented

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31. Passage of the Pruth, and commencement of the campaign.

The bad weather retarded the commencement of military operations till the beginning of May; but on the 7th of that month, the sun having broke forth, and the ground beginning to be covered with the first verdure of spring, the armed multitude began to cross the Pruth. The spectacle was grand and imposing in the extreme. As far as the eye could reach, the left bank was crowded with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which, at a signal given after singing *Te Deum*, began to defile in admirable order to the bridges which had been previously thrown across at Skouleni, Faltchy, and Ipatska, amidst cheers which resounded over the vast expanse. The Turks, who were in no force to resist such a crusade, and had resolved on making their first stand on the Danube, had merely a few videttes of cavalry on the spot, which retired as the Russians advanced, and left the entire principalities to the invaders. In a few weeks the level country was overrun, Jassy and Bucharest occupied; Galatz, with its valuable harbour, taken; their advanced guards observed Brahilov and Widdin, and the entire left bank of the Danube was occupied by the Muscovite troops.[1]

[1] Valentini, 223, 224; Ann. Hist. xi. 372, 373.

32. Preparations of the Turks.

The Divan on their part made the most vigorous efforts to maintain their independence. Though taken at a manifest disadvantage, from the old military force of the empire having been destroyed, and the new one not yet

100,000 men and 80,000 effective under arms. Their numbers on paper stood thus:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Guns.
3d Corps, General Roudzewitch, .	38,400	8,300	3,800	228
6th Corps, General Roth, . . .	19,200	4,900	1,600	96
Joined after campaign began, . .	...	2,400	400	16
7th Corps, General Vornoff, . .	19,200	5,300	4,800	144
Arrived in end of August.				
Imperial Guard, ...	16,200	3,150	1,600	96
2d Corps, General Tcherbutoff, .	28,800	2,400	1,650	88
	121,800	26,450	13,850	668
Making a total of 158,800.				

—*Table in Annuaire Historique*, xi. 371.

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organised, they succeeded, by rousing the religious zeal of the Mussulmans, in putting themselves, in a short time, in a surprisingly respectable posture of defence. The ships which had escaped the disaster of Navarino were equipped anew, and got ready for sea; the forts on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus armed and garrisoned with trusty troops; war proclaimed against the Russians with the utmost solemnity in the mosques, and all Mussulmans called on to take up arms in defence of their holy religion and national independence; a manifesto published against the Czar, embodying with great ability all their grounds of complaint against the cabinet of St Petersburg; and at length the sacred relic, the Sandjak-sheriff, was solemnly brought forth, and the well-known symbol of war to the death—the horse-tails, which recalled the pristine conquests of the Osmanlis—were displayed on the gates of the Seraglio.[1]

June 4.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 374, 375.

33. Forces they had collected in Europe and Asia.

By these means, acting upon the naturally intrepid and warlike spirit of the Ottomans, a very considerable force was in a short time got together, though but a small part was sufficiently disciplined to be able in the open field to contend with the formidable legions of the Muscovites. In the beginning of May, when the campaign commenced, the Turks had got together in Europe fifty thousand regular infantry (*Massouris*), several squadrons of regular cavalry, fifteen thousand spahis or feudal horsemen, of the most admirable description, and twenty thousand gunners, who already had been brought to a surprising degree of efficiency and skill. The fortresses on the Danube had all been armed and provisioned, and for the most part provided with adequate garrisons; and a reserve force was already beginning to be formed at Adrianople, from whence to strengthen any part of the front line which might be menaced. Schumla had been greatly strengthened with outworks, and already contained a garrison of thirty thousand men, in a position equally difficult to force and incapable of being left be-

hind; and in addition to this, the irregular hordes of the Albanians, the Bosniacks, the Roumelians, and the Bulgarians, had been called out; and as every Turk is trained to arms, and an accomplished horseman, they formed, though not regularly disciplined, a very formidable force, especially for the defence of walled cities. It was calculated that, with the aid of these rude but brave and effective auxiliaries, the Turkish force in Schumla might, if the barrier of the Danube was forced, be raised to a hundred thousand men. In Asia Minor, where the Mussulman population constituted three-fourths of the entire inhabitants, and the religious spirit was at its height, the preparations, so far as numbers were concerned, were still more formidable; and it was calculated that the commander-in-chief, the Pacha of Erzeroum, could collect a hundred thousand men round his banners—a force triple any which Paskewitch could bring against him. But they were the old feudal militia of the country, with a very slender intermixture of regular troops; and though most formidable in the defence of fortresses, or in detached cavalry actions, could not be trusted to move under fire in the open field, and were liable to disperse on any serious reverse.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 374, 375; Fonton, Guerre de l'Asie Mineur, 174, 177.

34. Russian plan of the campaign, and its dangers.

By the Russian plan of the campaign, General Roth's corps was to occupy the two principalities, and extend itself to the upper Danube; while the seventh corps, under the orders of the Grand-duke Michael, was to undertake the siege of Brahilov, and having reduced it, to push on to Schumla; and Roudzewitch, with the third corps, should pass the Danube at Isaktchi, and move along the Black Sea to Varna, lending a hand at the same time to the seventh corps, which had advanced to Schumla. But this plan of operations, which was analogous to all those which the Russians had adopted in former wars, was open to very serious difficulties, owing to the peculiar conformation of the country, and the nature of the positions which the Turks occupied in it. Whoever will cast

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his eyes on the map will perceive that the Muscovite army extended in this manner from the shores of the Euxine to the frontiers of Austria, and, having its communications extending from the Pruth to Widdin, over a distance of above five hundred miles, exposed its long flank, in a most hazardous manner, to the Ottoman forces, comparatively concentrated, and resting on the fortified towns, which gave them the command of both banks of the Danube. As long as the latter were in possession of the triangle of which Silistria and Roudschuck formed the base, and Schumla the apex, the Muscovites not only could not, without extreme hazard, venture to push across the Balkan, either by the shores of the Black Sea or the great road by Sophia to Belgrade, but they were exposed to great risk from the power which the enemy possessed of making an inroad from their fortified posts on the Danube *into the very middle of their long line of communications.* It was impossible that every point of this line could be equally guarded; and if broken through at any one point by twenty or thirty thousand men, the whole supplies of the army would be interrupted, and its most advanced corps exposed to total ruin. This is the secret of the paralysis communicated to the whole Russian army, eighty thousand strong, by the defeat of inconsiderable bodies of men at Oltenitza and Kalafat in the campaign of 1853. These defeats endangered their whole line of communication, and arrested the march of entire corps, some hundred miles in advance, from the risk of being separated from their supplies and reserves.

35. Which was mainly based on the command of the sea.

To avoid this danger, of which the experience of former wars had made them well aware, the Russian generals, in the present campaign, resolved to push at once from Brahilov and Silistria on Varna and Schumla, by which means their columns, instead of being échelonnés *across* the Turkish forces in a long line, would come up in front, one behind another, in a comparatively short one, so as to be able to give mutual support in case of danger. This plan

was of course based on the command of the sea—a matter of great importance in all wars in maritime districts, but which, in every age, has been of vital consequence, and generally decisive, in those of Turkey and Greece. The reason is, that the countries around the Euxine and Ægean seas are so desolate and unhealthy in the plains, and so rugged and inhospitable in the mountains, that the passage of troops by land is attended with great loss of life, and the bringing up of supplies a matter of extreme difficulty, often impossibility; while, on the other hand, the ocean, penetrating every part, forms an interior line of communication, readily traversed in every direction, and affording to whoever had the command of it the means of transporting troops and the muniments of war in a few days to the most distant parts of the empire. The battle of Navarino, however, had given the Russians this immense advantage, and their dispositions soon showed that they were aware of its importance, and resolved to make the most of it in the operations which followed.* Yet was the country to which the war was in a manner confined, between the direct road from Roudschuck to Schumla and the sea, one presenting great difficulties to an invading army. The mouldering rampart of Trajan still ran, like the wall of Antoninus, in Scotland, across the narrow neck of land which led from Rassova on the Danube to Kustendji on the Euxine; and when it was passed, the country between the river and the Balkan presented very great difficulties to an invading army.[1] Intersected, as that to the north of the Po is by the Adige, the Piave, and the

[1] Valentini, 222, 223; Jomini, l'Art de la Guerre, i. 165.

* "Il est un cas dans lequel il est peut-être convenable de dévier de ce que nous venons de dire, et de porter ses opérations du côté de la mer: c'est lorsqu'on a affaire à un adversaire peu redoutable en campagne, et qu'étant maître décidé de cette mer, on pourrait s'approvisionner aisément de ce côté, tandis qu'il serait difficile de le faire dans l'intérieur des terres. Quoiqu'il soit fort rare de voir ces trois conditions réunies, ce fut néanmoins ce qui arriva dans la guerre de Turquie en 1828 et 1829. Toute l'attention fut fixée sur Varna et Bourgas, en se bornant à observer Schumla—système qu'on n'eût pas pu suivre en face d'une armée Européenne, lors même qu'on eût tenu la mer sans s'exposer à une ruine probable."—JOMINI, *L'Art de la Guerre*, i. 165.

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Tagliamento, by a series of streams with impetuous torrents and rocky banks, which descend from the mountains of Hæmus to the Danube, it presents a succession of defensible positions of which a retiring army can avail itself, and of which the Ottomans made good use in the two campaigns which followed.

36. Passage of the Danube by the Russians. June 8.

The Emperor of Russia set out from St Petersburg for the seat of war on the 7th May, and arrived on the 20th before Brahilov, situated on the left bank of the Danube, the approaches to which were conducted by the Grand-duke Michael in person. But the formidable nature of the place, and the difficulties in getting up the siege equipage, owing to great floods in the Danube, having rendered it apparent that little progress could be made in the siege for some time, he resolved to push forward in person the operations for the passage of the Danube. But there a fresh difficulty presented itself. The place where the passage was to be attempted at the end of the rampart of Trajan, near the mouth of the river, was low and swampy, and a dike required to be driven a considerable distance through the inundation before the stream could be approached. The Emperor had been led to believe, from the information transmitted to St Petersburg, that the piles for the bridge and its approaches were already fixed. On arriving at the spot he found that the wood for them was not yet cut down in the forests of Bessarabia.[1] Finding that nothing could be done there for some time, he withdrew to Bender, where he spent two weeks with the Empress; and the preparations having at length been brought into a state of forwardness, he returned to the banks of the Danube on the 8th June. The third corps was to force the passage, which was opposed by eight thousand Turks, with a powerful artillery, resting on the fort of Isaktchi. The Emperor established a battery of twenty-four twelve-pounders on the bank, which vigorously replied to the Turkish guns; and under cover of this fire eight battalions were em-

[1] Schnitzler, ii. 184, 185. Ante, c. viii. § 50.

June 8.

barked, and hurried across. The boats grounded far from the opposite bank, and the men, leaping out, found themselves up to the knees in water, through which they had to wade under a fire of grape for a considerable distance, and then through deep swamps, before they reached firm ground. Protected by the fire of the gun-boats, however, which kept up a vigorous cannonade, the brave Muscovites pushed forward, and the Turks, abandoning their guns, fled in disorder. Isaktchi was immediately surrendered, a *tête-du-pont* constructed, and the bridge having been laid across, the passage commenced and was continued during the following day without further interruption.* Count Nesselrode published from Isaktchi an address to the inhabitants of the principalities, in which, disclaiming all projects of territorial aggrandisement, he declared that the wishes of his imperial master were limited to securing to them their legal rights and privileges under the *protection* of Russia.[1]

[1] Valentini, 224, 225; Ann. Hist. xi. 377, 378.

37. First operations. Fall of Kustendji. June 20.

Rudiger was intrusted with the command of the Russian advanced guard, which moved upon the rampart of Trajan. They encountered only small bodies of the enemy, which skirmished while retiring, till they came to the fortress of Kustendji, at the extremity of the old rampart next the sea. It held out, however; but the approaches having been rapidly made, on the 20th the garrison, having exhausted all its means of defence, capitulated on condition of the men being conducted to Pravadi.[2] The Russians found on the ramparts thirty-six pieces of artillery; and, what was of much more importance, they became masters of a fortified

June 20.

[2] Ann. Hist. xi. 381, 382; Valentini, 242.

* "Le dessein de sa Majesté n'est pas, et n'a pas jamais été, d'agrandir ses états aux dépens des provinces qui l'avoisinent. Vos doctrines sont donc *à l'abri de tout projet de conquête:* mais l'ordre légal dont vous êtes appelés à jouir; mais les bienfaits d'une administration régulière et stable; mais l'inviolabilité des privilèges que vous possédez, l'exercice paisible des droits qui en découlent, le bonheur, enfin, de votre terre natale, sous l'égide des lois qui doivent la gouverner,—tels sont et seront toujours les objets des vœux que l'Empereur formera pour vous; tels seront aussi, il se plait à le croire, *les résultats de la Protection* qu'il ne cessera d'exercer sur les deux Principautés, et de l'administration provisoire qu'il vient d'y établir."—*Réponse de M. le Comte Nesselrode à l'Adresse du Divan de Walachie,* 12 June, 1828. *Annuaire Historique,* xi. 378, 379.

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harbour on the Euxine, where supplies could be landed with facility from the sea. The importance of this acquisition appeared the very next day in the arrival of twenty-six ships laden with provisions and stores from Odessa.

38. Siege of Brahilov: its description.

Meanwhile the siege of Brahilov continued to be prosecuted with vigour; but there the Russians encountered a most sturdy resistance, and were taught that, in the defence of fortified towns at least, their antagonists had not degenerated from the valour of their ancestors. This fortress, the most important and strongest place on the Lower Danube, is situated close to that river, on a plateau elevated seventy or eighty feet above its level. The Danube, a little way above the town, divides into two branches; and the smaller, which flows past its walls, is only four hundred yards broad. The other and larger branch passes the little fort of Matchin, rather more than a league distant. The place itself had no outworks, and none of the outer salient angles which in Vauban's system expose each face to a raking fire from the adjoining one. It has a rampart, however, thirty feet high, and nine bastions, with a deep wet ditch in front: the covered-way is narrow, but it terminates in a glacis, which forbade any access to the place except by regular approaches. The citadel is situated on an eminence on the right bank, and commands the whole interior of the place. It is surrounded by a strong bastioned wall, but has no casemates or protection against bombs other than the rude excavations behind the rampart, in which the Turks are in use to deposit their ammunition and combustible materials. The interior of the town bore no likeness to a modern city; it resembled rather the description which Montesquieu has given of ancient Rome. It had no regular streets, but passages cut for the entrance of cattle, booty, and provisions, through a confused mass of wooden houses or mud cottages.[1] But in these hovels dwelt thirty thousand inhabitants, of whom ten thousand were capable of bearing arms; and these, joined to a

[1] Valentini, 233, 234; Ann. Hist. xi. 379, 380.

garrison of nearly equal strength, constituted a most formidable body of defenders, whose resolution the Russians were too fatally taught in the siege which followed.

39. Commencement of the siege.

The first Russian troops appeared before this formidable fortress on the 11th May, when they made themselves masters, with scarce any resistance, of the suburbs. Operations in form, however, did not begin till the 17th, when the first parallel was begun. The trenches were armed with 24-pounders on the 25th, and a heavy fire commenced on the place. The Mussulmans, according to their usual custom, gave themselves very little trouble to disturb the advances of the besiegers, which were generally conducted in the night; they amused themselves with firing at single figures at a distance, as if to evince their skill in ball-practice. Their whole serious care was devoted to preparing a warm reception for the enemy, when he should venture to mount the breach. Their isolated shots were so well directed, that they struck down daily fifteen or twenty men in the besiegers' lines. Several sorties at daybreak were also attempted, but with little success, though the vehemence of the besieged was evinced by their issuing forth with a pistol in each hand, and a poniard in their teeth. Meanwhile the besiegers continued their advances with great vigour, and several mines having been run under the walls, three great globes of compression were fired at nine in the morning of the 15th June, while the assaulting column stood ready to rush forward when the last had exploded.[1]

[1] Valentini, 235, 237; Ann. Hist. xi. 380, 381.

40. Bloody repulse of the assault.

A breach of forty paces wide was formed by the third explosion, and the Russian column, before the smoke had cleared away, and when the fragments were still falling, rushed forward to the assault, the generals and chief officers at their head. Some of the column, however, missed their way, and got into the ditch at a distance from the rampart, where they were exposed to a plunging fire from its summit, which occasioned a very severe loss. A few hundreds succeeded in reaching the summit of the

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breach, but they were immediately mowed down by the deadly fire which issued from the Turkish musketeers, retrenched behind the breach and posted on the tops of the houses. Several bold men on the right and left of the breach succeeded in making their way in by escalade, and mounted on each others' shoulders, by the embrasures of the guns; but they too were instantly bayoneted on the top, or struck down by the murderous fire which assailed them on all sides. In vain the Grand-duke Michael, who directed the assault, and the officers who headed it, exerted themselves to the utmost to encourage the troops, and repeatedly led them back to the attack. All their efforts were vain, all their assaults repulsed; and at length, gnashing their teeth with vexation, the Russians withdrew on all sides, having, by their own admission, three thousand killed and wounded around the breach. Soliman, the governor of the town, had made good his words when summoned to surrender: "Should the rampart be destroyed, we will make a second living one with our bodies." 1*

1 Valentini, 238, 239; Ann. Hist. xi. 380, 382.

41. Fall of the place. June 18.

Nothing discouraged by this bloody repulse, the Russians on the following day sprung a fresh mine, which opened a still wider breach than the preceding; and the troops having been disposed for an assault, the brave governor, who did not feel himself in sufficient strength to resist a second attack, proposed to capitulate, provided he was not relieved in ten days. The Grand-duke, however, would grant only a respite of twenty-four hours; at the end of which time, as no relief approached, the governor capitulated. He obtained the most honourable terms, the troops marching out with the honours of war, and being conducted to Silistria with their arms and field-pieces. The Russians found two hundred and seventy

* Such was the spirit of the besieged, that a boy of twelve years of age, who was made prisoner on the breach, when his younger brother, a boy of ten, had just been killed, having been brought before the Grand-duke Michael, and asked whether he did not lament his brother, he replied, "Why should I weep for him?—did he not die upon the breach?"—VALENTINI, 239.

guns on the ramparts, and seventeen thousand pounds of powder, besides immense stores of wood and provisions in the magazine, which entirely subsisted the army for a month. There can be no doubt that the place made a noble defence, and that the governor was deserving of every commendation for his conduct in directing it; nevertheless, by the Mussulman customs, which do not distinguish between misconduct and misfortune, he incurred the penalty of death by consenting to a surrender. "Soliman," said the Grand Vizier, "has done well; but he should not have survived the fall of Brahilov." In effect, the bowstring was sent him; and it was with the utmost difficulty, and at the earnest solicitation of the Russian general, that he was saved from death as the reward of his devotion.[1]

[1] Valentini, 240, 241; Ann. Hist. xi. 381.

42. Further successes of the Russians, and Turkish system of defence.

The Russian besieging force, after the fall of Brahilov, was divided into several columns, and soon overran the whole level country between the Danube and the sea, as far as the rampart of Trajan. The fortresses of the district, Hirchova, Toultcha, Matchin, and Kustendji, capitulated at the first summons; the rapidity with which they lowered their colours begat the suspicion that the old janizary party was still predominant in them, and that they took this method of revenging themselves on their oppressors. Meanwhile the Seraskier, Hussein Pacha, having collected twenty-two thousand men in Schumla, and an advanced guard of eight thousand horse, under the orders of the celebrated Karadjeinem (Black Devil), advanced towards the Russian army on the road to Bazardjik. Jussuf Pacha, a great feudatory in Macedonia, was thrown into Varna with ten thousand men, and the garrison of Silistria augmented to nine thousand. A reserve began to be collected at Adrianople, to succour any point in the line which might be menaced; while the Sultan himself, with the standard of the Prophet unfurled, was making the utmost efforts to organise and forward reinforcements from the capital.[2] The system of defence adopted, and the orders issued to the

[2] Valentini, 243, 245; Ann. Hist. xi. 383, 384.

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generals, were to take advantage of every defensible position, and harass the enemy in all possible ways, but avoid general actions, and in the fortified towns to defend themselves to the last extremity.

43. Capture of Anapa by the Russians.

The Euxine is the interior line of communication to the Turkish empire; the party who has the command of it enjoys the inappreciable advantage of being able to direct his forces at pleasure in a few days to any place on its margin, while the enemy, toiling round its rugged or inhospitable shores, with scarce any roads practicable for carriages, is unable to render any timely support. Throughout the whole of this war, the Russians took the utmost advantage of the naval superiority which the battle of Navarino had secured to them; indeed, it was the main cause of their success. This is more especially the case on the side of Asia, for there is no road practicable for carriages along the shore of the Black Sea, by Anapa, from north to south; so that the troops proceeding from Russia to Asia Minor must have made the immense round by the pass of Vladi-Kavkas, or the Gates of Derbend, on the shores of the Caspian, before they could have reached their destination. On the 15th May an expedition, consisting of eight ships of the line and six frigates, having on board seven thousand land troops, sailed from Sevastopol, and made for Anapa, a fortress on the opposite shore of Asia Minor, at the foot of the Caucasus, valuable both on account of its strength, and as containing a safe harbour of great value on that dangerous coast. The garrison consisted of three thousand men; but the Russians, having made themselves masters of the peninsula on which the place is situated, pushed their approaches with such vigour—the land forces being under the orders of Prince Menschikoff, the sea of Admiral Greig, a Scotchman in the Russian service—that on the 10th June three practicable breaches were made in the walls, and on the 11th the place capitulated.[1] The besiegers found eighty-five guns on the ramparts, abundant stores of ammunition and provisions in the magazine,

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 382.

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and became masters of a fortified harbour of great value on the north-eastern coast of Asia Minor.

44. Combat of Bazardjik. July 8.

The first engagement in the open field which took place in the campaign was in the neighbourhood of Bazardjik, on the 8th July. The Turks had evacuated it in the course of their retreat, and their rear-guard, consisting of six thousand horse, was imprudently attacked by General Read with an inferior Russian body of cavalry. After a furious conflict the Muscovites were routed. Some squadrons of the hussars of Alexander, sent up to support them, shared the same fate; a gun was taken; and it was only by the opportune arrival of a brigade of foot that the Ottoman horse was at length arrested. The Russians in this affair lost twelve hundred men, and at one period six guns had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The superiority of the Turkish horse was rendered manifest by its result, and the sense of this never left either party during the remainder of the campaign. It was observed on this occasion, that though the Turkish horse were still equipped in the old fashion, and assailed their opponents by a swarm charge, yet they resumed their ranks more rapidly than formerly, and obviously obeyed the will of a single chief, instead of every one following, as heretofore, the dictates of his own impetuous courage. Such was the spirit of the men, that one of the Ottoman horsemen threw himself on a cannon which had been taken, as if to secure his prey, and was bayoneted while still sitting astride on it.[1]

1 Turkish Bulletins; Ann. Hist. 98; Pièces Hist. lxi. 385; Valentini, 245, 246.

45. Farther cavalry actions. July 15.

After this check Nicholas paused a week at Bazardjik, to give time for his reinforcements to come up. At length, deeming himself in sufficient strength to face the Turkish horsemen in the field, the march was resumed, on the 15th July, with fifty-five thousand men and a hundred and eight guns. Another cavalry action took place between the Russian advanced guard, under General Rudiger, and a body of eight thousand Ottoman horse, with five guns, on the road between Bazardjik and Jenibazar.

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The Russians were here more rudely handled than on the former occasion; their advanced guard was surrounded, and in part broken, by the Turkish horse; and it was only by the advance of Rudiger himself, with two brigades of infantry and a battery of horse-artillery, that the enveloped squadrons were at length extricated, after having lost six hundred men. In this, as in the other cavalry actions at the commencement of the campaign, the Russian horse were greatly inferior in number; but it was evident, from their result, that they had conceived an undue contempt for their adversaries, and that the spahis were as formidable still on their admirable steeds as they had been in the days of Soliman the Magnificent, or Bajazet the Invincible. Nothing could exceed the vehemence of their charge, or the impetuosity with which they threw themselves on the guns or bayonets of their adversaries; and their courage was now restrained by discipline, and directed by prudence; for they withdrew, when ordered, as readily as they had advanced, and thus escaped the disasters which, in former wars, had so often succeeded their greatest successes. It was the spahis of Bulgaria, each mounted on his own horse, superbly armed, and holding their lands by military tenure, which constituted this most formidable feudal militia.[1]

[1] Valentini, 247, 248; Russian Bulletins, 98; Ann. Hist. xi.; Pièces Hist.

46. General cavalry action before Schumla. July 20.

Their strength was soon put to the test on the greatest scale. On the 20th July, the reserves having come up, and the troops being concentrated, a general movement took place towards Schumla, with the cavalry in advance. The right was commanded by Rudiger, at the head of the third corps, the left by General Woinoff, with the assistance of Diebitch, in whose suite the Emperor placed himself. They had need of all their strength; for the Ottomans had ten thousand magnificent horsemen and sixty guns in the field, and watched only for an imprudent advance of some isolated corps to fall upon it, and trample it under their horses' hoofs. Several cavalry charges, with various success, took place; in the course of

which the Turks evinced their improved military skill, by the manner in which they supported their cavalry by masses of infantry, and the masked batteries which they opened, on a repulse of their own men, on the pursuing squadrons of the enemy. The Ottoman horse maintained their wonted superiority over the Muscovite; but the invading army was too strong in infantry and artillery for their opponents; and, after several brilliant charges, seeing the Russians established in great force with a hundred guns in front of their position, the Turks withdrew in the best order within their intrenched camp around Schumla, where forty thousand men were now assembled.[1]

[1] Valentini, 250, 251; Russian Bulletins; Ann. Hist. xi. 98; Docum. Hist. 386.

47. Blockade of Schumla, and plans of the Russians.

The Emperor had at first intended to hazard an attack upon this important stronghold, the key to the Balkan, and the crossing point of all the roads in that quarter which traverse that mountain barrier. But these ideas vanished at the sight of the strength of the position, and the experience they had had of the tenacity with which the Turks maintained their ground on every occasion. It was resolved, therefore, to observe Schumla only with a corps of thirty thousand men, and to direct the remainder of the army against VARNA, which presented fewer obstacles, and in the attack of which the command of the sea and the co-operation of the fleet promised several advantages. The army before Schumla was divided into two parts; the fifth corps received orders to occupy the redoubts erected to the north of the town, while the seventh was to extend itself by Eski-Stamboul, in its rear, so as to interrupt the communication and complete the blockade. Count Suchtelen, with four thousand men, had taken a position before Varna, and sustained, with great intrepidity, the attacks of the garrison, which was superior in number. Silistria was blockaded by General Roth with ten thousand men, who had been employed in the siege of Brahilov; but they were not in sufficient strength to undertake till August the siege of so im-

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portant a fortress; and General Geismar, on the extreme right, with a little corps of five thousand men, protected Little Wallachia against the incursions of the Pacha of Widdin, with the garrison of that place, and Kalafat, its *tête-du-pont* on the left bank of the Danube. It was evident that this line of operations was too extensive for the force which the Russians as yet had in the field; the more especially as the powerful garrison of Schumla, instead of remaining within their lines, made daily sorties, which, though attended with various success, were accompanied also with great loss of life, and for the most part turned to the advantage of the Turks.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 388, 389; Valentini, 255, 257.

48. Journey of the Emperor to Odessa, and measures adopted there.

The Emperor, perceiving that he was not in sufficient strength to undertake the siege of Schumla, or anything decisive, with the main army, till the guards and reserves, who had left St Petersburg in the beginning of May, came up, and deeming it derogatory to the majesty of the Czar to remain with the army in a state of inactivity, set out on the 2d August with a strong escort, consisting of twelve pieces of cannon and a large body of infantry and cavalry, for Varna. He arrived before that town on the 5th, and, after inspecting the approaches, which hitherto had made very little progress, he embarked, in the evening of the same day, on board the Flora frigate, part of Admiral Greig's squadron, which lay in the bay, for Odessa. He arrived on the 8th, and joined the Empress at a country palace at a little distance from the town. He there carried through two measures eminently indicative of the charges of the war, and the vast loss of life with which it had already been attended. The first was a loan of 18,000,000 of florins (£1,800,000), contracted with the house of the Hopes at Amsterdam; the other a general levy of four men in five hundred for the service of the army, promulgated by a ukase on 21st August.[2] At the same time, a decree was issued, prohibiting the exportation of all sorts of grain from the harbours of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof—a measure

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[2] Ann. Hist. xi. 390, 391.

destructive of the agricultural industry of the south of Russia, but adopted in the hope that it might starve the Sultan into submission.

49. Position of the Russians.

Great as had been the progress and incontestible the advantages gained by the Russians since the commencement of the campaign, matters had now become more gloomy, and it was evident that the issue of the campaign, unless large reinforcements came up, was very doubtful. The plague had broken out in the rear of the army, and made great ravages; the usual pestilential fevers of autumn had made their appearance in the principalities, and on the banks of the Danube; the hospitals were filled with sick; and without having as yet engaged in any pitched battle, the invading army was weakened by nearly half its numbers. Add to this, the roads, at all times bad, had been rendered all but impassable by the continued passage of carriages over them; provisions had become scarce, notwithstanding all the advantages enjoyed from the command of the sea; and the inhabitants of the principalities, overwhelmed by contributions, and the passage of one large body of men after another, did their utmost to conceal what they had, or fled into the woods and mountains to avoid the exactions of their oppressors.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 396, 397.

50. Defensive measures of the Turks.

On the other hand, the condition of the Turks was hardly less critical, for they were pierced to the heart of their empire, blockaded in their stronghold, the last and greatest bulwark of the realm; they had lost the important fortress of Brahilov, commanding a passage of the Danube; a third of their territory in Europe was in the hands of the enemy; and Constantinople itself was blockaded by sea, and shut out from the supplies from the Euxine, on which it had hitherto depended for the subsistence of its inhabitants. In these circumstances, the firmness of the Sultan and his council was worthy of the very highest admiration. In a grand council held at Constantinople on the 2d of August, it was resolved that the Grand Vizier, Mahomet Selim Pacha, should forthwith join the army;

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on the 5th, the horse-tails were again displayed in the court of the Seraglio, in presence of the Sultan, his ministers, and an immense crowd of spectators; public prayers were offered up for the prosperity of the empire and the preservation of the true faith; and a fresh proclamation was issued, calling upon all Mussulmans to take up arms, and combat in defence of their country and holy religion. These energetic measures were attended with a great effect. Recruits came rapidly in from all quarters, the armaments went on with redoubled activity, and Constantinople resembled an immense camp, where military exercises and preparations were incessantly going forward. On the 9th the Grand Vizier set out for Adrianople, attended by a splendid retinue, and in great pomp; but that gave rise to an occurrence which demonstrated how deep-felt had been the wounds recently inflicted on the old patriotic party, and on how precarious a footing the public tranquillity rested. When the procession set out, the well-known ensigns of the ortas of the janizaries were not to be seen; the public discontent soon became visible, and a tumult arose, which was not suppressed without measures of great severity, and the execution of a number of the persons suspected of favouring that hated body.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 397, 398.

51. Operations before Schumla.

Aug. 15.

Meanwhile the operations before Schumla continued with various success, but on the whole to the advantage of the Ottomans. On the 15th August, Rudiger received orders from Wittgenstein to move on Kioitei, a village near Eski-Stamboul behind that fortress, and on the road to Constantinople, in order to dislodge a body of three thousand Turks who were stationed there, and kept up the communications with the interior. He was at first successful, and drove the enemy back, but, attacked in his turn by superior forces, he was routed with the loss of four hundred men, and a gun taken. This check revealed the superiority of the enemy in detached actions, the ascendant which their horse had acquired, and the

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extreme danger to which the army was exposed in consequence. Provisions were becoming scarce, and forage in particular, in consequence of the first growth of summer having been consumed or past away, was everywhere awanting. The Turkish horses, accustomed to be fed entirely on barley or bread, did not suffer in consequence; but the Russian, accustomed to the green pastures of the Ukraine and the Don, were daily becoming weaker, and died in great numbers from pure inanition. This rendered a more extensive circuit for foraging indispensable; and that in its turn induced fresh dangers, by exposing the advanced parties to attack, not only from the indefatigable light troops of the enemy, but the armed peasants, who had everywhere taken up arms to defend their hearths from spoliation. In a word, the situation of the Russians before Schumla in 1828 closely resembled that of the French around Moscow in 1812; great numbers of foraging parties were every day cut off, the horses of the army were rapidly melting away; and the Russians were experiencing the danger so often encountered by a victorious invader in Eastern warfare, that of being starved in the midst of their conquests by the superiority of the enemy in light horse.[1]

[1] Valentini, 264, 265; Ann. Hist. xi. 399.

52. Surprise of a Russian redoubt. Aug. 26.

These dangers were brought to light in the clearest manner by an event which took place on the 26th August, and what was really extraordinary, by a phenomenon wholly unknown in Ottoman warfare—a nocturnal surprise. At one in the morning a large column of Turkish infantry silently defiled out of Schumla, and attacked the last redoubt on the Russian right. The surprise was complete; the redoubt was carried, six guns taken, and General Wrede, with five hundred men, put to the sword. The Russians experienced an equal loss in their efforts to regain the redoubt, which was obstinately defended, and in the endeavour to rescue the guns, which the Turks succeeded in carrying off. This attack was not a mere detached operation, but was intended to divert the attention

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of the Russians from the principal design, which was nothing less than to crush by a concentric attack the troops of Prince Eugene at Morai, in the redoubt of Tchangalick, four thousand strong, and then assault General Rudiger at Eski-Stamboul, who would in that event have been seriously compromised. These attacks were not entirely successful, but such as they were they inflicted a serious loss upon the Russians, and demonstrated the extreme danger which they ran when scattered around Schumla, in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 404; Valentini, 267, 268.

53. Attack on Prince Eugene and Eski-Stamboul. Aug. 26.

The column destined to attack Eski-Stamboul, composed of eight thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and eight guns, met with more resistance than that which destroyed General Wrede, for the enemy were informed of what was intended, and were on their guard. One Russian battalion was cut to pieces in the first fury of the assault, and although obliged to retire by the vigorous attack which three other battalions directed against it, the besieged carried with them one gun, and inflicted a very severe loss upon the enemy. The division destined for the attack of Prince Eugene, in the redoubt of Tchangalick, was still more successful, for by a vigorous assault they made themselves masters of the redoubt; and though obliged soon after to evacuate it, by the cross fire of several other redoubts by which it was enfiladed, they did so in the best order, and carrying with them as a trophy one of the enemy's guns. In these different actions the Russians lost above fifteen hundred men and eight guns; alarm and insecurity were spread over their whole lines, and the Turks gained the substantial fruits of victory by the introduction, two days after the tumult, of a considerable body of troops and large convoy of ammunition and provisions into Schumla.[2]

Aug. 28.

[2] Ann. Hist. xi. 404; Turkish and Russian Bulletins, ibid. 109; Pièces Just; Val. 269, 271.

These disasters convinced Wittgenstein of the necessity of concentrating his troops, and evacuating the ground which he held around the Turkish position on the southern side. The redoubts on the Balkan side of Schumla were

held for a few days after, to avoid the appearance of a defeat, but finally evacuated on the 6th August. The 7th corps, which had been stationed to the south of the place, was withdrawn, so as to be placed in close communication with the 3d, on the north of it, and both occupied positions on the roads to Jenibazar and Silistria. The communication of the troops at Schumla with both Adrianople and Constantinople was thus left open; not even the semblance of a blockade was kept up: the Russians merely occupied a position to the north, observing the place. The Turkish general profited by this opening to throw large supplies into the place, which augmented the strength and audacity of the garrison so much, that, no longer confining themselves to operations on the Balkan side, they threw out detachments on the road to Jenibazar, intercepted several Russian convoys, and daily made prisoners of great numbers of their foraging parties.[1]

54. Retreat of the Russians from the south of Schumla. Sept. 6.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 404, 405; Valentini, 271, 272; Russian Bulletins, Aug. 27 and Sept. 2, 1828; Ibid. 111; Pièces Hist.

While affairs were beginning to wear this sombre aspect on the side of Schumla, the siege of Varna had come to be seriously prosecuted. The reinforcements from Russia, which began to come up in the end of August, were directed to that place, and the communications connected with it; and as they amounted to above forty thousand men, including sixteen thousand of the guards, the best troops in the empire, the besiegers were enabled to assume the offensive in that quarter with every prospect of success. Admiral Greig, with eight sail of the line and as many frigates, kept up a close blockade by sea, and not only prevented any supplies from being thrown in, but destroyed a flotilla of twenty-eight Turkish gun-boats in a bay in the vicinity. Prince Menschikoff unfortunately was severely wounded in the thigh by a cannon-ball in the commencement of the siege, which rendered it necessary to confer its direction on Count Woronzow, who immediately pushed it with vigour on the side next the sea, in order to obtain the advantage of

55. Operations before Varna. Sept. 3.

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the co-operation of the fleet. Foreseeing that important events were approaching, the Emperor returned in person to Varna, and took the command of the besieging army; while general Golownin was detached to the other side of the bay, between the sea and the lake of Dewno, to take the command of the covering force.[1]

[1] Valentini, 271; Ann. Hist. xi. 404, 405.

56. Attack on Wittgenstein. Sept. 8.

It soon appeared how necessary the great reinforcements which were now coming up were to the invaders, and how serious were the dangers which threatened them on the side of Schumla. Vague reports had of late reached the Russian outposts of the arrival of the Grand Vizier with ten thousand men at Adrianople, and the concentration of daily increasing numbers in Schumla, and ere long Wittgenstein had convincing proof of their presence. Half an hour before daybreak on the morning of the 8th September, three of the Russian redoubts on the left were attacked by eight thousand Turkish foot, while nearly an equal force assailed the left under Prince Eugene. The Ottomans were vigorously resisted, for the Russians were forewarned and on their guard, and after a bloody combat they were obliged to retire; but the Russians having pursued with their attenuated horse, the spahis turned upon them fiercely and slew great numbers, so as entirely to stop the pursuit. Such was the exhaustion of the Muscovite horse, that sixteen in one brigade dropped down dead under their riders during the pursuit, and every day afterwards they lost one hundred or one hundred and fifty men in detached combats with the enemy. Seeing that it was now impossible to keep up even the semblance of a blockade, and that his army was daily melting away under the Osmanli sabres, Wittgenstein resolved on a general concentration of his troops in front of Jenibazar, in a position which in some degree covered the siege of Varna, and entirely barred the advance to Silistria.[1]

[1] Valentini, 272, 273; Ann. Hist. xi. 404, 405.

Meanwhile the siege of Varna was slowly advancing; for the extraordinary intrepidity of the Turks greatly

interrupted the operations, and their activity gave the Russians no respite night or day. In the night of the 31st August, the besieged made three sorties, and gained possession of an important post, which was only wrested from them the following night by a great expenditure of life. On the 5th September the Emperor arrived in person, and communicated new vigour to the besieging force, which was now reinforced by 21,000 men, with 96 guns. The two divisions of the guard, which were reviewed by his majesty, presented, after a march of 1700 miles, as magnificent an appearance as when they left St Petersburg four months before. The besieged, however, were 10,000 strong, had a powerful artillery on the ramparts, and were animated by the best spirit. They made a vigorous sortie on the 1st September, captured the most advanced of the besiegers' works, and nearly destroyed two Russian regiments; but they were in the end driven back. By the 5th September the blockade was complete on the north side; where the approaches were most complete, trenches had been opened on the 31st August; and on the 14th September the Russians sprung a mine, which brought down the north-east bastion of the place, and left a practicable breach. The Emperor immediately summoned it to surrender; and the Capitan Pacha, who commanded, repaired on board the Ville de Paris to treat for a capitulation. But as it was evident he was only feigning to gain time, the negotiations were broken off, and the fire resumed on the 15th; but although the breaching batteries kept up a continual and very heavy cannonade, little progress was made during the next ten days, and it was evident the means of defence of the besieged were very far from being exhausted.[1]

57. Siege of Varna.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 408, 409; Valentini, 260, 261.

The Turks on their side were not indifferent spectators of this strife, but were preparing a grand armament in the rear, to interrupt, and if possible raise the siege. A corps of twenty thousand men had been collected under the orders of Omer-Vrione, by means of the reinforcements

58. Advance of the Turks to raise the siege.

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which had been collected at Adrianople, and detachments from the army in Schumla; and it had advanced as far as the village of Hadgi-Hassan-lar, a little to the south of the lake of Dewno, within a few miles of Varna, where it had taken a position in very strong ground, flanked on either side with impenetrable forests. As soon as the Russians received intelligence of their approach, they detached fifteen hundred men to make a reconnoissance, under the command of General Harting; but having fallen unexpectedly in with a large body of the enemy, he was totally defeated, with the loss of half his force, and driven back to the lines before the place, without having effected his object. Upon this success the Turks advanced several miles forward in the forest, to a position in front of Kurteppe, which they strongly fortified with several advanced posts between it and Hadgi-Hassan-lar. Upon this the greatest efforts were made to collect a respectable force to oppose the enemy, and next day General Bistrom was despatched with five thousand men from the lines round Schumla, while Wittgenstein received orders to detach as large a force as he could spare to attack them in rear. He sent Prince Eugene accordingly with nearly six thousand men, which, after winding their way with difficulty through the forest, were approaching it, when the post of Hadgi-Hassan-lar, in the Turkish rear, was surprised by some troops that had come up from the lines before Varna and the post of Dewno, under the orders of General Sochozannet. Forces deemed sufficient for the undertaking having arrived during the 28th, a general attack was made on the Turkish position at Kurteppe by General Bistrom in front, and general Sochozannet in rear; but although the Russians displayed their wonted valour in the attack, and two battalions of the guard were brought into action, they were repulsed with the loss of twelve hundred men, among whom were General Tregtay, and two colonels of the guard killed at the head of their troops.[1] After the combat was over, Eugene came up with his men to Hadgi-

Sept. 26.

Sept. 27.

Sept. 28.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 410, 411; Valentini, 280, 281.

Hassan-lar, united with Sochozannet, and assumed the general command of the troops operating on the Turkish rear.

59. Bloody defeat of the Russians. Sept. 30.

Notwithstanding this check, the Russian generals prepared a grand attack on both sides on the following day. It met with no better success. At the first onset the Russians under Eugene made themselves masters of an advanced redoubt of the enemy at a distance from their camp, and took a gun; but having arrived in front of the central camp, they were received by so terrible a fire of artillery that they were obliged to recoil. Finding that the position was unassailable in front, Prince Eugene divided his force, and placed the weight of his men in the two wings; and some words of encouragement having been communicated to them from the Emperor, they returned to the assault with indescribable enthusiasm. A terrible conflict ensued, for the Turks fought with not less resolution than their antagonists, and the slaughter was dreadful. General Limanski was killed as he mounted the intrenchments; the two colonels of the regiment of Azof shared the same fate;—and the regiment itself, which burned with desire to wipe away a reproach received in one of the conflicts before Schumla, was almost entirely destroyed. On his side, General Bistrom with his little force did his utmost to aid the main attack, but his troops were too weak to enable him to effect anything, and he was repulsed with the loss of five hundred men. At length Prince Eugene was obliged also to draw off his shattered battalions, burning with shame at being obliged to retire before the enemy, and found shelter in the surrounding forest, after having fourteen hundred killed and wounded around the foot of the intrenchments.[1]

[1] Valentini, 283, 286; Ann. Hist. xi. 410, 411; Russian Bulletin, Oct. 1; Ibid. 115; Pièces Hist.

60. The siege is not interrupted.

Had Omer-Vrione, after this hard-fought success, possessed, in addition to his own, ten thousand English or French troops capable of encountering the Russians in the open field, he would have raised the siege of Varna,

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and the Muscovites, driven in all quarters across the Danube, would have been unable to effect anything material in the succeeding campaign. But the want of such a force rendered this impossible. The Turks, admirable in the defence of fortified posts, could not be trusted in combat with the Russian guards in the open country; and not deeming himself strong enough to force his way through, Omer-Vrione halted, and busied himself in fortifying his position, awaiting the opportunity of a sally from Varna to endeavour to throw supplies into the place. Such an opportunity, however, did not occur. The Russians also strengthened their position, and as the Turks were not in sufficient force to storm it, the operations of the siege were not interrupted; and the Russians, succeeding in their main object, reaped from their bloody repulse all the fruits of a brilliant victory. One of the last outworks of the place was stormed on the night of the 25th September; and two mines having been run under the ramparts, they were sprung on the night of the 3d October, and a large opening made; and another mine fired on the following night made a still larger breach. On the night of the 7th, some companies of the Russian chasseurs succeeded in making their way into the blown-up bastions, and even got into the centre of the town; but, not being supported, they were obliged to retire, after sustaining a loss of four hundred men.[1]

Oct. 3.
Oct. 4.
Oct. 7.

[1] Valentini, 292, 294; Ann. Hist. xi. 411.

61. Fall of Varna.

This event, however, coupled with the obvious inability of Omer-Vrione to force his way into the fortress, opened the eyes of the governor to the hopeless nature of his situation, and the impossibility of longer continuing the defence. Accordingly, on the 8th, at mid-day, negotiations were commenced with Jussuf Pacha, the *second in command*, which, on the 10th, led to the surrender of the place unconditionally on the 11th, the garrison being prisoners of war. They were still 6800 strong; 162 pieces of cannon were taken on the ramparts, with considerable stores of ammunition and

provisions. The Capitan Pacha, who was governor, was so indignant at these proceedings that he shut himself up with three hundred brave men in the citadel, when he threatened to blow himself up if he was not permitted to join the forces on the Kamtjik. The Emperor, respecting his courage or dreading his despair, acceded to the terms; and on the 12th he marched out and joined Omer-Vrione, who had, on hearing of the fall of the place, retired behind the Kamtjik, and thence to Aidos, without being seriously disquieted in his retreat. The Emperor Nicholas, with praiseworthy remembrance of former valour in misfortune, sent twelve of the guns taken in the town to Warsaw, to form a monument to Wladislaus VI., king of Poland, slain under its walls by the Turks under Amurath II. in 1444. The times were far distant from those when the chivalry of France perished under the sabres of the janizaries of Bajazet, after their glorious and victorious charge before the same town four hundred years before.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 413, 414; Ibid., Russian Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1828, 117; Valentini, 294, 295.

62. Reflections on this surrender.

The Turks, as well they might, exclaimed "Treachery" at this discreditable capitulation. Contrasted with the defence of Brahilov, there is certainly too much room for the imputation, for that fortress repulsed a desperate assault, and capitulated on condition of the garrison being sent to Silistria, after having stood it; whereas Jussuf Pacha surrendered at discretion, without any assault at all having been delivered, and when still in possession of considerable means of defence. Whatever doubt might have been entertained on this point was soon removed by the conduct of Jussuf Pacha himself. Not content with repairing in person first on board the Ville de Paris in the roads, and then to the Emperor's tent ashore, to conduct the capitulation, he sailed away in a Russian frigate when it was concluded, to Odessa, where he soon after received an *ample grant of lands in the Crimea from the Emperor*, in compensation, as it was alleged, of his extensive estates in Macedonia confiscated by orders of the Sultan! The Russians allege that his means of defence

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were exhausted that the first assault would have proved fatal to the garrison and inhabitants; that the fate of the governor of Brahilov, who only escaped the bowstring by voluntary exile to Mitylene, demonstrated that the Grand Seignior did not know how to distinguish between misfortune and misconduct, and that Jussuf Pacha had no alternative between exile and death. There can be no doubt that there is some truth in these observations; but every man of honour will feel that the good deeds of an enemy are always suspicious, and that he was not in reality reduced to the dilemma which his advocates represent.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 413, 414; Valentini, 295.

63. Operations before Widdin.

While these important events were determining the campaign in favour of the Russians on the shores of the Euxine, operations, subordinate indeed, but worthy from their heroism of being recorded, occurred at the other extremity of the line, where General Geismar, with an inferior force of five thousand men, observed the Pacha of

Aug. 15.

Widdin in that fortress. In the middle of August, when the Russian general was making preparations for an inroad into Servia to raise the warlike inhabitants of that province, the pacha suddenly issued from Kalafat, the *tête-du-pont* of Widdin on the north of the Danube, with fifteen thousand men, and moved upon Bucharest. Unable to resist forces so superior, Geismar retired as far as Slatina, abandoning his whole magazines to the enemy; and the inhabitants of Little Wallachia in consternation fled into the adjoining provinces of Austria. At length, having received a reinforcement of two thousand men, the

Sept. 26.

Russian general advanced to Krajowa, where he was attacked by the Seraskier of Widdin with eighteen thousand men. The combat was obstinate, but the Russians had the worst of it, for they retired at nightfall to a position in rear, and the Turks remained masters of the field of battle. All seemed lost, for a retreat in presence of so superior a force through the level plains of Wallachia was utter ruin. But then was seen what can be effected

by the resolution and conduct of one man. Foreseeing that he would be assailed and outflanked or surrounded on the following day, Geismar resolved to anticipate the enemy by a nocturnal attack. It completely succeeded. Surprised, and thinking they had to do with a fresh enemy, the Turks made very little resistance. In less than two hours they were entirely put to the rout, with the loss of seven hundred prisoners, seven guns, twenty-four standards, and their whole baggage and ammunition. In utter confusion they sought refuge under the cannon of Widdin; Wallachia was delivered from their incursions, and the whole right of the Russian line of operations secured from danger. Following up his success, Geismar, after a march of thirty miles, made a sudden attack on Kalafat, which he carried by escalade, the greater part of the garrison being drowned in attempting to make their way across to Widdin.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 400, 401; Langeron's Despatch, Oct. 4, 1828; Ibid. 114, 120; Val. 299, 300.

64. Abandonment of the siege of Silistria, and retreat of the Russians beyond the Danube. Oct. 11.

After the fall of Varna, the Russian generals were in hopes of being able to reduce Silistria before winter. This important fortress had hitherto been only blockaded by General Roth, with ten thousand men. A severe action took place under its walls on the 11th October, which turned out to the advantage of the Russians, and the investment of the place had already commenced when the approach of the autumnal storms, and the alarming news from Wittgenstein's army, rendered it evident that it could not be undertaken with any prospect of success before the following spring. The blockade therefore was raised, and orders were sent to Wittgenstein to retreat with all his forces behind the Danube. The Emperor himself, seeing the campaign over, embarked on the 14th October on board the vessel "Empress Mother," and made sail for Odessa. On the second night of their voyage they were assailed by a dreadful tempest, which drove them back almost to the mouth of the Bosphorus. So imminent was the danger that all on board gave themselves up for lost, and the Emperor alone preserved

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his presence of mind. The captain proposed running the vessel ashore; but Nicholas declared he would prefer death to falling into the Sultan's hands; and the wind having veered round a few points, he was saved either alternative. At length, on the night of the 19th October, after undergoing a thousand perils and hardships, they reached Odessa, the crew more dead than alive; and not without furnishing to the journalists of Europe ample ground for comparison with the flight of Xerxes across the Hellespont after the defeat of Salamis, two thousand years before.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 414, 415.

65. Disastrous retreat of Wittgenstein. Oct. 19.

Wittgenstein commenced his retreat on the 15th October; and it was conducted with so much secresy that the Turks, for some days, were not aware of what was going forward, and he at first sustained very little molestation. But this did not long continue. On the 19th, the rear-guard, near the village of Ardokhan, at the entrance of a woody defile, was attacked by eight thousand Turkish horse; and though they kept their ground till the third corps, which was defiling, had got through, this was only done at a very heavy loss. After this, as the weather every day became worse, the retrograde movement became eminently disastrous. Eyewitnesses of both compared it to the Moscow retreat. The Turkish roads, bad at all times, had been rendered all but impassable by the ceaseless passage of artillery and carriages over them during the summer and the heavy rains of autumn. Caissons and baggage were abandoned at every step; the stragglers nearly all fell into the enemy's hands, by whom they were instantly massacred; and Wittgenstein experienced in his turn the disasters which he had inflicted on Napoleon's army during the retreat from Witepsk to the Beresina in 1812. At length, after having undergone innumerable hardships, and sustained a very severe loss, his wearied columns reached the Danube, which they immediately crossed, and spread themselves in winter quarters over Wallachia. The Turks made preparations for an attack upon Varna

in the beginning of December, and approached the fortress in considerable strength; but they found the Russians too strongly posted to hazard the attempt. Thus ended in Europe the campaign of 1828, in which the Russians, with the exception of the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were abandoned without resistance, and the reduction of Brahilov and Varna, had made no sensible progress. Both parties, after it was over, found themselves on the banks of the Danube, after being mutually exhausted by the greatest efforts. The Russians, by their own admission, had lost half the troops engaged; for out of 158,800 which during the campaign had crossed the Pruth, only 80,000 remained in November in the fortresses they had subdued and in winter quarters. But the Ottomans, too, had sustained very great losses; two of their frontier fortresses had been wrested from them, and of the force which had so gallantly defended Schumla above a half left their colours, after the Ottoman fashion, and returned home in the beginning of winter, so that the Grand Vizier could not muster above twenty thousand men in that important stronghold.[1]

[1] Valentini, 298; Ann. Hist. xi. 413, 420.

66. Commencement of the campaign in Asia.

The campaign in Asia during the same year, though conducted on the part of the Russians with much smaller forces, was attended with much more glorious and decisive results, owing to the extraordinary talents of General Paskewitch, who directed it, and the warlike experience and heroic spirit of his troops. He had won, during his successful campaigns against the Persians, a solid base of operations on the Araxes by the acquisition of Erivan and other fortresses, and from them he commenced the brilliant campaign which has immortalised his name. His force was very small: it consisted only of thirty battalions of infantry, two regiments of regular and eleven of Cossack cavalry, and 114 guns—in all, 20,854 infantry, 5514 cavalry.[2] Of these, however, only 8561 infantry,

[2] Fonton, Guerre d'Asie, 244, 245; Valentini, 358; Ann. Hist. xi. 392.

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3346 cavalry, and 70 guns, were under the immediate command of the commander-in-chief, and achieved all the wonders of the campaign; the remainder were stationed in the two wings, and were destined to subordinate operations, intended chiefly to distract the attention of the enemy from the main object of attack in the centre.

67. Description of the theatre of war.

The formation of the mountains and plains points out three lines of operation, and three only, to an enemy invading Asia Minor from the side of Tiflis and Georgia. The first runs by the shores of the Black Sea; but the road in that direction, bad in all places, stops entirely at Trebizond. The second is the central line by the chain of the Allaghez direct upon Erzeroum. It is the great road, used for thousands of years, from Tiflis to Constantinople; but it traverses several mountain ridges of great height and difficulty in its course, of which the Allaghez chain, traversed by the pass of Saganlugh, lay athwart the road to Erzeroum, and presented many strong positions of defence. The third is the line of Ararat. After mature consideration, Paskewitch became convinced that the central was the preferable line, chiefly in consequence of its presenting fewer difficulties of a physical nature than the other two. It is true that an invasion by this line would be sure to be opposed by the whole military strength of Anatolia while penetrating by the passes of Saganlugh and of Karatchli across the Allaghez range; but even this opposition appeared to him less formidable than the natural difficulties of the other roads. He made his dispositions accordingly. Six battalions, with a Cossack regiment and sixteen guns, under General Hesse, were directed to move through Imeretia upon the mountains of Guriel and the shores of the Black Sea; three battalions, with a Cossack regiment and eight guns, were disposed in Armenia to form the left wing, and connected by two battalions in echelon with the centre;[1] while the centre, under the general-in-chief, consisting of eighteen battalions, nine regular squadrons, seven regi-

[1] Fonton, 246, 247.

ments of Cossacks and fifty-six guns, was to penetrate by the middle road, and make itself master of Erzeroum, the capital city, and centre of the Turkish power in Asia Minor.

63. Siege of Kars. July 7.

Gumri was the place where the main body of the Russians was concentrated, and from whence Paskewitch commenced his operations. His first movement was directed upon Kars, a fortress of strength, which lay directly upon the road to Erzeroum. The difficulty of the passage and the sterile nature of the country may be judged of by the fact that eighteen hundred and forty-eight chariots, and two thousand two hundred and fifty horses of burden, accompanied the army, though the entire combatants did not exceed twelve thousand men! This little army moved in a very peculiar order, adopted by Paskewitch in all his campaigns, and to the constant use of which great part of his unbroken success was owing. The parks of artillery and luggage were arranged in the centre, in two divisions, each escorted by a brigade of infantry; the remainder of the regular infantry, the cavalry, and artillery, moved on the flanks. In this order the army passed the frontier, and moved upon Kars. The Turks, on their side, had made the most vigorous preparations for defence. The Pacha of Erzeroum, with sixty thousand men, was to advance on Kars to raise the siege, should the Muscovites venture to undertake it; while the Pacha of Akhalzikh, a strong fortress on the Russian right, was to threaten their flank. The Pacha of Erzeroum confidently relied on the strength of Kars, to enable it to hold out till the promised succour arrived. He wrote to the governor of that fortress—"Your soldiers are brave, your fortress is impregnable. Persuade your people that the Russians are few in number and destitute of courage, and make good your post till my arrival."[1]

[1] Fonton, 267, 270.

But all these anticipations were disappointed by the activity of the Russian general. Before the Ottoman

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militia could be collected at Erzeroum, his troops were before Kars. Neither the badness of the roads, nor the intervening ridges, nor the mountain torrents, swollen with heavy rains, could arrest their march. On the 15th they were encamped at Tikhnip, on plains celebrated for a victory of their countrymen in 1807; and on the 19th the little army, mustering, of those come up, only eight thousand combatants, came in sight of the place, and a headlong charge of eight hundred horse drove the enemy back within the walls. On the day following the artillery was brought up, and operations in form were commenced. The fortress, built by Amurath III. during the Turkish war, between 1578 and 1589, is one of the most formidable in Asia. Besides a double circuit of walls, it has three citadels enclosed the one within the other, each surrounded by strong walls and several outworks. In addition to its artificial means of defence, the citadel is inaccessible on the side of the river on which it stands, by reason of a series of perpendicular cliffs, and on the side of the town by numerous batteries placed on its walls. The fortress was celebrated over all Asia, from having in 1735 repulsed all the efforts of the famous Nadir Shah, at the head of ninety thousand Persians, after he had defeated a hundred thousand Turks in its vicinity. Thence it passed over all the East for impregnable. The garrison was ten thousand strong, including four thousand armed citizens, second to none in the defence of their hearths, and not a doubt was entertained that they would repel all the assaults of the enemy.[1]

69. Siege of Kars, and its description. June 15. June 19.

[1] Fonton, 268, 270.

But they were soon undeceived, and taught that they had a very different enemy to deal with from the desultory bands of the Persians. Trenches were opened on the 22d, the attacks being directed to the two opposite extremities: the first, under General Kariffeki, being against the fortified post on the mountain of Karadagh on the extreme right; the second, under Colonel Boro-

70. Its fall.

dino, on the extreme left. While the attention of the Turks was thus drawn away to the two extremities, great efforts were making in secret to push forward approaches in the centre. A furious conflict ensued, when the suburbs, protected by bastions, were attacked; and for the next day it was a continual succession of bloody combats, from outwork to outwork, and from house to house, until at length the enemy were expelled, and driven into the citadel. There the garrison endeavoured to obtain terms; but Paskewitch would only give them an hour to surrender at discretion. At the expiration of that time, seeing the Russian columns of assault formed, the governor surrendered at discretion; and this strong fortress, one of the most formidable in Asia, with a hundred and twenty-nine pieces of cannon, twenty-two mortars, thirty-three standards, and great stores of ammunition, fell into the hands of the victors. The garrison, seven thousand strong, were made prisoners; and the Russians enhanced the lustre of their triumph by protecting the town, and subjecting it to none of the horrors usual in places taken by assault.[1]

July 15.

[1] Paskewitch's Despatch, July 23, 1828; Ann. Hist. xi. 106, App.; Fonton, 280, 294.

71. Appearance of the plague in the Russian army.

Immediately after this brilliant success, the advanced posts of Mahomet Pacha appeared in sight, who was advancing with a large body from the heights of the Saganlugh, to raise the siege. Finding the place taken, he retraced his steps to the mountains; and Paskewitch was preparing to follow, when it was discovered that the advancing army had brought from Erzeroum a more formidable enemy than its own bayonets. The plague broke out in the ranks of the prisoners taken, and some Muscovites were seized with it in the regiment of Georgia, and died in a few hours. In this crisis the measures of the general-in-chief were prompt and decided. Not attempting to disguise from the troops the nature of the malady, he set himself in the most vigorous manner to combat it. The sick were immediately separated from the rest of the troops, hospitals prepared for their reception,

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round which a cordon was established and rigidly maintained; all infected articles, or those which had been near the sick, were burnt, and the utmost care taken to prevent *contact* with those affected, or anything belonging to them. By these measures, enforced with inflexible severity, the malady was in three weeks arrested, but not before it had seized above five hundred persons, of whom only two hundred and sixty-three were cured and restored to the ranks.[1]

[1] Fonton, 296, 299.

72. Capture of Akhalzikh. Aug. 5.

Delivered from this danger, which threatened to stop him in the very outset of his career of conquest, Paskewitch directed his little army towards Akhalzikh, a strong fortress to the northward, between Kars and the Black Sea, the possession of which was necessary to give him a solid base for future operations, and put a stop to incursions which had commenced from thence on the Russian territory. Preparatory to this it was necessary to reduce the forts of Akhalkalaki and Hertwitz, which lay upon the road. No sooner, therefore, was the plague stayed than by a rapid march to the right, parallel to the frontier, he approached Akhalkalaki, the white towers of which appeared at first to be deserted; but on being summoned to surrender, the garrison, replied, "We are not warriors like those of Erivan and Kars: we are the warriors of Akhalkalaki! We have here neither wives nor children: we will die on the walls of our fortress, but we will not do so without a struggle. An old proverb says, 'An inhabitant of Kars is worth three of Erivan, and two of Kars are only worth one of Akhalkalaki!' We shall not belie that proverb." Notwithstanding this bold answer, the garrison did not make a very gallant defence. The approaches were conducted by Colonel Borodino with great rapidity; and the garrison, despairing of success, endeavoured to escape by letting themselves down by cords.[2] Borodino, however, overtook the fugitives and cut them to pieces; and the Russians, returning to the ramparts, mounted them by the scaling-ladders by which

[2] Fonton, 307, 309; Valentini, 349.

they had been let down. The fort was then taken, and, with fourteen guns, thirty-three standards, and three hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the Russians. From thence they moved upon Hertwitz, which soon yielded with fourteen pieces of cannon.

73. March upon Akhalzikh. Aug. 12.

The attack of Akhalzikh was now resolved on; and as it was a place of the greatest strength, Paskewitch ordered up his reserves and whole resources for its reduction. Mahomet Pacha, at the head of thirty thousand men and fifteen guns, lay on the Saganlugh, ready to interrupt the approaches. A severe cavalry action took place between the contending armies on the 17th, and it was only with the utmost difficulty that the Russian horse extricated themselves from the Ottoman cavaliers. Ground was broken in the night of the 19th, and then the formidable nature of its defences became at once apparent. Situated on a spur of the mountains of Kaia-Dagh, and flanked by the rocky banks of the Poskhof-Tchai, it was strongly fortified, and strengthened by all the resources of art and nature. The inhabitants, about twenty thousand, were in the highest state of prosperity, and resolute in the defence of their hearths and homes. The houses, like those of Saragossa, are strongly built of stone, generally of two stories, with a balcony in front, presenting the appearance each of a little fortress, capable of containing a garrison of from fifty to one hundred men. The defences of the place consisted in an exterior wall, flanked with towers, after the Turkish fashion, and the citadel, which is an irregular polygon, the bastions of which were almost contiguous to the nearest houses of the town. Forty guns were mounted on the citadel, which commanded every part of the city except that built on the Kaia-Dagh. The inhabitants, however, placed their principal reliance on the exterior defences of the town, which consisted of a huge tower, on which four guns were mounted, and four bastions, armed with heavy guns, and connected by strong palisades of fir, twelve feet high, and three thick. Within this exterior

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line was the wall of the town, consisting of an irregular nonagon, armed with twenty-two pieces of cannon. Thus, a triple line of defences surrounded Akhalzikh, the outer palisades, the walls, and the bastions of the citadel. But, most of all, it was defended by the warlike and indomitable spirit of its inhabitants, who were proud of their ancient renown, and had sworn to bury themselves in the ruins of the place rather than surrender it to the ancient enemies of their country and their faith. The spirits of the garrison had been greatly raised by the recent arrival, in an intrenched camp round the town, of Kiossa Mahomet Pacha, with a reinforcement of ten thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry—a force more than double that which the Russian general could bring against it.[1]

[1] Fonton, 319, 326.

74. Paskewitch's plan of attack, and its chances.

To attack such a force in such a position, with an army so inferior, was a very bold attempt; but Paskewitch had sufficient confidence in his own resources, and the courage of his troops, to hazard it. General Popoff came up, on the 19th August, with two thousand additional troops, and, thus reinforced, he determined to make a sudden attack on the Turkish intrenched camp which surrounded the town. It was indispensable to do this without delay, as the Turks were daily in expectation of reinforcements, which would have tripled their numerical strength. After mature consideration, the Russian general resolved to distract the enemy's attention by an attack on a quarter where their principal depots were placed, near the village of Tskhout, and meanwhile make the real attack on the heights of the intrenched camp to the north, which was justly regarded as the key of the position. The Ottomans were in four intrenched camps, but the strongest, against which the attack was first directed, was on the rocky heights close to the northern angle of the town. The cross march to Tskhout was to be made in the night, and the attack in that quarter made before daylight, it being well known that the Turks, like all irregular troops, were peculiarly liable

to a panic during a nocturnal attack. So strongly did this plan bear the marks of genius, and so ably was it calculated in all its details, that it commanded the unanimous assent of all the generals assembled in council to determine on its adoption.[1]

[1] Fonton, 325, 331.

75. Nocturnal attack on the Turkish camp. Aug. 27.

Notwithstanding all this, the attack had well-nigh failed from the unforeseen difficulties which occurred in its execution. The Russian column of attack, consisting of seven thousand combatants and twenty-five guns, set out at two hours before dark, and marched the whole night with the utmost expedition. But despite all their efforts, such were the difficulties of the passage through the narrow valleys, intersected with water-courses, through which their route lay, that at sunrise they were still two miles from the enemy's position which was to be first assailed, and already descried, and the Turkish horse crowned all the heights in sight. Surprise was now out of the question; but Paskewitch, with the decision of a great general, saw that there was more risk in retreating than in advancing, and determined to persevere in the attack. It was a bold step, however, for the alarm was now given in the whole Turkish camp; their troops crowded in from all quarters; and thirty thousand Ottomans, of whom nearly half were cavalry, crowned the intrenched heights, which were the first object of the intrepid Russians' assault. The pacha no sooner discovered the small number of his antagonists, not a quarter of his own, than he resolved to anticipate the attack; and, assembling his best infantry in the centre, he ordered an immediate advance out of the intrenchment, and a huge body of Turks, rending the air with their cries, came pouring down upon the leading Russian column of attack, while their numerous cavalry assailed it on either flank.[2]

[2] Fonton, 330, 335; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xi. 107; Doc. Hist.

76. Its perilous chances.

The Russians had need of all their firmness, for the onset was terrible. A frightful *mêlée* ensued. Hand to hand, breast to breast, knee to knee, the Turks and Muscovites contended with the most undaunted resolution. There was no time to load their pieces; but, seizing each

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other by the arms, or striking with the but-ends of their muskets, they fought, like the Athletæ of old, with the rude weapons of nature. But this desperate resistance gave time for two other Russian battalions to come up, which drove back the cavalry, and restored the equality of the combat. Soon after a Russian tumbril blew up, and the Turks, encouraged by this incident, renewed the attack; but the assailants, intimidated by the steady bearing of their adversaries, were at length repulsed; and both parties, exhausted by fatigue and the heat of the day, sunk into repose as at Talavera, close to each other, and remained peaceable for several hours. Paskewitch took advantage of this interval of repose to let his troops get their dinner, and the horses be watered at the adjoining stream; and at two in the afternoon, the men being thoroughly refreshed, he gave the signal to renew the conflict.[1]

[1] Fonton, 334, 336.

77. Desperate conflict on the heights.

Skilfully concealing his real design, which was to dislodge the enemy from the heights they occupied on their right, and deprive them of the immense advantage they derived from the guns of the fortress, Paskewitch grouped all his cavalry on his own right, and, drawing it up in battle array, seemed prepared to assault the enemy's left, and so menace their depots in that quarter. Deceived by this, the Turks moved their principal masses of infantry and cavalry in that direction, so as, in a great measure, to strip the heights on their right, the real key to the whole position. As soon as the Russian general saw this, he ordered a vigorous attack on the heights with his main force, while several lesser assaults were directed against other points to distract the enemy's attention. These movements were entirely successful. Surprised, when destitute of part of their artillery, and great part of their defenders, the Turkish intrenchments on the heights were menaced by a vigorous assault of the Muscovite grenadiers. But the defence was not less vigorous than the attack. General Korolkoff fell, at the

head of his troops, by a grape-shot, and the assaulting column, pierced by the Turkish fire, recoiled in disorder, while a violent thunderstorm, the peals of which were heard above all the roar of the artillery, added to the horrors of this terrific conflict. The Muscovites staggered, recoiled in disorder; and the Turks, with loud cries, leaping out of the intrenchments with their yatagans in their hands, pursued them a considerable distance with great slaughter.[1]

[1] Fonton, 337, 338.

78. Total defeat of the Turks.

But this disorder was momentary only. At length the hardihood and intrepidity of the Russians prevailed over all the enthusiasm of the Turks. The regiment of Chirvan, led by Colonel Borodino, in the middle of the tumult, and when the redoubt, the object of such fierce contention, was in part stript of its defenders, assailed it in flank, and, without firing a shot, forced its way in at the point of the bayonet. Encouraged by the sight of the Russian standards in the redoubt, the broken regiments returned on all sides; a *hourra* got up, in the midst of which the intrenchments were carried, with all their guns and seven standards; and the Turks on that point were driven back, with immense slaughter, within the palisades of the town. Of fifteen hundred men who occupied the redoubt only five hundred escaped. This great success was decisive. The Russian column, masters of the fortified heights on the north, which connected the Turkish camp with the fortress, made dispositions to cut them off from it, while the cavalry on the Russian right in the hollow prepared to charge. At this sight the Turks, passing at once from the enthusiasm of courage to the depth of despair, took to flight on all sides. Kiossa Mahomet Pacha, who had been wounded in the thigh, endeavoured in vain to rally them. He himself, with five thousand men, seeing the battle lost, took refuge in the fortress; but the remainder of the army fled in disorder towards Ardagan, and in great part dispersed.[2] The whole intrenched camps fell into the hands of the Rus-

[2] Fonton, 338, 339; Valentini, 362.

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sians, with ten guns, thirteen standards, and thirteen hundred prisoners; and of the vast array which had recently crowded round the ramparts of Akhalzikh, not a vestige was to be seen on the following day.

79. Assault of the town. Aug. 27.

Delivered from this band of enemies, Paskewitch prosecuted the siege with redoubled activity; and, trusting to the discouragement produced by their recent defeat, summoned the Turks to surrender. Relying, however, on the strength of the place, and a garrison now fifteen thousand strong, they returned an indignant refusal. The fire of the breaching batteries was immediately resumed, and the approaches pushed with the utmost activity. On the 15th, as a sufficient breach appeared to have been made, the columns of assault were formed, and the attack took place at four in the afternoon. The regiment of Chirvan, destined to lead the assault, received the sacrament with great solemnity, after which they partook of a rude repast, and advanced courageously to the breach, with colours flying and music playing. Colonel Borodino was at their head, and the regiment, passing without hesitation through a severe fire of grape and musketry which opened upon them, got into the bastion in which the breach had been made, which they took with all its guns. But the Turks, who had been in some measure taken by surprise, as the hour chosen for the assault was that usually dedicated to repose, now thoroughly alarmed, soon crowded in on all sides, and the victorious regiment found itself assailed by above four thousand Ottomans, with their formidable scimitars in their hands, before they had time to strengthen themselves in the adjacent houses.[1]

[1] Fonton, 352, 353.

80. Frightful assault of the town.

A desperate conflict now ensued; for the Turks, rushing towards the breach from all quarters, had a vast superiority of force; and the Russians, surrounded in the bastion, were on the point of being overwhelmed. Such was the fury of the besieged that the women even took part in the conflict, and with their yatagans in their hands were to be seen in the front of the conflict. Colo-

nel Borodino evinced the most heroic intrepidity; but, in spite of all his efforts, he would have been destroyed had he not thought of the expedient of bringing up two guns, which, with infinite difficulty, were got through the ditch, and over the breach. At the first cannon-shot a loud hurrah broke from the Muscovite ranks, and, rushing forward with the bayonet, they carried the churchyard in which the Turks were placed, and got close to the church, where Borodino fell, pierced through the heart by a musket-ball. Colonel Burtsdorff immediately took the command, and succeeded in getting some more guns over the breach; and Paskewitch, informed of the danger of the assaulting column, sent some battalions to its support. By their aid the cemetery was secured, the church carried, almost choked with dead bodies; and the assailants, pressing forward, engaged the Turks in a hand-to-hand conflict in every quarter. So obstinate was the defence, so infuriated the resistance, that it was only by setting fire to the houses that the Russians were able to expel the besieged from them. Steadily they advanced, however, the flames preceding, the artillery following them; and at length discipline and steadiness prevailed over rude valour. Four hundred of the besieged perished in a mosque; and the flames, spreading in all directions, involved the greater part of the city in conflagration. The conflict continued through the whole night by the light of the burning houses; and a church, in which a great number of the besieged had taken post, with large stores of powder, blew up at midnight with a frightful explosion. At length, after a desperate conflict of thirteen hours' duration, the whole palisades and outer walls were conquered by the Russians, and the besieged driven into the citadel. There they soon after capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire to Erzeroum; and they soon after marched out in two columns, the regular soldiers with the proud air which the consciousness of a noble defence inspired,[1] the armed inhabitants with

[1] Fonton, 357, 360.

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the dejection consequent on the abandonment of their homes.

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31. Reduction of Alskhur and Ardagan.

This great conquest gave the Russians a solid base of operations within the Turkish territory; and the defeated Turks, unable to keep the field, were driven to take post on the lofty ridge of the Saganlugh, where they hoped to be able still to interrupt the enemy in his advance upon Erzeroum. This undertaking, however, appeared to the Russian general too extensive in the close of the campaign, and with an army weakened by so many glorious achievements. He contented himself, therefore, with the reduction of the intermediate forts of Alskhur and Ardagan, which capitulated in the beginning of September, and gave him the command of the entire country to the foot of the Saganlugh, and prepared everything for the advance on Erzeroum in the following campaign. Meanwhile the bulk of his forces was advanced to Ardagan, which completed the communication with Kars, and established the Muscovites in the most secure manner in a triangle, of which the latter town was the apex, threatening the capital of Asia Minor.[1]

Sept. 7.

1 Fonton, 365, 367.

32. Operations on the Russian flanks, and results of the campaign.

Operations of minor magnitude, but still material for future operations, took place on the flanks of the Russian army before the winter set in. After the fall of Akhalzikh, Paskewitch received several offers of submission and alliance from the chiefs in the neighbourhood, who, like all Asiatics, lost no time in ranging themselves on the side of success. These offers were accepted; the towns of Ossasghiti and Askani, on the right flank, were occupied, and the whole of the province of Guriel on the sea-coast ranged itself on the side of Russia; while on the left, a Russian division, under Prince Tchevtsevadze, had subdued the whole pachalic of Bajazeth, and stormed its principal fortresses. Relieved by these successes of all disquietude concerning his flanks, Paskewitch distributed his troops in winter-quarters, the excessive rains of autumn having rendered all farther operations in the field

impossible. He placed 2600 men in Akhalzikh, under Prince Bebutoff, and 2700 in Kars, under General Bergman. The rest of the troops repassed the frontier, and took up their quarters around Teflis, the capital of Georgia, where the general-in-chief fixed his headquarters. They had good reason to be proud of their exploits, for they had conquered three pachalics, those of Kars, Akhalzikh, and Bajazeth, stormed the three fortresses of these names, and taken, besides three strong castles, with 313 pieces of cannon, 195 standards, and 8000 prisoners! These successes had been gained by the main body, which never had more than 12,000 combatants, and the two wings, whose united force did not exceed 6000! Never had the superiority of the Europeans to the Asiatics been more clearly evinced; and it is still more surprising that the entire loss of the Russians in this most active campaign, by disease as well as the sword, was only 3200.[1]

[1] Fonton, 364, 373; Ann. Hist. xi. 108, 109; Doc. Hist.

83. Paskewitch's plans, and formation of Mahommedan corps.

Notwithstanding the small amount of these losses, the forces at the disposal of Paskewitch were obviously inadequate to the extensive operations which the next campaign in Asia Minor would require. Although he had been reinforced by 4000 men during the winter, and the Emperor had ordered 20,000 conscripts to the Caucasus, yet they could not arrive before the middle of summer; and for the opening operations he could reckon only on 13,000 infantry and 3500 horse. In this dilemma, he resolved to embrace a measure which seemed bold, considering the religious character which the wars between the Russians and the Turks have always borne, but which the event entirely justified. This was to organise several Mahommedan corps of cavalry out of the nomad tribes in the provinces he had subdued, and lead them at once against the Mussulmans. This plan was immediately put into execution, and with the most entire success. Several corps of admirable horsemen were formed; and so popular did the service become, that the Pacha of Mush, a power-

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ful chieftain, who had furnished twelve thousand irregular cavalry to the Porte, put his forces at the disposal of the Russian general. The required regiments were immediately completed, and their conduct, when led to battle against their co-religionists, proves that, except in periods of extraordinary fanatical excitement, the military spirit and sense of honour of the Asiatics prevail over their religious sympathies. The Mahommedan regiments were perfectly steady to the Russian colours; they proved valuable auxiliaries through the remainder of the war; they won for themselves a lasting place in the Emperor's service, and it was among them that the adroit horsemen were found, whose equestrian feats excited the astonishment of all the cavalry officers of Europe at the camp of Kalice, many years afterwards.[1]

[1] Fonton, 375, 380.

84. Vigorous defensive measures of the Porte in Asia during the winter.

Thoroughly alarmed by the progress of the Muscovite general in Asia, the Sultan during the winter not only made the most vigorous defensive preparations, but set on foot measures calculated to recover some of his lost possessions. The Seraskier, Halil Pacha, and his lieutenant, Kiossa Mahomet Pacha, were both disgraced, and Hadgi-Saleh Pacha of Maidan, and Hagkhi-Pacha of Sivaz, both men of tried vigour and courage, appointed in their stead. Saleh Pacha, inspired with the Sultan's vigour, commenced his government by a proclamation, in which he called on all true believers to take up arms in defence of the Crescent, and large sums of money sent from Constantinople enabled him to organise the tumultuary bands in a regular manner. Large depots of ammunition and provisions were formed at Erzeroum and Hassan-Kale, at the foot of the Saganlugh, and the fortifications of the former were greatly strengthened, while two hundred pieces of cannon lined its ramparts. The new levies were raised, drilled, and equipped with the utmost expedition, and out of the remains of the former army a corps of ten thousand regular troops was formed, to which an equal number of the new levies was joined. It

was calculated that before the end of spring, including irregulars, eighty thousand men, with sixty-six pieces of cannon, would be assembled at the foot of the Saganlugh, to bar the road to Erzeroum, and even penetrate into the Russian province of Georgia, while the Pachas of Van and Mush, with fifty thousand men and fifty pieces of cannon, operated on their right flank against the pachalic of Bajazeth and Armenia. Great as these forces appear to be, the immense resources of the Turkish government in Asia, and the warlike spirit of its inhabitants, left little doubt that their hopes would be realised.[1]

[1] Fonton, 380, 381.

85. Assassination of the Russian minister at Teheran, and siege of Akhalzikh by the Turks.

An atrocious event in Persia precipitated events before the preparations on the part of the Ottomans were complete. This was the assassination of the Russian minister at Teheran, which took place on February 12, 1829. As this melancholy catastrophe appeared to prognosticate an immediate resumption of hostilities by Persia, it excited an immense sensation on both sides, and complicated in a most serious manner the position of the Russians to the south of the Caucasus. What might be expected if the whole military resources of Persia and Asia Minor, capable of mustering two hundred thousand combatants, were arrayed against the diminutive army of the Muscovites, which could not bring above twenty thousand effective men into the field? Reports were soon prevalent that an alliance, offensive and defensive, against their common enemy, was about to be concluded between the courts of Teheran and Constantinople. Influenced by these dangers, Paskewitch concentrated the bulk of his forces in the province of Erivan, and in those districts of Georgia which could be first menaced by Persia, on the left bank of the Araxes, having only slender garrisons in the fortresses conquered from the Turks. Symptoms of disaffection and rebellion appeared in the pachalics which had recently joined the Russian alliance. The Seraskier deemed this a favourable opportunity to

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strike a blow at Akhalzikh, the recovery of which would completely derange the Russian plans for the succeeding campaign; and accordingly, having suddenly collected twenty thousand men, in the end of February he moved towards that town, and entered its suburbs on the 4th of March. The inhabitants, who were chiefly Mussulmans, with loud cries and indescribable enthusiasm united themselves to their co-religionists, and both together advanced to the attack of the town, defended only by the regiment of Chirvan and some companies of that of Kherson, not in all above two thousand combatants.[1]

[1] Fonton, 384, 390; Ann. Hist. xi. 375, 376.

86. Siege of the fortress by the Turks.

But this little garrison was a band of heroes, and they were under the command of Prince Bebutoff, who was worthy to lead them. Such was the enthusiasm of the Mussulmans, that they ventured on a storm by escalade the moment the army entered the suburbs; and it was only after a severe conflict of an hour's duration that they were repulsed. The rage of the Mussulmans upon this exhaled in every species of ferocity against the unhappy Christians and Jews in the suburbs, who were brought out on the roofs of the houses, and barbarously murdered in sight of the Russian garrison, who were unable to render them any assistance. But the Turks had gained one important advantage, which well-nigh proved fatal to the besieged during the tumult of this assault. They had got possession of several houses adjoining the rampart, and overhanging it, which the humanity of the governor had prevented him from previously destroying, and which were almost the only ones which had escaped the conflagration in the first siege. Here the Ottomans took post in great numbers, and not only defied all attempts to dislodge them, but kept up an incessant fire of musketry on the rampart, against which the besieged had no protection.[2] Meanwhile repeated attempts to penetrate into the place in this way were made; and the Turkish general, following in the traces of the Russians in the first siege, began to push approaches as much in the

[2] Fonton, 389, 391; Valentini, 369; Ann. Hist. xii. 377.

European style as their rude state of information would admit. CHAP. XV.

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In this extremity Prince Bebutoff proposed a sortie to carry and destroy the houses; but this was deemed too hazardous with their slender means, and it was resolved to elevate the parapet by sacks of earth, raised so high as to ward off the fire from the houses, and guard against an irruption of assailants from them by double guards and increased vigilance. In spite of all their efforts, however, the situation of the garrison became every day more perilous. Hardly in sufficient force to guard the wide circuit of the walls from the assaults of the enemy, they were kept night and day on the watch, and worn out with incessant toil, combating at all points, amidst a season of extraordinary severity even in that rigorous climate. Ahmed Bey, who directed the besiegers, succeeded in commanding the approach to water, which afterwards they could only reach during the night. So rigorous was the blockade, that of the numerous messengers sent from Ardagan, Kars, and Akhalkalaki, not one reached the besieged, who saw themselves cut off apparently from all hope of succour, and hourly threatened with an assault from an enemy whom they had no adequate means of resisting. To add to their dangers, the melting of the snows swelled the torrent of the Kura to such a degree as to render it extremely difficult for the Russians to approach to raise the siege; and orders had been sent to the Turks who were besieging Alskhur to seize the defiles of Bordjom, by which alone the fortress could be reached.[1]

87. Extreme danger of the besieged.

[1] Fonton, 392, 393; Valentini, 369; Ann. Hist. xii. 377.

The besieged, worn out by incessant toil and fighting during fourteen days, and after having bravely repulsed an assault through a practicable breach which had been made, still repudiated all thoughts of a surrender. Such was the spirit with which they were animated, that there were no sick; the wounded insisted on being brought out to the ramparts, and, lying on their mattresses with

88. Their deliverance. March 16.

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their muskets by their side, took part in moments of danger in the fusilade. Such heroism at length met its reward. General Burtsdorff, who was intrusted with intercepting a large body of the enemy which was advancing to seize the defiles of Bordjom, disposed his troops so skilfully that he repulsed them, kept possession of that important defile, and drove them back to the neighbourhood of Alskhur. The importance of this success was soon apparent. On the morning of the 16th, immediately after Prince Bebutoff had rejected a summons to surrender, on the assurance that the Russian force advancing to raise the siege had been destroyed, an unusual stir was observed in the Turkish lines; soon after the outposts were withdrawn, and it was evident that a general retreat had commenced. Bebutoff immediately sallied out with five companies and two guns to attack the retreating foe, and this was done with complete success. Before the Russians reached them, the Turks took to flight, and soon after dispersed. With difficulty Ahmed Bey rallied five hundred men and five guns as a rear-guard, which were immediately charged and taken by Bebutoff, and soon after not a vestige of the enemy was to be seen save in his devastations. The cause of this sudden flight was soon apparent. At two in the afternoon the heads of Burtsdorff's columns were seen on the heights on the road to Alskhur; soon after they passed with drums beating and colours flying through the yet smoking ruins of Akhalzikh, and, entering the gates of the fortress, threw themselves into the arms of their comrades.[1]

[1] Fonton, 396, 398.

89. Measures of Paskewitch against the Persians.

During these glorious and interesting events, Paskewitch, with the bulk of his forces, kept a vigilant eye upon the Persians, from whom hostility was hourly to be apprehended. Persia had derived no advantage from the peace with Russia except the guarantee of Abbas Mirza's succession to the throne; and this had only rendered him an object of increased jealousy to his younger brother, by

whom intrigues for his overthrow were fomented. The hostility of the Persians became ere long so decided, that the Russian consul at Tabriz without orders quitted his post, and interrupted the diplomatic relations of the courts of St Petersburg and Teheran. But Paskewitch had struck the decisive blow by the relief of Akhalzikh. No sooner did the Persian government receive intelligence of that event than they changed their policy. Paskewitch addressed an energetic letter to Abbas Mirza, in which the innate jealousy of the Russians at the English in the East revealed itself,* and a successful repulse of a fresh attempt upon Akhalzikh by General Burtsdorff at length terminated the indecision of the Persians. Their armaments were disbanded, and amicable relations restored with the court of St Petersburg.[1]

May 13.

[1] Fonton, 404, 410; Ann. Hist. xii. 377, 378.

90. Opening of the campaign with the Turks.

Relieved of all anxiety on the side of Persia, and having at length received considerable reinforcements despatched by sea from Sevastopol, the Russian general made preparations for an active campaign against the Turks, with an army of 25,000 men and 76 guns, among whom were four admirable regiments of Mussulman horse recently raised in the service of Russia. The army of the Seraskier, 50,000 strong, was assembled at Hassan-Kale, at the foot of the southern slope of the Saganlugh, with an advanced guard in the intrenched camp on that mountain. The weather was still cold, the tops of the hills were covered with snow, and heavy rains impeded the movements of the troops in the valleys; but the circumstances were so urgent as to impose upon the Russian general the necessity of immediate operations. The enemy's plan was obviously to advance on Kars, or to

* "Ne comptez ni sur les promesses des Anglais ni sur les assertions des Turcs. Les Anglais ne vous défendront pas; leur politique n'a en vue que les interêts de leurs possessions dans les Indes. Nous pouvons en Asie conquérir un royaume et personne ne s'en inquiètera. En Europe chaque pouce de terrain peut donner lieu à des guerres sanglantes: la Turquie est nécessaire à l'équilibre Européen; mais les puissances de l'Europe ne regardent pas qui gouverne la Perse."—*Général* PASKEWITCH *à* ABBAS MIRZA, 16 April 1829. FONTON, 406, 407.

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attack the Russians when entangled in the defiles of the mountains. To counteract these designs, Paskewitch established his left wing under Pankratieff, three miles in front of Kars; the centre, under his immediate command, advanced to Ardagan, and encamped in the neighbourhood of that place, which was strongly fortified, while the right, under Burtsdorff, rested on Akhalzikh. Everything indicated that the Seraskier, with his vast army, meditated an attack on Kars; while Hadgi Pacha, with 15,000 men and 20 pieces of cannon, menaced Akhalzikh. Deeming the position of Pankratieff under the cannon of Kars unassailable, the Russian general wisely resolved to concentrate his forces on Hadgi Pacha's corps. With this view, orders were sent to Burtsdorff to march from Akhalzikh direct against him, while Mouravieff, detached from the centre with four battalions, 850 horse, and 14 guns, moved from Ardagan to threaten his flanks. The opposing parties came in sight on the 12th June. The two Russian divisions had only 5250 infantry, 1200 horse, and 22 guns; but notwithstanding the inferiority of force, they resolved to attack the enemy.[1]

[1] Fonton, 414, 418; Valentini, 373, 374.

91. Defeat of Hadgi Hassan. June 13.

Burtsdorff's division was first engaged, and he had a rude conflict to maintain with the enemy's horse, in the course of which the Russian squares were charged to the teeth by six thousand Turkish horse, and one was penetrated. At length, while they were with difficulty maintaining their ground against the increasing masses of the enemy, the guns of Mouravieff were heard on their flank, and the Turks, immediately desisting from the attack, shut themselves up in their intrenched camp. There they were attacked at daybreak on the following day, and after a vigorous resistance the intrenchments were forced, and the enemy totally routed. The whole artillery of the Turks, with five standards, fell into the hands of the Russians, who only lost ninety men, while their opponents

June 14.

were weakened by twelve hundred in killed and prisoners, and their corps of fifteen thousand men was entirely dispersed. This success relieved Paskewitch from all anxiety concerning his right, and left him at liberty to concentrate his principal forces for the attack of the main army of the Ottomans, fifty thousand strong, under the Seraskier, which was strongly posted on the Saganlugh, barring all approach to Erzeroum.[1]

[1] Valentini, 373, 374; Fonton, 414, 431.

92. Paskewitch's dispositions, and position of the Turks.

Paskewitch's men were divided into three columns—the right, under Mouravieff, consisted of 7160 infantry, 1140 cavalry, and 28 guns; the left, under Pankratieff, of 5175 infantry and 1145 cavalry, with 30 guns; the reserve of 3495 infantry, and 12 guns;—in all about 18,000 men, including the artillerymen. With a force so inferior to the vast Mussulman host, it was no easy matter to force the passage of the Saganlugh. Two roads only traversed that lofty chain, which unite on their southern side at a bridge over the Araxes. The first, which is fifty miles in length, passes by the pass of Milli-Duz, on the summit of the range; the second, which is called the road of Zevinn, is of greater length, being sixty-five miles long. The mountain range which these roads traverse is above six thousand feet high, so that the snow lies on its summits till far in summer; and the approaches to it present innumerable positions of the utmost strength, where a stand may be made against an invading enemy. The whole lower sides of the mountains are covered with thick woods of pine and larch, intersected by deep and rocky ravines, which rendered all attempts at passage, except by one or other of these routes, utterly impracticable. The Seraskier, who had the command in chief, had stationed Hadgi Pacha, with twenty thousand men, in the first of these passes, which goes by Milli-Duz, while he himself, with thirty thousand, was moving up from Erzeroum to occupy the longer route by Zevinn.[2] From the magnitude of the Mussulman force in both passes, the fame of the generals who commanded it,

[2] Fonton, 419, 423; Valentini, 375, 376; Paskewitch's Despatch, June 23, (o. s.) 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 34; Doc. Hist.

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and the great strength of the positions they occupied, not a doubt was entertained that any attempt to force them would terminate in the destruction of the Russian army.

93. Paskewitch's plan of attack.

Everything depended upon Paskewitch succeeding in attacking the enemy's corps separately, because if they were united, or acting in co-operation, the magnitude of their forces and the strength of their positions precluded all hopes of success. To accomplish this object he determined upon an immediate attack on Hadgi Pacha, not by the road of Milli-Duz, which, from its comparative shortness, promised the greatest chance of effecting the object, but by a circuitous march on Zevinn. It was attended with no small danger, as, by making the march in that direction, he abandoned his communications with Kars, and his whole base of operations; but it promised such advantages that the Russian general did not hesitate to adopt it. As he had abandoned his communications, he made every soldier carry with him bread for five days, and each piece of cannon was only allowed one caisson. The better to conceal his real design, he made great demonstrations against the enemy's camp at Milli-Duz, and even ordered a simulate attack on it by four thousand men, under General Burtsdorff. While the attention of the Turks was entirely occupied with the assault which they hourly expected in that direction, the general-in-chief, with the main body and the reserve, fourteen thousand strong, with fifty guns, defiled at nightfall in silence by the right, in the direction of Zevinn. Ten half battalions, with the whole baggage-waggons, three thousand in number, covered this movement, and concealed it from the enemy, whose attention was entirely occupied with a nocturnal attack made on them with the utmost skill by Burtsdorff. With such expedition did the troops march, that they went over a distance of thirty-two miles, and crossed two snowy ridges, before they called a halt![1] But the object was gained—the pass was gained before the the Seraskier came up to occupy it; and at nine o'clock on

[1] Fonton, 427, 429; Valentini, 376, 377; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 84, 85; Doc. Hist.

the following morning the Russians were established in force on the southern slope of the mountain, between the camp of Hadgi Pacha and Erzeroum.

94. Subsequent movements of Paskewitch.

The ridge of the Saganlugh was now surmounted; but the intrenched camp of Hadgi Pacha was not yet forced, nor the army of the Seraskier defeated; and till one or other or both of these things were done, it was impossible to advance against Erzeroum. The camp of Milli-Duz was as strong in flank as in front; it was impossible to assault it before the heavy artillery and reserve parks came up, and meanwhile an attack might daily be expected from the Seraskier, with thirty thousand men, coming up from the south, aided by a sally of Hadgi Pacha with twenty thousand from the intrenched camp. In these critical circumstances, Paskewitch adopted the same resolution which Frederick the Great or Napoleon would have done in a similar situation; he resolved to direct his forces in the first instance against the most formidable of his opponents, and take advantage of his central position between them, to destroy first one and then the other of the corps opposed to him. To do this, however, it was necessary to secure the passage of the mountains by his baggage and parks, which had necessarily fallen behind during the excessive rapidity of the preceding march; and for some days his whole attention was directed to this object. Hadgi Pacha detached twelve hundred men under Osman Pacha to occupy the defile through which they had to pass; and a bloody conflict ensued between them and a Russian detachment, under Colonel Fridrichs, which was intrusted with covering the march. The Turks, however, were at length defeated, and driven headlong down the precipices into the raging torrents by which the road was bordered; and the train having been all got through and joined the main body, Burtsdorff was also called in; and the whole Russian army, entirely abandoning its communications, was concentrated on the southern

[1] Valentini, 378, 379; Fonton, 431, 435; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 84, 85.

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slope of the Saganlugh, under the general-in-chief in person.

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95. Advance upon Kainly, and dispositions of attack. July 1.

Having now surmounted the chain, and concentrated his troops, Paskewitch lost no time in leading them against the Seraskier, who was approaching from the south. It was high time he should do so, for the two Turkish armies, now not more than thirty-five miles from each other, were rapidly approaching a junction, which they could easily effect by a concentric movement upon Zevinn. If the attack was delayed even a day, he was liable, while contending with the Seraskier in front, to be assailed in flank by Hadgi Pacha with the forces in the intrenched camp, now become entirely disposable by Burtsdorff having been called in. Accordingly, everything was prepared for an attack on the Seraskier on the morning of the 1st of July. The advance took place by the right, headed by Mouravieff, with four battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and twenty guns; behind him came the immense baggage-train, flanked by two battalions on one side, on the other covered by an impassable ravine; in the rear of them was the main body, consisting of seven battalions, two Cossack regiments, and twenty-four guns; three battalions closed the march and brought up the rear. This was just the order of march observed by Cæsar, when near the enemy, in the wars in Gaul.* The times were changed since Korsakoff, in the retreat of the Russians from Zurich in 1799, placed the infantry in solid squares in front, the cavalry in the centre, *and the artillery and baggage in the rear.*[1]

[1] Hist. of Europe, c. xxviii. § 47; Fonton, 439, 441; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 85; Doc. Hist.

96. Battle of Kainly. July 1.

At ten in the morning the Russian advanced guard first descried some bodies of Turkish horsemen on the road to Erzeroum. Paskewitch immediately reinforced his advanced guard by three battalions and ten guns; and as this gave him a momentary superiority on the

* "Quum ad hostes appropinquabat, consuetudine suâ, Cæsar sex legiones expeditas ducebat; post eas totius exercitûs impedimenta colocarat; inde duæ legiones quæ promixè conscripta erant totum agmen claudebant, præsidioque impedimentis erant."—CÆSAR, *de Bello Gallico*, ii. 19.

great road over the enemy, he resolved to hazard an instant attack before Hadgi Pacha, from the intrenched camp, had time to assail his flank. The baggage-trains and parks, accordingly, were left on the summit of the Tchakhir-Baba, strongly barricaded, and guarded by three thousand men, with eight guns. The remainder of the troops descended into the plain, where they were drawn up in two columns in order of battle, at the distance of two miles from the foot of the mountains. The troops were arranged, in the usual order adopted by the Russian general, in squares of half battalions, with the artillery in the intervals of the infantry, and the cavalry on the flanks or rear. The Turks soon approached in immense masses, and with loud cries threw themselves on the Russian squares opposed to them; and no sooner was the conflict in front seriously engaged than the horsemen of Hadgi Pacha, six thousand strong, were seen descending from a hollow in the heights of Milli-Duz, and they immediately commenced a furious attack on the Russian left, under the orders of Burtsdorff. So vigorous was the onset that it required all the firmness of the veterans in their squares to repel, by a rolling fire and with fixed bayonets, the dreadful charge. "In an instant," says Paskewitch, "the Turks charged us with inconceivable audacity; their tirailleurs at every instant penetrated into the line of ours, who were obliged to resist them with the bayonet: they threw themselves on the battalions in squares, and were only repulsed by a ceaseless rolling fire which issued from their ranks." [1]

[1] Paskewitch's Despatch Ann. Hist. xii. 85; Fonton, 444, 445; Valentini, 377, 378.

97. Success of the Russians in the centre and on the left.

To support this vigorous onset, and entirely destroy the Russian left, the Turks successively withdrew several battalions from their centre. The eagle eye of Paskewitch, like that of Wellington at Salamanca, immediately discovered this false movement, and he prepared to take advantage of it. He ordered a general attack of infantry, supported by eight guns and the Cossack horse, on the now weakened enemy's centre, and entirely broke it. But while this great success was

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gained in the centre, Burtsdorff had the utmost difficulty in maintaining himself against the masses of the Turkish cavalry on the left, which, despite the rolling fire of the squares, broke into the intervals between them, and cut down the Russian gunners at the side of their pieces, which were immediately silenced. All seemed lost in that quarter; but fortunately Pankratieff, seeing, from the heights of Tchakhir-Baba, where he was barricaded behind the baggage-waggons, the imminent danger of Burtsdorff, detached a brigade of irregular cavalry along the crest of the ridge to descend on the Turkish rear. In spite of the rugged nature of the ground, this movement was executed by these hardy horsemen with entire success. Concealed for the greater part of the way by intervening rocks, the Russian horse got unperceived close into the Turkish rear, and then with a loud hurrah suddenly broke in upon them. At the same time, General Sacken, with the regular cavalry, turned the left flank of the same division, and threatened to cut them off from Milli-Duz. A sudden panic immediately seized the whole Turkish right and centre, which fled and dispersed, leaving the field in possession of the Russians, who took advantage of this success to bring down the baggage and train under Pankratieff to the valley beside the main body of the troops.[1]

[1] Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 85; Valentini, 378, 379; Fonton, 447, 449.

98. Defeat of the Seraskier.

The work of the Russian general, however, was only half done. The corps with which he had contended were only the cavalry of the Seraskier and the corps of Hadgi Pacha; the infantry and main body of the former's forces were yet to fight. Eighteen thousand foot were to arrive during the night; and the Seraskier, little anticipating any further attack, took up a strong position with the troops that were yet unbroken a little in the rear, to await their arrival, and give battle on the following day. But Paskewitch, having learned the approach of reinforcements to the enemy so considerable, which would render their forces quadruple of his own, had no intention of waiting till he was overwhelmed, but resolved to attack

them, before they came up, *that very night*. Having given his troops a few hours' rest, accordingly, he again led them out to the attack at four in the afternoon; and, as the Russian left was now entirely secured against any attack from the side of the intrenched camp, he was able to bring a preponderating force against the Seraskier's position. At a signal given, the troops, now arranged in dense masses with the bands of all the regiments playing, advanced to the attack. On this occasion, though their guns kept up a vigorous fire on the columns as they approached, the Turkish infantry made very little resistance. Paskewitch himself, at the head of all the cavalry, appeared on their flank, and, riding over the intrenchments, which were only begun to be thrown up, broke into the camp. Upon this a general rout took place. The Turks broke, dispersed, and fled on all sides. Paskewitch, having stationed a body of men at the entrance of the defiles leading down from Milli-Duz, to prevent any attack from that quarter, continued the pursuit with the utmost vigour till it was dark. Twelve guns, the whole baggage and ammunition of the army, and five hundred prisoners, were taken during the pursuit; and such was the consternation of the Seraskier, that he was the third man who brought to Hassan-Kale, the headquarters in the rear, the intelligence of his own defeat.[1]

[1] Fonton, 450, 453; Valentini, 379, 381; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 84, 85.

99. Storming of the intrenched camp at Milli-Duz. July 1.

Still there remained the intrenched camp at Milli-Duz to storm, where Hadgi Pacha had collected eighteen thousand men after his repulse, in a position as strong as art and nature could make it. But Paskewitch, who, like Cæsar, deemed nothing done while anything remained to do, determined to attack it before the Seraskier's corps had recovered from the consternation of their defeat, and could give him any annoyance. Accordingly, at seven next morning the troops were led back to the assault of the intrenched camp. After toiling up the steep ravines which led to it, the Russians, when they reached the plateau on the summit, beheld the intrenchments bristling with guns, and defended by a numerous mass of infantry and cavalry,

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whose bayonets and turbans appeared above the embrasures of the guns. The Russians had 6743 foot, 4750 horse, and thirty-six guns. When they first appeared on the plateau, the Turks were ignorant of the defeat of the Seraskier; but Paskewitch took care that they should be informed of it by means of a deserter, while he was waiting the arrival of his heavy artillery, which was toiling up the steep. As soon as they learned it, the utmost discouragement seized the Turks, who began to disband and leave the camp; while Hadgi Pacha, seeing himself cut off from all succour, proposed to capitulate. The Russian general, however, insisted on a surrender at discretion, which being refused, the assault was ordered. The assailants were divided into four columns, headed by the general-in-chief in person, Pankratieff, Mouravieff, and Sacken. They all proved successful. The assault was made with such vigour by Paskewitch and Mouravieff, that the Turks, after discharging their pieces, turned about and fled, leaving the other columns nothing but the pursuit. The camp, with nineteen pieces of cannon, eighteen standards, and twelve hundred prisoners, were taken on the spot, two thousand slain, and the army entirely dispersed. Hadgi Pacha himself, with his whole suite, was among the captives. Being brought before the Russian general, he said, in a noble spirit, "The fate of arms is inconstant; a few hours ago I commanded an army of twenty thousand men—now, to my shame, I am your prisoner; but your name is revered amongst us because of your great qualities; and it is said if you know how to conquer, you know also how to forgive. I trust myself to your magnanimity." Paskewitch showed himself not unworthy of the appeal. He treated him with distinction, and assured him of the protection of the Emperor.[1]

[1] Fonton, 459, 461; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 89; Valentini, 380, 383.

100. Results of these conflicts.

Thus in less than twenty-five hours the Russian army had marched thirty-five miles, beaten and entirely dispersed two Turkish armies, each of which was more than double its own strength; taken one of the generals, two pachas, both camps, twenty-eight guns, nineteen standards,

three thousand prisoners, and their whole ammunition and provisions, with the loss of less than two hundred men. History furnishes few examples of success so brilliant and decisive, and so obviously the result of superiority in generalship and tactics. It reminds us of the days of Alexander the Great and Pompey, when small European forces, admirably led and disciplined, and inured to war, overthrew forces five times more numerous of the Asiatic monarchies. The campaigns of Napoleon in Italy in 1796, and France in 1814, which they very much resemble from the skilful use made of a central position, and the wonderful effects of rapidity of movement, present no results more striking or more demonstrative of the talents of the general-in-chief.[1]

[1] Fonton, 460, 461.

101. Advance of Paskewitch against Hassan-Kale, and its fall.

Paskewitch had profoundly studied ancient history, and his own experience in the wars of Persia had taught him that the character of the Asiatic people was unchanged; that still, as in the days of Cyrus or Mithridates, they passed rapidly from one extreme to another; and that entire nations were ready, on decisive events, to range themselves in willing multitudes around the banner of the victor. He set himself, accordingly, in the most vigorous manner, to improve his success, and strike a decisive blow, before the excitable minds of the Asiatics had recovered from their consternation. The position of the Seraskier had become desperate. Of his late immense host only ten thousand horse could be assembled at Hassan-Kale, all in the deepest state of dejection; and with these he despaired of defending its walls against his enterprising enemy. Accordingly, when the Russian outposts, under General Burtsdorff, approached the fortress, he made his dispositions to evacuate it, and withdraw to Erzeroum. When they descended the valleys on the southern side of the Saganlugh, towards the Araxes, they speedily felt the change of climate, and the troops, which had recently shivered on the edge of perennial snows, now were melting under the rays of a burning sun. On

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their approach the troops of the Seraskier mutinied, and, disbanding, fled in all directions. The Russians crossed the Araxes by a noble bridge of seven arches, still entire, constructed by Darius Hystaspes, and speedily took possession of the abandoned fortress, where they found twenty-nine guns, and immense stores enclosed within the walls, which dated from the days of the Romans. Situated on a lofty rock, which commands the whole valley of the Araxes, it is the key of that valley, and may be considered as the principal outwork of Erzeroum.[1]

[1] Fonton, 464, 466; Valentini, 335; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 89.

102. Fall of Erzeroum. July 20.

The advance of the Russians and capture of Hassan-Kale spread the utmost consternation in that capital. The populace loudly clamoured for immediate submission; but the troops still stood firm, and the walls were lined with numerous defenders, apparently bent on a resolute defence. Paskewitch, however, rapidly approached; on the 19th his advanced guard appeared before the capital, and on the day following he himself arrived, with the guns and bulk of his forces. Conferences soon began for the surrender of the place; but as the enemy seemed to be only striving to gain time, he ordered an immediate attack on Top-Dagh, a fortified rocky eminence, commanding both the citadel and the entire town. The Russians advanced to the attack with drums beating and colours flying, and the Turks were so intimidated by their aspect that, without attempting any resistance, they abandoned the post, and fled into the city. This success was decisive of the fate of Erzeroum; further resistance was impossible, for the guns from Top-Dagh commanded every part of the town. A capitulation, accordingly, was agreed on, and the Russian troops entered the capital of Asia Minor on the anniversary of the battle of Pultowa. A hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, six standards, the Seraskier's baton, and immense stores of ammunition and provisions, fell into the hands of the victors, and the Russian standards waved on the ramparts of the capital of the Turkish empire in Asia.[2]

[2] Fonton, 470, 476.

The Russians, however, were not allowed to remain long in the quiet possession of their conquest. The pachalic of Bajazeth, as a glance at the map will demonstrate, was extrinsic to the line of operations, and being pushed far into the enemy's territories, lay exposed to his attacks, the more especially as the garrison, of fifteen hundred Russian and a thousand Armenian levies, was hardly adequate to its defence. Encouraged by these circumstances, and anticipating an easy conquest, the Pacha of Van, in the beginning of June, collected ten thousand men, with which he laid siege to the town. The Turks at first gained such success that the fall of the place appeared certain. They penetrated, after several assaults, into the works, and made themselves masters of two bastions and several guns. General Popoff, the governor, deeming further resistance useless, proposed to evacuate the place; but General Panatine, the second in command, though wounded, combated this proposal so strongly that it was resolved to continue the defence. They concentrated the garrison, accordingly, in the strongest points of the town which still remained to them, and there made so vigorous a defence that the Turks, after having been repulsed with great slaughter in several assaults, were compelled to raise the siege, after having lost two thousand men before the place; but one-third of the heroic garrison had fallen during the defence.[1]

103. Further movements.

June 21.

July 1.

[1] Fonton, 476, 484; Valentini, 389, 390.

So rapid had been the advance upon Erzeroum, and so immediate the success, that the Russian reserves were still far in the rear when the place fell, and Paskewitch was obliged to suspend his operations till their arrival. He turned this necessary delay to good account, by strengthening his position in that capital, and establishing there a central government, under the protection of Russia, which might turn the resources of the conquered provinces to good account. His administrative measures were so judicious that they gave universal satisfaction, and won for him the confidence of all classes of citizens. So wide-

104. Submission of the Pacha of Musb, and of Baibout.

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spread was the reputation of his probity and just administration, that it soon procured for him the submission of distant provinces, which had never yet been visited by the Russian arms. Among the rest, the Pacha of Mush gave in his adhesion, and withdrew his troops from the Turkish service; and the inhabitants of Baibout, a town situated seventy miles from the Russian headquarters, made offers of submission. Paskewitch at first hesitated to accept them, owing to the distance; but having received intelligence that the Seraskier was levying troops there, he changed his resolution, and sent General Burtsdorff, with two thousand men, to occupy the place. At his approach the Turks, five thousand strong, dispersed, and evacuated the fortress, which was occupied without resistance. This acquisition was of importance, both from its intrinsic strength, and as opening the road to Trebizond and the shores of the Black Sea.[1]

[1] Fonton, 485, 491; Valentini, 390.

105. Disaster before Khart. July 19.

The reserves having at length arrived, Paskewitch, after three weeks' inaction, resolved to recommence operations. His advance was accelerated by a severe check which Burtsdorff's division received in an attack upon the fortress of Khart, which was repulsed with the loss of sixty killed and two hundred and seventy wounded—among the latter of which was Burtsdorff himself, who was struck in the breast by a pistol-shot as he was seizing a standard. This disaster opened the eyes of Paskewitch to the danger of any further extension of his operations with the limited force at his disposal; but at the same time he saw the necessity of a vigorous stroke to re-establish the lustre of the Russian arms, which in all wars, but especially those of Asia, is so important an element in success. No sooner, accordingly, did he hear of the disaster of his lieutenant, than, collecting all the disposable forces at his command, he set out himself against Khart.[2] The Lazes, twelve thousand strong, who formed the militia of the country, collected in great force at his approach, and, flushed with their former victory,

Aug. 20.

[2] Fonton, 491, 499; Valentini, 391, 392; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 93, 94; Doc. Hist.

prepared to defend the place to the last extremity. They were posted in an intrenched camp resting on the town; but notwithstanding the strength of the position, and the valour of the Mussulmans, they were utterly routed and dispersed, and the town taken. This important victory insured the immediate submission of all the neighbouring tribes, and opened to the Russians the roads to the important harbours of Livaz and Trebizond.

106. Retreat of Paskewitch to Erzeroum. Aug. 21.

Notwithstanding this success, and the brilliant prospect of getting the command of the whole sea-coast from Trebizond to Batoum thus opened to him, which would have established his communication with the sea of which the Russians were masters, Paskewitch felt the necessity of checking his advance, and securing the conquests he had made, before attempting fresh ones. The better to conceal his design, he detached two columns towards the sea-coast, which were entirely successful, and drove the Turks in confusion before them. The fortress of Ghumicol-Kane was occupied without firing a shot, and the light horse were pushed almost to the gates of Trebizond. But the attack on that place could not have been hazarded without at least five thousand men, and such a force could not be spared in the present divided state of the army. The general-in-chief therefore withdrew the bulk of his forces to Erzeroum, and evacuated Baibout, after having blown up its fortifications.[1]

[1] Fonton, 501, 509; Ann. Hist. xii. 93, 94; Doc. Hist. xii. 385.

107. Defeat of the Turks in Guriel, and subsequent checks of the Russians. Aug. 14.

While Paskewitch was adopting this wise resolution, General Pankratieff had resumed operations with vigour in Guriel, and on the shores of the Black Sea. Surmounting precipices and passing by roads deemed impracticable, he attacked and totally defeated eight thousand Turks in the defiles of Mukha-Estatt, taking sixty-eight guns and five hundred prisoners. At the news of this defeat, all resistance ceased in Guriel, and the armed bands in that quarter dispersed.[2] But an expedition, undertaken by General Sacken, the governor of Akhalzikh, against another mountain chief of Adjar, failed from the

Aug. 28. Sept. 18.

[2] Fonton, 509, 516.

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insurmountable difficulties of the rocky heights in which the enemy had taken post; and soon after another expedition against Tsikhedjeri, an important hill-fort near Batoum, was repulsed with the loss of seven hundred men.

108. Advance of Paskewitch against Baibout.

These checks, and the commencement of the autumnal rains, which set in early and with great severity that year, induced the Russian general to make preparations for withdrawing to his winter-quarters in Georgia, leaving only garrisons in the towns which had been conquered. No sooner did this become known than the Seraskier announced the immediate retreat of the Russians from Erzeroum, and the abandonment of all their conquests. He succeeded in this way in again rousing the Lazes and Kurds to take up arms, who, like other Asiatics, pass easily from one extreme to another, and are as rapidly elevated by success as they are depressed by defeat; and Osman Pacha was soon at the head of ten thousand men at Baibout, and six thousand more were assembled at Tiflis, while on his other flank a large force was collecting under the orders of the Pacha of Van. Informed of these preparations, and desirous of striking a decisive blow before he withdrew into Georgia, and left the conquered fortresses to their own resources, Paskewitch continued his preparations as for a general retreat, while he was in reality concentrating his forces for a final blow. At length, having got a sufficient force in hand, and deeming the enemy so far assembled that the moment for action had arrived, he despatched a small covering force to keep in check the Pacha of Van on his left flank, and marched himself with the bulk of his forces, consisting of six thousand infantry, fifteen hundred horse, and thirty guns, in two columns against Baibout. Having skilfully interposed one of his columns between the forces posted at Baibout and those at Tiflis, he conducted the attacks in person on the former of these places.[1] It was garrisoned by twelve thousand

[1] Fonton, 516, 525; Paskewitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 84, 87.

men, strongly posted in an intrenched camp, armed with redoubts, and amply provided with artillery.

Relying on their decided superiority of forces, which was above two to one, the Turks, on the approach of the Russians, sallied out of their intrenchments, and themselves commenced the attack. Paskewitch instantly saw his advantage, and turned it to the best account. Forming his troops into two columns, he led them in double-quick time against the enemy. The Ottomans no sooner saw the intrepid countenance of the Russians, than, without awaiting the shock, they took to flight, and rushed back in confusion to their intrenchments, so closely followed by the Muscovites that they could not fire the guns on them for fear of striking down their own men. Thus victors and vanquished entered the redoubts together, which, with all their artillery, remained in the hands of the Russians. The whole army upon this took to flight, closely followed by the cavalry and Cossacks of Paskewitch, who continued the pursuit till they were entirely dispersed. In this brilliant affair the Turks lost seven hundred killed, twelve hundred prisoners, six guns, and twelve standards, while the total casualties of the Russians did not exceed a hundred men. After the battle was over, the Seraskier came up with the reserve, ten thousand strong; but seeing the entire destruction of the corps first engaged, he hastily withdrew to Balakhor. Baibout remained in the hands of the Russians; but it was little more than a heap of ruins, for the inhabitants fled with the Turks, and their houses, which took fire during the conflict, were almost entirely consumed before the entrance of Paskewitch's men could be effected.[1]

109. Total defeat of the Turks, and termination of the campaign. Sept. 28.

[1] Fonton, 516, 529; Russian Bulletin, Nov. 17, Ann. Hist. xii. 102.

This was the last action of the campaign. Immediately afterwards, despatches were received by both parties announcing the conclusion of a convention between General Diebitch and the Grand Vizier, with a view to the conclusion of a peace, at Adrianople. Hostilities imme-

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diately ceased on both sides; and Paskewitch, after leaving garrisons in the conquered towns, led back the remainder of his forces to their winter-quarters in Georgia. In recrossing the Saganlugh, on the 17th October, he met the courier of the Emperor, who brought him the baton of a field-marshal. Never was the honour more worthily bestowed. In the space of four months he had, with a force which never could muster twenty thousand combatants in the field, marched two hundred and fifty German miles, beaten and dispersed three Turkish armies, each double the strength of his own, carried by storm several intrenched camps and four strong fortresses, conquered the capital of Asia Minor and two entire pachalics, taken two hundred and sixty-two pieces of cannon and sixty-five standards, and made prisoner the Turkish general-in-chief, and three thousand soldiers! These brilliant successes had been achieved with the loss only of four thousand men in killed, wounded, prisoners, and by sickness—a number singularly small, when it is recollected that, during the whole course of the campaign, the plague raged in several of the towns which were taken. These great results were gained entirely by the admirable stratagetical skill of the general, and the courage and perseverance of his followers. The annals of Rome in ancient, of the British conquests in India in modern times, contain no more memorable story illustrative of the ascendancy of mind over matter, of intelligence, combination, and genius, over a vast superiority of physical strength.[1]

110. Conclusion of an armistice, and summary of the campaign. Oct. 17.

[1] Fonton, 527, 532; Ann. Hist. xii. 105.

111. Preparations of the Turks for the campaign in Turkey in Europe.

While Asia Minor was the theatre of these glorious exploits, events, perhaps less distinguished by military talent, but still more momentous in their consequences, took place in European Turkey. The forces of either party had there been much weakened by the losses of the preceding campaign; but great efforts were made on both sides to recruit during the winter. The Turks were so much reduced by the departure of their

troops to visit their homes, according to their usual custom in winter, that scarce ten thousand men remained in Schumla; and an expedition which the Grand Vizier undertook, with six thousand, against Pravadi, in the end of November, led to no result. The Mussulmans returned in crowds to their standards, however, when spring came back, and the Grand Vizier, in the beginning of March, had forty thousand men in the intrenched camp around Schumla; and the most pressing orders were sent to the Pachas of Widdin, Janina, Adrianople, and Scutari, to hasten to the scene of action with all their forces. Had they duly obeyed the summons, and brought their contingents into the field, there would have been two hundred thousand Ottomans to defend the line of the Balkan, and the Russians would have attempted in vain to cross it. But some held back from disaffection, part from the indelible tardiness of the Ottoman character. The Pacha of Widdin delayed obviously from treachery; and the Pacha of Scodra, who should have appeared with thirty thousand men, did not come up till the campaign was over. It was too evident that, in Europe as in Asia, the deadly feud with the janizaries had paralysed great part of the strength of the empire. The result was, that the Turks had not above a hundred thousand men altogether in arms in Europe to meet the first shock of war, and above half of this force was absorbed in the fortresses on the Danube. Of the forty thousand in Schumla a great part were new levies, who had never seen service, and had been broke into it by a discipline which they detested. Many of them, instead of the honourable wounds received in war, bore on their faces and shoulders the marks of the blows recently inflicted by the drill-sergeants in the course of instructing them in the rudiments of the military art—an indignity which an old janizary or spahi would have instantly resented with the death of his tormentor.[1]

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[1] Valentini, 397, 403.

The Russians turned the breathing-time afforded them

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112. Preparations of the Russians.

by the cessation of hostilities in winter to much better account; and the length of time which the war had now lasted had enabled them to bring up their distant forces and reserves to the theatre of war. The vast array of a hundred and fifty-eight thousand men, which had crossed the Danube in the course of the preceding campaign, had melted away to half that number before its close, by fatigue, sickness, and the sword. Of these forty thousand, under General Roth, lay between Hirchova, Pravadi, and Varna; fifteen thousand, under General Geismar, were in Little Wallachia, and the remainder in observation before the fortresses still held by the Turks on the Danube, or in keeping up the communications. This force was obviously inadequate to attempt any offensive movement against an enemy so strongly posted as the Turks were on the Danube and the Balkan; but before the winter was over they received very great reinforcements. No less than a hundred and twenty thousand men, on paper at least, were drawn from the army of the south, under General Sacken, and twenty thousand hardy Cossacks came up from Bessarabia. At least a third, however, must be deducted from these numbers for non-effective, and if to this the losses from sickness and fatigue are added, it may fairly be concluded that seventy thousand effective men were added to the Russian army. Thus they began the campaign with at least a hundred and fifty thousand men in Bulgaria and on the line of the Danube—an immense force, considering its discipline and experience, the command of the sea which it possessed, and the prestige derived from a long series of victories it enjoyed. It had with it five hundred and forty guns, and provisions for the immense host for two months were stored on the Danube.[1] Add to this, that its generals had become acquainted, by the experience of the preceding campaign, with the tactics and mode of combating the Turks, and that the army was incomparably better provided with camels, horses, magazines, stores, and im-

[1] Chesney, 201; Ann. Hist. xii. 357, 358; Moltke, Feldzug von 1828-29, 108.

plements requisite for the war, than it had ever been on any former occasion.

Encouraged by the growing superiority of their force, the Russian generals were tempted during the winter to undertake some minor operations on the coast, which were not without their influence on the general issue of the campaign, and might have revealed to the Turkish generals the quarter in which the most serious effort against them was to be expected. Count Langeron, so well known in the last war between Russia and France, having collected eight thousand men in the end of January, made an attack on the Turkish intrenched posts at Kale and Turnoid, on the left bank of the Danube, between Roudschuck and Widdin. The first was taken with thirty guns in the first assault; the second held out, but was at length reduced by regular approaches on the 11th February. Ninety-eight pieces of cannon fell into their hands on the walls; the garrison, two thousand five hundred strong, was permitted to retire to Roudschuck. This success led to the capture of a flotilla of thirty gun-boats on the Danube, near Nicopolis, a few days after, which gave them the entire command of that portion of the river. A still more important acquisition was the castle of Sizepolis, a stronghold situated on a rock projecting into the Black Sea, a little to the south of the Bay of Bourgas, at the eastern end of the Balkan. It yielded in a few hours to the simple cannonade of some Russian vessels of war, the garrison, consisting of one thousand Albanians, having evacuated the place. The Russians immediately landed, took possession of the fort, and strengthened its works, too happy to become so easily masters of a little Gibraltar on the sea-coast, *within* the vaunted line of the Balkan.[1]

113. Operations during the winter.

Jan. 24.

Feb. 11.

Feb. 18.

[1] Valentini, 397, 399; Ann. Hist. xii. 353, 354; Chesney, 203.

The success of Wittgenstein in the preceding campaign against the Turks in Europe had not been such as to justify his being retained in the command. He was

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114. Retirement of Wittgenstein, and appointment of Diebitch to the command-in-chief. Feb. 27.

allowed to retire accordingly, a step rested on his age and infirmities; and he received for his successor COUNT DIEBITCH, the chief of his staff, whose great abilities and success in the succeeding campaign fully justified the Emperor's choice.* Wittgenstein retired in February, with the thanks of the Emperor for "his distinguished services in the career of glory, and for those which he had rendered in the preceding winter, by organising the army in such a manner as to insure victory in the succeeding campaign." Diebitch, in an order of the day, at the same time, in announcing his taking the command, expressed himself in flattering terms to his respectable predecessor, "whose advanced years deprived him of the pleasure of again combating the enemy; but nothing is impossible to the Russian warriors, when they combat for their faith, their honour, and their country."[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xii. 357, 358.

The decisive superiority of the Russians at sea, both in the Mediterranean and the Euxine, gave them a very great advantage, which threatened to starve Constanti-

* Like so many of the generals in the Russian service, Diebitch is a foreigner. He was born on 13th May 1785, at Grossleippe, in Prussian Silesia, of an ancient family, and received his military education at the school of cadets in Berlin. In 1805, at the age of thirty, he entered the Russian service as ensign in the grenadier guards, where his talents and courage attracted the notice of the Emperor Alexander. He was engaged in the battle of Austerlitz, and, being wounded in the right hand, he did not leave the field, but took his sword in his left, for which he was rewarded by a sabre of honour from the Czar. He signalised himself also at the battles of Eylau and Friedland, for his conduct on which occasions he received a company, and was decorated by the orders of St George of Russia and of Merit in Prussia. After the peace of Tilsit, he profited by his leisure to study the military art, especially strategy, in which he soon made such progress as procured for him a situation on the staff. In the war of 1812 he was attached to Wittgenstein's corps, and distinguished himself on the 18th October in the defence of a bridge, which preserved from destruction an entire corps, and won for him the rank of major-general. In the retreat he followed the Prussian general D'York with eighteen hundred horse, and by his prudent conduct contributed much to the important defection of that general with his corps, which ensued. In 1813 he was made chief of the staff to Wittgenstein, then in command of the grand allied army, a situation of the very highest importance; and he was one of those who conducted the secret treaty of Reichenbach, concluded on 14th June 1813 between the allied powers. He evinced great talents at the battle of Dresden, where he had a horse shot under him; and distinguished himself so much at the battle of Leipsic, that he was

Naval forces of the Russians and Turks.

nople itself into an early submission, and deprived the Turks of all possibility of transporting their troops or magazines by water; a difficulty of the very greatest magnitude in a country so destitute of practicable roads as Turkey, both in Europe and Asia. Admiral Greig, with nine sail of the line, five frigates, and twenty-eight corvettes, carrying 1556 guns, blockaded the Bosphorus; while Admiral Hamelin, with eight sail of the line, seven frigates, and seventeen corvettes, shut in the Dardenelles. The Turks and Egyptians, whose marine had been totally ruined by the battle of Navarino, had no force capable of meeting these fleets; the whole ships remaining in the harbour of Constantinople in the spring of 1829 were four sail of the line, two frigates, and six corvettes; and the Egyptian fleet, consisting of one ship of the line, six frigates, and nine corvettes, was cut off from them by the blockade of the Dardanelles, and rendered no service whatever during the campaign.[1] Thus the entire command of the sea, with all its inestimable

[1] Ann. Hist. xii. 360, 361.

promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general by the Emperor Alexander in person on the field of battle. In the campaign of 1814, when the memorable conference took place to consider whether the Allies should advance to Paris, when Napoleon moved on Arcis-sur-Aube, he was one of those who most strenuously supported the advance to the French capital which led to such important results. Arrived on the heights of Montmartre, Alexander publicly embraced him, and decorated him with the order of St Alexander Newski. After the peace of 1814 he returned to St Petersburg, where he married a niece of Barclay de Tolly, and was soon after summoned to the Congress of Vienna, and appointed chief of the staff of the first army. After this he became so great a favourite with Alexander that he accompanied him on all his travels, and attended his deathbed at Taganrog in 1825. He was, from his devotion to the imperial family, singled out for the peculiar vengeance of the conspirators at that time, and was to have been carried off or despatched with the Emperor and Grand-duke. On occasion of the revolt of the guards at St Petersburg, he exhibited a rare combination of talent and prudence; and he was despatched afterwards to Moscow, to attend the remains of the Emperor Alexander to St Petersburg. When the war broke out in 1828, he was appointed chief of the staff to Wittgenstein's army; and in February 1829 to succeed him in the chief command. His strategetical talents were very great, and have won for him a lasting place in European fame; and his coolness and courage were *à toute epreuve*. But his disposition was warm, and his temper irritable, which sometimes led him into excesses; and in the end, as will appear in the sequel, occasioned his death in the prime of life.—See *Biographie Universelle, Supplément*, lxii. 470, 471 (DIEBITCH.)

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consequences, fell to the Russians during the whole remainder of the war.

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116. Russian plan of the campaign, and Turkish, and repulse of the latter at Sizepolis.

The Russian plan of the campaign, based on the possession of Varna and the command of the Black Sea, was to besiege Silistria, Roudschuck, and Schumla, and, having made themselves masters of these places, to push across the Balkan by the eastern valleys between the last of these fortresses and the sea. The fort of Sizepolis was of great value in this view, as it was a stronghold *within* the Balkan range, and by means of its harbour enabled the Russians to communicate with their fleet in the Black Sea, and receive supplies from Galatz and Odessa. The Turkish generals, impressed with the importance of Schumla in all preceding campaigns, were persuaded that it would be of equal importance in the one which was approaching, and used all their efforts to concentrate as large a force as possible within its walls. They thus stripped the eastern defiles of the Balkan of nearly all its defenders; and only three thousand men were left in charge of the passes leading from Varna and Pravadi across the mountains. They were aware, however, of the value of Sizepolis, and fitted out an expedition to recover it. By a sudden assault at

April 9. daybreak on the 9th April, they succeeded in breaking into the fort, and surprising part of the garrison. But a portion of it rallied with such vigour that the Turks in their turn were expelled from the works, with the loss of two hundred and fifty. Encouraged by this success, the garrison of Sizepolis made an attack on Antiochia, which was repulsed with equal loss; but the Russians, notwithstanding, maintained themselves in the former important post, which they held till the end of the campaign. Irritated beyond endurance by the establishment of a Muscovite post within twenty-five leagues of the capital, the Sultan ordered the Turkish fleet, consisting of four ships of the line, five frigates, and a few corvettes, to issue from the Bosphorus and endeavour to retake it. They

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fell in with a Russian frigate, the Raphael, of forty-five guns, which they took, and brought back in triumph to Constantinople. The unwonted spectacle of a naval triumph excited the utmost enthusiasm in the capital, which was increased a few days after by the arrival, during the suspension of the blockade, of a valuable convoy of wheat from Natolia, for the use of its inhabitants. But these transports were of short duration; for, having ventured upon a second sortie a few days after, Admiral Greig met them with his squadron of eight line-of-battle ships, forced them to retire within the Bosphorus, and re-established the blockade on that side, which was continued till the conclusion of the war.[1]

May 20.

[1] Ann. Hist. xii. 362, 363; Chesney, 205, 207; Molkt, Feldzug von 1829, 117.

117. Commencement of the campaign on both sides.

The violence of the equinoctial gales and storms, and the floods of the Danube, rendered it impossible to commence the campaign till the beginning of May, by which time the forces were fully brought up on both sides; it then began in good earnest, and soon became of great importance. The Russians on their side advanced in two huge columns to the Danube, which they began to pass at Hirchova and Kalavatsch, immediately below Silistria. The passage was completed in imposing style on the 10th, and the left column approached that fortress, the siege of which was the first object of the campaign. A warm action of cavalry ensued on the 17th, which ended in the Turks being driven under the cannon of the place, and the investment was commenced, General Kouprianoff, being stationed at Pravadi with eight thousand men, to keep up the communication of the forces under General Roth, near Varna, with those which were directed against Silistria. Redschid Pacha, who had recently been called from Greece to the important station of Grand Vizier, had collected forty thousand men in Schumla; and he resolved to commence the campaign by an attack on Pravadi, preparatory to an attempt to regain Varna.[2] He issued, accordingly, with ten thousand foot and five thousand horse to com-

May 8.

May 17.

[2] Ann. Hist. xii. 364, 365; Val. 410, 412; Chesney, 207, 208; Molkt, 120, 121.

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mence operations, but before reaching Pravadi it was deemed expedient to make an attack on a post the Russians had established and fortified with redoubts at Eski-Arnautlar, three miles from Pravadi, where six battalions were posted.

118. Bloody combats at Eski-Arnautlar.

The attack was commenced by the Turkish troops with great resolution, and such success that victory appeared certain, when they were assailed in flank by General Wachter, who came up with three thousand foot and eight hundred Cossacks from the side of Dewno, thrown into confusion, and driven back towards Pravadi. But the Grand Vizier on his side also had summoned up reinforcements from Schumla; and they met the victorious Russians as they were pursuing the Turks from Eski-Arnautlar. Instantly three thousand Ottoman horse, in splendid condition, having as yet experienced none of the fatigues of the campaign, threw themselves, with loud cries, on two Russian battalions which headed the pursuit. The Muscovites were assailed before they had time to form square; the rush was irresistible, and they were almost all cut to pieces, with their brave commander, General Rynden. The four remaining Russian battalions seemed lost; and so they would have been, if it had been possible to keep the Turks better in hand. But, intoxicated by their success, they dispersed to plunder and behead the slain, and this gave a breathing-time to the battalions in rear, who retreated to a rising ground, where they succeeded in maintaining themselves till General Roth, by a flank movement, which threatened to cut them off from Schumla, obliged them to retire to the intrenched camp before that fortress. In this desperate affair the loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about two thousand men to each party, and each had some standards to exhibit, wrested from their antagonists in fair fight;[1] but the Russians, upon the whole, justly claimed the advantage, as they had succeeded in maintaining the position of Eski-Arnautlar, and compelling

[1] Valentini, 412, 413; Ann. Hist. xii. 364, 365; Molkt, 124-7.

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their opponents to withdraw to the intrenched camp in front of Schumla.

On the same day on which these bloody conflicts took place between Schumla and Pravadi, the investment of Silistria was effected. This town, which is situated on the right bank of the Danube, near the commencement of its delta, contained, in 1829, twenty-nine thousand inhabitants, of whom nearly six thousand were enrolled among the armed defenders of the place. It is imperfectly fortified, and is commanded by some heights on the outside, especially to the south-west. There are ten fronts, each of which has an extremely long curtain and two small bastions, which give a flanking fire to the ditch. The scarp and counterscarp have scarcely a perpendicular of fifteen feet, but the former is surmounted by a hurdle parapet, with a strong row of palisades rising above its crest on the inner side. There is a low and very imperfect glacis, but no covered-way or outworks, excepting three exterior redoubts on the land side and two towards the river, which cover the vessels anchored under the walls. Such had been the supineness of the Turks during the winter, that they had made no attempt to demolish or injure the approaches made by the Russians during the preceding campaign, so that when they returned on this occasion they marched into the old works and trenches as if they had only evacuated them on the preceding day. It may readily be conceived how this marvellous negligence on the part of the Ottomans facilitated the operations of the next siege. The besieging force was thirty-five thousand strong, and Diebitch was at the head of a covering army of forty thousand, a little in advance towards Schumla. The garrison, exclusive of the armed inhabitants, was nearly ten thousand, commanded by Achmet Pacha, a man of determined resolution and tried ability.[1]

119. Commencement of the siege of Silistria, and its description.

[1] Chesney, 39, 40; Ann. Hist. xii. 365; Val. 413, 414; Molkt, 127, 131.

Diebitch prosecuted the siege of this fortress with the utmost vigour, while a powerful flotilla, issuing from the

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120.

First operations of the siege, and Redschid Pacha's movement against Pravadi. May 28.

upper part of the river, cut the besieged off from all communication by water on the west. His approaches were directed chiefly against a hornwork which the Turks had constructed on the margin of the river, and the front to which it was attached. But the besieged made a vigorous resistance, and recourse was of necessity had to the tedious processes of sap and mine; and the inundations of the Danube rendered the progress of both during the first week of the siege extremely slow. This circumstance, joined to the chequered success which had attended the Ottoman arms in the combats of the 17th at Eski-Arnautlar, induced the Grand Vizier to conceive a grand plan, which might, if successful, be attended with decisive effects upon the issue of the campaign. This was nothing less than to move out of Schumla, with nearly the whole troops assembled there, against Pravadi, where only eight thousand men were left in garrison, who, it was thought, might with ease be overcome by the superior force brought against them. Impressed with this project, which he hoped would effectually divert the enemy's attention from the siege of Silistria, and probably lead to its abandonment, Redschid Pacha issued from Schumla on the 28th May, at the head of thirty-six thousand men, and, directing his steps across the hills, he reached the rugged and narrow valley in which Pravadi stands, and established himself in front of the western works of that place on the 1st June. General Roth reinforced the garrison by two battalions, and retired with the bulk of his forces, about ten thousand strong, to Koslodschi, twenty miles to the northward, despatching at the same time an officer with the intelligence to Diebitch. This officer had orders to ride as for life and death; and with such fidelity did he execute his mission that he reached the headquarters of the general-in-chief, a distance of *eighty miles*, in twelve hours, without changing his horse.[1]

[1] Valentini, 421; Chesney, 209, 211; Ann. Hist. xii. 371; Molkt, 130, 134.

Diebitch no sooner heard of this movement of the Grand Vizier against Pravadi, than he conceived, and

instantly carried into execution, the brilliant stroke which decided the campaign, and has deservedly given him a very high place in the archives of military fame. This was, to break up with the bulk of the covering army from the neighbourhood of Silistria, and to move direct by forced marches, not on the Grand Vizier's force in front of Eski-Arnautlar, but on his line of communication with Schumla. By this means he would compel the Turks either to abandon the latter fortress entirely to its feeble garrison, in which case it could make no defence, or to fight their way back to it through the Russian army—a contingency more likely than any other to lead to decisive success, as the Turkish troops, however zealous and brave, had not yet acquired the consistency requisite to enable them to perform complicated movements under fire in the open field. This decision was no sooner formed by the Russian general than it was acted upon; and on the 5th June, accordingly, he set out from the shores of the Danube at the head of twenty thousand men, leaving General Krasowsky to continue the siege of Silistria.[1]

121. Diebitch throws himself on the Turkish communications.

[1] Valentini, 421, 422; Ann. Hist. xii. 371; Chesney, 210, 211; Molkt, 132, 136.

Pravadi stands in a deep and narrow valley, shut in on either side by mountain ridges about two thousand feet in height, the offshoots of the Balkan, and which runs nearly south and north, the stream in its bottom flowing to the Danube from that ridge. It forms the base of a triangle of valleys, of which the one side is the valley of Kalugre or Newtscha, and the third that of Markowtscha, the apex being at Madara, a little beyond Kuletcha. Thus Madara was the point through which an army, taking either of the valleys between that of Pravadi and Schumla, must pass in moving from the one to the other. Thither, accordingly, Diebitch directed his footsteps; and with such expedition did he march that Count Pahlen, with the advanced guard, established himself there on the 9th June. Next day General Roth, who had, by skilfully drawing a curtain of light troops between the Ottomans and the line of the Russian advance, entirely concealed their move-

122. Description of the country, and movements of the armies.

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ments from the enemy, by a rapid forced march effected his junction with Diebitch, thereby raising the force under the command of the latter to thirty-one thousand men, and one hundred and forty-six guns. The Russian force now occupied the entrance of all the valleys leading from Pravadi to Schumla, so as entirely to cut off the Turks from their retreat to that fortress, which was observed by four battalions. But the Russian army, which was raised by the junction of Roth's corps to forty-four battalions and fifty squadrons, was very much scattered, extending from Boulanik by Madara to near Pravadi, a distance of twenty-five miles.[1]

[1] Chesney, 213, 214; Valentini, 422, 423; Ann. Hist. xii. 371, 372; Molkt, 140.

123. Turkish movements.

A line of such extent, in a country where the roads were so bad and the communications so difficult, presented a favourable opportunity for striking a decisive blow to a concentrated enemy; and had Diebitch been in presence of Napoleon or Wellington, it is probable he would have paid dear for his temerity. But no danger was to be apprehended from the Turkish commanders, who, entirely ignorant of what was going forward on their line of communication, remained quiet before Pravadi, intent only on insignificant skirmishes with the garrison. A combat between the advanced guard of Diebitch, under General Kreutz, and a body of Turkish cavalry, on the evening of the 10th, near Jenibazar, first made the Grand Vizier aware of his danger; and from some prisoners taken he learned the astounding news that his communications with Schumla were entirely cut off. Three lines of retreat to that fortress alone existed—that by the great road through Madara, which was in the hands of the enemy, and could not be forced without a general battle; one on the right, by the valley of Neftja, on Jenibazar; or one on the left, by Kawarna and Marasj. The two last offered the greatest chances of passing without serious molestation from the enemy. But the roads by these routes were mere mountain paths, very difficult for the Turkish artillery, which was all drawn by bullocks.[2] The central road, there-

[2] Chesney, 213, 214; Valentini, 423, 424; Ann. Hist. xii. 372, 373; Molkt, 138, 140.

fore, by Madara, was preferred; and as the Grand Vizier persisted in the belief that he had only the corps of Roth and Rudiger to deal with in his line of retreat, he anticipated very little difficulty in destroying them, and re-entering Schumla by the great road, with the trophies of victory in his train.*

124. Battle of Kouleftscha. June 11.

The retreating masses of the Turks first came in contact with the Russian advanced-guard at the debouch of the defile of Tchirkvona. It consisted of five battalions, four squadrons, and twelve guns, under General Otrotschenko, which had been ordered to make a reconnoissance on the Russian right to discover the enemy. Instantly a battery of five guns was brought up by the Ottomans, and masked, while a body of three thousand horse prepared to charge the moment the masked battery was opened. When the enemy came within canister range, accordingly, the guns opened, the cavalry charged, and the Russian horse were completely routed, with the loss of four hundred killed and five pieces of cannon. Following up their charge, the Turkish horse next threw themselves on the squares of infantry, each composed of a battalion. Two were broken and cut to pieces, one of them sixteen hundred strong, as the men stood in their ranks, where they perished under the Turkish scimitars.† Five more guns were also taken. The three remaining squares with difficulty made their way back to the valley of KOULEFTSCHA,

* "Il faut toujours aux Turcs des chemins larges, parce que leur artillerie, attelée de buffles, n'en saurait suivre d'étroits. Il paraît que des préjugés nationaux enracinés s'opposent à toute espèce d'amélioration. Ils croiraient avilir le noble cheval en l'attelant. On sait qu'il est du naturel du Turc d'avoir plus d'égard pour les animaux de prédilection que pour les hommes. Il n'est point de leur usage de faire ce qui est necessaire pour faciliter le transport, de graisser leurs roues ou leurs essieux; car, dit la loi du Prophete, 'Il n'y a que des voleurs et des malfaiteurs qui rôdent dans le silence et en secret, sur des chemins défendus, tandis qu'un vrai Mussulman va toujours sans crainte, *avec un bruit convenable, et partout avec des essieux criants, quand il est en voiture.*'"—VALENTINI, 425.

† "According to the account given to the author by a Russian officer who was in the battle (Lieutenant Schaufup), two of the squares were broken, and one of them, sixteen hundred in number, of Murom's regiment, was entirely cut to pieces as the men stood in their ranks. Six guns were also taken."—CHESNEY, 219.

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where the pursuit of the Ottomans, who were rushing through the valley with loud shouts, was at length checked by the cross fire of several Russian batteries posted on the heights on the opposite side, and the firm countenance of a brigade of infantry, which was suddenly brought up to the scene of danger under General Pahlen. By their united efforts the pursuit of the Turks, who by this time had become a disorderly swarm, was at length checked, and time given for the infantry which had escaped to re-form. Finding themselves overmatched, the Turkish horse retired as rapidly as they had advanced; but in their retreat they were attacked by a brigade of Pahlen's hussars, and thrown into utter confusion. They regained the position they had left in the morning with heavy loss, and after having won a success which, if properly supported by the Grand Vizier's reserve, would not only have entirely cleared the road to Schumla, but achieved a glorious victory.[1]

[1] Chesney, 216, 219; Diebitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 68; Doc. Hist.; Valentini, 428, 429; Molkt, 140, 141.

125. Fresh dispositions of Diebitch.

The battle had now lasted four hours, and both parties, exhausted with fatigue, took a short repose during the burning noon of the dog-days. The Turkish troops, resting under the shade of their thickets, remained motionless, as did the Russian which had been engaged. But Diebitch, perceiving he had the whole Turkish army in his front, with their backs to Pravadi and their faces to Schumla, resolved to bring on a decisive battle. He accordingly, without losing an instant, drew together every disposable man and gun to strengthen the centre, which was *à cheval* on the high-road, a little in front of Madara, between Kouleftscha and Salpija. Twenty-four battalions and a body of hussars were kept in reserve, to be at hand in case of disaster, and observe the garrison of Schumla, which might possibly attempt a sally during the action. The remainder of the army, consisting of twenty battalions and forty squadrons, with the whole artillery, numbering a hundred and ten guns, in front, was thus disposed:[1] Generals Roth and Zoll were ordered to advance against

[1] Valentini, 428, 429; Diebitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 68; Doc. Hist.; Chesney, 220, 223; Molkt, 141, 144.

the enemy's front; while a division, under Kulitza, was detached, by a circuitous mountain-path, without cavalry or artillery, to threaten his rear, when the action was once thoroughly engaged. In the front of all was the horse-artillery of Arnoldi, consisting of twenty-four pieces, supported by Pahlen's guns, thirty-five in number, which opened a terrible fire of round shot, and then canister, on the enemy's position, and deservedly earned a historic name on this memorable occasion.

126. Victory of the Russians.

The Turkish artillery consisted in all of fifty-six pieces; and being entirely *drawn by oxen*, it was little better than batteries of position, and wholly unable to reply with effect to the concentrated fire which the Russian guns, all drawn by horses, brought to bear on this decisive point. Accordingly, the Ottomans suffered very severely from the fire of the Russian guns, which at length, to the number of a hundred, were brought to the front, and were sending round shot and canister among their lines. The young soldiers, of whom there were a great number on the Turkish side, at length began to grow nervous with the incessant crash of the branches above their heads, as well as the fearful chasms which the shot made in their own ranks. But, notwithstanding this, they made good the position till five o'clock, when three Turkish caissons having accidentally exploded in the centre of their line, a sudden panic arose, and the whole army fled in confusion. Entangled in the rocks and thickets among which it was placed, the artillery could not be brought off, and forty pieces, with three mortars, were taken in the first charge of the victorious Russians, who, with loud shouts, now broke in on all sides, and pursued the fugitives with the utmost vigour. Five thousand were slain in the battle and pursuit, fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and more than half the fugitives threw away their arms, and never were seen again.[2] But the victory was by no means bloodless to the Russians; for they had to lament the loss of two thousand five hundred killed and

[2] Valentini, 429, 430; Diebitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 68, 69, and 373; Chesney, 221, 223; Molkt, 144, 146.

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a thousand wounded, chiefly in the early part of the action.

127. Measures of Diebitch after the battle. June 12.

Had Diebitch been aware of the extent of the disaster which had been sustained by the Turks, or, even without knowing it, had he possessed the energy of Napoleon or Paskewitch, he would have put himself at the head of his reserve, which had not been engaged, that very night, and moved direct upon Schumla, which would, in that event, have proved an easy conquest. The garrison had made a sally during the battle, which had at first been attended with some success; but it was at length repulsed with heavy loss. It was probable, therefore, that that important fortress would have fallen in the first tumult of victory; the more especially as the garrison, in its hurried retreat, abandoned some of the exterior redoubts, which had proved such serious impediments in the preceding campaign. But the Russian general, though profoundly versed in strategy, as his recent march from the Danube evinced, was not equally master of tactics; and, above all, he was not sufficiently aware of the value of time in war, and the importance of the utmost vigour in carrying into execution the able designs which he had formed. He contented himself, therefore, with simply driving the garrison back into the inner works, and despatched Roth, on the 12th, to Marash, in order to intercept the retreating Ottomans. General Matadoff, who commanded the advanced guard, fell in, near that place, with fifteen hundred Turkish cavalry, who were supported by the fire of three redoubts constructed in 1828. They held the post till the arrival of the Russian artillery obliged them to evacuate it, which they did not do till the greater part of them had been put to the sword. Their defence, however, gave time for the Grand Vizier to pass with six thousand horse, and he reached Schumla, by a circuitous route, on the morning of the 13th.[1] The infantry, who had been joined by the troops left in the lines before Pravadi, came in on that and the succeeding

June 12.

[1] Valentini, 430, 432; Ann. Hist. xii. 373, 374; Chesney, 224, 225; Diebitch's Despatch, Ann. Hist. xii. 69, 70; Molkt, 148, 150.

day, by scrambling through the rocks and woods; but then appeared the magnitude of the loss they had sustained. The Grand Vizier could only muster twelve thousand foot-soldiers and six thousand horse, with twelve guns—the poor remains of forty thousand men and fifty-six guns, which had issued from the place, in fine order, a few days before.

128. Progress of the siege of Silistria, and its fall.

This brilliant expedition of the commander-in-chief retarded, but did not suspend, the siege of Silistria. By the end of May all the outworks had been carried; and on the 11th June the third parallel was completed, and the fire of the breaching batteries was so effective that they completely silenced that of the enemy opposed to them. On the following night the sap was run up close to the covered-way, and mines were run under to blow it into the ditch. Still the Turks made a most gallant defence, notwithstanding the discouragement produced by the victory of Kouleftscha; and at daybreak on the 19th they made a general sortie, which was in the outset attended with such success that the Russians were everywhere driven back to their batteries, and the ground lost was not regained till noon on the following day. On the next night the besiegers threw a number of rockets into the town, which, setting it on fire in several places, diffused general consternation. The arrival of Diebitch at the besiegers' lines, on the next day, augmented their vigour; and the inhabitants of the fortress, seeing no chance of being relieved, besieged the governor with petitions for a capitulation. Their entreaties, however, were sternly refused, until the 30th June, when a great mine under the rampart having been exploded, made a yawning breach in it, which by the concentric fire of the Russian artillery was soon rendered practicable. Seeing further resistance hopeless, the two pachas who commanded in the town agreed to surrender. The troops were made prisoners of war, and to the number of eight thousand laid down their arms.[1] There were found on the ramparts

June 19.

June 30.

[1] Chesney, 229, 239; Diebitch's Despatch, July 8, 1828; Ann. Hist. xii. 79; Doc. Hist.; Molkt, 154, 156.

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two hundred and thirty-eight pieces of cannon, besides thirty-one on board the flotilla in the harbour; and thirty-eight standards fell into the hands of the victors. The armed inhabitants were allowed to retire, without their weapons, to any place they chose; but none of them availed themselves of the permission; and the Russians entered the fortress by the breach, with colours flying, on the 1st July.

129. Description of the passes of the Balkan.

So little use had the Turks in Schumla made of the breathing-time afforded them by the resistance of Silistria, which had stood thirty-seven days of open trenches, that in the beginning of August, when the place fell, there were still only 18,000 troops in that fortress, and the eastern passes of the Balkan, between it and the sea, were only occupied by 3000 men! There are twelve or fifteen mountain-paths over that celebrated range, but only five which deserve the name of roads, or are at all practicable for carriages or artillery. These are—the old Roman road from Sophia to Tatar-Bazadgik, which is the present way from Constantinople to Belgrade and Vienna—two from Ternova, by Kusanlik and Silemno—and two from Schumla, by Karnabat and Aidos. Of these the two from Ternova are the most difficult, as they pass over the highest and most inaccessible part of the Balkan range; and that by Aidos is the most frequented, as a chasm in the hill renders the ascent slight and comparatively easy. It goes first by the valley of the Kamtjik, from the northern side, and crosses the ridge between Kouprikios and Aidos. The mountains there are not above 3000 feet in height; and the summit-level of the road, which is a very good one, is not above half that height. The hills are chiefly conical, and generally clothed with oak and beech trees of a very large size; the valleys are bold, shut in with steep precipices, and largely covered with evergreens.[1] The abutments on the southern side, which are higher than those on the northern, are chiefly of limestone, ter-

[1] Chesney, 45, 46; Val. 50, 51.

minating in walls of rock from fifty to two hundred feet in height. Numerous streams and thick underwood abound in the northern slopes; and owing to these impediments, the elevated plateaus on the summit of the mountains cannot be reached without very great difficulty.

130. Diebitch's preparations for passing the Balkan.

It may readily be conceived what facilities for defence a mountain ridge of this description was calculated to afford, especially to an army possessing the numerous and admirable marksmen which the Turkish possessed. But the Grand Vizier, preoccupied with the idea that Schumla was the real object of attack, and that it would prove the vital point in this, as it had done in all preceding campaigns, was intent only on its preservation, and neglected the eastern pass, although the direction of the enemy's attack on Varna, Pravadi, and Sizepolis, clearly indicated that the serious attempt was to be made in that direction. The better to confirm him in his error, Diebitch no sooner found himself at the head of a large disposable force by the fall of Silistria, than he made the most ostentatious show of preparation for a grand attack on Schumla with his whole forces. Detachments during the day incessantly arrived in the camp before that fortress, with banners flying and music playing; but in the night, and carefully concealed by a chain of outposts, other detachments of an equal or larger amount defiled in silence to the left, to reinforce the corps of Roth and Rudiger, which had entered the valley of the Kamtjik with the view of passing the Balkan by the Aidos pass. These precautions so entirely succeeded in deceiving the enemy, that while Roth and Rudiger, with 20,000 men, were at the northern entrance of the pass, nothing had been done to defend it, except throwing up a few trifling intrenchments, and stationing 3000, with 12 guns, at Kouprikios, at the foot of the northern slope of the central ridge of the mountain.[1]

[1] Diebitch's Despatch, July 21, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 71, 72; Doc. Hist.; Chesney, 237, 238; Valentini, 432.

Having ascertained that the pass was still in this defenceless state, Diebitch determined immediately to

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131. Passage of the Balkan. July 18.

force the passage. With this view, having, like Cæsar in his Gallic campaigns, given each soldier four days' provisions, and put ten days more in the waggons which followed each regiment, the march began on the 17th July. General Roth, with 10,000 men, advanced by the sea-coast to Missivri, which he reached after defeating small bodies of the enemy in several encounters, and he there entered into communication with the Russian fleet in the Bay of Bourgas. At the same time Rudiger, with 12,000 men, entered the valley of the Kamtjik, carried the slight works erected there, threw a bridge over the stream, and moved against the 3000 men stationed at Kouprikios. While some regiments advanced, with music playing and colours flying, against the front of the Turks, a still larger body turned their flank and threatened their retreat. Instantly, on seeing the latter on the heights, the Ottomans took to flight, leaving all their guns and 500 prisoners in the hands of the Russians, who did not lose a single man. No obstacle now remained to the passage of the mountain, which they ascended and crossed without further resistance. At the summit the Russian troops obtained a view of the whole southern slopes of the Balkan, declining in height till they melted into the plain, with the Bay of Bourgas lying embosomed in the wood-clad hills, which formed the eastern extremity of the ridge. Turkey seemed lost; its mountain barrier was passed, and the cheers of the troops as they reached the summit announced their joy at having passed the barrier hitherto deemed impassable, and beholding the bay at their feet covered with their sails. Pursuing their march without any further serious opposition, the corps of Roth, on the left, occupied Bourgas, and entered into communication with the garrison of Sizepolis; while that of Rudiger, on the right, two days after entered Aidos at the southern foot of the mountains, after defeating a body of 7000 Turks, who endeavoured to dispute the passage.[1]

July 17.

July 16.

July 17.

July 24.

July 26.

[1] Diebitch's Despatch, July 26, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 73, 75; Valentini, 434; Chesney, 239, 240; Molkt, 158, 160.

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132. Subsequent movements of the Turks and Russians.

When the Grand Vizier, at Schumla, at length obtained intelligence of what was going forward on his right, towards the sea, he in haste detached ten thousand men to guard the passes above Kouprikios and on the Kamtjik, never supposing that they could have been already won. But they arrived too late, and brought back the mournful intelligence that the mountains had been passed by an army which, with Oriental exaggeration, was described as more numerous than the leaves of the forest and the sand of the sea. In truth, however, it was neither the one nor the other; and Diebitch's position, however brilliant in appearance, was in reality fraught with danger. His posts occupied the immense line from Bourgas, on the Black Sea, to Selimno, in the heart of Mount Hæmus, a distance of above eighty miles, as well as from Silistria to Aidos, a distance of a hundred and fifty; and such was the dispersion of force occasioned by the necessity of keeping detachments on the principal points of these immense lines, that the disposable force to the south of the Balkan did not exceed twenty-one thousand men. In front of these were twenty thousand Turks, who had fallen back from the passes, and been swelled by the whole armed Mussulman population in the towns through which they retired. On their right flank was the Pacha of Scodra, who might ere long be expected on the scene of action with twenty-five thousand Arnauts and Albanians; and in their rear was the Grand Vizier with eighteen thousand, in the intrenched camp at Schumla. Impressed with these dangers, Diebitch wisely halted at Aidos, and sent forward detachments, by the route of Karnabat and Kazan, to open a communication with General Krasowsky, who commanded the blockading force before Schumla.[1] This was effected without difficulty, but still the situation of the Russian general was full of danger, and it was evident there was no middle course between dictating a glorious peace or total ruin. Like Napoleon at Moscow, or at Vienna after Aspern,

[1] Chesney, 241, 243; Valentini, 438, 439; Ann. Hist. xii. 393, 394.

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he had got into a situation in which the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin; and such was the anxiety felt at St Petersburg on the subject, that the Emperor ordered a fresh levy of ninety thousand men in his dominions, and contracted a loan of 42,000,000 florins (£2,000,000) in Holland, for the prosecution of the war.

133. Successful attack on the Turks at Sliwno. Aug. 11.

In these critical circumstances, the resolution and firmness of General Diebitch triumphed over all obstacles, and, by concealing the weakness of his position, extricated him from its real dangers, and brought about a glorious peace. A considerable body of Turks had collected at Sliwno, a town on the southern slope of the Balkan, and from whence a flank attack might be made on the Russian line of communication, in the advance from Aidos to Adrianople. He resolved accordingly, after giving his troops ten days' rest at the former place, during which he had opened his communications with Krasowsky, to recommence his forward movement by an attack on this body of the enemy, which was seven thou-

Aug. 11.

sand strong. The attack took place on the 11th August, and was conducted with such secresy and skill that it proved a complete surprise. Though intrenched, according to their usual custom, the Turks, who were taken unawares, made scarcely any resistance. The whole took

1 Valentini, 439, 440; Ann. Hist. xii. 394, 395; Diebitch's Despatch, Aug. 15, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 78, 80.

to flight and dispersed, leaving their guns, nine in number, in the hands of the enemy, who entered Sliwno next day, amidst the cheers of an immense concourse of spectators, and preceded by the Greek clergy, with the Cross in their hands, who offered the victors bread and salt, and testified the utmost joy at being delivered from their oppressors.[1]

134. Advance upon Adrianople, and its capture.

This success was of great importance to Diebitch, for it entirely cleared his right flank on the march to Adrianople, made him master of the chief central passes over the Balkan, and opened the direct communication with Krasowsky before Schumla. The extreme left of the

Russian army, under Roth, soon after made several important acquisitions on the shores of the Black Sea. By these means the communication with the fleet, and all the supplies which it bore, was rendered secure. The Turkish army, twenty thousand strong, deceived by the exaggerated reports which had been spread of Diebitch's force, retired to the ridge of low hills, twenty-five miles in front of Constantinople, which had so often in ancient times served as a barrier against the northern barbarians. Encouraged by these circumstances, the Russian general determined on advancing to Adrianople. After giving his troops a day's rest accordingly at Jamboli, he advanced by forced marches down the course of the river Tomalia towards that city. Neither the ardent rays of the sun, which shone forth with uncommon brilliancy, nor the length of the marches, generally twenty miles a-day, nor the rugged nature of the roads, which were far worse than those over the Balkan, could retard the progress of the troops. On they pressed with ceaseless vigour, animated to the highest degree by the prospect of their approaching conquest. When the guns stuck fast, or the horses were unable to drag them up the ascents, the soldiers harnessed themselves in, and got them through, in which they were joyfully assisted by the peasants of the country, who beheld with transport, after an absence of four hundred years, the standards of the Cross waving in their valleys. A word from Diebitch would have excited a general insurrection against the Ottomans; but, guided by the humane orders of the Emperor, he restrained it, and approached the ancient capital of the empire, attended only by a joyful and friendly crowd. Ten thousand Turks made a show of resistance, but it was but a show; a capitulation was entered into, by which the soldiers gave up their arms and artillery, consisting of fifty-six guns, and the armed inhabitants returned to their homes.[1] Next day the magistrates brought the keys of the city, which they laid at Diebitch's feet; the people rushed in crowds

Aug. 19.

[1] Diebitch's Despatch, Aug. 20, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 81; Doc. Hist.; Val, 441.

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to meet their deliverers; the Russian general passed the gates of the town in triumph, and took up his residence in the palace, recently prepared for Sultan Mahmoud; and the entry of the Muscovites into the ancient capital of their hereditary enemies "resembled," says Diebitch, "rather a popular fête, than the military conquest of a hostile capital."

135. Extended positions of the Russians.

The better to augment the report of the magnitude of his forces, and keep up the prestige of their invincibility, as well as to provide them with the means of subsistence, the Russian general, after this splendid success, made a great dispersion of his forces. Like Napoleon, after the battle of Jena, and with similar success, he spread them out from the centre at Adrianople like a fan, in every direction. While the advanced guards of the centre were pushed on the high-road to Constantinople as far as Loule-Bourgas, only eighty miles from the capital, the

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left wing, under Rudiger, advanced and took Midiah, within sixty-five miles from the entrance of the Bosphorus, where it entered into communication with Admiral Greig's squadron; and the right, under General Sicorre, moved forward by Trajanopolis on Enos, in the Mediterranean, which it reached on the same day, and met the fleet of Admiral Heiden, which was at anchor, expecting them in the bay. At the same time Krasowsky, by repeated attacks, so imposed upon the garrison of Schumla, that, so far from thinking of disquieting these movements, they deemed themselves fortunate to be able to preserve their own redoubts. Thus the Russian army extended its mighty arms from the Euxine to the Mediterranean, across the entire breadth of Turkey, a distance of one hundred and forty miles, and was supported by a powerful fleet at the extremity of either flank; while at the same time its reserve blockaded eighteen thousand men in Schumla, and its advanced guard menaced Constantinople.[1] But the strength of their army was not equal to so great an expansion of its force, and in reality it was on the verge of

[1] Chesney, 243, 246; Journal du 2e Armée, Sept. 15, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 32; Doc. Hist., 397, 399; Valentini, 441, 442.

the most terrible catastrophe. In the middle of September, the force under Diebitch at Adrianople did not exceed *fifteen thousand men;* and a British officer, who saw them all mustered for a grand review on 8th November, has recorded, in his interesting work on the campaign, "that there were scarcely thirteen thousand men of all arms in the field."

136. Unbounded alarm at Constantinople, London, and Vienna.

Immense was the impression produced by these decisive events, both at Constantinople and over Europe. The terror in the Turkish capital was extreme; for the Christians apprehended an immediate massacre from the infuriated Mussulmans, and the latter were not less apprehensive of extermination from the avenging swords of the victorious Muscovites. The Sultan was besieged at one time by deputations from the violent Ottomans, urging the immediate arming of all the followers of the Prophet, and the most severe measures against the Christians; at another, with the most urgent entreaties from the latter, supported by the earnest representations of the ambassadors of the Western powers, to yield to necessity, and avert the threatening dangers by an immediate concession of the demands of Russia. The English ambassador, Sir Robert Gordon, and the Austrian, were in an especial manner active in their efforts to bring about an accommodation, by moderating the demands of Russia on the one hand, and overcoming the obstinacy of the Sultan on the other. It is no wonder they were so; for the statesmen at the head of both countries, the Duke of Wellington and Prince Metternich, were equally impressed with the necessity of preventing the destruction of the balance of power which would result from the conquest of Turkey. A secret convention had been entered into between them to avert such a catastrophe by force of arms; and the English admiral in the Mediterranean had orders, if the Russian proved obdurate, to attack the fleet of Admiral Heiden in the Greek waters, and conduct it as a pledge to Malta.[1] The efforts of these able diplomatists, joined

[1] Ann. Hist. xii. 400, 401; Chesney, 245, 246; Ann. Reg. 1829, 218, 219.

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to the exaggerated reports of Diebitch's force, who was represented as being at the gates of the capital at the head of sixty thousand men, at length overcame the firmness of Sultan Mahmoud, and, with tears in his eyes, he agreed to the TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE, one of the most glorious in the Russian, one of the most disastrous in the Turkish, annals.

137. Treaty of Adrianople. Sept. 14.

By this celebrated treaty the Emperor of Russia restored to the Sublime Porte the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and all the places in Bulgaria and Roumelia conquered by his arms, with the exception of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, which were reserved to Russia. All conquests in Asia Minor were in like manner restored to Turkey, with the exception of the fortresses of Anapa, Poli, Akhalzikh, Alzkow, and Akhalkalaki, which, with a considerable territory round them, were ceded to Russia, and, in a military point of view, constituted most important acquisitions. All the privileges and immunities secured by the former treaties (those of Ackerman, Bucharest, and Kainardji), as well as the conventions relative to Servia, were ratified in their fullest extent by articles 5 and 6. An entire and unqualified amnesty was provided for all political offenders in every part of the Turkish dominions. The passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to all Russian merchant vessels, as well as those of all vessels at peace with the Sublime Porte, with all guarantees requisite to secure to Russia the undisturbed navigation of the Black Sea. The indemnity to be awarded to Russian subjects complaining of arbitrary acts on the part of the Turkish government was fixed at 1,500,000 Dutch ducats, or £750,000, payable in eighteen months; and that to the Russian government, for the expenses of the war, at 10,000,000 ducats, or about £5,000,000 sterling. The evacuation of the Turkish territories was to take place progressively as the indemnity was discharged, and not to be completed till it was entirely paid up.[1]

[1] Treaty, Sept. 14, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 94,98; Ann. Reg. 1829, 475; Public Documents.

Another convention, signed the same day, of still greater eventual importance, determined the respective rights of the parties to Wallachia and Moldavia. It provided that the hospodars of these provinces should be elected for life, and not, as heretofore, for seven years; that the pachas and officers of the Porte in the adjoining provinces were not to be at liberty to intermingle in any respect in their concerns; that the middle of the Danube was to be the boundary between them to the junction of that river with the Pruth; and, "the better to secure the future inviolability of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Sublime Porte engaged not to maintain *any fortified post or any Mussulman establishment on the north of the Danube;* that the towns situated on the left bank, including Giurgevo, should be restored to Wallachia, *and their fortifications never restored;* and all Mussulmans holding possessions on the left bank were to be bound *to sell them to the natives* in the space of eighteen months. The government of the hospodars was to be entirely independent of Turkey; and they were to be liberated from the quota of provisions they had hitherto been bound to furnish to Constantinople and the fortresses on the Danube. They were to be occupied by the Russian troops *till the indemnity was fully paid up, for which ten years were allowed;* and to be relieved of all tribute to the Porte during their occupation, and for two years after it had ceased."[1]

138. Convention regarding Wallachia and Moldavia.

[1] Convention, Sept. 14, 1829; Ann. Hist. xii. 99, 100; Ann. Reg. 1829, 401.

Before this treaty was signed by the Emperor of Russia, the negotiations were on the point of being broken off by a rude third party, who threatened to intervene between the contracting parties. This was no other than the Pacha of Scodra, who, in the end of September, appeared at Philippoli with twenty-five thousand men, and declared his intention of breaking off the proposed peace. It may readily be conceived what alarm this extraordinary and unexpected apparition occasioned to the Russian commander-in-chief. He instantly ordered

139. Irruption of the Pacha of Scodra.

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General Geismar to hasten with all the troops he could collect from Wallachia, and General Kisselef to come from the blockade of Schumla to join the army at Adrianople. Geismar, with twelve thousand men, made his way across the Danube, and, getting through the pass of Anatza, in the Balkan, he succeeded in getting into the rear of the pacha near Sophia. The latter, however, continued to advance, declaring that he would be in Adrianople in eight days; and he had already got to Hermanli, half-way from Philippoli to that city, when he was met by the messengers of the Sultan with the ratification of the treaty. This stopped his singular hostile movement, and he withdrew to the position he occupied before it commenced. But it revealed the dangerous position of the Russians, and the depth of the abyss from which they had been rescued by the fortunate audacity of Diebitch, and the want of co-operation in the Turkish commanders; for if the Pacha had advanced a month sooner, nothing could have saved the Russians from a disaster similar to the Moscow retreat. The truth was, he belonged to the old party of the janizaries; and his object was to hang back till the necessities of the Sultan enabled him to make terms for the restoration of that body with his sovereign, and he lost his opportunity by delaying too long.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xii. 406, 407; Chesney, 246, 247.

140. Affairs of Greece in 1828.

The contest of Greece became a matter of such secondary importance, after its independence was secured by the convention of 6th July 1827, and the battle of Navarino, and when the Russians and Turks were dealing such weighty blows to each other on the banks of the Danube, that a few words will suffice to give a summary of its progress during the years 1828 and 1829. Threatened with a formidable invasion from the north, and with their navy ruined, and Egypt cut off from sending its formidable succours, the Ottomans were in no condition to resume offensive operations. But as Ibrahim Pacha had received positive orders from the Sultan to hold out

to the last extremity, and he refused to quit his hold of Navarino, and the other fortresses in his possession in the Morea, an expedition was sent from France, with the concurrence of the British Government, to compel him to evacuate them. It consisted of fifteen thousand men, under the command of Marshal Maison, and landed in the Morea on the 25th August 1828. They were received with transports by the Greeks, who had been informed by the President, Capo d'Istria, that they came to complete their deliverance. Ibrahim was in no condition to resist so formidable a mediator; and accordingly, a convention was concluded on the 7th September, in virtue of which the whole Egyptian troops were embarked, and conveyed to Alexandria, in English and French vessels. The Turkish garrison in Navarino and Modon made some show of resistance, but it was soon overcome, and the places surrendered to the English sea forces and the French troops; while the castle of the Morea, which stood a siege, was speedily reduced by the scientific skill of the French engineers. Before the end of autumn, the whole of the Morea was cleared of the Ottomans; but it was not deemed expedient to push the conquest of the Allies farther at that time, as it was not then determined whether more than the Morea should form part of the infant state.[1]

Aug. 25.

Sept. 7.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 455, 473.

141. Progress of the Greeks in 1829.

Relieved, however, of the enormous load which had so long oppressed them, and against which they had so heroically struggled, the Greeks soon showed that they were in a condition to recover their independence without external aid. When the disciplined battalions of Egypt were withdrawn, they had no difficulty in making head against their Ottoman enemies. Candia was, after a severe struggle, almost entirely recovered by the Christians, and the Turks shut up in Canea and a few other strongholds. An expedition under Colonel Fabvier against Chios failed; but a nest of pirates in Carabuso, the refuge of that species of malefactors ever since

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the days of Pompey, was rooted out by the British fleet. The appointment of Count Capo d'Istria to the presidency of the state had a surprising effect in stilling the internal discord which had so long paralysed its strength; for it was known that he was supported by the influence of Russia, and it seemed hopeless to struggle against such a power. Chief after chief sent in their adhesion to the new government; and so much was the military strength of the state increased by this unanimity, that the government was enabled to undertake and carry through with success several enterprises which materially enlarged its bounds. Ten thousand Turks were still in Attica, which forbade any attempt to regain that province, but in western Greece the progress of the Christians was uninterrupted. Deeming them supported by the French army, the Ottomans considered it hopeless to attempt any resistance. Salona, with its garrison of eight hundred men, capitulated; Lepanto and Anatolicon followed the example; and at length the standards of the Cross again waved on the blood-stained ramparts of Missolonghi. An invasion of five thousand Albanians was repulsed, and the invaders compelled to capitulate to the Greeks at Pietra, and all the Turkish garrisons in that quarter were withdrawn. The families which had withdrawn from the Morea to the shelter of the islands returned after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, in such numbers that the sounds of industry and the voice of gladness were again heard in the land. Finally, the revenue of the state was so much increased with its altered fortunes, that Capo d'Istria was able to announce to the legislature, assembled at Argos on the 13th July, that the ways and means were equal to the expenditure, each amounting to 25,000,000 Turkish piastres, or £700,000. In the receipts, however, were included a loan of 8,000,000 piastres from France, and one of 4,000,000 from Russia, being just half of the entire revenue.[1]

Sept. 25.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 469, 485, xii. 427, 429.

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142. Convention of March 22, 1829, regarding the limits of Greece.

The limits of Greece were fixed by a protocol, signed by the plenipotentiaries of Russia, England, and France, at London, on March 22, 1829, to which Russia and Turkey gave their adhesion by article 10 of the treaty of Adrianople. By this treaty Greece was to include the whole mainland of Turkey to the south of a line from Arta in the Adriatic to Volo in the Archipelago. It was to embrace also the whole islands of the Ægean Sea known under the name of the Cyclades, with Eubœa or Negropont, but neither Candia nor Cyprus. The islands embraced in these limits contained three hundred and thirty-nine thousand souls, of which only two thousand were even then to be found in the unhappy Chios, instead of its former population of eighty-five thousand; and the whole inhabitants of the state were about six hundred thousand. Greece was to remain tributary to Turkey, and to pay an annual sum of 1,500,000 piastres (£100,000), but it was to be governed entirely by its own inhabitants and laws; and the infant nation was placed under the guarantee of Russia, France, and England. The state was to be monarchical, but no sovereign was to be placed on the throne belonging to the reigning families of any of the powers which signed the treaty of July 6, 1827; a complete amnesty was to be proclaimed by the Porte in favour of all persons, without exception, who had been concerned in the Greek revolution; and a year was to be accorded reciprocally to the Greeks to sell their property in Turkey, and the Turks to dispose of their property in Greece. The limits thus assigned were subsequently contracted, and the line drawn on the continent, not from Volo to Arta, but from Arta to Cape Armyro, in the gulf of Volo, in consideration of which the tribute was remitted, and the sovereignty of the Porte entirely excluded. These limits included Missolonghi and Thessaly, but they excluded Ipsara, Chios, and Samos, and left the beautiful islands of Crete and Cyprus to languish still under the tyrannical government of the Ottomans.[1]

[1] Treaty, March 22, 1829; Ann Hist. xii. 107, 109; Ann. Reg. 1829, 231.

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143. Reflections on this convention.

There were extraordinary difficulties in the way of an amicable settlement of the Greek question, in consequence of the jealousies of the powers which had signed the treaty of 6th July; and this must always be taken into account, in considering the merits or demerits of the statesmen who were parties to its arrangement. But considered with reference to the interests of religion, humanity, or European independence, there never was a greater mistake committed than in making the limits of Greece so contracted. Nature had pointed out what they should have been; they should have embraced the whole countries where the *Greek* race was still predominant. A line drawn from Cattaro on the Adriatic to Salonica on the Ægean, would have included this region; leaving out Servia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and the Trans-Danubian provinces, where, though hostility to the Mussulmans is as strong, different races of northern conquerors have settled, and greatly preponderate over the original inhabitants. Above all, the *whole* islands of the Archipelago, including Candia, Cyprus, Samos, Mitylene, Lemnos, Tenedos, and Ipsara, should have been included in the limits of the new state. In a kingdom so constituted, the maritime and commercial interests would have been predominant; and in such a community it need not be said with whom the real alliance of people as well as government would have been formed. Private interest, identity of feelings and pursuits, would have made both lean on England. Constituted as the Greek state actually was by the convention of 22d March, it of necessity looked to Russia. Too weak for independence, too large for neglect, it presented a tempting prize to Muscovite ambition, to the government of which, from identity of religion, the people on the mainland at least were naturally inclined. It was a great thing, doubtless, for the interest of humanity, to have rescued even a portion of the Christians in Turkey from the Ottoman gripe, and the heroic efforts of the Greeks to secure their independence well

deserved such a reward; but in a political point of view, and with reference to the interests of Europe, it has been detrimental rather than the reverse. It has *weakened the Mussulman barrier against Russia, and not created a Christian one.* Such has been the consequence of doing things by halves—of not regarding, in prospective arrangements, the obvious tendency of human affairs, and seeking to prop up existing influences, without seeing that the time has come when they must be swept away. The alarm now so generally, and with so much reason, felt in Europe at Russian predominance in the East, would have been avoided, if the obvious step of establishing Greece on a respectable and efficient footing had been adopted, after the opportunity of entirely restoring a Christian monarchy at Constantinople had been lost.

What is the circumstance which has now rendered the Eastern question so complicated, has caused the Western powers to make such vast efforts to resist the encroachments of Russia, and brought France and England for the first time in history into a sincere and generous alliance? It is not merely the strength of Russia, great as it undoubtedly is, and formidable in every respect to the liberties of Europe. It is the weakness of Turkey which is the real difficulty; and that arises from the circumstance that, in its European dominions, two millions and a half of indolent Mussulmans, with the sword in their hands, have obtained by wielding it the dominion over seven millions and a half of Christians, who hold the plough, the loom, and the sail in their grasp. All the military strength of the state is vested in the brave, barbarous, and tyrannical minority; all the civil resources, nearly all the knowledge and industry of the community, in the unarmed and pacific, but querulous majority. How is such a state of things to be long kept up in the finest portion of Europe, and in which, from extending intercourse with the Western powers, the seeds of knowledge and civilisation are every day more widely spread,

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and their blessings more generally appreciated? The thing is evidently impossible; and if any doubt could exist upon it, it would be removed by the fact that the Mussulman race is everywhere declining, the Christian is everywhere increasing; and that while the former is chiefly to be found in the proud and lazy inhabitants of towns, the latter constitutes the great bulk of the robust cultivators of the country. Yet how is this anomalous and perilous state of things to be terminated, when the Ottomans are in possession of the government, and form the war caste and military strength of the state, and it is *with them* that the Western powers are in alliance, and whose dominion their national faith is bound to uphold?

144. Remarkable words of the Emperor Nicholas on this subject.

The Emperor Nicholas said to Sir G. H. Seymour, the English ambassador at St Petersburg, on February 22, 1853: "There are several things which I never will tolerate: I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians; and it shall never be held by the English, French, or any other great nation. Again, I will *never permit any attempt at the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state:* still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe. Rather than submit to any of these arrangements, I would go to war, and as long as I have a man or a musket, I would carry it on."[1] These memorable words at once accuse the past policy, and throw a steady light on the future course which should be pursued by the Western powers on the Turkish question. All admit that a barrier must be erected against Russia; the only question is, How is that barrier to be constructed? The Czar has taught us how that is to be done, for he has told us what he will spend his last man and musket to prevent. It is evident that what he would spend his last shilling and musket to prevent, the rest of Europe should spend their last shilling and musket to

[1] Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell, Feb. 22, 1853; Times, March 19, 1854.

effect; and this can only be done by restoring the Byzantine Empire in Europe, under the rule of a *Christian* government, or a government in which the rights of the Christians are effectually secured, with the guarantee of England, France, and Austria. This, however, is the remote and *ultimate* result: the one thing needful in the mean time is to rescue the Turkish dominions from the withering grasp of Russia: not less inimical to real Christianity than the oppressive rule of the Mussulman.

145. What of the alleged regeneration of Turkey?

Much has been said of the regeneration of the Turkish empire within the last thirty years, since the period to which the preceding history refers; and great are the expectations formed by a certain class of politicians of the social and political improvement of its inhabitants and institutions by the intermixture of European ideas. Experience has not yet enabled us to determine whether these anticipations are well founded, and it would be premature to give any decided opinion on the subject. It is doubtless possible to give to Asiatic *troops* and police the discipline and efficiency of European, and that is what has taken place in Hindostan, Egypt, and Russia; and by working out the resources of Asiatic wealth by the machinery of European civilisation, a great degree of temporary power and vigour may be given to a state. Whether it is feasible to unite with it, in like manner, the institutions and habits of a different race and quarter of the globe, and whether it is possible to erect the fabric of European freedom on the basis of Asiatic servitude, is a question not yet determined; but on which it can only be said, that, if it does take place, it will be contrary to the experience of six hundred millions of men during six thousand years.

The treaty of Adrianople affords a striking instance of that astute but ceaselessly encroaching policy which has so long characterised the court of St Petersburg. They disclaimed all idea of territorial aggrandisement at the commencement of the war; but they closed it by requiring

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146. Astute policy of Russia in the treaty of Adrianople.

the cession of a valuable territory on the Black Sea and in Georgia, including the strongest frontier fortresses of Turkey in Asia Minor. They did not openly claim the command of the navigation of the Danube; but they compelled the cession of the islands at its mouth, which effectually gave it them. They made a great show of moderation in consenting to relinquish the Principalities which they had overrun; but they agreed to do so only on payment of £5,000,000 public, and £750,000 of private indemnities—a sum equal to five-sixths of the whole revenue of Turkey, and which it seemed impossible it could ever defray. In the mean time, they stipulated the destruction of all the fortresses the Turks held on the left bank of the river, including Giurgevo and Brahilov, and the sale of all the Mussulman property in the two provinces within eighteen months—steps obviously pointing to their transference to a Christian government. They professed to respect the independence of Turkey; but they compelled its government to recognise a right of interference in behalf of its Christian subjects, especially in Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, inconsistent with anything like independence in a sovereign state, and the internal government of which provinces was made quite independent of Turkish rule. These clauses might at any time give them the means of renewing the war on plausible pretexts. Finally, by stipulating for an absolute and universal amnesty for all the subjects of the Porte who had been engaged in rebellion, they openly proclaimed to all the world that they were the protectors of the disaffected in the Sultan's dominions, and that they were to look to St Petersburg for a shield against the violence or injustice of their own government.

The campaigns of 1828 and 1829, though they terminated to the disadvantage of Turkey, are yet eminently calculated to modify the ideas generally entertained as to the great power of Russia in aggressive warfare, as

well as to evince the means of defence, in a military point of view, which the Ottoman dominions possess. The Turks began the war under the greatest possible disadvantages. Their land forces had been exhausted by seven bloody campaigns with the Greeks; their marine ruined in the battle of Navarino; their enemies had the command of the Euxine and the Ægean, the interior lines of communication in their empire; the janizaries, the military strength of the state, had been in part destroyed, in part alienated; and only twenty thousand of the regular troops, intended to replace them, were as yet clustered round the standards of the Prophet. On the other hand, the Russians had been making their preparations for six years; they had enjoyed fourteen years of European peace; and a hundred and twenty thousand armed men awaited on the Pruth the signal to march to Constantinople. Yet with all these disadvantages, the scales hung all but even between the contending parties. Varna was only taken in the first campaign in consequence of the Russians having the command of the sea; the Balkan passed in the second, from the Grand Vizier having been outgeneraled by the superior skill of Diebitch. Even as it was, it was owing to treachery and disaffection that the daring march to Adrianople did not terminate in a disaster second only to the Moscow retreat. Had the Pacha of Scodra come up three weeks earlier with his twenty-five thousand men, and united with the twenty thousand who retired towards Constantinople, where would Diebitch with his twenty thousand have been? Had ten thousand English auxiliaries been by their side, the Muscovite standards would never have crossed the Balkan; had twenty thousand French also been there, they would have been hurled with disgrace beyond the Danube.

147. Difficulty of the conquest of Turkey evinced in this war.

It is not to be supposed, however, that these startling results are to be ascribed to any weakness in military strength on the part of Russia, or any extraordinary warlike resources which the Turks possess, independent

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of their geographical position. The strength which Russia put forth in the war was immense. A hundred and sixty thousand men crossed the Danube in the course of the first campaign; a hundred and forty thousand were brought up to reinforce them in the course of the second. Yet, with all this, they could only produce thirty-one thousand men at the decisive battle of Kouleftscha; and when their victorious march was stopped, only fifteen thousand were assembled at Adrianople! At least a hundred and fifty thousand men had perished in the two campaigns; and that, accordingly, is the estimate formed by the ablest military historian of the war.[1] A very small part of this immense force perished by the sword; fatigue, sickness, desertion, produced the greatest part of the dreadful chasm. The long march of twelve hundred miles from Moscow to Poland, the pestilential plains of Wallachia, the hardships of two campaigns in the inhospitable hills or valleys of Bulgaria, did the rest. As Turkey is the portion of Europe most exposed to the incursions of the Asiatics, so it is the one to which Providence has given the most ample means of defence; for the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia present a perilous glacis, which must be passed before the body of the fortress is reached; the Danube is a vast wet ditch, which covers the interior defences; the Balkan a rampart impassable when defended by gallant and faithful defenders. Sterility and desolation, the work of human tyranny, add to the defences of nature. Of no country may it be so truly said, in Henry IV.'s words, "If you make war with a small army, you are beaten; if with a large one, starved."

148. Great strength of Russia in force, and of Turkey in situation.

[1] Moltke, Feldzug von 1829, 174.

149. Cause of the strength of Russia in defensive, and its weakness in offensive war.

The strength of Russia in a defensive is owing to the same cause as its weakness in offensive war. Its prodigious distances are the cause of both. A third of Napoleon's army disappeared before it reached Smolensko, or had been engaged in any serious battle; three-fourths had perished before a flake of snow fell. One-third of the troops which invaded Turkey in 1828 and 1829

sank under the fatigues of the march, another third under the diseases and hardships of the campaign which followed. It is the same with the English in India, and from the same cause. With the resources of a hundred millions of men at their command, they underwent a catastrophe, which rivalled the fate of Varus's legions, at the hands of the mountaineers of Affghanistan; they were soon after outnumbered, and brought to the verge of ruin by the Sikhs, who had only the resources of six millions to rely on. One-third of the invaders of Russia perish before they reach the country they are to assail; one-third of the Russians perish before they get out of it to begin the career of conquest, from the simple effect of the distances. It is no exaggeration, but the simple truth, to affirm that fifty thousand English and French troops disembarked at Varna, and beginning their fatigues there, are equal to a hundred and fifty thousand Russians, who have commenced their march from St Petersburg, Moscow, and Warsaw.

150. Dangers of the Russian position in regard to Turkey.

The position of the Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia is singularly open to serious disaster. Spread out over an extent of three hundred miles in breadth, from the Euxine to the frontiers of Austria, it is accessible to attack, from a concentrated enemy, along the whole course of the Danube; and if defeated by a powerful army crossed over near Brahilov, a disaster as great as that at Marengo would await the Russian forces. A blow directed at Focksana, the vital point of their communications with Bessarabia, would compel them to fight their way back to the Pruth, with their faces to Moscow, and ruin, if worsted, in their rear. The Crimea, with the Russian naval establishment at Sevastopol, lies also open to attack by a power having the command of the sea—for thirty thousand men could hold the neck of the peninsula against any force which would in all probability be brought against it; while twenty thousand, with the aid of a fleet, would with ease reduce the fortress itself,

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which, though impregnable on the sea, is by no means equally defended on the land side. The real danger of Turkey arises, not from the strength of its enemies, but its internal weakness; and the proofs of it are to be found, not in the triumphant march of Diebitch across the Balkan, but in the annals of the Greek revolution.

151. The final triumph of Christianity in Turkey is secure.

Human thought can scarcely discern what is the probable issue of the contest now commencing in the East, in reference to the belligerent powers; but Providence is wiser than man, and can educe good out of the most apparently inextricable elements of confusion and discord. Whatever the result of the contest may be, the triumph of Christianity is secure, and the days of Ottoman dominion in Europe are numbered. If the Russians prevail, the ancient prophecy recorded in Gibbon will be realised, and the Cross will be replaced on the dome of St Sophia; if the Western Powers are successful, and wrench the protectorate of the Christians in Turkey from the Czar, the triumph of the religion they profess is equally secure, and the government at Constantinople must pass into the hands of the great majority of the inhabitants of European Turkey. Unable to defend itself, the Ottoman empire must fall under the rule of one or other of the potentates which have entered the lists for its defence and subjugation. Power in the end must centre in the portion of mankind which is advancing, and pass from that which is receding; and the fact attested by all travellers, that the Christians are rapidly increasing in Turkey, and the Osmanlis as rapidly diminishing, points to the future destiny of those realms as clearly as the handwriting on the wall did to the fate of the king of Babylon.

CHAPTER XVI.

FRANCE FROM THE DEATH OF LOUIS XVIII. TO THE ACCESSION OF THE POLIGNAC ADMINISTRATION.

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1. Great advantages of Charles X. on his accession to the throne.

NEVER did a monarch ascend a throne with fairer prospects and greater advantages than Charles X.; never was one precipitated from it under circumstances of greater disaster. Everything at first seemed to smile on the new sovereign, and to prognosticate a reign of concord, peace, and happiness. The great contests which had distracted the government of his predecessor seemed to be over. The Spanish revolution had exhausted itself; it had shaken, without overturning, the monarchies of France and England, and led to a campaign glorious to the French, which on the Peninsula, so long the theatre of defeat and disaster, had restored the credit of their arms and the lustre of their influence. In Italy, the efforts of the revolutionists, for a brief season successful, had terminated in defeat and ignominy. After infinite difficulty, and no small danger, the composition of the Chamber of Deputies had been put on a practicable footing, and government was assured of a majority sufficient for all purposes, in harmony with the great body of the peers, and the principles of a constitutional monarchy. Internal prosperity prevailed to an unprecedented degree; every branch of industry was flourishing, and ten years of peace had both healed the wounds of war, and enabled the nation to discharge, with honourable fidelity, the

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heavy burdens imposed on it at its termination. After an arduous reign and a long struggle, Louis had reaped the reward of his wisdom and perseverance; he had steered the vessel of the state through many dark storms and shoals of perilous intricacy; but he had at length got into harbour: by the success with which his measures, externally and internally, had been attended, he had both restored the lustre of the throne, and in a great degree dissipated the prejudices which, at the commencement of his reign, prevailed against the Bourbon family. He had bequeathed to his successor a throne to appearance firmly established, a realm undoubtedly prosperous, and an external influence which seemed adequate to the wishes of the most ardent patriots in the country.

2. Character of Charles X.

The character and personal qualities of Charles X. were in many respects such as were well calculated to improve and cultivate to the utmost these advantages. Burke had said, at the very outset of the French Revolution, that if the deposed race was ever to be restored, it must be by a sovereign who could sit eight hours a-day on horseback. No sovereign could be so far removed from this requisite as Louis XVIII., whose figure was so unwieldy and his infirmities so great, that, for some years before his death, he had to be wheeled about his apartments in an arm-chair. But the case was very different with his successor. No captain in his guards managed his charger with more skill and address, or exhibited in greater perfection the noble art of horsemanship; no courtier in his saloons was more perfect in all the graces which dignify manners, and cause the inequalities of rank to be forgotten, in the courtesy with which their distinctions are thrown aside. He had little reflection, and had never thought seriously on any subject save religion, with the truths of which he was deeply impressed, in his life. He was the creature of impulse, and yielded alternately, like a woman, to many different and seemingly contradictory external influences. But that very circumstance gave, as it does to a graceful enchantress,

an indescribable charm to his manner. He was princely courtesy personified. None could withstand the fascination of his manner; his bitterest enemies yielded to its influence, or were drawn by its seductions into at least a temporary acquiescence in his designs. He was a warm and faithful friend; in early youth he had been an ardent and volatile lover, but the misfortunes of middle life had trained him to more serious and manly duties. His heart was warm, his benevolence great, his charity unbounded. He sincerely desired the good of his people, and had the greatest wish for their affection, which, by encouraging the love of popularity, led him sometimes into many doubtful or dangerous acts.[1]

[1] Lamartine, Histoire de la Restauration, viii. 2, 3.

3. His defects.

A pretty fable was told of the Regent Orleans at his birth, that all the fairies were invited to his christening, and each brought a gift of some mental quality to adorn his future life. One brought courage, one genius, a third the graces, and so on. To one old fairy, however, no invitation had been sent, and in anger she came, and in spite brought a gift which should annul all those the others had bestowed; and that was, that he should be unable to make any use of them. Following out this fable, a very powerful old fairy had been left out of the invitation at the christening of Charles X. His abilities were considerable; he had good natural parts, and great quickness in the apprehension of ideas in conversation, and an extraordinary turn for felicitous colloquy. Many of the sayings he made use of, in the most important crises of his life, became historical; repeated from one end of Europe to the other, they rivalled the most celebrated of Henry IV. in warmth of heart, and the most felicitous of Louis XIV. in terseness of expression. But, with all these valuable qualities, which, under other circumstances, might have rendered him one of the most popular monarchs that ever sat upon the throne of France, he was subject to several weaknesses still more prejudicial, which, in the end, precipitated himself and his family from the throne. He was extremely fond of the chase,

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and rivalled any of his royal ancestors in the passion for hunting; but with him it was not a recreation to amuse his mind amidst more serious cares, but, as with the Spanish and Neapolitan princes of the house of Bourbon, a serious occupation, which absorbed both the time and the strength that should have been devoted to affairs of state. A still more dangerous weakness was the blind submission, which increased with his advancing years, that he yielded to the Roman Catholic priesthood. He had been in former times passionately attached to a very charming lady, Madame de Pollastron; and on her death-bed he had vowed that he would never yield to a fresh passion, but devote to the Most High the fidelity which he had sworn to her in this world. He did so: but the resolution, however respectable in its principle, induced a change in his character more fatal than any female influence could by possibility have been; for it brought him under the direction, not of the changeful caprices of beauty, the very volatility of which often prevents their being attended with any serious danger, but of a firm and consistent priesthood, whose undying influence was unceasingly directed, wholly regardless of consequences, to the augmentation of the power and authority of their own body.[1]

[1] Lamartine, Histoire de la Restauration, viii. 3, 5; Lacretelle, Histoire de la Restauration, iv. 132, 133.

4. The Duke d'Angoulême is declared Dauphin.

The first care of the new monarch on coming to the throne was to secure the order of succession in favour of his son. He was too well aware of the scarcely concealed pretensions of the Orleans family to the crown, not to be aware of the danger of a contest for it, and of the importance of taking every possible step which might secure its descent in the direct line of the elder branch of the house of Bourbon. The saying of Louis XVIII. in regard to the Duke of Orleans, "He is near enough the throne already; I shall take care he does not approach it more nearly," was constantly present to his mind. There was a certain awkwardness in declaring a prince long past the prime of life Dauphin for the first time, an appellation usually bestowed, like that of the Prince of

Wales, on the heir-apparent to the throne at his birth, and it might be construed into an open declaration of war against the Orleans family. But in the insecure state of the Crown, it was important during the lifetime of the reigning monarch to declare his successor, and the advantages of such a step appeared to overbalance the dangers with which it was attended. The Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, accordingly, were declared Dauphin and Dauphiness of France; but at the same time, to conciliate the rival family, the title of "Your Royal Highness" was bestowed on the Duke and Duchess of Orleans, and a regiment in the Guards bestowed on their eldest son, the Duke of Chartres. To these marks of favour he added the substantial benefit of a gift in fee under the feudal title of *appanage* of the immense domains of the house of Orleans, which, reft from it in 1791 by the Revolution which it had supported, had been bestowed on the family in liferent by Louis XVIII., and was restored it by the Crown against which it had conspired. In his anxiety to secure the grandeur of the house of Orleans, he caused this magnificent grant, which rendered them the richest family in Europe, to be confirmed by the Chambers by the same act which settled the provision on the Crown. He judged of others by the generosity of his own heart: he thought he could stifle rivalry by kindness; he only kindled ambition by gratification.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 9, 12, 15; Cap. ix. 4, 8; Lac. iv. 133, 135.

5. The secret Camarilla of ecclesiastics.

No change was made by the new sovereign in the ministers of state, who indeed were as favourable to the royal cause as any that he could well have selected. But from the very outset of his reign there was a *Camarilla*, or secret court, composed entirely of ecclesiastics, who had more real influence than any of the ostensible ministers, and to whose ascendancy in the royal councils the misfortunes in which his reign terminated are mainly to be ascribed. The most important of these were, the Cardinal Latil, Archbishop of Rheims, who had been the King's confessor during the time he was in exile, and earnestly recommended to him by Madame de Pollastron, and who

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possessed the greatest influence over his mind; the Pope's legate, Lambruschini, a subtle and dangerous ecclesiastical diplomatist; and M. Quelen, Archbishop of Paris, a man of probity and worth, but full of ambition, and ardently devoted to the interests of his order. To these, who formed, as it were, the secret cabinet that directed the King, and of which he took counsel in all cases, was added the whole chiefs of the ultra-Royalist and ultra-Catholic party, who, like a more numerous privy council, were summoned on important emergencies. The most important of these were the Duke de Rivière and Prince Polignac, who had both given proofs of their ardent devotion to the throne; M. de Vaublanc, long an intimate counsellor of the new monarch, and whose advanced years had not diminished either his ambition or spirit of intrigue; and M. de Vitrolles, who had taken so important a part in the first Restoration. He possessed qualities which at once made it probable that he would gain the lead in such a secret council, and power eminently dangerous in its direction. Bold but yet courteous, ambitious but insinuating, knowing much of individual men, but little of the course of events, without the responsibility of ostensible office, but with the influence of secret direction, he was the very man to recommend dangerous measures, of which others, in the event of failure, would bear the responsibility, and he, in the event of success, would reap the fruits. Such was the secret council by which Charles from the first was almost entirely directed, and the history of his reign is little more than the annals of the consequences of their administration.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 9, 11; Lac. iv. 132, 133.

The King made his public entry into Paris on the 27th September. The day was cloudy, and the rain fell in torrents as he moved through the streets, surrounded by a brilliant cortège; but nothing could damp the ardour of the people. Mounted on an Arab steed of mottled silver colour, which he managed with perfect

skill, the monarch traversed the whole distance between St Cloud and the palace, bowing to the people in acknowledgment of their salutations with that inimitable grace which proclaimed him at once, like the Prince-Regent in England, the first gentleman in his dominions. His answers on his way to and when he arrived at the palace were not less felicitous than his manner. When asked if he did not feel fatigued, he replied, "No; joy never feels weariness." "No halberts between my people and me," cried he to some of his attendants, who were repelling the crowd which pressed in too rudely upon his passage—an expression which recalled his famous saying on April 12, 1814, "There is but one Frenchman the more." Never had a monarch been received with such universal joy by his subjects. "He is charming as hope," said one of the numerous ladies who were enchanted by his manner. Some of his courtiers had suggested the propriety of taking some precautions against the ball of an assassin in the course of his entry. "Why so?" said he: "they cannot hate me without knowing me; and when they know me, I am sure they will not hate me." Everything in his manner and expressions towards those by whom his family had been opposed, seemed to breathe the words, "I have forgotten." Marshal Grouchy, who had made the Duke d'Angoulême prisoner in 1815, was restored to favour. To General Excelmans he said, "I have forgotten the past, but I feel assured I may rely upon you for the future."[1]

6. Entry of the king into Paris. Sept. 27.

[1] Lam. viii. 15, 17; Cap. ix. 15, 17; Lac. iv. 128, 129.

7. Abolition of the censorship of the press. Sept. 28.

The first act of Charles was one eminently calculated to realise the expectations excited by these felicitous expressions, and to tinge the opening of his reign with the brightest colours. On the very evening before his entry into Paris, he proposed, in a council of his ministers, to abolish the censorship of the press. The Ministers acquiesced in the proposal, though not without secret misgivings as to the result; and next morning a decree appeared in the *Moniteur*, formally abolishing the restric-

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tions on the press.* It need not be said with what transports this resolution was received by the press, which had been severely galled by the restrictions, and was proportionally enchanted by their removal. Even the journals heretofore most strongly opposed to the Bourbons were profuse in their expressions of gratitude, and their professions of loyalty. "A new reign," said the *Courrier Français*, the most violent of the Liberal journals, "has commenced: the King wishes the general good, but he has need to be taught how it is to be attained. In restoring liberty to the journals, his wisdom has torn asunder that cloud of deception with which his Ministers would willingly envelop him; what more assuring pledge can the nation desire? what more efficacious guarantee can it obtain for the future?" A review of the National Guard, held the next day, and at which the King rode through the ranks on horseback, afforded an opportunity for giving vent to their sentiments in a way of all others the most reassuring—from the voice of the armed force of the capital. Never, not even in the palmy days of Napoleon and the Empire, had the monarch been received with louder and more unanimous demonstrations of affection.[1]

[1] Moniteur, Sept. 29, 1824; Courrier Français, idem.; Cap. ix. 19, 20.

8. Dangers of this step.

In proportion as this great concession to public freedom was calculated to insure the present popularity of the monarch, did it augment his future dangers, if the measures of his government did not in all respects keep pace with the ambition of the journals and the expectations of the people. Like many other similar measures, it purchased present tranquillity at the expense of future disturbance. But this peril, sufficiently great at all times, and under all circumstances, was augmented in a most serious degree in the case of Charles from the ultra-Romish principles by which he was actuated, and the influence of

* "Ne jugeant pas nécessaire de maintenir plus longtemps la mesure qui a été prise dans des circonstances différentes contre les abus de la Liberté des Journaux, l'ordonnance du 16 Août dernier cessera d'avoir son effet."—*Moniteur*, 28 Sept. 1824.

the secret conclave of Jesuits and priests by which the determinations of the monarch were ruled. The principles of this party were in direct opposition to those of the Revolution, for they tended to extinguish the freedom of thought, and re-establish that sacerdotal despotism which, even more than the oppression of the Crown, it had been the object of that convulsion to remove. Yet so little were the chiefs of this religious party aware of this, that they were zealous in wishing the restoration of the freedom of the press, and were the chief instigators of the measure. They recollected how powerfully the pen of M. de Chateaubriand and the columns of the *Conservateur* had aided their cause in the days of M. Decazes and the Duke de Richelieu, and anticipated a corresponding support, now that it was freed from its fetters; forgetting, or never having learned, that Romanism, in the days of its misfortune, will sometimes ally itself with Liberalism, but never fails to become its bitterest enemy in those of its power.[1]

[1] Cap. ix. 30, 33; Lac. iv. 130, 134.

9. Increase of the Jesuits' influence at the court, and their efforts in the country.

Before the new reign had continued many weeks, appearances began to indicate what was deemed an undue preponderance of the *Parti-prêtre* in the palace, and to create uneasiness as to its coming ascendancy in the Cabinet. On all sides there was a talk of establishing new colleges for the Jesuits, and some were actually set on foot, with a munificence which showed that their funds came from no ordinary sources. Montrouge, their chief religious seminary, became the centre to which they drew the youth of the highest distinction about the court. Wise in their generation, they passed by the middle-aged and confirmed in opinion, and bent their whole efforts to influence the thoughts and win the affections of the young. A perpetual file of splendid equipages was to be seen at the doors of their seminary, indicating the elevated connections of their pupils. The court itself assumed an entirely new aspect: masses, vespers, fasts, processions, sermons, prayers, became the order of the day; an air of extraordinary sanctity the best avenue to promotion. So numerous, however, were

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the observances, so austere the practices, so rigid the fasts prescribed for the devotees, that many thought the favour of the court was dearly purchased at such a price. Great efforts were made to spread religious fervour among the soldiers: the Minister at War, M. de Clermont-Tonnerre, nephew of the Archbishop of Toulouse, one of the most enthusiastic of the prelates, and who shared all his uncle's zeal, was indefatigable in his endeavours to electrify the troops, a task of difficulty and obloquy in a scoffing and irreligious generation, but which, from the religious feelings of several of the regiments raised in rural districts, sometimes met with surprising success. A regular system of catechising was established in many regiments; the Royalist journals were filled with accounts, ostentatiously paraded, of military communions among soldiers by hundreds at a time. Incessant processions, in which the priests were to be seen arrayed in unheard-of luxury of ecclesiastical splendour, were to be seen in the streets of the capital and the chief provincial towns. The people looked on sometimes with reverence, sometimes with indifference, often with contempt. In all this the Jesuits and leaders of *the congregation*, as this party was called, mistook the signs of the times, and injured rather than advanced the progress of real devotion. They were right in supposing that it was by the influence of religious feeling that it was alone possible to combat the progress of revolutionary ideas; but they were wrong in imagining that it was on the throne that the fountain from which they were to spread was to be opened. It was not from the temple of Jerusalem, but the fishermen of Galilee, that the faith sprung which changed the face of the world.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 132, 138; Cap. ix. 21, 30.

The extreme religious party, however, were very powerful both in the Chamber of Deputies and the administration; and it is not surprising that, seeing their strength at once in the legislature and the court, they were sanguine in their hopes of being able to reconstruct society on an entirely new basis. They could boast of one hundred and

10. Strength of the Jesuit party in the legislature and the administration.

thirty members of the Chamber of Deputies who were entirely in their interest—so great was the change which the alterations in the Electoral Law, in 1821, had made in the composition of the representative part of the legislature. In the Peers they were less powerful, the numbers on whom they could there rely being not more than thirty; but this was not of much importance, as the court was known to be with them, and it was not likely that, except on a very anxious crisis, the Peers would thwart the wishes of the Government. The highest offices in the palace were filled by their adherents: M. de Latil disposed of the whole patronage there; and MM. de Montmorency, de Blacas, and de Rivière, who held the situations of importance around the prince, were in their interest. M. Frayssinons, the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, was a zealous and powerful supporter, by whom all the instructions and ceremonies at Montrouge were directed; and they had succeeded in getting a creature of their own either into every important office under Government, or into the confidence of the persons who actually held it. M. de Renneville, a young man of remarkable abilities, was intrusted with the surveillance of M. de Villèle, the President of the Council; M. Tronchet, with that of the Minister of the Interior; M. Delavan, of the Minister of Police; M. Doudeauville, of the King's Household; M. de Dumas, of Foreign Affairs; M. de Vaulchier, of the Post-office. By the unseen but ceaseless agency of these zealous and able partisans, who were all in the interest of the Jesuits, it was hoped that the object of their leaders would be attained without the public becoming aware of what was going forward, or the jealousy of the press or the tribune being awakened, as the ostensible holders of the great offices of state had undergone no alteration since the demise of the late king.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 137, 139; Cap. ix. 30, 32.

It was no easy matter, however, to conceal this secret agency altogether from the vigilant eyes of the press, for its leaders were both able and clear-sighted. At the

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11. Their opponents in the Chambers and the press.

head of the party who, from the very first, detected and denounced the movements of the Jesuits, was the Count de Montlouis, a veteran of the Right in the Constituent Assembly, but who anticipated nothing but evil from the zealous efforts of the ultra-religious party in the present time. The Viscount de Chateaubriand also, though an ardent and devoted Royalist, united his efforts to those who opposed the ultramontane party; he was too sagacious not to see that the age was not one in which the press could be fettered or thought confined in bonds. The Abbé de Pradt also gave the aid of his ready pen and envenomed wit to the same side; while in the daily press PAUL COURIER was already giving tokens of those great abilities on the Liberal side which afterwards rendered his name so celebrated; and Hoffman, the most powerful writer in the *Journal des Debats*, proved that the weapon of Pascal could pass into the hands of those who were not so sincerely attached to the cause of religion.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 138, 139.

12. General prosperity in France.

The good sense and delicate tact of the King prevented the opposite parties coming into collision before the Chambers met; and the answers he made to the various constituted authorities and bodies which presented him with addresses on his accession to the throne, breathed the most liberal and conciliatory spirit.* The uncommon prosperity which prevailed in the kingdom, added

* To the Papal Nuncio, who congratulated him on his accession, the king replied, "Mon cœur est trop déchiré pour que je puisse vous exprimer mes sentimens. Je n'ai qu'une ambition, et j'espère que Dieu me l'accordera, c'est de *continuer avec zèle ce que mon vertueux frère a si bien fait*; mon règne ne sera que la continuation du sien, tant pour le bonheur de la France que pour la paix et l'union de l'Europe." To the French Academy he answered, "Les sciences et les lettres ont perdu un protecteur, qui les a cultivées dès sa plus tendre jeunesse; je l'imiterai, non pas avec le même talent, mais avec le même zèle, et je suis persuadé que l'Académie me secondera." To the Minister of Public and Ecclesiastical Instruction he said, "J'ai besoin de grands secours: que le clergé joigne ses prières aux miennes; l'instruction publique est la chose la plus importante, non-seulement pour nous, mais pour nos successeurs. Je compte sur vos efforts pour continuer le règne de mon vertueux frère." To the President of the General Assembly of the French Protestants he said, "Soyez sûr de ma protection, comme vous l'étiez de celle de mon frère: tous les Français sont égaux à mes yeux; ils ont tous les mêmes droits à mon amour, à ma protection, et à ma bienveillance."—CAPEFIGUE, ix. 16, 18.

to the satisfaction which these declarations created, and diffused a universal feeling of contentment and security. The harvests since 1818 had all been good; with the armies of the stranger, and the odious tributes paid to them, the inclemencies of the season, the storms of autumn, seemed to have passed away. Manufacturers, mainly dependent in France on the home market, had prospered with the prosperity of the agricultural classes, to whom they sold their produce; and the general cheapness of provisions, the happy result of abundance in them, not scarcity in the money by which they were represented, had extended among all classes the means of purchasing the comforts and luxuries of life. Steamboats had multiplied immensely in the principal rivers, and more than doubled the coasting trade. The silk manufacturers of Lyons, Rouen, St Etienne, were in a state of prosperity superior to any they had ever enjoyed; and the cotton manufacturers rivalled those of England in everything but the extent of their capital and the length of the credit they were enabled to give. The affluence which had in consequence accrued to the proprietors of these establishments, enabled them to surround the manufacturing towns with a circle of elegant villas, vying with those of Great Britain in elegance and splendour. The capital more than shared in the general prosperity of the kingdom; the equipages, the liveries, the balls, recalled the most prosperous days of the monarchy; the hotels were crowded with strangers, and the ample gains derived from their expenditure consoled the French for what had been extorted from them by their conquests.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 141, 143; Lam. viii. 18, 19.

13. Injudicious measure regarding the army. Dec. 16.

The first circumstance which broke in upon this pleasing dream of unbounded prosperity, was an injudicious measure of the Government regarding the army. A royal ordonnance put on half-pay all those who, having a right to the maximum of their retired allowances, had not been employed since 1st January 1823; and those who were entitled to less than the maximum and had not been employed

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since 1st January 1816. The effect of this ordonnance, which for its object was very skilfully devised; was to throw out of active service fifty lieutenant-generals, and above a hundred marshals of the camp. Among the number were Generals Grouchy, Vandamme, Gazan, Drouot, Ornano, Excelmans, Harispe, and nearly the whole celebrities of the Empire. It may be supposed what a sensation an ordonnance of such general application and sweeping severity made in a country still moved by the passions of the Empire, and so passionately desirous of military glory as France was. The King was not aware of the effect of the measure when he gave his consent to it. It had been arbitrarily decreed by the Minister at War, who was entirely in the interest of the Camarilla, to exclude from the army all those who might prove hostile to the measures they had in contemplation. Such as it was, however, the measure was so unpopular, and so far in advance of what the nation was prepared for, that the King was from the outset obliged to accord exemptions to certain persons from its operation; and they ere long became so numerous that the ordonnance remained without any other practical effect but the calamitous one of exciting doubts and apprehensions as to the real intentions of the Government. General Foy expressed the general feeling when he said the ordonnance was "a cannon-shot charged at Waterloo, fired ten years after the battle, and pointed direct at its mark."[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 155, 156; Cap. ix. 36, 37; Ann. Hist. vii. 137, 139.

14. Opening of the Chambers: comparative strength of parties. Dec. 22.

The Chambers were opened by the King in person with great pomp on the 22d December, and the speech from the throne, which was very cautiously and temperately expressed, and received with unbounded applause, still, when attentively considered, foreshadowed some changes pointing to a desire to recur to the old régime of the monarchy.* It was not obscurely intimated that a great

* "Nous avons perdus un roi sage et bon. La gloire de son règne ne s'effacera jamais. Non-seulement il a rélevé le trône de mes ancêtres, mais il l'a consolidé par des institutions qui, en rapprochant et réunissant le passé et le

measure of indemnity to the sufferers by the Revolution was in preparation; and how violent soever might be the opposition to such a measure, both in the Chambers and the country, the state of parties in the legislature presented the fairest prospects of carrying it into execution with success. When the votes for the President of the Chamber of Deputies were taken, M. Ravez had 215 voices, M. Chilhaud de la Rigaudie 199, the Prince de Montmorency 177, and the Marquis de Bailly, who was supported by the whole strength of the Liberal party, only 142. M. Ravez was selected by the King, this being the seventh time he had enjoyed that honour.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 2, 3; Lac. iv. 156, 157.

15. Flourishing state of the finances.

Much had been said in his last days of the debts of the late king, his prodigality to his favourites, the immense sums with which Madame Du Cayla had been enriched at the expense of the nation. The event disproved all these assertions: it was found that Louis had left no debts; the accounts of his household were in the best possible order, and the rare feature in royal exchequers was exhibited, of a constant excess of some hundred thousand francs a-year over the expenditure. All his kind acts to friends, which were very numerous, all his public and private charities, which were immense, had been provided for by the economy and good order of his private establishment. The public finances were in a not less prosperous condition, and promised to realise the hopes held forth in the speech from the throne, that the indemnity to the emigrants, how great soever, might be provided for without injuring public credit, or

présent, ont rendu à la France le répos et le bonheur. Le roi mon frère trouvait une grande consolation à préparer les moyens de fermer les plans de la Revolution; le moment est venu d'éxécuter les sages desseins qu'il avait conçus. La situation de nos finances permettra d'accomplir ce grand acte de justice et de politique, sans accroitre les impôts, sans nuire au crédit. Je veux que la cérémonie de mon sacre termine la première session de mon règne. Vous assisterez, Messieurs, à cette auguste cérémonie. Là prosterné au pied du même autel où Clovis reçut l'onction sainte, et en présence de Celui qui juge les peuples et les rois, je réhouvellera le serment de maintenir et de faire observer les institutions octroyées par le roi mon frère."—*Annuaire Historique*, vol. viii., Appendix No. 1.

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materially adding to the burdens of the nation. The cessation of the enormous war-payments to the Allies, and the preservation of peace now for a period of ten years, had so restored the finances of France that not only was the sinking fund maintained inviolate, and the public debt undergoing a sensible diminution, but the agreeable feature of an excess of income above expenditure had been exhibited in the public accounts. The Five per Cents had risen to one hundred and two in the beginning of 1825, and the price of grain fallen to fifteen francs the hectolitre—rates still more indicative of the general prosperity which prevailed.[1]*

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 35; Doc. Hist.; Cap. ix. 37, 38; Lac. iv. 157, 158.

16. Restoration of the estates of the Orleans family.

Four laws, alike characteristic of the principles on which the government of Charles X. was to be conducted, were brought forward in the Chamber on January 3. The first was the law on the civil list, or settlement of the revenue of the crown, which was fixed at 25,000,000 francs (£1,000,000) for the King during his life, besides 7,000,000 francs (£280,000) for the service of his family, and 6,000,000 (£240,000) for the obsequies of the late king, and the coronation of his successor. This law was chiefly remarkable from the noble grant which it contained of the whole territorial possessions of the Orléans family to the present possessors of its honours. These immense estates had been annexed to the state in 1791; and Louis XVIII. had only accorded a temporary usufruct of its rents and profits to the family. But Charles, in a truly regal spirit, now proposed to sanction the restitution by law, so as to put it beyond the reach of himself or his successors, on the condition only that, in the event of the failure of the male line of the family, the estates should revert to the crown.[2] This magnanimous gift to a rival and long hostile family passed the Depu-

Jan. 14, 1825.

[2] Ann. Hist. viii. 7, 15; Cap. ix. 40.

* The Expenditure of 1824 was . 986,073,842 francs, or £39,440,000
The Income, . . 994,971,960 „ or 39,800,000

Excess of Income, . . 8,898,118 „ or £360,000

—*Annuaire Historique*, App. 31, Partie 1, 1825.

ties by an immense majority, and the Peers almost unanimously. It is melancholy to reflect on the return which the Orléans family made to Charles for this graceful concession.

17. Law of indemnity to the sufferers by the Revolution.

The next measure proposed, and by far the most important of Charles's reign, was that for the creation of a stock to provide an indemnity to the sufferers by the Revolution. This was proposed to be effected by the creation of a stock to the extent of a milliard of francs (£40,000,000) in the Three per Cents, the whole money paid for which was to be devoted to the families which had lost their possessions during that convulsion. The elevated state of the public funds at once insured above £100 for each £3 a-year inscribed, and secured the gift to the emigrants at the cost only of three per cent to the nation. The annual charge would be about 30,000,000 francs (£1,200,000) a-year; and to reconcile the people to the imposition of such a burden, M. de Villèle consented to abandon his favourite project of reducing the interest of the national debt, which the high state of the public funds rendered easy of accomplishment in a financial point of view, but the violent resistance of the holders of stock scarce practicable in a political. M. de Martignac was the principal author of this great measure; and as it interested so many feelings, revived so many reminiscences, and excited so much jealousy, it gave rise to the most violent debates both in and out of the legislature.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 159, 160; Lam. viii. 33, 35; Cap. ix. 41, 44.

18. Argument of M. de Martignac in favour of the measure.

On the part of the Government it was urged by M. de Martignac: "The families of the emigrants—dispossessed during an absence which all now acknowledge to have been legitimate, despoiled on their return of all hope of restitution by the sale of their estates—have claims on the benevolence of the King and the justice of the nation which cannot be overlooked. Their fields, their houses, the inheritance of their families, have been confiscated and sold for the benefit of the nation. To every gener-

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ous mind that constitutes a claim, the justice of which cannot be disputed. But as the contracts and sales which have taken place during the progress of the Revolution must be maintained inviolate—and their sacredness constitutes the corner-stone of the Restoration—the only means that remains of making good the indemnity is by pecuniary payments to the sufferers in proportion to the amount which they have lost. All hearts have felt the force of this appeal; it was first made by a noble peer (Marshal Macdonald), one of the ornaments of the Empire, in the first months which succeeded the Restoration; and France will never forget the generous sentiments to which he then gave utterance. The misfortunes of 1815, the heavy pecuniary difficulties to which they gave rise, the necessity of providing succour in his misfortunes to the King of Spain, have rendered it necessary to postpone from time to time the great work of reparation, but it has never been lost sight of; and the measure now proposed is in substance the same as that which had been matured in the cabinet of the late king, before the army of the Duke d'Angoulême crossed the Pyrenees.

Continued.

"The moment has now arrived when it is practicable, nay easy, to carry these just intentions into effect—to give vent to these generous sentiments. The final discharge of all the arrears due to the army of occupation, the prosperous state of our finances, the constantly increasing strength of our credit, the good intelligence which prevails between the King and the other European powers, have at length enabled us to set in good earnest about sounding that wound which the Revolution has opened, which the Restoration has not yet closed; and which, though it seems to affect only a part, in reality reaches the whole body politic. The time has at length arrived when we can say to those who have been spoiled of their inheritance, and who have borne their misfortunes with a noble resignation, 'The state has deprived

you of your possessions; it has in times of trouble and of disorder transmitted them to others; the state, restored to peace and to the sway of legitimacy, makes you the only reparation in its power; receive it, and with the gift may all trace of these confiscations and heartburnings disappear for ever.'

20. Continued.

" We are asked, why should the losses sustained by the emigrants be the only ones to which the measure of reparation applies?—are there no other wounds which require to be stanched—no other scars which are not healed, which need not the healing salve? The holders of public stock, for example, who sustained a loss to the extent of two-thirds by the act of 1797, why are they excluded from the reparation? Your sense of justice, gentlemen, has suggested the answer. Without doubt the Revolution has produced evils without end; injustices without number have been the fruits of its errors and fury, and it is in vain to think of repairing them all. But because every one cannot be relieved, is no one to be succoured?—because the work of justice cannot be rendered complete, is it never to be attempted? The case of the emigrants is crying and peculiar; they have been the victims of injustice without example, a ruin without parallel. The state creditors, victims of a culpable faithlessness, have lost, indeed, two-thirds of their stock, but they have preserved the remainder, and the great rise in the value of stock has restored to them much of what they had lost. But what have the emigrants regained of their inheritance? If, among the numerous evils which the Revolution has produced, there is one which justice signalises as the most odious, and reason as the most fatal, one of which the origin is a crime against the most sacred rights, and the effects a cause of the most endless divisions, are we to be told that the impossibility of applying an entire remedy to such enormous evils is a reason for not attempting such as is in our power?

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"The injustice which the emigrants have undergone, the evils they have suffered, is beyond what any other class have. The laws of the Maximum, of the Assignats, have destroyed a large part of the wealth of the capitalists, but they have not diminished their immovable possessions. Those who have seen their fields laid waste by the armies of the enemy, have also beheld the sun of succeeding years restore their harvests, and the labour of subsequent time efface the traces of devastation. But the laws against the emigrants have wrested from them their *all*, their credit, their claims, their movables, their lands, their houses. They have stript them of everything, down to the very roof which had sheltered their forefathers from the storm. It is for these evils that reparation is demanded. The evils they have undergone take them out of the common case: the injustice they have experienced is peculiar, unprecedented. The confiscation to which they were subjected was the worthy accompaniment of the proscriptions; it could be compared only to the violent acts of Sylla and Marius. It is for France to give an illustrious example of the sense of justice which repairs as much as possible such terrible deeds of injustice, and to show that, if it can follow other nations in the path of iniquity, it can precede them in that of repentance and reparation.[1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 85, 86.

* M. de Martignac gave the following details as to the extent to which the confiscation of land estates had been carried during the Revolution, and compensation was now sought:—

	Francs.	
Estates valued at twenty years' purchase, and sold,	692,407,615	or £27,840,000
Estates sold, of which the value was calculated at current prices,	605,352,992	or £24,280,000
	1,297,760,607	or £52,120,000
Deductions allowed,	309,940,645	or £12,364,000
To be provided for,	987,819,962	or £39,756,000

To meet which he proposed the inscription of 30,000,000 rentes on the Grand Livre, which would produce a capital of 1,000,000,000 francs, or £40,000,000. —*Annuaire Historique*, viii. 86, 87.—*Rapport de* M. DE MARTIGNAC.

"Let us not be told that the emigrants have leagued with the stranger against their country, and are no more worthy to be ranked among its citizens. When they fled to the frontier, the king indeed was upon the throne, but he was powerless, he was in chains; his most faithful servants had been persecuted or destroyed. What became of the assemblies which succeeded? They mutually destroyed each other. What then remained for the emigrants to defend? Their country? At the very moment when they left it, their real enemies were tearing out its entrails. Our country is in our religion, and its altars were overturned; it is on the steps of the throne, and its ruins even were scattered: our country is in the king, around the king, and he had disappeared in the tempest. Our country is in its institutions, its laws; and it had no other institutions but prisons, no other laws but scaffolds. The emigrants sought safety in exile, that they might breathe freely; they found death on our soil, which was no longer their country. Who can say, in these circumstances, that the emigrants committed a fault; that they did wrong in striving to liberate their country from the most execrable of tyrannies; that they committed a crime in refusing to return and place their necks under the guillotine?" [1]

22. Concluded.

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 96.

23. Embarrassment of the Government from other claims.

The great difficulty which the Government had to encounter in the discussion of this question, was not the resistance it roused, but the concurring claims which it awakened. The justice of the appeal to the nation was generally admitted, but it was urged that other sufferers, during recent times, had equal or superior claims for indemnification. The Chamber of Deputies was assailed by petitions of all sorts from all who had been impoverished, and many who had been enriched by the events which had occurred since the Revolution. The capitalists who had suffered from the confiscation of the public funds, the dealers who had been such losers by the law of the Maximum, the Vendeans whose fields had been

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ravaged during the terrible war of which their country had been the theatre; the marshals and officers who had been deprived of their provisions by the disasters of 1814 and 1815, which had reft from France the countries on which they had been secured—the sufferers under the foreign invasion of those years of mourning—all preferred the most urgent claims to indemnification. General Foy expressed the general feeling of the Liberal party on the subject, when he used in the heat of debate the expressions which became famous. "At the moment of the splendid feast which you are about to serve up to the emigrants, let a few crumbs at least fall to the old and mutilated soldiers who have carried to the farthest corners of the earth the glory of the French name."[1]

[1] Séance du Jan. 26, 1825; Moniteur, Jan. 28, 1825.

24. Argument against the project by the Liberals.

It was strenuously contended in opposition to the project of Government—"The situation of the country, externally and internally, is the least favourable that can be imagined for so vast an addition to the public burdens. At the first Restoration, in the year 1814, the budget for the ensuing year was fixed at 618,000,000 francs, comprising in that sum 70,000,000 francs for the liquidation of arrears; now our expenditure amounts to 1,000,000,000 francs, and it is proposed to augment it by 30,000,000 francs a-year! We want peace with all the world; our armies occupy the strong places of a neighbouring power; but our debt has multiplied fivefold, and general misery attests the suffering state of our people. Will even the large indemnity now proposed satisfy the claimants? Never: it will only open the door to fresh demands, and, like the sums given in former days to buy off the hostility of the Normans, it will immediately give rise to new clouds of depredators, who will ravage and lay waste our country.

25. Continued.

"Every one knows that the emigration which proved most fatal to France—that which armed Europe against her—commenced in 1791. When it began, France was at peace with all the world; the greatest possible tran-

quillity reigned in the interior. The decree of August 1, 1791, enjoined the emigrants to return. Soon a constitution, framed according to the suggestions of the King, and sanctioned by the laws, offered the French the hope of a durable liberty. What did the emigrants do? Did they return, according to the royal invitation, according to the injunctions of the government, according to their duty to their country? They did just the reverse. They followed no other route but that to Coblentz; they placed their honour in foreign lands. Forgetting alike to whom they had sworn fidelity, and whom they were bound to defend alike from duty and interest, and whose life, had they done so, they would probably have saved, they leagued with the stranger, they armed themselves alike against their king and country, and, without regarding the dangers which threatened their parents, their wives, their children, they called Europe to share in the spoil of the land which had given them birth, and which was yet charged with the maintenance of all who were dear to them. The manifestoes of Berlin, of the Duke of Brunswick, had appeared; the war had commenced when the confiscation was pronounced. It was not a measure of severity upon countrymen, but of retaliation upon those who had become enemies.

26. Continued.

"We are told the emigrants have lost everything; the capitalists, the fundholders, the merchants, have lost only a part. Say rather—and you may do so with sincerity—the others have lost much, they have lost all, but they have remained faithful to their country. Hence the disregard they have experienced—'*inde mali labes.*' It is a mere illusion to say the emigrants have lost everything, and the other sufferers by the Revolution only a part. With the exception of a few provincial proprietors, who would receive but a very trifling part of the indemnity—with the exception of those who have suffered only in their movable estate, and whom the proposed law, based on the principles of justice, excludes—with the ex-

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ception of a few cadets of families, who have nothing but their swords, they are all or nearly all electors, nearly all belong to the elevated class of the grand colleges, all or nearly all are eligible as representatives of the people.

27. Continued.

"We are told it is desired to remove the feeling which exists against the new proprietors, but never was property which can found on a juster title. If the possession of lands which have once been confiscated is illegitimate, what title is free from that defect? Where is the estate in France which has not been confiscated since the sentence pronounced against Robert of Artois or the Constable de Bourbon to our days? What answer could be made to a new proprietor who, presenting himself before the Chamber of Peers with a list of historic confiscations in his hand, should ask restitution of them all? What became of the estates of Coligny, Teligney, and the thousands of Frenchmen who perished on the execrable day of St Bartholomew? In whose hands are the estates of those who fled from the persecution of Louis XIV. on account of their religion? All in the possession of court favourites, many of them of the most unworthy description. The principle on which the law is rested, therefore, is one which goes to shake property of every description. See into what an abyss the Government is about to lead us. It awakens a process which has slumbered since the days of Gracchus, a process which revives the furies of Sylla and Marius, and you are the judges appointed to decide it!

28. Continued.

"If anything could add to the insanity of such a proceeding, it would be the selection of the tribunal which is to decide so perilous a question. It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence, recognised in all countries and in all ages, that no man is to be permitted to decide in his own cause. But when I look around me in the Chamber, I see nothing but parties interested—not one impartial judge. Not one but has a share, some a very large one, of the proffered indemnity to expect. In vain will

you give the name of law to your decision in such a cause; it never can bear that character. It is essential to a law that it should be general, apply indiscriminately to all the citizens, whether it pronounces on their interests or determines on their duties. The present project can never approach to that august character, for it is the decision of a question in dispute, a litigated point between a part of the people and the whole, and the judgment is to be pronounced by the very parties most deeply interested in the issue. Whatever conclusion you arrive at, therefore, can never be a law; it can only be a decision of a litigated point by one of the litigants. And are we, the guardians of the laws, the protectors of right, the final judges in the last court of appeal, to set out with a proceeding so unjust that it would at once be set aside by a superior judicatory, if attempted by the humblest in the land?

29. Continued.

"What did the emigrants go to the stranger to ask? War—war against France, under chiefs and armies whose ambition after victory they would have been powerless to restrain. What is this but treason of the very worst description—treason against the land of your birth? All nations have an instinct which is superior to all other instincts—the instinct of self-preservation; a feeling paramount to all other feelings—the feeling of patriotism. All nations have regarded the citizen who herds with the stranger against his native land as its worst enemy. If such sentiments did not exist, if they were not implanted in our breasts by the hand of nature, it would be necessary to invent them; and the nation which should depart from these conservative principles, essential to the life and duration of societies, would be no longer a nation; it would have abdicated its independence, accepted ignominy, and voluntarily committed the most odious of suicides.

"It is the fundamental principle of a hereditary monarchy that the throne appertains to the nation; that

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30. Concluded.

it is confounded with it, identified with it; that for its advantage, and that alone, it is occupied by a single race—by that race and no other race, by that prince and no other prince. Individual properties pass from hand to hand; they are sold and parcelled out: the nation derives benefit from every sale and every division. But in the midst of that universal movement and turmoil, the throne alone remains in majestic stillness, motionless for the benefit of all. Should the day ever arrive when a whirlwind should separate the monarch from the monarchy, the whirlwind passes away, the monarch is restored to the monarchy. Those, then, calumniate the royal majesty who would separate the monarch from his entire subjects, who would make him the auxiliary only of a party, and who would place the King of France elsewhere than at the head of the affections, of the glories of the universal French people."[1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 93, 95, 119, 120; Moniteur, Jan. 19, and Feb. 24, 1825.

The law passed both Chambers by large majorities; that in the Deputies being 105—the numbers being 259 to 154; in the Peers, 96—the numbers being 159 to 63.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. viii. 137, 154.

31. Beneficial results of this measure.

One very singular result, which was little expected, ensued from this measure, and that was the altered relations of the different classes of society to each other. The addition of so vast a capital as £40,000,000 sterling, equivalent to at least £60,000,000 in Great Britain, to a single class in society, the dispossessed proprietors, made a prodigious difference in their weight in society, but it did not restore their original position. It rendered them fundholders, not landholders; it allied them in interest, at least, not with the territorial, but the monied class, —not with the country, but the town. The importance of this change was not at first perceived, and least of all

* The two last paragraphs in this argument are taken from the speech of General Foy on the question. It is easy to discern in them the distinctive marks of a great orator. One of the greatest privileges and chief enjoyments of a historical work of this description is that of translating or transcribing so many noble specimens of eloquence from the most gifted speakers of all nations.

by the recipients of the indemnity, who were overjoyed at such an unlooked-for addition to their means of existence; but the consequences became very apparent in the end, and will be traced in the sequel of this work. The addition of so large a sum also to the movable capital of the nation produced a very great movement, gave a vast impulse to speculation, and augmented the monied interest so much as to throw the elections for the most part into their hands, and contributed in no small degree to the blind security on the part of Government which led to the fall of the monarchy.[1]

[1] Cap. ix. 77, 78; Lac. iv. 168, 169.

32. Distribution of the indemnity: large share which fell to the Duke of Orleans and other Liberals.

The distribution of this magnificent gift of justice was made with the greatest impartiality; the spirit of party had no hand in it. The greatest enemies of the throne, those who in the end overturned it, received as much in proportion as its staunchest supporters. It was only to be regretted that, owing to the magnitude of the estates of some of the great families which had been sold, the proportion which their heirs received was exorbitantly large, while that which fell to the lot of the provincial noblesse was often, from the scantiness of their heritage, very inconsiderable. The Duke of Orleans received no less than 14,000,000 francs (£560,000) for that part of his estates which had been sold; the Duke de Choiseul and the Duke de la Rochefoucauld 1,000,000 francs each (£40,000); the family of Montmorency 12,000,000 francs (£480,000); M. de Lafayette 400,000 francs (£16,000). It is melancholy to reflect on the part which many of these recipients of the royal bounty afterwards took against their benefactors. In the mean time, however, the magnitude of the sums received diffused universal satisfaction, not only among the individuals who received the indemnity, but their relations, creditors, and dependants; and the ease and prosperity thence diffused through the nation went far to smooth the path of Charles X. in the first years of his reign.[2]

[2] Lac. iv. 169; Cap. ix. 74, 76.

The clergy, as mere liferenters, possessed only of a

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33. Law against sacrilege.

usufructuary interest in the possessions which formerly belonged to the church, had no share in this indemnity, and this naturally excited some dissatisfaction among a body which had suffered so much from the Revolution as the ecclesiastical had done. It is a singular proof of the strange and infatuated ideas which at this period had got possession of the leaders of the French church, and their supporters in the Ministry, that they thought they would compensate this want, and extinguish this discontent, not by an enlarged provision for the church, but by an *enhancement of the pains of sacrilege.* A law was introduced by the Government, which proposed to punish the profanation of the consecrated elements with the pains of parricide; that of the sacred vases, not yet filled with the consecrated elements, with death; theft in churches or sacred places with death, or forced labour for life; and of sacred objects in unconsecrated places, with lesser penalties, as imprisonment for various periods. The excessive severity of these enactments, more suited to the twelfth than the nineteenth century, excited, as might have been expected, the most violent opposition in both Chambers. Viscount Chateaubriand spoke and voted for the amendment proposed by the Liberals; but such was the strength of the ultra-religious party in both, that the law, without any material alteration, passed the Commons by a majority of 115, and 36 in the Peers. It is worthy of notice, that in all these extreme measures the majority in the Commons was much greater than in the Peers; so materially had the modification of the Electoral Law, and the admission of an enlarged number of rural representatives, altered the character of the popular part of the legislature. The professed object of the law was to check the growth of irreligion and infidelity,—a design in the importance of which all must concur, though the question as to whether it was likely to be favoured or retarded by enactments of so extreme and rigorous a description, is by no means equally clear.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 64, 65, 74; Lac. iv. 175, 180; Cap. viii. 79, 86.

Another step, less important in itself, but equally significant, as indicating the rapid tendency of ideas and legislation in the party at present ruling the state towards Romish institutions, was the bill for legalising female religious communities. The law of January 2, 1817, had enacted, that every religious establishment recognised by the law should be capable of holding property under certain conditions; but this privilege applied only to societies of men. The present law extended the privilege to societies of women, on condition of their being established for religious and charitable purposes, under certain prescribed regulations, and approved by the bishop of the diocese. It was stated by the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, in the debate on the subject in the Chamber of Deputies, that 140,000 sick persons among the poor were yearly attended by the pious care of the Sisters of Charity, 120,000 children in the humblest classes received gratuitous education from their labours, and 100,000 in the higher an education suitable to their more elevated duties. Certainly in these exemplary duties there was nothing which was not the proper object of admiration; and so obvious were the advantages of these charitable institutions, that, notwithstanding the jealousy of monastic advances, the bill passed the Chambers by a very large majority, that in the Deputies being 263 to 27.[1]

34. Law regarding religious societies of women.

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 25, 43; Cap. ix. 94, 97.

Although M. de Villèle had been defeated upon the question of a reduction of the interest of the national debt, he did not despair of ultimate success; and the extremely high state of the public funds, which had attained such an elevation that the Five per Cents were above a hundred, afforded the fairest prospect of success. The indemnity to the emigrants, as already noticed, was based on the establishment of a three per cent stock; and as the principle of such interest was once admitted, it seemed to afford a precedent for effecting a gradual reduction of interest to the same level. The plan now brought forward by M. de Villèle was less extensive

35. Measure of M. de Villèle for the reduction of the debt.

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than that which had been thrown out in the preceding year, and therefore less likely to excite general alarm; but it was destined to the same object, and intended to prepare the way for a more general measure. The Government proposed to the holders of five per cent stock to convert them into four and a half per cent, with a guarantee against being paid off before 1835. It was hoped that this advantage, in the existing state of the money market, would induce the holders of stock to consent to the small reduction of their interest. The project, which was very complicated in its details, was adopted by a large majority in both Chambers; the numbers being, in the Deputies, 237 to 119; in the Peers, 134 to 92. Thus commenced the system of progressively reducing the interest of the public debt—a system, the expedience of which, in a financial point of view, is beyond all dispute, but which, in a social, is attended with very important and often unlooked-for results. "When the public funds," said M. Bertin de Veaux, during the discussion of this question, "shall yield only three per cent, land will yield only two per cent; its value as stock will increase, its income diminish. Would you know the result of such a state of things? It must be the *entire disappearance of small properties.* To them it is, in truth, a law of expropriation. Under the long-continued action of such a system, the soil of France will come to be divided among a few great millionaires and seigneurs, who alone will be able to bear, from the immensity of their possessions, the low rate of profit to be derived from any portion of land."[1]* It may be subject of grave consideration whether this effect is not already taking place in Great Britain, when it is recollected that, despite its vast stores of accumulated

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 174, 182; Cap. viii. 103.

* The beneficial effect of M. de Villèle's motion on the finances appeared from the result in August 5, when the books, opened for the conversion of five per cents to four and a half, were closed.* The reduction of interest was 6,238,000 francs a-year, which was applied to a reduction of the land-tax.—*Ordonnance*, 23d Sept. 1825; *Annuaire Historique*, viii. 284.

wealth, drawn from all parts of the world, there are only 236,000 persons possessed, from every source, of an income of £200 a-year.

36. Coronation of the King at Rheims. May 29.

The coronation of the King took place, with extraordinary pomp, at Rheims on the 29th May. An accident which occurred to the King's carriage, and was nearly attended with fatal effects to the royal person, on the journey to the town a few days before, afforded, by the anxious solicitude which it awakened in all classes, a measure of the popularity of the sovereign. Nothing could exceed the grandeur and magnificence of the preparations and the ceremony, in which all the minutiæ of feudal etiquette were religiously preserved, but combined with the splendour of modern riches and the delicacy of modern taste. An important change, indicative of the spirit of the age, was introduced into the oath which the monarch took on the occasion. A long negotiation between the government and the heads of the church had been carried on before, which terminated in a considerable modification of the coronation oath, both as regards the duty of the King to his subjects, and the obligations formerly imposed on him to persecute heretics. The oath he now took was to govern his subjects *according to the Charter*, and merely to maintain the Roman Catholic religion without assailing any other.* All the powers of Europe were present, by their ambassadors, at the august spectacle. England was worthily represented in rank, character, and splendour, by the Duke of Northumberland. All hearts were moved by the magnificent spectacle, which recalled the days of Joan of Arc and the paladins of the monarchy. None could foresee the

* The oath, so far as regards the state, now taken, was in these terms: "En présence de Dieu, je promets à mon peuple de maintenir et d'honorer notre sainte religion, comme il appartient au Roi très-Chrétien et au Fils aîné de l'Eglise; de rendre justice à tous mes sujets; enfin, de gouverner *conformément aux lois du Royaume et à la Charte constitutionnelle*, que je jure d'observer fidèlement; qu'ainsi Dieu me soit en aide et ses Saints Evangiles. Nous jurons à Dieu, le Créateur, de vivre et de mourir en sa Sainte Foi et Religion Catholique, Apostolique, et Romaine."—*Annuaire Historique*, viii. 267.

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gulf which was yawning beneath so brilliant a surface, or the treacheries which were to disgrace the last days of the monarchy of St Louis. Three marshals were made Chevaliers of the Cordon Bleu on this occasion, who had fought against the Bourbons during the Hundred Days—Soult, Mortier, and Jourdan. The Duke de Chartres was invested with it, with that great felicity of expression which was peculiar to the King, and gave such a charm to his generous action; and a general pardon of political offenders terminated in a worthy spirit the royal benefactions.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 260, 267; Cap. ix. 121, 122; Lam. viii. 41, 42; Lac. iv. 136, 190.

37. Prosecutions against the Liberal press.

Notwithstanding these gracious acts and gorgeous festivities, the Liberal party had taken the alarm, and several articles appeared in the journals, particularly in the *Drapeau Blanc*, the *Courrier Français*, and the *Constitutionnel*, which denounced the measures of the Jesuits and the "Congregation," or *Parti-prêtre*, in the most violent terms. They were injudiciously made the subject of a prosecution by the Procureur-Général or King's Advocate. The indictment prayed for a suspension of the journals for three months each. They were ably defended by M. Dupin, and the trial was the first struggle between the religious and Liberal party. The court avoided the difficulty of pronouncing sentence or acquitting, by declaring itself incompetent to pronounce the suspension craved, and dismissing the complaint, without costs; enjoining, at the same time, to the editors of these journals to be more circumspect in future. Neither party could boast of this result as a decided triumph, but it was with reason regarded as a great advantage gained by the Liberals, who, being freed from the shackles of the censorship, and now relieved from the apprehensions of a prosecution, were left at liberty to continue their attacks on the measures of Government without restraint.[2]

[2] Cap. ix. 137, 138; Ann. Hist. viii. 296, 297.

The close of this year was marked by the death of two very eminent men on opposite sides, whose genius threw a radiance over the brief, but, in an intellectual

view, glorious period of the Restoration. The first of these was General Foy, who died on the 29th November, while still in the vigour of his talents and at the zenith of his reputation. He was carried off by an affection of the heart—a malady to which those seem to be peculiarly subject, who, like him, feel the force of genius impelled by the stream of the generous affections. The general grief felt at his premature end recalled that felt at the death of Mirabeau; yet had he not the genius, at once creative and destructive, of the French Demosthenes. His turn of mind was of a different kind, but one more suited to the comparatively pacific period of the Restoration. A soldier who had distinguished himself in the fields of fame under Napoleon, he had never shared in the servilities of the Empire; thence his long disgrace under the Imperial régime. A stern republican in principle, he combated for the independence of France at Waterloo; but when the Bourbons were restored, he bowed to the necessities of the times, and aimed, under the Restoration, not at subverting the dynasty, but at restraining its excesses, and establishing, in conformity with the spirit of the age, a tempered monarchy in France. He was often vehement and imprudent in his language at the tribune, but it was against the Ministers that his violence was directed, and he generally distinguished between the respect due to the throne and the opposition called forth by its measures. He possessed oratorical powers of a very high order, and was at the same time a distinguished military writer—a remarkable circumstance in a man bred up in camps, and accustomed to wield the sword rather than the thunders of the forum. Alone almost of his military contemporaries, he preserved through life the affections of his earlier years; and though no bigot in religion, at his mother's desire, to whom he had been tenderly attached, made known on her deathbed, he celebrated the anniversary of her death, wherever he was, by taking the communion, at which he had formerly par-

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ticipated with her. He died poor—the sure sign of virtue in a corrupted age; and a subscription opened, and soon filled up, at once evinced the public grief and provided in the most splendid way for his family. It amounted to 1,000,000 francs (£40,000.) The Duke of Orléans subscribed 10,000 francs (£400), Casimir Perier the like sum, the banker Lafitte 50,000 (£2000.)[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 45, 47; Cap. ix. 140, 142.

39. Death and character of M. de Serres.

Very nearly at the same time, M. de Serres also paid the debt of nature. He had long been in declining health, and had gone to Naples for its recovery, where he expired on the 25th November. Less celebrated by party eulogy than General Foy, less the object of national homage, he was not on that account the less of a national loss, or less deplored by the friends to whom his splendid abilities and exemplary worth were known. Having espoused the Royalist side, and never courted the favour of the people, he did not share in the gales of popularity, and died at Naples, oppressed by electoral defeats and the ingratitude of his country. Like Scipio Africanus, who expired on the same shores, he might say, "Ingrata patria ossa mea non habebit." He was a man of the finest genius, gifted with the soul of oratory. It was oratory, however, of the very highest kind, springing from an elevated mind, the outpouring of a noble spirit; and not, on that account, so well adapted as the less philosophic, but more impassioned eloquence of General Foy, for effect in the tribune. These two very eminent men, though opposite in thought, antagonists in action, were inspired with the sincerest admiration for each other, and expressed it with such generous enthusiasm as savoured rather of the warmth of political partisanship than the sober estimate of hostile power—a sure proof that they were both of a lofty disposition, and worthy of each other's opposition and esteem.[2]

[2] Cap. ix. 139, 140.

The year 1825 was marked by an event which, although practically decided a quarter of a century before, by the disaster which had then befallen the French arms, was not formally settled till this time. This was the

recognition of the independence of St Domingo by a convention concluded with the envoys of that power on the 31st October. Although these envoys were commercial rather than political agents, and the convention itself was ostensibly for settling the affairs of trade, yet it was, like the similar recognition, shortly before, of the South American republics by Great Britain, a practical acknowledgment of independence; and as the first concession of that position to a state composed entirely of negro inhabitants, it deserves particular notice, as a step in the social progress of mankind. Regarded as a concession to liberal principles, and a step favourable to the interests of commerce, it was extremely well received, and rendered Charles X., for a brief period, a favourite on the Stock Exchange. The motives which led him to take this step, painful to the feelings of the monarch, and therefore honourable to the principles of the man, were thus explained by himself in confidential conversation: "In that negotiation I was not influenced merely by the advantages of commerce and the marine; I was moved chiefly by compassion for a class at once the most unfortunate, and the most undeserving of misfortune. No one can doubt the repugnance which I felt at entering upon that affair; I was in the same position in regard to St Domingo as my brother had been in regard to France. Three parts alone remained for us to take—either to make war, and attempt to subdue them by force; or to abandon the island and colonists altogether; or to enter into a compromise. The last was the one which we adopted, and which my Ministers carried into execution." The emancipation, like the Charter, was on those principles conceded by ordonnance, not treaty, to avoid the appearance of compulsion; an indemnity of 150,000,000 francs (£6,000,000) was fixed, according to a scale calculated on the losses of the colonists, and certain commercial advantages were stipulated for France in its future intercourse with its emancipated colony.[1]

40. Recognition of the independence of St Domingo. Oct. 31.

April 17, 1825.

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 289, 291; Cap. ix. 145, 147.

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41. Negotiations for the independence of the Spanish colonies.

The principal design which the Liberal party had in view, in urging upon Government the emancipation of St Domingo, was to furnish a precedent for the recognition of the independence of the South American colonies—an object of the most intense desire in Great Britain, and for the attainment of which Mr Canning exhausted all the powers of his eloquence, and all the influence of his position. The details of the negotiations which took place on the subject will be given in the account of British transactions, as that power had the chief hand in accomplishing that great revolution. But France had a share also, though less considerable, in the development of its results; for its government, too, anticipated commercial advantages for their subjects from the severance of the insurgent colonies from the parent state. M. de Villèle joined his representations in favour of the colonies to those of Mr Canning; but they were less warm than those of the British Foreign Minister, and remained without effect. Spain answered them only by fresh preparations for an expedition to South America in the harbours of Ferrol and Cadiz.[1]

[1] Cap. ix. 150, 153; Ann. Hist. viii. 290.

42. Legislative measures regarding St Domingo. Feb. 11.

The affair of St Domingo was brought before the Chambers in the session of 1826, because, although the King might, of his own authority, publish ordonnances, or conclude treaties, the consent of the legislature was essential for a grant of money for the indemnity to the colonists. The project brought forward by M. de Villèle, on the part of the Government, was the complement of the royal ordonnance of 17th April, and provided for raising the 150,000,000 francs for the indemnity to the colonists who had been ruined by the revolution in that island. The details brought forward to justify the grant afforded a melancholy proof of the disastrous results of the premature emancipation of the negroes; for it appeared that while, in 1789, the exports of the island had been 150,000,000 francs, they had now sunk to 30,000,000, of which one-half only

was clear profit, the other half being absorbed by the expenses of cultivation. Calculating the present net revenue of the island, therefore, at 15,000,000 francs, and the value of the estates at ten years' purchase, he proposed 150,000,000 francs as the indemnity to be given to the colonists for the loss of their estates, which, by the severance of the island, they lost all chance of recovering. This, of course, was no indemnity to the proprietors for the consequences of the revolution in the island, which had inflicted on them losses three times greater. It simply took them as they stood, and awarded compensation for their entire loss at their existing depreciated value. The measure, however, was so obviously founded on justice that it could not be withstood; for what was given to the colonists was not any compensation for the social revolution in the condition, but for the loss of estates taken from them by an ordonnance of the sovereign. It passed, accordingly, by large majorities in both houses—that in the Deputies being 245 to 70; in the Peers, 135 to 16.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 64, 72, 82; Cap. ix. 204, 219.

43. Law of entail: its necessity.

A subject of greater practical importance, and awakening more of the passions of the people in France, was that regarding a change in the law of succession. This subject has been treated by the author in a former work, and the revolutionary law of succession which the 913th article of the civil code established as the general law of the realm fully explained.[2] The law of entail, or *Majorats*, which had been subsequently passed in the time of Napoleon, with a view to form a certain indefeasible provision for the heirs of hereditary honours, had not been generally acted upon; and as the existing law, where there was no majorat, effected a division of estates to the extent of nearly three-fourths on an average on every death, it was evident both that the lands of France would soon come to be infinitely subdivided, and that no suitable provision could by possibility exist for any length of time for the heirs of the hereditary honours of the monarchy. It was no easy

[2] Hist. of Europe, c. vi. § 63; and c. xxxv. § 91.

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matter, however, to discover a remedy for the evil, for the equal division of properties had been one of the greatest objects and most highly-prized victories of the Revolution, and no opinion was more generally adopted in France than that it was the chief blessing which that convulsion had conferred upon society. Government, in the midst of so many difficulties, proposed a middle course, in the hope of being able to do something for the support of the aristocracy without entirely alienating the body of the people. The law they proposed was, that in all properties which stood destined to the direct descending line, and which paid 300 francs (£12) of direct taxes, if the deceased had not disposed of the amount of the succession which the law left at his disposal, that quantum should, under the title of a legal *Precipium*, descend to the eldest son; and if he had disposed of a part of the disposable portion, the precipium should consist of what remains. These provisions, however, were only to take effect in the event of the deceased not having disposed of the disposable part by a deed, *inter vivos*, or by testament; but if he had not done so, it should attach in the first instance to the immovable estate, and failing it to the movable.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 86, 87; Cap. ix. 194, 195.

44. Argument against the law by M. Pasquier.

It was impossible that any law infringing on the revolutionary order of succession, and tending towards the restitution of the right of primogeniture, could do so in a more slight degree than this, because it proposed only to make that portion of the succession which the existing law itself left at the disposal of the testator, descend *ab intestato* to his eldest son. But political measures are judged of, in general, not by their immediate or even remote effects, but by the tendency which they indicate, and the principles of the party from which they emanate. This project met with the most violent opposition, not only in both Chambers, but in the public press and throughout the country. M. Pasquier and Count Molé were the most powerful orators on the popular side. "Let us consider," said the former, "the inevitable con-

sequences of the adoption of such a law. It divides society into two portions, but two of very unequal dimensions. On the one side are the fathers and the eldest sons of France, on the other the entire population. Will it benefit the fathers of families, will it augment their authority, increase their influence? Does it not compel them, on the contrary, by the most immoral of all combinations, to disinherit a part of their offspring? As little will it benefit the eldest sons. Will not their right, which injures nature, which is founded on feudal ideas and ancient customs, alienate from them their brothers and sisters, without bestowing any countervailing advantage on themselves? The law is as impolitic as it is unjust. It professes to establish an aristocracy of elder sons, but must not that very circumstance convert the younger into a redoubtable democracy, interested to overturn institutions from which they have sustained injustice? In withdrawing from circulation a fourth or a third of properties, will you not proportionally diminish the territorial revenue of that portion of society, and cause it to be crushed by the weight of taxes? Let us appease all such disquietude, remove all fresh dangers, by rejecting this project.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 90, 94; Cap. ix. 194, 195.

45. Continued.

"The ground on which this proposal is rested by the Government is not even justified by the fact. The excessive division of properties is the ground put forth to justify the measure; but if there is anything in that reason, there is too much. If on that account a law restraining the division of estates in the case of the precipium at the disposal of the father is justifiable, it must be so equally, and for a similar reason, in the case of all. It should be made imperative; and if so, it would destroy the paternal authority, and the power of testing on any part of the succession. The proposed law must fail in attaining even its professed end, for it tends to augment the division of properties; it founds the stability of families on the instability of the imposts; it exposes the

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father to fatal errors in the disposal of his property; it shocks feelings, contravenes customs, disunites families, multiplies lawsuits, and overturns legislation. Does it not needlessly and painfully thwart the principle of equality in the eye of the law, that great victory and first blessing of the Revolution? Is it not a vain and powerless attack directed against that principle? Does it not essentially wound morals—not merely public, but private morals, even the most intimate relations of life? Will it not put the fathers of families in the most false and deplorable position?—and is not every law attended with such inconveniences, the most deplorable gift which legislation can possibly make to society?[1]

[1] Cap. ix. 194, 196; Ann. Hist. ix. 96, 97.

46. Concluded.

"No country can be pointed out in which agriculture has suffered from the excessive division of properties, many in which it has been ruined by their accumulation in the hands of a few. Italy, under the Roman Empire in its later days, perished from this cause. Spain, Sicily, the Campagna of Rome, have been ruined by it in modern times. Since the Restoration, the number of proprietors has greatly increased; is there any one bold enough to assert that such a change is not a signal public advantage? Has not the acquisition of property the effect of elevating a man in his own eyes, clothing him with a sense of his own respectability, and thus raising him in the estimation of society generally, and in the performance of every social and political duty? Has not the course of events proved that, with every acquisition of property, the people have become more difficult to move—that they were more excitable from 1764 to 1792, than from 1800 to 1825? No conclusion hostile to these principles can be drawn from what occurred from 1792 to 1800. That was a period of social and political madness, from which no sound argument or inference can be drawn. But reflect on the peaceable disbanding of the French army in the midst of foreign hosts in 1815, and say whether such an event, unparalleled in history,[2] could have taken

[2] Ann. Hist. ix. 97, 98.

place had not property cast its restraining influence over the minds of armed men."

47. Answer of the Government.

On the other hand, it was argued by M. Peyronnet and the supporters of the Government: "Succession does not depend on positive laws, any more than property its foundation. In the savage state, man has only limited wants and desires; but with the complications of society other wants arise, and his wishes extend to his children and dependants. Do not say, therefore, that you wound original feeling, when you give men in the latter state the means of preserving their family; their fortune, their name. These sentiments are as natural, and arise as inevitably in one state of society, as those invoked on the other side do in another. The right of primogeniture arose at the period when the obligation of military fiefs rendered it necessary for the eldest son to be in a situation to wield the united forces of the family. The head of the family in a monarchy represents the family; and he does so not less effectually in the legislature than his ancestors did in the field of battle. But how is he to find an entrance, how maintain his place there, if the fortune of the family is dissipated and divided on every decease? It is evident that the thing is impossible; and thus the only effect of rejecting the present law will be to render the maintenance of a peerage impossible, and to prevent anything like a hereditary succession of statesmen in the Chamber of Deputies. If such a state of things can coexist with the maintenance of freedom in any country, which is very doubtful, most assuredly it is not in France, so full of sentiments of honour, so fraught with historical recollections, that the combination is to be looked for.

48. Continued.

"The preservation of estates keeps up, in a most important and influential class of society, ideas of order, foresight, and moderation; and from their influence it tends to diffuse these valuable qualities through society. It induces an order of things peculiarly suitable to a monarchical government, which, as it reposes on one head,

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so it requires a corresponding agglomeration of interests and opinions round his head in every grade of society. There must be a certain analogy between the frame of government and the institutions and ideas of society beneath it, if stability in institutions is to be looked for. The Liberal party cannot dispute this, for it was on this principle of its being conformable to a democratic form of government that the new order of succession was established in 1792. Granting that this was the case, is it not equally necessary, and for the same reason, to re-establish primogeniture to a certain extent if monarchy is to be maintained?

49. Concluded.

"If the extreme division of landed estates is an evil, and is attended with serious inconveniences in every civilised community, it is peculiarly so in a constitutional monarchy. As such governments are mainly distinguished from other governments by the larger admission of the people into them, so it is in a peculiar manner essential that a class should exist in society capable of sending forth persons capable of discharging the duties of legislators, and exercising the functions of government. But where is such a class to be found?—how is it to be preserved, if the perpetual division of all property, movable and immovable, is going forward? If France becomes a land of peasants and bourgeois, where are its legislators to be looked for? It is evident that a certain training, a costly education, the possession of libraries, and ease of living, is essential for men who, relinquishing their private concerns and interests, are to devote their principal attention to the affairs of the state. The tendency of the existing law of succession is to destroy this class, and prevent its ever arising again. And yet, is it not on its existence and vigour that not merely the fortunes of the state, but even the preservation of the democratic principle and the maintenance of the public liberties depend? For if properties come to be infinitely subdivided, is it not evident that the number of persons entitled to exercise the electoral franchise, and

eligible to a seat in the Legislature, will be continually diminished, from the diminished fortunes of all classes; and thus not only will the intelligence be wanting requisite to the right conduct of public affairs, but an oligarchy of the worst kind, because incapable of remedy, will arise from the very excess to which the democratic principle has been carried."[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. ix. 84, 85; Cap. ix. 198, 199.

50. Result of the debate.

Notwithstanding the strength of these arguments, such was the hold which the principle of equality had got of the minds of the people that it soon became evident that the ministerial project, at least so far as regarded the re-establishment in any degree of the right of primogeniture, would be defeated. Orator after orator, on the Opposition side, hastened to inscribe their names to speak against the measure; and the excitement which their declamation produced was such that it was evident that the measure must be thrown out. The measure was originally introduced in the Chamber of Peers, and after a long and stormy discussion, the main clause re-establishing the right of primogeniture, to a certain extent, was defeated by a majority of 26, the numbers being 120 to 94. The minor clause regarding substitution, which was of little practical importance, passed both Chambers. The overthrow of this attempt to re-establish primogeniture was celebrated over all France as a victory over the aristocracy, and it increased not a little the reputation of M. de Pasquier, to whose eloquence in the Chamber of Peers the result was in a great measure with justice ascribed.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. ix. 116, 117; Cap. ix. 199, 200; Lam. viii. 59, 60.

51. Reflections on this subject.

When Dr Johnson was challenged to assign any good reason for the right of primogeniture, he replied, "What, sir! do you consider it no advantage *to secure only one fool in a family?*" Without giving an entire assent to this celebrated saying, and fully admitting that there are many eldest sons, especially among the aristocracy, who justify the eminence of their rank by the display of all the qualities by which it is ennobled, it cannot have escaped the observer that, in the middle ranks par-

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ticularly, there is much truth in the observation. The caustic and witty observation of the sage is more applicable in a commercial and industrious country, such as England, than a military monarchy such as France; but still the observation is generally applicable, and points to a principle of universal importance in human affairs. It never, however, appears to have crossed the imagination of any man in France, during the prolonged and anxious discussions which took place on the subject. No one can doubt, however, who is acquainted with the state of society and the springs of improvement in Great Britain, that one of the principal of them is to be found in the general destination of the landed estate to the eldest son, which, while it provides a phalanx for the support of the throne, and the maintenance of a mixed constitution, leaves at the same time no other resource, in the general case, to the younger but their own energy and perseverance—qualities which often prove more valuable to them in the end than all the gifts which fortune has lavished on their elder in birth. Certainly, if we survey in private life the career of those who have been "cursed with a moderate competence," we shall have no reason to conclude that fate has been in reality adverse to those whom it has assigned nothing but the stimulus of necessity and the vigour of their own minds; and perhaps among the causes which have spread the British race throughout the world, and established an empire in the East "above all Greek, above all Roman fame," a principal place must be assigned to the institutions, apparently adverse, which drew forth the energies of the whole class of younger brothers, and sent them forth in every career to struggle, to labour, to conquer, and to make themselves and their country great.*

* A very superior man, well known for his taste and knowledge in paintings, Mr Woodburn, once said to the author that he objected to art-unions as giving a moderate independence to artists too soon, and thus tending to produce "myriads of *mediocre artists*." The history of France will show whether the infinite subdivision of property does not tend to produce "myriads of mediocre men."

The revenue of France in 1826 was 985,000,000 francs (£39,400,000), and the expenditure something less, being 981,972,609 francs. The receipts for 1827 were calculated at much less, being 916,608,000 francs, and the expenditure at 915,729,000 francs. The exports in 1826 fell nearly a fourth short of those of 1825, owing to the terrible monetary crisis in England at the end of the last of these years; but the imports of 1826 exhibited rather an increase.* The army exhibited, from the preparations made for the Spanish war, a great increase over what it had been before revolutionary troubles broke out in the Peninsula. It amounted to 232,000 men; the navy to forty-five ships of the line and thirty-seven frigates. The public debt was 3,373,500,000 francs (£135,000,000), including the large additions made for the indemnity to the emigrants in France and colonists in St Domingo. A supplementary vote of 37,000,000 francs was voted to the Government, without opposition, for the expenses of the occupation of Spain.[1]

Statistics of finances of 1826 and 1827.

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 625, ix. 28, 29; Cap. ix. 215, 216.

53. Measures of the Jesuits.

A more important topic, in reference to its ultimate effects, was the continued and persevering efforts made by the Congregation and the Jesuits to obtain the mastery of the Government, and carry their long-conceived designs for the establishment of a theocracy into effect. Two events occurred at this period, affording an opportunity for evincing their intention, which excited, not without reason, the utmost alarm, not only among the decidedly irreligious, but among the reasonable and sensible portion of the community. The first of these was a general jubilee, which was, on the application of the Government, appointed for all France, in the middle of summer. It lasted a month and a half,

June and July 1826.

* Exports from and Imports into France.

	Imports.	Exports.
1825,.....	400,579,530 fr. or £16,027,000	543,881,169 fr. or £21,760,000
1826,.....	436,116,000 „ „ 17,400,000	461,027,171 „ „ 18,440,000

—*Annuaire Historique*, ix. 28, 29.

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during which the churches and the capital resounded with an eternal *miserere;* and four great processions traversed the streets, displaying in its utmost splendour the pomp and magnificence of the Catholic worship. All the chief functionaries of Government were to be seen in these processions. Marshal Soult was particularly distinguished by the regularity of his attendance, and the enormous breviary which he caused to be carried before him. Some persons were malicious enough to observe, that it would be more to the purpose if he would make restitution of some of the pictures which he had plundered from the monasteries of Spain during his military occupation of Andalusia.* It may be conceived what an impression these unwonted displays and sudden conversions made in the mocking and irreligious capital of France, and the alarm which they excited in all classes as to the ultimate designs of the ultramontane party which had now obtained the direction of affairs.[1]

[1] Cap. ix. 222, 223; Lac. iv. 236, 237.

54. Preceptor to the Duke of Bordeaux.

A more serious subject of disquietude, because it related to a more important matter, was the choice of the preceptor for the young Duke de Bordeaux. The care of the prince during his infant years had been intrusted to the judicious management of Madame de Gontaut; and the Duke de Montmorency, who had his direction when he became of an age to admit of intellectual culture, was in every way qualified to train him in the exercise of every moral and Christian virtue. But this estimable nobleman died in the course of this summer, and his place as preceptor was supplied by M. Tharin, Bishop of Strasburg, a violent Romish prelate, who had lately published, in an inflated style, an acrimonious diatribe against the philosophy of the age.[2] The Duke de Rivière, at the same time, was appointed comptroller of his household—

[2] Cap. ix. 223, 224; Lac. iv. 238, 239.

* A very interesting account of the magnificent collection of paintings which by his abuse, not of the *rights* but the *wrongs* of war, Marshal Soult contrived to make, during his two years' military occupation of Andalusia, is to be found in Mr Stirling's most able, learned, and interesting work on Spanish Painting. —*See* STIRLING *On the Spanish Painters*, ii. 237-239.

an ominous appointment, as he was one of the most ardent and uncompromising enemies of the Revolution.

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55. Denunciation of the Jesuits by Count Montlouis.

These open advances and important acquisitions of power on the part of the Jesuits, led to an intrepid denunciation of their designs by the Count Montlouis. He had been a veteran defender of the Coté Droit in the Constituent Assembly, and the Liberals were far from anticipating such an assault from an old champion of the royal cause. But though a steady friend of the monarchy, the Count de Montlouis was far from being a partisan of the Jesuits, and his memory, which was rich in historical lore and inferences, furnished him with too many facts condemnatory of their policy to make him bend to their designs. On the contrary, he denounced them in the most unmeasured terms. It was in these words that he apostrophised the secret consultations of that aspiring party among each other: "Why," say they, "should we any longer delay to declare ourselves? The mystery of our existence affords a powerful arm to our adversaries. The holy father has recognised us, and re-established our order in the most flattering terms. The King protects us with the same zeal as if he was one of our brethren; nearly all the prelates and pastors are united to us, and breathe only our holy maxims. We may say the same of the whole noblesse of France: the court is our empire; every day we are making farther progress in the army. Is it not time to cast aside the veil which partially conceals, but in truth only renders us suspected? It is our name which we claim as a right. Mystery belongs to weakness, publicity to force." [1]

[1] Lac. iv. 240, 241; Cap. iv. 224, 225.

56. Answer of the Jesuits.

On the other hand, it was contended by the Bishop of Hermopolis, with that caution and astuteness which in general characterises their proceedings, that nothing could be so unfounded, and even ridiculous, as the terrors now so generally expressed against the Jesuits. "What is the real amount of influence in this body, which we are told is to overturn the liberties of France? Among all

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the colleges and seminaries of France they possess only seven! One is tempted to smile at the terrors excited by so very trifling a portion of public instruction being in the hands of any portion of the religious establishment. But what great things have the Jesuits done with such trifling means! what immense blessings are their missions daily conferring upon mankind! The good they do is in proportion to the terrors they excite; the power they possess is in its inverse ratio." There was some truth in these representations, but it was not the whole truth. It was true that they had only the command of seven seminaries of education; but it was not less true that such was the vigour and energy of those in the direction of these establishments, and the extent of the riches which the zeal and piety of their adherents among the laity placed at their disposal, that they could boast of a greater number of scholars than all the other seminaries of education in France put together.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 242, 243.

57. Law against the liberty of the press.

Such was the vehemence of the contest between the Jesuits and the press, that it was soon apparent that one or other of them must perish. They were rival powers contending for the supremacy in the empire; it was inevitable that one must be destroyed. Bitterly did the ultramontane party now regret the concession on the liberty of the press, made by them during the first transports of the accession of the new monarch, and the result of several prosecutions rendered it more than doubtful whether any check could, under the existing law, be put to the antagonism and licentiousness of the press. They now became convinced that no government or system of administration, either in church or state, could maintain its ground against the ceaseless attacks of an uncontrolled press, acting upon and inflaming the passions of an excitable people, on a side in conformity with their general inclination. The Jesuit Camarilla accordingly determined on some measure coercive of the liberty of the press; and, situated as they were

in the country, there can be no doubt that, for their own interests, they were right in their views. They had to contend with a vast majority of the reading and influential portion of the public in the towns, then in the entire possession of political influence; and their only allies being a party, zealous indeed, and able, but whose speeches and writings none of their opponents would so much as read. They had great difficulty, however, in getting the Cabinet to go into their views, for its members were practical men, well acquainted with the real state of affairs and balance of powers in the state; and M. de Villèle, in particular, was decided in his opposition to the proposal. But the Congregation prevailed, and after a violent contest in the Cabinet, it was carried by a majority to adopt the measure proposed by the Congregation. This is an important era, for this was the first cannon-shot fired in the great conflict which terminated in the overthrow of the throne.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 256, 259; Cap. ix. 252, 254; Ann. Hist. x. 54, 59.

53. Its provisions.

In the bill brought forward by Government, it was proposed that all writings of twenty pages and under should be deposited with the censors five days before publication; if published before the expiry of this period, the entire edition was liable to be confiscated, and a fine of 3000 francs (£120) imposed on the publisher. A duty of one franc for the first sheet, and ten sous for each sheet after, was imposed on every publication below twenty pages. Speeches in either Chamber, pastoral letters, and journals appearing only once in two months, which by the existing law were obliged to find caution, were relieved from these enactments. The proprietors of journals were to be the parties against whom actions founded on delinquencies against the state or individuals were to be directed, and no company for conducting a journal was to be legal if consisting of more than five persons. Fines might be imposed from 2000 to 20,000 francs (£80 to £800).[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. x. 53, 56; Cap. ix. 255, 256; Lac. iv. 259, 260.

No words can describe the storm of indignation which

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this law, with its severe enactments, created in the Liberal party throughout France. The whole public press was instantly up in arms on the subject. They denounced it, not without reason, as utterly subversive not only of the liberty of the press, but of all other liberties, and indicating in the clearest manner the arbitrary designs of the faction into whose hands the government had now fallen. The indignation was the more formidable from its being not confined to the parties immediately interested, but extending to the judges, the bar, the professors, the men of letters; in a word, the whole reading and thinking part of the public, beyond the pale of the Jesuit and ultramontane interest, were unanimous in their condemnation. The universal cry was that the censorship of Napoleon was now re-established, with additional powers invested in Government, and a more formidable body of inquisitors to direct its movements. The Academy of France, with M. de Chateaubriand at its head, took a leading part in the movement; his strong Royalist and religious feelings did not prevent him on this occasion from standing forth as the defender of freedom of thought. M.M. Villemain and Lacretelle, and Michaud the historian of the Crusades, joined in the remonstrance, which was carried in the Academy by a majority of 17 to 9. Strange to say, in the minority were found the illustrious names of La Place and Cuvier: occupied with the architecture of the heavens, or the remains of pristine creation, they had little concern with the interests of present existence, or were swayed only by its gains or honours. The Government evinced a want both of judgment and temper on this occasion: M. Michaud was dismissed from his situation as reader to the King, M.M. Villemain and Lacretelle from lesser situations under Government.[1]

59. Universal indignation which it excites.

[1] Lac. iv. 263, 265; Lam. viii. 68; Cap. ix. 257, 258.

The discussion of this question in the Chamber of Deputies, where it was first introduced, still farther increased the agitation of the public mind on the subject; and the excitement was peculiarly great in the

young men at the academies and universities, always the first to be influenced by generous feeling, whether well or ill directed. The bill underwent several amendments in the committee, and was the subject of long and vehement debates in both Houses. It ultimately passed them both, however, though in so mutilated a form, by the adoption of successive amendments, that its authors hardly recognised their own handiwork. The division in the Deputies was 233 to 134; in the Peers, 164 to 144. The result of this great debate was justly regarded as a triumph by the Liberal party, and it was celebrated as such over all France. Certain restrictions were imposed on the press by the adoption of the project, but they proved almost nugatory in effect, and the powers of thought rose into increased influence and activity from the vain attempt made to coerce them. In this there is nothing surprising: a coerced press is impracticable in an age of intelligence and advancing civilisation, and should never be attempted. Physical and moral strength, the sway of intellect, and the force of the sword, are antagonistic powers, which can never coexist in the same community. If the press is to be restrained, and public freedom preserved, it must be by itself, and its own weapons alone; neither bayonets nor batons can effect it. Great as have been in every age of intellectual activity the evils of the licentiousness of the press, they are inferior to the total ruin consequent on the extinction of its liberties. The first gives rise to many curses, but it contains the germ of all blessings; the last is an entire destruction of the hopes of humanity. It is the first duty of intellect, by combating intelligence with its own weapons, and *them alone*, to avoid the necessity of recurring to ruder methods of coercion, and reply to the maledictions of liberalism by preserving its existence.[1]

Passing of the law in a mitigated form.

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 110, 142; Lac. iv. 273, 274; Cap. ix. 289, 312.

Two events occurred at this period strongly indicative of the extreme peril of the course on which the Government had now entered, and which, to any men but those

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61. Riot at the funeral of the Duke de la Rochefoucauld.

infatuated by religious fanaticism, would have presaged the calamities which were approaching. The first of these was a serious riot which occurred at the funeral of the Duke de la Rochefoucauld. This respectable old nobleman, whose name was associated with the early career of the Constituent Assembly, and who was a moderate Royalist on the Opposition side, had recently fallen under the displeasure of the Court, in consequence of some votes and speeches in the Chamber of Peers during the discussion on the liberty of the press, and he had in consequence been deprived in one day of all his offices under Government, which consisted of seventeen presidencies, and as many honorary distinctions, the reward of a long life of beneficence and humanity. He survived his disgrace only a few days, and at his funeral, which took place at Chalons on the 30th March, a melancholy scene of discord was exhibited. Being extremely beloved in that neighbourhood, which in every department of industry and charity had felt the influence of his benevolence, a procession was formed of the young men at the School of Arts there, to bear his remains to their last resting-place. They did so accordingly, and bore his body on their shoulders from his house to the church, where the funeral service was read. But in coming from the church to the place of interment the police interfered, and insisted on the coffin being placed on the hearse. The young men refused, and prepared by force to keep possession of the body; a scuffle ensued, in the course of which the coffin fell from the hands of the youths, and was broken on the pavement, and the ensigns of the peerage placed on it were drawn through the mud. The military were called in, the coffin replaced in the hearse, and the funeral conducted as the authorities intended; but the incident, which became the subject of a solemn inquiry in the House of Peers, excited a prodigious sensation throughout France, and materially increased the strength of the Liberal party,[1] by demonstrating the generality of the feelings

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 144, 145; Lac. iv. 276, 278; Cap. ix. 319, 320.

with which the violent proceedings of the Jesuits were regarded over the whole country.

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62. Review of the National Guard. April 12.

The next event was one still more indicative of the state of the public mind, in the most important and influential classes, and so important in its effects, that it may be regarded as one of the principal causes of the revolution which overturned the elder branch of the Bourbons. Deeply chagrined at the evident symptoms of the decline of the popularity of which he was so passionately desirous, and yet blind to an inconceivable extent to the cause which was producing it, Charles fixed a great review of the National Guard of Paris for the 12th April, the anniversary of his entrance into Paris two years before. The day was beautiful; the National Guard had never turned out in such strength and in such splendid appearance; and a magnificent cortège surrounded the King, who rode on horseback on a beautiful charger, which he managed with consummate grace, along the line. Cries of "*Vive la Roi*" were at first heard on all sides, and the monarch was saluted by the great majority of the legions with the utmost enthusiasm. But when he came to the tenth legion, their loyal demonstrations were mingled with cries of "*A bas les Ministres!*" "*A bas les Jesuites!*" and some of the most violent even left their ranks to give expression to their cries at the feet of the monarch. "I come here to receive homage, and not lessons," was the dignified reply of the monarch; but it produced no impression. The cries were repeated, and after the King had passed on, became still more frequent; loud demonstrations of dislike were levelled at M. de Villèle, regarded as embodying the policy of the Government; and the princesses, who were present at the review in open carriages, returned to the Tuileries in despair at the contumelious expressions with which they had been assailed.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 151, 152; Cap. ix. 324, 326; Lac. iv. 279, 280.

Considering the great importance of the National Guard, both as a powerful military force in possession of

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63. Disbanding of the National Guard. April 13.

the capital, and as an organ of public opinion in its inhabitants, this incident was sufficiently serious in itself; but it became doubly so from the ill-advised and disastrous step which immediately followed. The King at first put a good face upon the matter. "My dear Marshal," said he to Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the National Guard, after the review was over, "we have had some grumblers, but the mass is well disposed; say to the National Guard that I am satisfied with their appearance, and bring me the evening order to sign." But these prudent views soon gave place to more violent councils. The princesses arrived in tears at the contumelies to which they had been exposed, and the seditious cries which had met their ears; and the party of the Jesuits were indefatigable in their representations, that the time had now arrived when farther temporising was impossible, and when a vigorous measure was imperatively called for. The King was unfortunately drawn into these violent councils. In the evening a Cabinet Council was hastily summoned; the deliberations continued till a late hour in the night; and on the following morning an ordonnance appeared DISBANDING THE NATIONAL GUARD OF PARIS.[1]

[1] Moniteur, April 13; Ann. Hist. x. 151, 153; Cap. iv. 281, 283; ix. 327, 328; Ordonnance, April 13, 1827.

64. Its immediate success, and ultimate effects.

If anything could exceed the imprudence and disastrous consequences of this step, it was the joy with which it was received by the ultra-Royalists in Paris. "At length," said they, "we have a King—a great King; no more days such as the 14th July;* we see what Paris is worth. Force—always force; that is the secret of success." At first everything seemed to favour their anticipations. Paris remained perfectly tranquil; the disbanding of the National Guard took place without opposition; but by a fatal want of foresight *they were left in possession of their arms.* As a military organised force, subject to discipline, they were put an end to; as a body of discontented men whose feelings had been

* The day on which the Bastile was taken.

ulcerated, upon whose loyalty an imputation had been cast, they remained with arms in their hands. But all was joy and confidence at the Tuileries; the days of revolution were thought to be at an end. "Well," said the Duke de Rivière, preceptor to the Duke de Bordeaux, "Paris is tranquil; the King has great power; France is tired of revolutions and revolutionists."—"Paris has not moved," replied a Liberal peer, to whom the words were addressed, "because the King has not exceeded his power. He was entitled, if he chose, to dissolve the National Guard; but let the time come when he may need the support of his good city of Paris, and you will then see what you have done."[1]

[1] Cap. ix. 328, 329.

65. Reflections on this event.

Both parties were to blame in this memorable event, which was the first downward step in the fall of the monarchy. The National Guard, who insulted the King by seditious cries, forgot their first duty as soldiers, which is implicit obedience; their first duty as citizens, which is personal respect to their sovereign. If they were dissatisfied with the measures of Government, they had a clear and constitutional mode of expressing it, which was by their representatives in the Chamber of Deputies; if they were dissatisfied with the King for retaining such servants in his confidence, their course was to displace them by a vote of the Chambers. But to insult him with cries when he was reviewing them as soldiers, to urge a change of men and measures with bayonets in their hands, was to forego all the advantages of representative government, and impose on the country a rule of the worst kind,—that of prætorian guards or an armed democracy. The King and Government were nearly as much to blame in the method they adopted for making their displeasure known. They were fully entitled, nay, officially called upon, to express their high displeasure at the legions which had been guilty of these acts of insubordination; nay, if they had even disbanded some of the battalions most in fault, though many might have doubted the prudence, none

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could have disputed the legality of the step. But to disband the *whole* National Guard on account of the misdemeanour of the 10th legion, to punish the many innocent on account of the sins of the few guilty, and alienate the affections of the whole military force of the capital, because a small part of their number had been guilty of acts of insubordination, was an act of injustice so glaring, of imprudence so manifest, that it almost looks like judicial blindness to have taken such a step. The only thing which could by possibility have justified it, was the necessity of disarming so formidable and seditious a force in the capital; but even this excuse was awanting, for their arms were left in their hands.

66. Treaty of 6th July on Greece, and convention regarding the slave-trade. Feb. 10.

The treaty of 6th July 1827 regarding Greece has been considered in the chapter on its Revolution, with which it is more immediately connected, as it led to the glorious battle of Navarino, which had the chief effect in establishing its independence. A domestic matter, however, signalised the French legislation of this year, which was also connected with England, for it was mainly urged on the Cabinet by the English Government. This was a treaty for the suppression of the slave-trade. By the project of the law introduced on this subject, the engaging in the slave-trade was declared punishable, with confiscation of the cargo and banishment to the chiefs of the expedition, and from three to five years' imprisonment to all others engaged in the enterprize. The discussion on the subject was very warm in both Houses, not so much on its own merits, for on such a subject there could be no dispute, but on the indignity to France of submitting to what was deemed an insulting and degrading dictation from a foreign power. It passed, however, by large majorities in both Houses; the majority in the Peers being 114 in a House of 227, and in the Deputies nearly in the same proportion.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. x. 49; Cap. ix. 346, 347.

Notwithstanding the large majority in the Chamber of Deputies which had hitherto supported Ministers, it

was apparent before the end of the session that their position was becoming precarious, and that ere long it might be necessary to dissolve the Chamber. The financial projects of the year were discussed with great rigour and acrimony; and the commercial crisis, which had been felt with such severity in the close of the preceding winter in England, reacted upon the prosperity of France, and occasioned an alarming deficit in the Exchequer. January had exhibited a surplus of 2,860,000 francs, but February and March showed instead a deficit of 6,755,000. This deficiency, though noways ascribable to Ministers, furnished, as usual in such cases, a powerful handle against them, and added to the vehement denunciations with which their conduct was assailed by the Opposition. Benjamin Constant exclaimed—"M. de Villèle speaks of the interest of the country! Was it, then, for the interest of the country that the National Guard should be disbanded? Was its existence inconsistent with the interest of the country? Come to the point; specify how it happened that that National Guard, which in every crisis has defended and supported the interests of the country—which is attached to its laws—which is so devoted, so orderly, so courageous—which is, as it were, the fruit and measure of the industry and prosperity of the state—should be thus ignominiously treated? Where are Ministers now to find their support? In the people?—They have outraged them. In public opinion?—They have roused it against them. In the Peers?—They cannot subject them, but by subverting their independence. In the magistracy?—They resist them in the sacred name of justice."[1]

67. Financial projects and embarrassment of the Government.

[1] Cap. ix. 350, 351; Ann. Hist. x. 230, 231.

The manner in which these violent apostrophes were received in both houses, and the lessening majorities by which Ministers were supported in the Deputies, especially on the financial questions, demonstrated the necessity of an appeal to the people to strengthen the hands of Administration. The Government, accordingly, in

68. A dissolution resolved on.

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secret sounded the prefects as to the chances of success in the event of a dissolution; and having received, as it always does on such occasions, satisfactory assurances, the measure was resolved on. As a preparatory measure, it was determined, after the session of the legislature had closed, to re-establish the censorship by a royal ordonnance, and this was accordingly done. The motives for the step were announced in an article in the *Moniteur*, in which, amidst some exaggeration, much undoubted truth was stated.* The Opposition immediately took the alarm; a society was quickly organised, of which M. de Chateaubriand was president, to defend the liberty of the press; and a host of pamphlets which issued from its members, and inundated the country, showed how little in real strength Government had gained by a measure so unpopular, and so much calculated to inflame the most violent passions.[1]

Jan. 24, 1827.

[1] Cap. ix. 354, 357; Lac. iv. 286, 287; Ordonnance, June 24, 1827; Moniteur, June 26.

69. New creation of Peers, and dissolution of the Chambers.

But it was not sufficient to stifle the voice of the press; it was necessary also to overcome a hostile majority in the House of Peers, which, even more than the Chamber of Deputies, was known to be hostile to the present policy of Government. So largely had the former great creation of peers, in 1819, to force through the democratic changes in the constitution effected in that year, modified the spirit of the Chamber of Peers, that it had now become necessary to counteract it by as large a measure on the other side; and after considerable

* "Cinq années de liberté de presse, durant lesquelles l'autorité s'est refusée constamment à désespérer du bon sens national, et des écrivains qui seraient obligés de la contester pour lui plaire; cinq années de travaux laborieusement suivis à travers les difficultés, que la licence des écrits suscitait sans cesse autour des projets les plus éclairés et des résolutions les plus droites; cinq années d'excès d'une part, et de patience de l'autre, ont pu enseigner à tous les hommes dont l'opinion mérite de compter dans les destins d'un pays, où étaient les amis et les ennemis de la presse. Ses ennemis ont vaincu; ils ont désarmé la résistance de ses amis; ils ont arraché une ordonnance de Censure à une administration qui est née de la publicité de la Tribune et de la Presse, qui à vécu par elle, et qui est réduite à modifier l'une de ces libertés pour sauver l'autre, pour les sauver toutes ensemble."—*Moniteur*, 26 June 1827; *Annuaire Historique*, x. 245.

discussion in the Cabinet, it was agreed that the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies should be followed by a great creation of peers, sufficient to render it in harmony with the views and policy of Government. A great creation of ecclesiastical peers was resolved on, it being thought that the interest of the Church was not sufficiently strong in the Upper House. Five archbishops were in the number, fifteen nobles, and thirty-six rich proprietors from the Lower House. The world was astonished at some of the names in the list; among others, the Count de Vieuville and the Count de Tocqueville, prefect of the department of Seine and Oise, were to be seen beside Marshal Soult, the hero of the Empire and the Hundred Days, and Prince Hohenlohe, celebrated in German story. The total number of peers agreed on was seventy-six—a number sufficient to overbalance the numerical majority on the other side. The same *Moniteur* which contained this great creation contained also an ordonnance dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, and appointing the electoral colleges to meet on the 17th and 24th November, and the Chambers to assemble on the 5th February following. A list was published of the presidents of the electoral colleges, nearly all in the interest of the High Church party.* The reason assigned for this step was mainly the difference between the situation of the peerage in England, which contained so large a proportion of the property in the state, and in France, where it had so little;[1] and the consideration of

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[1] Ordonnance, Nov. 5, 1827; Moniteur; Ann. Hist. x. 254, 255.

* En Angleterre la Chambre des Pairs a, comparativement à celle des Communes, une importance qui pourrait être moindre même sans danger, si on considère que la Chambre des Communes y est, pour ainsi dire, fille de la Pairie, qui, avec la Couronne, a une si grande influence sur les élections, où les pairs font admettre leurs fils, leurs frères, leurs parens, leurs obligés. En France rien de semblable. La Chambre des Pairs ne s'élève qu'aux deux-tiers à peu près de la Chambre des Députés; et avec une population double de celle de l'Angleterre, notre Chambre des Députés ne forme guère que les deux-tiers de la Chambre des Communes, et la Pairie Française égale à peine celle de l'Angleterre. La force de résistance de la Chambre des Pairs doit donc être dans le nombre de ses membres, et surtout dans l'esprit qui l'anime."—*Moniteur*, 5 November 1827.

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the Assembly was chiefly dependent on the number and talents of its members.

70. Formation of the parties, and preparations for a moral struggle on both sides.

The die was now cast, and both parties began seriously to prepare themselves for a struggle, which all saw to be inevitable. On the one side was the whole weight of authority and power, exercising its prerogatives, and making use of its influence in the most determined way, and setting at defiance the opinions of the great bulk of the intelligent inhabitants of the country, to follow the dictates of a resolute but rash and ill-judging ecclesiastical party. On the other was the whole popular party, which, now foreseeing the danger which was approaching, began to organise themselves in regular bodies, with a view both to a systematic action on the public mind in the mean time, and an efficient means of physical resistance to Government, if it should become necessary to have recourse to that extremity. The society "*Aidez toi et le ciel t'aidera*" was now established, composed for the most part of ardent Liberals or Italian *Carbonari*. Its maxim, as the name indicates, was to act for itself, and seek the means of salvation for the public liberties in the vigour of its own councils and the determination of its own measures. There was nothing illegal in either its constitution or objects, as at first established. It proposed simply, by constitutional means, to organise an effective resistance to the advance of power by the Government. All the measures of opposition were agreed on and discussed in its meetings; and never was union more complete, and enthusiasm more ardent, than existed among its members. The press resumed all its activity in the form of pamphlets, still exempt from the censure, and was directed with more ability, and a more thorough unity of object. Everything the Royalist Ministry had done since their accession to power was made the subject of the most violent invective, and commented on with the most unmeasured exaggeration. The acts by which they had gained a majority in the election of 1824, after the suc-

cessful termination of the war in Spain, was now turned against themselves. To such a length did the general transport go, and so little did the parties deem it necessary to disguise their projects, that, in a letter publicly addressed to the Duke of Orléans, he was invited to head a revolution, and place himself on the throne, in terms so unambiguous that he found it necessary, personally, to disavow it to the sovereign.[1]*

[1] Cap. ix. 370, 371; Lac. iv. 285, 287; Ann. Hist. x. 247, 249.

71. Elections and riots in Paris. Nov. 20.

The general election came on in November, and as the objects of the opposite parties were now avowed, the greatest efforts were made on both sides, and the excitement of the public mind became indescribable. Every one felt that on the result it depended whether the objects of the Jesuits were to be accomplished, and a throne based on an ultramontane theocracy established, or a constitutional monarchy resting on a democracy, with the Duke of Orléans at its head, substituted in its stead. The elections in the colleges of arrondissements, which were composed of the highest class of electors, were a thunder-stroke to the Ministry. The Opposition obtained two-thirds of the seats of that class: Paris was the theatre of the most violent contest; but the triumph of the Liberals was complete. Their candidates, M. Dupont de l'Eure, Lafitte, Casimir Perier, Benjamin Constant, Ternaux, Royer-Collard, and Baron Louis, all staunch Democrats, had 6690 votes, while the ministerial could only muster 1110. Illuminations took place in several places; in others the mob endeavoured to force the occupants of houses to illuminate

* "Echangez vos armoiries ducales contre la couronne civique. Allons, Prince; un peu de courage: *il reste dans notre monarchie une belle place à prendre*, la place qu'occuperait Lafayette dans une République—celle de premier citoyen de France. Votre principauté n'est qu'un chétif canonicat *auprès de cette Royauté morale.* Le peuple Français est un grand enfant, qui ne demande pas mieux que d'avoir un tuteur; *soyez-le*, pour qu'il ne tombe pas en de méchantes mains, afin que le char, si mal conduit, ne verse pas. Nous avons fait de notre côté tous nos efforts; essayez des vôtres, et saisissons ensemble la roue sur le penchant du précipice."—*Lettre à M. le Duc d'*ORLÉANS, *Nov.* 1827, *par M.* CAUCHOIS-LEMAIRE, p. 16, 17.

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against their will. This led to serious riots, in the course of which the military were called out, and numerous arrests took place. These riots were characterised by one ominous symptom—the FIRST BARRICADES of these days, so well known in the contests of former times, were seen in the streets. One of them was so strongly constructed that it more than once repulsed the assailants, and was at last only conquered by a regular fire of musketry. What was still more alarming, hesitation for the first time appeared in the troops of the line. The enthusiasm excited by the Spanish war was at an end; and in more than one instance the officers of infantry refused to obey the orders of the civic authorities, or to act against the people. "It is not from such as you I am to take orders," said one; "I will not exchange bullets with stones," replied another. It was a rehearsal on a small scale of the great drama of 1830.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. x, 258, 262; Cap. ix. 376, 378; Lac. iv. 290, 291.

72. Mutual recriminations of Ministers and the Jesuits.

The repeated defeats sustained in the provinces as well as the capital—and above all, the extreme and violent character of the successful candidates, left no doubt in the minds of Ministers that the Chamber returned would be greatly less manageable than that which had been dissolved, and that it was not improbable Government might be left altogether in a minority. Violent altercations in consequence ensued between M. de Villèle and the leaders of the Jesuits; each, as usual in such cases, endeavouring to throw the responsibility of steps which had proved so calamitous on the other. "What would you have?" said he: "have I not, this year, satisfied all your wishes? The severe restrictions on the press, the censorship of the journals, the creation of seventy-six peers, the disbanding of the National Guard, the camp at St Omer, are they not sufficient? I have said it a hundred times, your march is too rapid; you think only of violence when management is what is required."—"Let us hear no more of concessions," replied the Duke de Rivière:[2] "let us openly advance under the banners of a King who has the

[2] Lac. iv. 293, 294; Cap. ix. 375, 376.

blood of Louis XIV. in his veins. Those cursed elections, which occasion so much annoyance, are entirely to be ascribed to your own want of foresight, perhaps of your perfidy."

73. Dissolution of the Villèle Administration.

The majority of the Chamber, upon the whole, was ministerial, though in a much lesser degree than had been expected, or than the former Chamber had been. But when language such as this passed between the head of the Ministry and the chief of the secret Camarilla which ruled the King, it need hardly be said that the position of the Government was eminently precarious, and that a remodelling or entire change of it had become indispensable. In fact, their position had become so uncomfortable, and the dissensions in the Cabinet so serious, that nearly the whole Ministers, in despair of being able to meet the Chambers, and carry on the Government, had come to the resolution of resigning, or expelling their neighbours. M. de Villèle designed to expel M. de Peyronnet, M. de Peyronnet had the same intention toward M. de Villèle. M. de Corbière declared his inability to remain Minister of the Interior; M. de Chabrol was deputed to M. de Martignac, to sound him as to the formation of a new ministry. A secret instinct, usual in such cases, told all that a crisis was approaching, and that every one, as in shipwreck, must look out for his own safety. M. de Villèle had too much sagacity not to see that he had not influence sufficient to command the Chambers in the crisis which was approaching, nor power to direct the vessel of the state through the violent shock with which it was threatened. Before the end of the year, he had announced to the King the necessity of forming a new ministry, and MM. de Chateaubriand, de la Ferronais, de Fitz-James, and de la Bourdonnaye, had been submitted to his Majesty as the heads of the new Government. But Charles felt a repugnance at M. de Chateaubriand, in consequence of his recent opposition to the measures of the Government against the press; and he was too great

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and independent a man not to be the object of secret jealousy to the Romish authorities, to whom nothing is so repugnant as independence of thought. Great difficulty was experienced in making up the list of the Cabinet, and especially in determining who was to be its head as President of the Council. But at length the choice fell on M. de Martignac. With him were conjoined M. Portalis, as Keeper of the Seals, M. de Caux, as Minister at War, the Count de la Ferronais, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. de Vatismenil, in the Interior, M. Hyde de Neuville, for the Marine, and M. Feutrier, as Minister of Public Worship.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 336, 342; Cap. ix. 393, 397.

74. Reproaches addressed to him from both parties.

Thus fell the Ministry of M. de Villèle. It underwent the usual fate of a Government which, placed between two opposite and implacable factions, strives to steer a middle course between them, and generally succeeds only in alienating the one without conciliating the other. The Liberals could not forgive the concessions he had made—reluctantly, indeed, and under the pressure of necessity, but still made—to the ultra-Royalist and Jesuit party, the restrictions on the press, the law against sacrilege, the attempt to restore the right of primogeniture, the disbanding of the National Guard, and the dissolution of the Chamber in the hope of obtaining one more favourable to the arbitrary views of the dominant party at the court. The Royalists forgot, in their present animosity, the immense services which he had rendered, in the hour of need, to the monarchy and the throne. They forgot the wisdom and prudence he had displayed at the tribune, the moderation which he had evinced in the conduct of public affairs, the magnificent compensation he had succeeded in obtaining for the sufferers by the Revolution, the stability which, after so many shocks, he had succeeded in giving to the throne, the glorious war he had brought to a successful issue in Spain, the entire restoration of the finances, the foundation laid for Grecian independence by the treaty of 6th July, the lustre he had shed over the white

flag by crushing the forces of revolution. They reproached him with not going the whole length of their desires, with being at heart a Revolutionist, with having neglected to use the influence of Government so as to secure a majority in the elections; with having introduced some Liberals, under false colours, into the Upper House; with having done nothing efficient to restore the influence, or vindicate the property of the church; with having introduced the fatal principle of expedience instead of that of duty, and based government on the influence of corruption instead of the attachments of loyalty. There was some truth, as is generally the case, in all these representations; but both parties would have done more justice to that eminent statesman if they had shown how the acts which they made the subject of reproach could have been avoided, or how the government of a country, so divided in opinion, and distracted by opposing influences, as France then was, could have been conducted without concessions to both parties, which could not fail to alienate the violent men of either.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 103, 105; Lac. iv. 296, 297.

75. Character of M. de Martignac.

If the King had been at liberty to follow out his secret inclinations, he would have sent for M. de Polignac at this crisis, and thrown himself at once and openly into the arms of the extreme Royalist party. But it was not deemed safe to take at once so extreme a step; the public mind was not yet sufficiently prepared, the new influences adequately extended, and a transition Ministry was considered, with justice, as an indispensable preliminary to the formation of a purely ultra-Royalist one. The Martignac Ministry, accordingly, was a species of compromise —an attempt to overcome the animosity of the Liberals, who had been violently irritated by the last measures of M. de Villèle, and prepare the public mind, by a change of servants, and seeming change of policy, for an ultimate change of measures. M. Martignac himself was as fortunate a choice as could have been made for this object. Bred up in the school of M. de Villèle, the intimate

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friend of M. Lainé, whose esteem was itself a security, he possessed all the qualities requisite to regain the popularity of the Crown, by counselling such measures as might conciliate the mind and calm the irritations of the country. Eloquent in diction, gracious in manner, prudent in council, loyal in feeling, liberal in intellect, he represented and embodied the idea, then so general in France, of blending the ancient institutions of the monarchy with the expanding ideas and growing wants of modern civilisation. But it resulted from this, that the Minister did not possess the real confidence of the sovereign; he was intended only as a compromise, and the means of getting over a period of difficulty, until the time had arrived when the new system might be introduced, and a Ministry of lasting duration established.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 116, 117, 121; Cap. ix. 397, 399; Lac. iv. 345, 347.

76. The new Ministry had not the confidence of the King.

It may readily be conceived that, under such circumstances, the Martignac Ministry was not destined for long duration. "You know, gentlemen," said the King at one of the first Cabinet Councils, "that I have not voluntarily separated from M. de Villèle; his system is my own; and I hope that you will conform to it to the utmost of your power." This was but a poor commencement for an administration avowedly installed in power in order to alter the system of government of the preceding administration, and regain popularity, by at least an ostensible change of measures. From the first, accordingly, it was evident that they did not possess the confidence of the monarch, and that, in English state phraseology, they only held office till their successors were appointed. A seat in the Ministry was offered to M. de Chateaubriand; he at first was inclined to have accepted it, but, by the persuasion of his friends, he in the end declined an honour which might compromise his reputation, and did not seem destined for long endurance. It was soon apparent that he had judged wisely in the decision at which he had arrived. When the Chambers met, it was evident to all that the Ministry

did not possess their confidence. Such was their hatred at M. de Villèle that they dreaded his resurrection to power in the persons of any administration which had been associated with him in office. The choice of a president for the Chamber of Deputies, which was the first trial of strength, showed what a formidable coalition had been formed against the Government. M. Labourdonnaye, who was supported by the coalition, had 178 votes; M. Ravez, who had long filled the chair with ability and moderation, only 162. On the next division, M. Delatot was elected by a majority of 212 voices, to 189 who supported Royer-Collard; but the King, desirous to conciliate the Liberals, selected the latter from the list presented to him. The speech of the King was as moderate and conciliatory as could well be imagined; but the Address presented by the Chamber revealed the implacable hostility with which the majority of its members was animated. One expression, in particular, in allusion to the dismissal of the late Ministry, was deemed peculiarly painful, if not insulting, to the Crown: "The remonstrances of France have put an end to the *deplorable system* which had rendered illusory all the promises of your Majesty." The question of retaining so very strong an expression in the address gave rise, as well it might, to the most vehement debates; but it was carried that it should be retained, by a majority of 33. The whole party of M. de Chateaubriand voted in the majority.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 14, 17; Lam. viii. 126, 127; Lac. iv. 348, 349.

77. Answer of the King to the Address.

Charles was deeply wounded at this address, but he preserved a dignified demeanour on the occasion. "I shall receive this address," said he, "as my brother received that which was voted against M. de Richelieu and his ministry. I shall admit to my presence only the President and two secretaries of the Assembly, and I shall deliver an answer which will be a reproof without inducing a rupture." The monarch with his own hand effaced several expressions from the answer prepared by his Ministers which savoured too much of severity, and

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as ultimately agreed on the answer was as follows: "In calling you to labour with me for the happiness of France, I reckoned on the concurrence of your sentiments as well as on the light of your intelligence. My words were addressed to the entire Chamber; it would have been agreeable to me if the answer had been unanimous. You will not forget, I feel assured, that you are the natural guardians of the majesty of the throne, the first and most noble of your guarantees. Your labours will prove to France your profound respect for the memory of the sovereign who gave you the Charter, and your just confidence in him whom you call the son of Henry IV. and Saint Louis."[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 24, 27; Lam. viii. 127, 128.

78. Legislative measures of the session.

The legislative measures of the session of the Chambers were not of very great importance; but such as they were, they bespoke the change, painful to the King, which had taken place in the ruling power in Parliament. A law was introduced to exclude from the electoral suffrage all persons employed under Government; and as their number was so considerable in France, this was a measure of great importance, and which went seriously to diminish the influence of the Crown. LAFAYETTE, who had been recently returned to the Chambers, denounced in violent terms the enormous multiplication of offices which had sprung up under the imperial régime, and been found too serviceable to be abandoned by succeeding governments. "In casting our eyes," said he, "over that hierarchy so skilfully constructed, under the imperial régime, on the ruins of the rights of the French people, and religiously upheld to this hour by the Government of the Restoration, we shall search in vain for an atom of independence. Prefects, sub-prefects, councils of prefectships, of municipalities, of arrondissements, of departments, receivers of contributions, judges of the peace—all are the creatures of power, and removable at its pleasure. Are we waiting to pass the present law till the principle of freedom of election, called for on all sides, has restored life to the commercial and departmental administrations,

and to the judges of peace,* and reduced to reasonable limits the exorbitant power of the prefects, whose name has been exhumed from the ruins of the Lower Empire? No, without doubt; but there are means of execution which you may vote on the spot." There can be no doubt that Lafayette was right in these observations, but he forgot to add, what the event has now abundantly proved, that it was his own frantic innovations which imposed of necessity this vast herd of servile employés upon the country by destroying the race of comparatively independent proprietors, who might have discharged the public functions on the nomination and by the influence of the people.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 31, 32; Lac. iv. 354.

79. It passes the Peers.

So strong was the feeling in the Chamber of Deputies against the exercise of the influence of the Crown in elections by means of their employés, that the law passed it by a majority of 257 to 106. It met, however, with a very different reception in the Chamber of Peers, where M. de Villèle's creation of seventy-six Royalists had rendered that party nearly a majority. Several amendments proposed were only thrown out by a majority of four or five votes. The law, however, finally passed by a majority of eighty-three, a result which proved that even the vast additions made at successive times to the peerage had not been able entirely to extinguish the spirit of Republicanism in its bosom. The right of hereditary succession had in some degree restored it, and many of the new peers gave proof of this by voting against the ministerial project, and in a way which was little expected by the party which had created them. The great want of the peerage, however, was of estates commensurate to the rank bestowed; a defect which necessarily drove a large proportion of them into a discreditable submission to any government which might furnish them, through office, with the means of existence.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. xi. 52, 56; Lam. viii. 134; Lac. iv. 355, 356.

The part which France was called on to take in aiding

* A species of arbitrators appointed to settle the disputes of the poor without having recourse to actual litigation.

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the Greeks in their efforts to shake off the Ottoman yoke, in consequence of the treaty of 16th July, of which an account has been given in treating of the affairs of Greece, led to a demand on the part of Ministers of a vote of credit of 80,000,000 francs (£3,200,000), which was granted by a very large majority. But a more serious difficulty arose in regard to a new law of a conciliatory character regarding the periodical press, which removed several of the most galling restrictions on the public journals. It proposed to allow all persons to set up journals, provided they conformed to the provisions of the law, and to abolish the most obnoxious species of prosecution, called the "procès de tendance." The law passed both Houses by large majorities, that in the Peers being 65, and in the Commons 132; and it was in a great degree owing to the liberty of discussion thus acquired that the Liberals were able to fan the conflagration which ultimately consumed the throne.[1]

80. New law regarding the press.

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 68, 71; Lac. iv. 357, 359; Lam. viii. 131.

These concessions, though by no means inconsiderable ones, were far from satisfying the Liberal party, which had by the last election acquired so great a preponderance in the Chamber of Deputies. Some more substantial guarantee against the designs of the Jesuits was demanded, and nothing so anxiously as some restriction on their interference with the education of the young, which they were so anxious to effect, and had in some degree acquired. It was no easy matter, however, to prevail on the King to consent to any change in this respect; for this touched his conscience, and threatened to disturb the system which his spiritual advisers represented as the sole foundation which could be relied on either for the altar or the throne. When his Ministers first broached the matter in Council, he said, "That is a serious matter: I cannot determine on it without consulting my council." The Council, however, was unanimous on the subject; even the Duke d'Angoulême, whose devotion was so well known, and the royal confessor himself,

81. Law against the Jesuits.

counselled a temporary bending to the storm, with a view to evading its fury. Charles long held out; but at length, yielding to the earnest solicitations of his whole Council, he agreed to sign two ordonnances, the first of which suppressed all the schools and seminaries in France under the direction of the Jesuits, and restored them to the control of the University; while the second limited to twenty thousand the number of those who were to be trained for the ecclesiastical profession at these seminaries. "My dear Minister," said the King to the Bishop of Beauvais, who presented to him the ordonnances, and his pen to sign them, "I cannot disguise from you that this signature has cost me more than anything else in my life: I am thus putting myself into hostility with my most faithful servants, with those whom I esteem and love the most: fatal situation of princes, in whom a sense of duty rules the heart. Do you not think we are doing wrong?" "No, sire!" replied the Bishop; "you are saving religion from irreparable ruin." [1]

[1] Lac. iv. 360, 363; Lam. viii. 136, 137; Ann. Hist. xi. 84, 87.

82. Indignation excited among the Jesuits; but the Pope approves the measure.

Nothing could exceed the indignation expressed by the whole Jesuit party at this great concession to the demands of their adversaries. The King was stigmatised as impious, the Minister as a persecutor, the Bishop of Beauvais as an apostate. A hundred thousand copies were thrown off of a protest by the bishops of France against the ordonnance, and circulated among the families of the faithful, where they produced no small grief and consternation. The Archbishop of Toulouse refused to obey the ordonnance, and put himself into open hostility with the Crown; the Bishop of Chartres prophesied the approaching downfall of the impious dynasty. The Government had influence enough with the Court of Rome to procure a bull, addressed to M. de Latil, one of the bishops most attached to the King, and the least suspected of undue concessions to the irreligious spirit of the age, approving of the ordonnance as a measure of internal policy of the French Government, which did not interfere

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with the prerogatives or rights of the Church. This public act, on the part of the head of the Church, appeased the tumult, but did not remove the discontent. The Jesuits left France, but retired into Switzerland, where they established themselves on the frontier, and continued in an underhand and indirect way their action upon all the devout and aristocratic families over whom they possessed influence.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 138, 139; Lac. iv. 363, 364; Ann. Hist. xi. 127, 134.

83. Preparations for a change of Ministry.

These measures were so evidently adverse to the wishes and principles of the King, that it soon became evident to all that the present transition and compromise Ministry could not by possibility stand, and that it was merely a question of time when it was to be succeeded by one either of a decidedly Royalist or Revolutionary character. The opportunity for making a change occurred sooner than might have been expected. M. de la Ferronais, the respected Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been obliged to relinquish his active duties for a time from bad health, and he had been succeeded *pro tempore* by M. de Rayneval, a veteran diplomatist, but not equal to the duties of that responsible situation. The King resolved to take advantage of the opportunity which the necessity of choosing a successor presented for introducing M. DE POLIGNAC, whom he had already in secret fixed on as his future Prime Minister, into the Administration. He despatched, accordingly, an official letter to that nobleman, who was then ambassador in London, desiring him to return forthwith to Paris. He appeared there in the end of December, to the great terror of all parties;—of the Royalists, from dread of the dangerous steps which he might adopt; of the Revolutionists, from apprehension of the overthrow of the semi-Liberal administration which he would probably effect. The King, however, was nowise shaken in the resolution, which he had now matured, of confiding himself to M. de Polignac. He was confirmed in that intention from a journey which he had recently made with a view to test the temper of the public mind in Lorraine and Alsace,

where he had been received with the most unbounded demonstrations of loyalty. Both parties concurred in these expressions of attachment: it was hard to say whether the peasantry of the few great seigneurs who had survived the Revolution, or the workmen of the great manufacturers who had arisen on the ruins of those who had fallen, were most loud in their cheers. The King decorated with his own hand M. Casimir Perier, who, with M. Benjamin Constant, was peculiarly conspicuous from the fervour of his loyalty. Yet were both parties insincere, or rather deceptive, in these demonstrations, which went far to mislead the King as to the real state of public opinion in the country. Each had an object to gain in making them, because both felt that a crisis was approaching, and that it was by outvying the other in effusions of loyalty that they were most likely to turn it to their own advantage.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 147, 149; Lac. iv. 370, 371.

84. Opening of the Chambers. Jan. 11, 1829.

Notwithstanding the secret resolution of the King to intrust to Prince Polignac the formation of a new Ministry, it was not deemed safe as yet openly to take that step; and the session of 1829 commenced with M. de Martignac still at the head of the Government. The King drew with justice a flattering picture of the state of the country, which was prosperous in every part beyond all former example; and his speech, which was hailed with enthusiasm, concluded with these words: "Experience has dissipated the prestige of insensate theories. France knows, as you do, on what basis its prosperity rests; and those who seek it elsewhere than in the sincere union of the royal authority and the liberties consecrated by the Charter, will find themselves speedily disavowed by it." These words were received with loud applause, and it seemed, from the unanimity displayed, that the legislature was more unanimous than they had ever been in their attachment to the throne, instead of being, as it really was, on the eve of a convulsion which was to shake it in the dust.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. xii. 3, 4; Lam. viii. 151; Lac. iv. 373, 374.

In the discussion on the address in the Chamber of

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85. Remarkable speech of Prince Polignac.

Peers, Prince Polignac, who was not yet invested with any ostensible power, but whose presence at Paris had excited no small sensation in the capital, spoke as follows: "The public journals have, within these few days, directed against me the most violent attacks, without provocation on my part, without truth, without even probability, without a single fact to adduce that could furnish them either with motive or pretext. They have dared to hold me up to entire France as nourishing in my heart a secret repugnance to our representative institutions, which seem now to have acquired an additional title to veneration since the King who bestowed them reposes in an honoured tomb. Could the authors of these calumnies penetrate into the interior of my home, they would find there the best, the most decisive refutation of these calumnies. They would find me surrounded with the fruits of my continual studies, all of which had but one object and end, to consolidate and defend our institutions, and to contribute to make them descend to our children. Yes," he added, in a solemn tone, "our institutions appear to me to reconcile all that can be required on the one side by the power and dignity of the throne; on the other, by the just independence of the nation. It is, then, in entire accordance with my conscience and my conviction that I have taken the solemn engagement to concur in and maintain them. And what right has any one now to say that I will recede from that engagement? What right have they to suppose in me an intention to sacrifice my legitimately acquired liberties? Have they ever seen in me the servile adorer of power? Has my political faith wavered at the presence of danger? If it were possible to interrogate the consciences and life of my accusers, would I not find them bending the knee before the idols, when, more independent than these, I braved in chains danger and death?"[1]

[1] Moniteur, Jan. 17, 1829; Lam. viii. 152, 153.

This speech, which revealed the secret hopes and expectations of the orator, fell like a thunderbolt on M.

de Martignac, to whose administration it presaged an early downfall. He was sagacious enough to perceive that the King was preparing for him a successor; and he felt the disheartening conviction that he was only smoothing by his administration the path of power for a different Government. The first votes in the Assembly showed how thoroughly its members were imbued with these thoughts and presentiments. M. Royer-Collard had the majority; but M. Casimir Perier had 155 votes, and M. de la Bourdonnaye, the ministerial candidate, only 90. This sufficiently demonstrated that the state of parties was such that it was impossible for the Government to withstand any coalition that might be formed against it. The Centre even belonged more to M. de Villèle than M. de Martignac; and the support of the Left was not to be relied on in a question with a combination that threatened to overthrow the Ministry.[1]

86. State of parties in the Assembly.

[1] Lam. viii. 154, 155; Lac. iv. 375, 376; Cap. x. 27, 34.

To conciliate the Liberal majority, Government brought forward a law which tended to increase the popular influence in the municipal councils. The Royalists were expected to support the project, for as it proposed to give admission to an additional number of votes from the rural districts, where their chief influence lay, it appeared calculated to increase their authority. The Liberals were equally relied on for their support, for they were impressed with the idea, which subsequent events have so entirely disproved, that any considerable increase in the number of voters, or the powers with which they were invested, would tend to augment their preponderance in the state. Nevertheless, by one of those combinations of parties which often precede or occasion the fall of a ministry, this measure, framed to please both parties, gained the support of neither. On the contrary, a coalition was formed against it, which proved fatal to the law itself and the Administration. The projected law was divided into two parts, one regulating the municipal régime, the other the councils of arrondissement. The

87. Law for the departmental municipalities, and its defeat.

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first met with little opposition; but the second, which went to establish more extended and popular assemblies of the cantons, in lieu of the old councils of arrondissement, was defeated by a coalition of the Left and Left Centre, the numbers being 124 to 103. It is difficult to imagine a more flagrant instance of factious and unprincipled combination than this, for the measure thus thrown out by a coalition of Liberals and Liberal Royalists was a large concession to popular influence, and a decided blow at the influence of the Crown. The Royalists, anxious to overthrow the Ministry, remained immovable on their seats, and, anticipating their fall, were deaf to the entreaties of M. de Martignac and M. Hyde de Neuville, that they would come to the rescue of the Crown. The Liberals, guided by Casimir Perier and Guizot, disregarded equally the representations of the Minister, that the King would never go beyond these concessions, and that his fall would throw the Government into the hands of an ultra-faction, which by its extreme measures would endanger the monarchy. It seems strange that, for the purpose of party, public men should lend themselves to such a dereliction of principle; but the history of England furnishes many similar examples—one in particular, which will be detailed in the sequel, on an occasion hardly less momentous, or attended with consequences less important than this.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xi. 104, 109; Lam. viii. 156, 158; Lac. iv. 381.

83. The King withdraws his measures.

Nothing could exceed the satisfaction of the King, who in secret desired the fall of his Ministers, at this defeat. When M. de Martignac and M. Portalis announced the hostile vote, he said, with joy depicted in his countenance: "Well, see how they receive my kindnesses. You see where they wish to drag me: you see whither you have been dragged yourselves by your system of concessions. I have smiled twenty times at your confidence in the Chambers. You will gain nothing but by vigour. Return and announce to the Chamber that I withdraw my laws." Thunderstruck with this announcement, the vigour and celerity of which revealed

a prior and concerted resolution, the Ministers, downcast and sad, returned to the Chamber, and announced the royal determination. The consternation of the Chamber equalled that of the Ministers; they now saw what they had brought about, and bitterly regretted the step they had taken. But it was too late. The thing was done, and could not be undone. All foresaw that a crisis was approaching, and that in the shock of parties the monarchy might be overthrown, and all men of sense deplored the perils which could no longer be averted. The ultra-Royalists alone, preoccupied with one idea, and blind to the signs of the times, evinced an undisguised and almost ominous joy at their approach.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 157, 158; Lac. iv. 381, 383; Cap. x. 61, 64.

89. State of the Legislature at the close of the session.

Though conscious that he could no longer carry on the Government, M. de Martignac, like a good soldier, remained at his post, resolved as long as possible to avert the collision of the Crown and the Legislature. The remainder of the session, however, was almost dumb show; all were aware that the decisive stroke had been struck, that the days of the compromise Ministry were numbered, and that it was merely a question of time when they should give place either to a decided Royalist administration, appointed by the King, or a decided Liberal one forced on him by the Chamber of Deputies. The budget, as a matter of necessity, was voted, under a tacit compromise between the parties, almost without discussion. A slight change took place in the Ministry, by the appointment of M. Portalis as Minister of Foreign Affairs *ad interim*, in the room of M. de la Ferronais, whose health was permanently broken; but it was generally understood that this was a temporary arrangement only, and that the place was really reserved for Prince Polignac. The approaching downfall of the Ministry was so universally presaged that they had become an object of derision to the very courtiers and pages of the palace.[2]

[2] Lam. viii. 158, 159; Lac. iv. 383, 384.

One evening, after a prolonged and bitter discussion on the expenses of the army, M. de Caux, the Minister at

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War, entered the King's Cabinet. "Well, M. de Caux," said the monarch, "what do you say to this assembly?" —"Abominable, sire," replied the minister. "You agree with me, then, that this cannot last? Am I sure of the army?"—"Sire!" answered M. de Caux, "you must first tell us in what cause." "Without condition," rejoined the King.—"Well then, sire! the army will never fail the King in the defence of the throne and the Charter; but if it became a question to re-establish the ancient régime?"—"The Charter, the Charter," replied the King; "who talks of violating it? Doubtless it is an imperfect work—my brother was so desirous to reign at any cost. I shall respect it, nevertheless; but what has the army to do with the Charter?"—"Your Majesty," replied M. de Caux, "is in error; and the reason is, that out of 20,000 officers in the army, there are *not* 1000 *who possess, of private fortune, 600 francs* (£24) *a-year.*" This sufficiently indicated where the danger lay. The vast majority of the officers in the army was composed of the bourgeois class; it sympathised with its feelings, was guided by its interests, read its journals. The Royal Guard was an exception; its officers had been carefully selected from the best families that yet remained in France. But these vital considerations made no impression on the King. Secret conferences, chiefly during the night, were now held frequently in the Tuileries, to which the most ardent Royalists, such as M. de le Bourdonnaye and M. de Montbel, were conducted by the valet-de-chambre's apartments in ordinary dresses; and Prince Polignac, who had returned to London after his speech at the tribune, was recalled by a holograph letter of the King himself.[1]

90. Conferences of the King and the extreme Royalists.

[1] Lam. viii. 160, 161; Lac. iv. 385, 386; Capefigue, Hist. de Louis Philippe, i. 157, 158.

Profoundly skilled in dissimulation, the monarch concealed all these secret movements from his Ministers, and M. de Martignac was slumbering on in fancied security, in the belief that he had recovered his confidence, and that he might yet weather the storm, when, on the 6th August, M. Portalis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

91. Change of Ministry, and Prince Polignac Premier. Aug. 8.

was suddenly called to St Cloud, and informed by the King himself of the dissolution of the Ministry. "Concessions," said he, "have weakened me, without satisfying my enemies;" an observation which may be applied with equal justice to all conciliatory measures, yielded to intimidation instead of a sense of justice. The whole Ministers immediately repaired to St Cloud, and surrendered their portfolios to the King; M. Roy, the Minister of Finance, alone was requested to remain, which he declined. M. Hyde de Neuville could scarcely be brought to believe in his disgrace. In the evening, the list of the new Ministry, which was all prepared, appeared in the *Moniteur*, and as it was composed entirely of persons known to entertain the most extreme Royalist opinions, it sounded like the tocsin of revolution throughout France. Prince Polignac, though ostensibly Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the real Premier; M. de la Bourdonnaye was Minister of the Interior; M. de Bourmont, of War; M. de Montbel, of Public Instruction; M. de Courvoisin, of Justice; M. de Chabrol, of Finance; and M. d'Haussey, of the Marine. The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs was suppressed. M. de Rigny, the hero of Navarino, had declined the office accepted by M. d'Haussey.[1]

[1] Moniteur, Aug. 8, 1829; Lam. viii. 162, 163; Lac. iv. 388, 389.

92. Importance of the change.

Thus was accomplished, for the first time since the Restoration, an *entire* change of government in France. Power was now placed in the hands of men able indeed, and zealous, and devoted to the monarchy, but destitute of practical experience, and guided by a fanaticism which refused to take council from the signs of the times. It was a singular combination of circumstances which brought about such a result in a country possessing representative institutions, and so strongly imbued in the middle class, in which power was vested, with democratic opinions. But little eventual good could be anticipated from a change which, in an age of intelligence and intellectual activity, placed a Government in power whose principles, however much in harmony with the opinions of the majo-

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rity of the rural population, were utterly at variance with those of the urban inhabitants, in whom political power was exclusively vested; and who yet were so sincerely impressed with the danger of yielding to their antagonists' opinions, that they were prepared to hazard the monarchy itself in striving to overturn them. Nothing but combined wisdom and energy, vast previous preparation, and decisive rapidity in action, could bring the Government through such a crisis; and these were precisely the qualities in which, with all their ability, the new Administration were most deficient.

CHAPTER XVII.

FRANCE FROM THE ACCESSION OF THE POLIGNAC MINISTRY TO THE FALL OF CHARLES X.

1. Prince Polignac: his biography.

PRINCE POLIGNAC, who was the real head of this Administration, and played so important a part in the eventful drama which so soon succeeded, was a man possessed of several brilliant, some noble qualities. Born under the shadow of the court in the brilliant days of the monarchy; the son of the princess whose beauty and tenderness had fascinated the heart of the romantic and confiding Marie-Antoinette; godson to that princess; bred up on the knees of the Count d'Artois; driven into exile early in life, from the effects of a Revolution to which the attachment of the Queen to his mother had in some degree contributed; held up to the maledictions of the people, in consequence of the sincerity of his devotion to the royal family,—he was bound to the throne by the strongest of all ties, to a generous mind—early associations, gratitude for prosperity, fidelity in misfortune. He was, before he had passed adolescence, actively engaged in the attempts made to restore the fallen fortunes of royalty, and was implicated in the plot of Georges at Paris, in 1801, to overturn the First Consul. In consequence of this he was arrested, brought to trial, and condemned to death; and he then evinced the generosity of his disposition by a heroic contest with his brother, who also was condemned, each striving to devolve upon the

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other a pardon, which, on account of their extreme youth, Napoleon had accorded to one of the two. His life was spared; but as a dangerous state criminal, he was imprisoned for several years in the castle of Vincennes, during which, as is generally the case with an ardent and intrepid mind, he was hardened in resolution, and confirmed in opinion, from the severity of the suffering which he was enduring for its sake. He was at length liberated by the Emperor, and joined the Count d'Artois in exile, with whom he re-entered France in 1814. He retired with that prince to Ghent in 1815, and headed an insurrection in Savoy against the Emperor. After the second Restoration, he distinguished himself by the intrepidity with which, almost alone, he maintained his opinions in church and state against a hostile majority. He was sent as ambassador to London by Charles X., soon after his accession, chiefly in order to prepare him, by intercourse with public men, for the important place in the councils of the state for which he was designed by that monarch; and he still held that embassy, when he was called to the perilous task of guiding the monarchy in an open contest with the majority in the country.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 165, 166; Cap. x. 164, 165; Biog. Univ. lxxx., (Polignac.)

2. His character.

His character, from the vast importance of the events which occurred during his administration, has been drawn in the most opposite colours by annalists on the different sides. At this distance of time and place, however, it is possible to form a comparatively impartial opinion of his merits and demerits. His countenance—which inherited from nature the beauty of his mother, and the aristocratic cast of his father—had been imprinted with melancholy from his early misfortunes, and the long imprisonment he had undergone in consequence of his fidelity to his opinions. His manners were refined and gracious; and when he did apply to business, it was with vigour and effect. During his lengthened confinement, which had endured nine years, he had read and meditated much. Unfortunately he was, by that very circumstance, de-

barred from intercourse with men, or collision with the world, during his long solitude, and led to form his opinions, not from what he saw to be practicable, but from what he thought to be right. These external influences, combining with an intrepidity which nothing could shake, and a loyalty which nothing could seduce, rendered him the most dangerous Minister whom it was possible to imagine for France at this crisis; for they led him to engage without hesitation in a contest which his conscience indeed approved, but of which his reason had neither calculated the chances nor for it provided the means. His political principles, albeit ultra-Royalist, were far from arbitrary. He aimed at securing for France a constitution similar to that which for a century and a half had given prosperity and glory to Great Britain; and he engaged in the contest of 1830 chiefly in order to emancipate it from the revolutionary influences which seemed to him the only impediment to that consummation. Unhappily he never took into account the essential discrepancies between the circumstances of the two countries, or the impossibility of constructing, in a country where the aristocracy had been destroyed, and the church spoliated, a constitution adapted to one in which they formed the two pillars of the state.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 164, 167.

3. Character of M. de la Bourdonnaye.

M. DE LA BOURDONNAYE, the new Minister of the Interior, was a man of vigour and resolution, who imparted to the Royalist side the ardour and determination which had so often proved successful on the popular. A Vendean representative of 1815, and deeply imbued with the passions of that period, he became a minister in 1829 with a resolution to carry those principles into effect. He was a sort of Royalist Terrorist; he retorted upon the Revolutionists their own principles, and made the Liberals turn as pale now with the extreme measures which he was understood to have in contemplation, as he had done the Buonapartists with the lists of proscription he had demanded. His violence, however,

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was in words rather than action; his fire evaporated at the tribune; and he was satisfied if his burning expressions, circulated from one end of France to the other, threw his opponents into continual alarm. He menaced more than struck; he desired renown rather than power; and rejoiced more in the thunder of his eloquence than the wounds he might inflict upon his enemies. The King had been misled as to his real character and qualities by his sonorous declamations at the tribune. He expected to find in him a sort of monarchical Mirabeau, and discovered to his cost, when the hour of trial came, that he had introduced into his Cabinet a man of words rather than deeds, whose vigour evaporated in terse expression, and who made no preparation in action for the support of the changes which he had so strenuously recommended in council.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 168; Cap. x. 127, 129.

4. M. de Bourmont.

M. DE BOURMONT redeemed an unhappy circumstance, which cast a shade on his life, by the highest military and civil talents. He embodied in his single person the whole spirit of La Vendée; his name recalled the heroic courage, the glorious victories, the tragic reverses, of its immortal contest. Unhappily, it recalled also the dishonourable defection on the eve of the battle of Waterloo, and the envenomed testimony which he had borne against Marshal Ney, which had gone so far to seal the fate of that unfortunate man. He had borne a distinguished part in the war of La Vendée, and, after its pacification, in those of the Empire, when his former antagonists had become his comrades. The penetrating eye of Napoleon had distinguished him among the many whom that eventful period trained to the profession of arms; and it was the confidence with which he had been treated, and the value of the information which he possessed, which caused his defection on the eve of the battle of Waterloo to be so severely felt. His military abilities were of the very highest cast, his powers of administration great, his foresight and arrangement, so far as they depended on him, per-

fect. It is the general opinion, that if he had been at Paris instead of Algiers when the Revolution of 1830 broke out, the issue of the convulsion would have been different from what it was. He possessed great civil as well as military talents; he was sagacious in council, eloquent in debate, and gifted with the rare quality of fascinating the minds of his hearers by the fire of extempore oratory. His high forehead and pensive eye bespoke the ascendant of intellect; his fascinating smile and gracious manners, the polished courtier; his firm and confident step, the consciousness of superiority, and power to rule mankind. The brevity and force of his expressions revealed the force of a mind which made itself felt, like that of Burke, in the shortest conversation. Fascinated by these solid as well as brilliant qualities, and regarding it only as a proof of his devotion to the royal cause, Charles felicitated himself upon his choice of such a man as War Minister, and overlooked entirely his defection at Waterloo. But France had not forgotten it, and considering, with reason, fidelity to his colours as the first duty of a soldier, regarded with undisguised dismay his appointment to so important a situation, and trembled at it, as the herald of Royalist reaction and civil war.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 170; Cap. x. 129, 134; Lac. iv. 391.

5. M. de Montbel, M. de Courvoisin, and M. de Chabrol.

The other members of the Royalist Cabinet, though all men of talent, did not stand prominently forward like those who have been mentioned. M. de Montbel, new to public life, had been known only as able in the administration of affairs at Toulouse, of which he had been mayor. He was an *elève* of M. de Villèle, and was obviously placed in the Cabinet to facilitate his return to power. M. de Courvoisin was in a peculiar manner the orator of the Cabinet, and as he had defended with vigour and eloquence the system of M. Decazes, he was regarded with less jealousy by the Liberals than the rest of the Ministry. M. de Chabrol and M. d' Haussey, who hitherto had been unknown in power, though distinguished in subordinate branches of the Government, were men capable

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of discharging with success their respective departments of Minister of Marine and of the Finances; but as they were not master-spirits, and characterised chiefly by their loyalty and fidelity to the King, they might be expected to concur, without difficulty, in any measure which the ruling powers in the Cabinet might propose.[1]

[1] Cap. x. 137, 139; Lam. viii. 171, 172.

6. Extreme violence of the Liberal press at the Ministry, and preparations of the Liberals.

Deeming the mask now thrown off, and that open war was proclaimed between the Government and the country, the Liberal press broke out, the very day after the Ministry was announced in the *Moniteur*, into the most violent invectives against them. Nothing before had ever equalled since the Restoration, nothing since has ever surpassed, the fury with which they assailed the new Cabinet. "Coblentz, Waterloo, 1815," exclaimed the *Journal des Debats*, after giving the names of the Ministers; "the emigration in M. de Polignac; desertion to the enemy in M. de Bourmont; the fury of proscription in M. de la Bourdonnaye: such are the three principles in the three leading persons of the Administration. Press upon it; nothing but humiliation, misfortune, and danger will drive it from power. Unhappy France! unhappy King!" M. Guizot and M. Thiers, the one in the journal of *Le Temps*, the other in that of the *National*, launched with more ability and argument the thunders of their eloquence against the madness of the King. Other writers, less eminent, and more declamatory, congratulated the country upon the veil being at length torn aside, which had hitherto imperfectly concealed the conspiracy which had been going on for six years against the liberties and constitution of the country. The Directing Committee, under the guidance of M. de Lafayette, which gave the law to all the other democratic bodies in France; the society "Aidez-toi et le Ciel t'aidera," under the rule of M. Guizot and M. de Broglie, began seriously to organise the means of rebellion.[2] Corresponding committees were established in all the principal towns of the country, to organise a general system of resistance to taxes, and subscrip-

[2] Cap. x. 279, 280; Lam. viii. 172, 173; Lac. iv. 392, 393.

tions opened to defray the necessary expenses of a universal moral and physical warfare against the Government.

7. Lafayette's triumphant journey in the south.

To take advantage of the universal ferment, General Lafayette made a journey to the south, where he was received with such enthusiasm that it resembled rather the progress of a popular and adored sovereign, than the honours bestowed on a subject, how eminent soever. At Grenoble, he was escorted into the town by a numerous body of cavaliers; at Vizille, the mayor of the town presented him with a silver crown, in imitation of oak leaves. At Lyons his reception was still more enthusiastic, and he made his entry in an open chariot, drawn by four white horses, like a sovereign prince. His speech to the inhabitants and functionaries, who received him at the gate, was remarkable. "To-day," said he, with the aristocratic grace which he knew so well to assume, "after a long diversion of brilliant despotism and constitutional hopes, I find myself in the midst of you in a moment which I would call critical, if I had not perceived everywhere on my journey, and if I did not see in this great and powerful city, the calm and even disdainful firmness of a great people which knows its rights, feels its strength, and will be faithful to its duties; and it is above all, at this very moment, that I love to express to you a devotion to which your appeal will never, to my latest hour, be made in vain." To counteract the effect of this movement, a progress of the King into Normandy was projected by the Ministers, but abandoned, on consideration, as too hazardous.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xii. 269, 271; Cap. x. 281, 283; Lam. viii. 174.

8. Retreat of M. de la Bourdonnaye. Oct. 29.

It soon appeared, when they took their seats at the Council, that Prince Polignac and M. de la Bourdonnaye were not likely long to draw together. Both aspired to the dignity of President of the Council, corresponding to the premiership in England, and neither was inclined to wave his pretensions in favour of the other. Their feelings and motives of action also were different, though

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both were equally sincere Royalists. Polignac was the representative of the ultra-Romish party, which, regarding the contest in which they were engaged as an affair of conscience, never stopped to calculate the chance of success, but was equally prepared to accept the crown of martyrdom or the chaplet of victory from its results. La Bourdonnaye, a statesman trained in the contests and desirous of the triumphs of the tribune, was more worldly in his ideas, and was strongly impressed with the idea that the one thing needful was, to secure a parliamentary majority, and that any strong measures would be hazardous and misplaced till this object was secured. In this state of matters their co-operation in the same Cabinet was impossible. The complaint made against M. de la Bourdonnaye by the Pope's nuncio and the *Parti-prêtre* was, that he was not a man of action, however skilful in debate —an ominous expression, indicating that he was not prepared to second the desperate measures which were in contemplation. Sensible that he was misplaced in a Cabinet where such designs were in contemplation, M. de la Bourdonnaye voluntarily resigned before the divergence of his opinions with those of his colleagues had been manifested by any overt acts; he was raised to the Peerage, and was not heard of again in public life. He was succeeded as Minister of the Interior by M. Guernon de Ranville, an able and eloquent man, who had courage enough, in critical times, like Strafford, to accept a ministry which presaged the possibility of a scaffold.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 177, 178; Cap. x. 285, 287; Lac. iv. 392, 394; Ann. Hist. xii. 278, 279.

9. M. Guizot: his biography.

Two men appeared at this juncture in the legislature, and entered on the career of public life, destined to the highest celebrity in future times, M. GUIZOT and M. BERRYER. M. Guizot had been employed in the Administration at intervals since he accompanied the King to Ghent, in 1815; and from his known talents for business, as well as powers of oratory, he had already acquired a great reputation. He belonged to that small section of

very eminent men who, like the Economists in former days, have acquired the soubriquet of the "*Doctrinaires*," and whose object was to combine the institutions of the ancient monarchy with the wants and requirements of modern society. M. de Barante, M. Vilmain, M. Broglie, and M. de Staël belonged to this school, which was cordially supported by M. Decazes, that statesman being in a manner the acting representative of it. With his colleagues of the same political creed, M. Guizot retired on the fall of that able minister, and betook himself to the composition of the lectures on history, in the University of Paris, which have since been published under the name of *Civilisation in Europe, and Civilisation in France*, and have laid the foundation of his great reputation. He is a Protestant in creed, and has none of the lustre of nobility in his descent; but some men are made noble by the patent of nature, and no man ever stood forth as a more zealous and intrepid defender of an enlightened Christian faith.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 178, 179.

10. His character as a writer and statesman.

M. Guizot, as a philosophic historian, is one of the very greatest men that the world has ever produced. Less terse in his style than Montesquieu, less discursive than Robertson, he is more just and philosophic than either. He has drawn his conclusions from a wider induction, and rested his views on a more thorough acquaintance with the progressive changes in the social system. He exhibits that combination of antiquarian research and accuracy in detail, with luminous views and a thorough appreciation of the growing wants of the age, which is so rare in philosophical writers, but which, like the union of minuteness of finishing with generality of effect in Claude Lorraine, is essential to the highest eminence in the sister arts of history and painting, and never appears without leading to lasting fame. A laborious antiquarian, an eloquent professor, an indefatigable journalist, his eyes were fixed alike upon the past and the present, and from

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the combination of the two he drew his inferences as to the future. His countenance bespeaks his character. He has neither the fire of genius nor the ardour of enthusiasm in his expression, but the sober steadiness of deliberate thought, and the calm eye of steadfast resolution. He was invaluable as a political partisan, for he gave to party views the air of philosophic conclusions, and, perhaps unconsciously to himself, advanced the interest of a faction when he seemed engrossed only with those of humanity. A liberal Royalist during the government of the Restoration, he took an active part in the journalist hostility and open rebellion which at length overturned it; and, borne forward to power on the gales of popularity, under its successor he again reverted to his loyal impressions, and, as Minister of Louis Philippe, stood forth the eloquent and courageous supporter of conservative principles. But he did so only to share his fall; and he was precipitated from power in 1848, and the liberties of France destroyed, by the influence of the very doctrines which in 1830 he had done so much to promote, and which all his subsequent efforts had not been able to arrest—a memorable example to future times of the extreme danger, for factious or party purposes, of subverting established authority, and of the awful responsibility which attaches to those who, gifted with the power of launching forth the "winged words" which bear thought on their pinions, become in the end the rulers of their country's destinies.

11. M. Berryer.

M. Berryer has not obtained the same niche in the temple of fame as M. Guizot, chiefly because he was more consistent; for, unfortunately, all history tells us that the men who rise, even for a time, to greatness, are often those who, like Cæsar or Marlborough, can accommodate their principles to the varying circumstances of the times; not those who, like Cato or Aristides, preserve them unchanged through all the mutations of fortune. Connected by birth with the highest society, he had been admitted into its saloons, and imbued with its principles

and its graces. His talents for conversation, and the charm of his manners, had acquired for him a great reputation in those elevated circles; and though bred to the bar, and known as a public speaker only in its courts, he was selected for public life by Prince Polignac, after his accession to power, with the highest expectations of his value as a political supporter. In this he was not disappointed, although the time of his entrance into public life was unfortunate, and he became the ornament of a party only in time to share its fall. His handsome countenance prepossessed all who approached him in his favour; his piercing eye bespoke the internal fire of genius; his lofty forehead the power of intellect; his open expression the benignity of a magnanimous disposition. His courage was equal to any trial; and he possessed that chivalrous disposition, the sure mark of a noble mind, which led him to embrace without hesitation the cause which honour dictated, and attached him only the more strongly to the throne, from its obvious inability to bestow temporal rewards on its supporters. But his information was not equal to his eloquence: his reflection was inferior to his energy; he often spoke before he had thought; his name is attached to no great work either in legislation or literature; and, like many other persons similarly gifted, his biography leaves only a feeling of regret that dispositions so noble and talents so brilliant should not have realised themselves in a form permanently beneficial to humanity.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 179, 180.

12. M. Thiers.

Another man destined to future greatness began to rise into eminence at this period. M. THIERS, like M. Guizot, had none of the advantages of aristocratic birth or connection: what he gained and became he owed to himself, and himself alone. He raised himself to eminence, in the first instance, by his *History of the French Revolution*, written in early youth—a party work, often inaccurate in facts and erroneous in principle, but powerfully written, unscrupulous in politics, and only the more likely

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to be, in the first instance, popular, from its inculcating the doctrine, convenient to statesmen, but dangerous to nations, that the horrors of the Revolution were owing to a fatality unavoidable in such circumstances, not the faults or crimes of the persons engaged in it. The early celebrity of this work led to his being actively engaged on the Liberal side in the public press, which, with the lead which he took in the Revolution of July, early raised him to power under the government of Louis Philippe. His talents proved equal to any situation however great, any duties however onerous; and he was alternately prime minister with Guizot of the quasi-legitimate monarchy. It is the strongest proof of his ability, that it has proved equal not only to the highest and most varied functions, but has increased in the most remarkable manner in the line in which he originally became distinguished. His *History of the Consulate and the Empire* is so superior to that of the Revolution, that it is difficult to believe they proceeded from the same hand. The one is the production of a vigorous inexperienced youth, the other of a matured and reflecting statesman. Gifted with a ready elocution and uncommon powers of oratory, he soon acquired a lead in, and in the end almost the mastery of, the Chamber of Deputies. It is to be regretted only that his consistency and candour are not equal to his genius; that he has too often sacrificed public principle to private ambition; and that, in the anxiety to make his own fortune, he has not escaped the imputation of having unduly made use of his influence and peculiar means of information as a minister to augment it.

13. Prince Polignac's Memoir.

A very able Memoir on the state of the kingdom was prepared in Prince Polignac's office, and laid before the King at this juncture, which contains a clear exposition of the state of the country, the difficulties with which the Government was beset, and the grounds on which the *coup d'état* which followed was rested by its authors. "An alarming agitation," it was said, "undoubtedly prevails

in the public mind, but its origin is to be found exclusively in the disposition of those who are habitually occupied with public affairs. As to the mass of the people, they are entire strangers to it, and remain in that state of impassibility which excludes alike applause or murmurs. Everywhere in the country, as in the town, the masses are occupied only with their material prosperity; all interests find a sufficient guarantee in the institutions accorded by the Crown; they connect with them speculations for the present, and projects for the future; the overthrow of the order of things established by the Restoration would overturn all means of existence to the great majority; and, despite the declamations of the journals, no one seriously regards as possible the accomplishment of their sinister predictions.

14. Continued.

"It is the daily press which alone keeps up the agitation in the minds of men, and it gives to that movement an importance much greater than it really possesses. In truth, what can be the object of that agitation? Is it dread of the overthrow of our institutions? No one is thinking of it. Our institutions are the work of the royalty which protects and defends them. The King, whose word embraces all guarantees, has made known his determination to maintain them; his Government is applying itself sedulously to carry his wishes into effect; all the laws are executed, not only literally according to their word, but in good faith according to their spirit. The public liberties are respected, property of all sorts protected with a scrupulous care, which renders it doubly precious from the security which accompanies it. To these facts, which are so notorious that no one can deny them, what do the public journals on the other side oppose? Nothing but suppositions purely gratuitous as to culpable intentions on the part of Ministers, accusations which they themselves repel with indignation, and which derive their only credence from those who advance them imputing to their antagonists those culpable inten-

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tions as to *coups d'état*, by which their own conduct, whenever they were, even for a short season, in power, has been invariably regulated.

15. Continued.

"To impute with any show of reason an intention on the part of Ministers to overturn our institutions, it must be shown that this project has some prospect of success. Can any one suppose for a single moment that such chance exists at the present day? No one knows better than the chiefs of the Administration what profound roots our institutions have struck in the heart of all Frenchmen, friends of order and of public peace. These institutions conciliate all the feelings of the French, and give them entire satisfaction. The guaranteed security of private interests, the protection afforded to industry of every sort, fulfil all the wishes of the people; in a word, it is not only in our actual institutions that they find all they wish, but it is in them that they look for all that they hope. No power is able to tear that system from the hearts of the French. It is already so powerful and so solidly established, that if, by a concurrence of unforeseen circumstances and events which no human prudence could avert, *some deviations from our institutions might become unavoidable*, that deviation, how slight soever, and though known to be only momentary, could not by possibility be favourably received, unless the public were thoroughly convinced that it secured for the future on an imperishable basis the whole of our actual institutions. France would never submit to their *passing suspension*, but in the hope of securing their durable existence down to the latest posterity.

16. Continued.

"The chief causes of our present difficulties, and of the agitation which pervades the public mind, are the license of the public press, and the bad spirit which pervades a part of the electoral body. The last evil is in part the result of the first; in part it is owing to a cause peculiar to itself, which is the indefatigable labours of the revolutionary Directing Committee. Opposition writers, inte-

rested in denying the existence of that Committee, found mainly on the impossibility hitherto experienced of specifying the names of the individuals of which it is composed. Assuredly the Directing Committee is not an association whose members are proclaimed, or whose meetings are regulated by fixed and public statutes; it is modified according to circumstances, and changes according to the time its means of correspondence and action. The electoral body is the constant object of its measures. At the approach of elections, the editors, proprietors, and patrons of the revolutionary journals meet and agree on the candidates who are to be proposed and supported in every college. The journals publish those lists, and recommend them in the most imperious manner to the electors. In that singular traffic of votes, it constantly appears that the revolutionary journals make a sacrifice of their interests, their resentments, their preferences, and come to an understanding with singular precision as to the candidates to be supported. That of itself is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a central ruling authority, to which all local committees yield obedience. In November 1827, the Liberal committee went so far as to insert in the public journals a letter, by which certain candidates were recommended to the electors by the persons subscribing that letter, and these persons were M. Dupont de l'Eure, Voyer d'Argenson, Lafayette, Benjamin Constant.

17. Concluded.

"As to the means which the Committee employs to secure in each department the effect of its recommendations, or rather of its electoral injunctions, they are no longer the subject of doubt. In every place of any importance there is to be found what is called an 'Electoral Committee;' the members of these are known to the Minister of the Interior. These committees exercise a permanent inquisition over the electoral lists—favoured by the right which the law gives to a third party to interfere in the structure of those lists. The Committee use every possible

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effort to get enrolled all of democratic principles, and to exclude such as are suspected of Royalist principles. The class of electors upon whom these committees chiefly act are those who owe their suffrages to patents (trades and professions); it may readily be conceived what a powerful influence rich merchants and manufacturers, who are often in the interest of the committees, exercise over such persons. The peasants in the rural districts are equally at the mercy of the attorneys, notaries, and legal men out of office, by whom their properties are beset, and who naturally swell the ranks of opposition. In a word, the representation has become entirely subjected to external influences of the most dangerous kind, and it is no longer in the power of the King without the aid of the Chambers. The Ministers can do nothing but remove all cause of discontent or fear for the future, by causing the agitation excited by the press and the committees to be deprived of any real foundation."[1]

[1] Memoir, Feb. 1830; Cap. x. 331, 339.

18. Vast influence of the press in France.

Prince Metternich said, in April 1830, when at Paris, "If I were not Prime Minister in Austria, I would be a journalist here." In effect, the influence of the press in France had become such that it was omnipotent; the ruling power had slipped out of the hands of Government and passed into its. By means of the electoral committees, which were entirely at its disposal, they had got the command of the Chamber of Deputies, nearly two-thirds of which was arrayed under the banners of Opposition. By incessant action on the public mind, they had succeeded not only in directing but in inflaming it to such a degree as to render Government, by the means and influences provided by the constitution, impracticable. An appeal to the people, to extricate the Crown from the meshes of the net in which it was enveloped, only made matters worse; every successive dissolution augmented the Liberal majority. The momentary reaction produced by the change in the Electoral Law, introduced in 1821, and the success of the war in Spain in 1823, had been

soon obliterated; the colleges of departments had fallen as much under the direction of the revolutionary committees as the colleges of arrondissements; and the press, acting upon the whole middle class of society, in which the electoral suffrage was vested, had come to acquire the entire direction of the legislature. The fatal mistake of vesting the right of voting for members of the Chamber of Deputies in *one single class of electors*, and that the most democratic in the state, committed by the *coup d'état* of 5th September 1817, had prostrated the commons before the revolutionary party; the great democratic creation of Peers, in 1819, had given it the command of the Upper House. Deprived of its natural supporters in both branches of the legislature, the Crown was left alone to maintain a contest with a revolutionary party, bent upon subverting the throne, and wielding the greater part of the material and intellectual strength of the state; and, as if to render the conflict utterly hopeless, the Government was so left when under the guidance of an ecclesiastical Camarilla, whose rashness in adopting extreme resolutions was equalled only by their total want of preparations or foresight in carrying them into execution.[1]

[1] Capefigue, l'Europe depuis l'avènement du Roi Louis Philippe, i. 112, 131.

19. Vehement hostility of the press at the Polignac Ministry.

The rancour with which the whole Liberal press of France assailed the Polignac Ministry had had no parallel even in the past annals of that convulsed country, and it has scarcely had an equal in subsequent times. It was not the resolute determination of men striving to establish a principle or secure an object; it was the fierce passion of a woman set upon destroying a rival. The journals made no attempt to combat the measures of Government; they did not stop to inquire either what they were, or what they were likely to be; they directed their whole efforts to destroy the men who composed it. Indefatigable was the industry, great the ability, unbounded the license, which they exerted or permitted themselves in the pursuit of this object. Private scandal, false accusations, vilifying lampoons, were freely mingled with eloquent

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declamations, heart-stirring appeals, and gloomy denunciations of impending danger. In this death-struggle, the greatest ability, the most transcendent genius, was found in the same ranks with the most base and prostituted talent; Guizot, Benjamin Constant, and Thiers, poured forth their effusions against the Ministry, day after day, alongside of Paul Courier, Dulaure, and other pamphleteers, whose names have long since been forgotten. There were able writers, too, on the Royalist side, but they had few readers; the people, as usual in such conflicts, would peruse nothing but what fell in with their preconceived opinions; and the great circulation of the Liberal, compared with the Royalist journals, proved decisively to what an extent the majority of the more intelligent portion of the community had ranged itself in opposition to the Government.[1] *

[1] Capefigue, Hist. de Louis Philippe, i. 113, 120.

20. Opening of the Chambers. March 2.

The Chambers met on the 2d March 1830, and their proceedings were looked to with the utmost anxiety in every part of France; for every one foresaw that the decisive struggle was approaching, and that the legislature would be the theatre of the conflict. The deputies arrived in great number some days before from all quarters; none who could possibly attend on the day of battle were absent. The whole pomp of royalty was ostentatiously displayed; peers and commons were arrayed in a dense mass round the throne, which was placed on an elevated platform, and from which the King pronounced the LAST royal speech of the Restoration. He dwelt on his amicable relations with all foreign powers save Algiers, which he was resolved to punish for the insults offered

* In April 1830, the following was the circulation of the Parisian journals: —

Liberal.		Royalist.	
Constitutionnel,	16,666	Gazette de France,	9,863
Débats,	9,900	Quotidienne,	4,060
Courrier Français,	5,000	Drapeau Blanc,	666
Le Temps,	4,166	Gazette des Cultes,	622
Globe,	1,853	Messager des Chambres,	1330
National,	1,590	Moniteur,	2,606

—CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de Louis Philippe*, i. 113, note.

to the French flag; on the prosperous state of the finances, which had much surpassed expectation, which would enable him to gratify his wishes by alleviating the public burdens. "The first wish of my heart," said he in conclusion, "is to see France happy and respected, developing all the riches of its territory and its cultivation, and enjoying in peace the benefit of the institutions which it is my firm resolution to maintain. The Charter has placed the public liberties under the safeguard of the rights of the Crown; those rights are sacred, and my duty is to transmit them uninjured to my successors. Peers of France, deputies of *the departments*, I cannot doubt your concurrence in effecting the good which it is my object to bring about. You will repel with contempt the perfidious insinuations which malevolence has sought to propagate. Should culpable manœuvres obstruct my government, which I cannot and will not anticipate, I will find the means of surmounting them in my resolution to maintain the public peace, in my just confidence in the French, and in the love which they have always shown for their King."[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 7; Cap. x. 307, 308.

21. Votes on the Presidency, and Address of the Chambers.

There was nothing which could be the object of just criticism or attack in this speech; but the Opposition in the Chamber of Deputies felt themselves in such strength that they resolved to commence hostilities, and in the very outset hoist the signal of defiance. Their strength appeared on the first division for the election of a President; for the candidate whom the Ministry supported, M. de Berbes, had only 131, and Delatot 125 votes; while Royer-Collard had 225, Casimir Perier 190, and General Sebastiani 177. The King, as a matter of necessity, not less than inclination, selected M. Royer-Collard from the list presented to him; for not only was he the first on the list, but he had in former days been Royalist in principle, and Charles could not believe that he would now prove unfaithful to the Crown. The Address prepared by the committee, and which led imme-

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diately to the rupture which followed, concluded with these expressions: "Sire! in the midst of the unanimous expressions of respect and affection with which your people surround you, there has appeared in the minds of men a disquietude which disturbs the tranquillity which France had begun to enjoy, dries up the sources of its prosperity, and might, if it continued, become fatal to its repose. Our honour, our conscience, the fidelity which we have sworn, and *which we will always preserve*, impose on us the duty to unveil to you its cause. The Charter, which we owe to the wisdom of your Majesty's predecessor, and which your Majesty is so firmly resolved to maintain, consecrates *as a right* the intervention of the country in the direction of the public interests. That intervention is and ought to be indirect, wisely measured, circumscribed within narrow limits, which we will never permit to be passed; but it is not the less real in its results, for it makes the paramount concurrence of the political views of the Government with the wishes of your people *an indispensable condition* of the regular march of public affairs. Sire! our loyalty, our devotion, compel us to say that that concurrence does not now exist. An unjust distrust of the feelings and reason of the French is at present the fundamental thought of your Administration. Your people are afflicted at it, because it is unjust towards themselves; they are disquieted by it, for it is menacing for their liberties. That distrust can never find a place in your noble heart. No, sire! *France does not wish for anarchy any more than you wish for despotism.* It is befitting that you should have the same faith in its loyalty which it has in your promises. Let the wisdom of your Majesty determine between those who misunderstand a nation, so calm, so faithful, and we who, with a profound conviction, pour out into your bosom the griefs of a people jealous of the esteem and confidence of their King.[1] The royal prerogatives have placed in your hands the means of insuring between

[1] Ann. Hist. viii. 18, 19; Lam. viii. 185, 186.

the different powers in the state that constitutional harmony, which is the first and necessary condition of the power of the throne, and of the greatness of France."

22. Debate on the Address.

These words necessarily occasioned a storm in the Chamber, for they brought out mildly, but fairly and manfully, the fundamental question at issue between the parties. This was whether the appointment of Ministers was to be vested in the Crown or the Chamber, or rather whether the former was to be obliged to yield to a negative imposed by the latter. This question, so long resolved in favour of the House of Commons in England, and so thoroughly understood in parliamentary practice in that country, was new in France; and the assumption of such a power on the part of the Deputies appeared to many, as probably it was understood by themselves, as but a step to the entire direction of affairs, and the stripping the King of the most important of his prerogatives —that of the choice of his responsible servants. It gave rise, accordingly, to animated debates when the motion was made that the address should be agreed to, in which M. Berryer for the first time mounted the tribune, and by his energy and eloquence produced a profound impression.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 167, 183.

23. M. Berryer's argument against it.

"The projected address," said he, "attributes the disquietude which prevails to the formation of a new Ministry; that is to say, an act emanating from the royal will—the sole act of the executive power which cannot be the object of any responsibility, which is clearly a discharge of the King's duty, and within his prerogative—is represented as the cause of the grief of a whole people. Send to the King, then, a great deputation, and say to him at once: 'Sire, the use you have made of your prerogatives disturbs our security, dries up the sources of our prosperity, and may become fatal to our repose. (Loud murmurs on the Left.) Your interruptions," continued he, addressing the Left, "do not disturb me; they satisfy me that I am right. You recoil from the consequences

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of your own act. That assures me that the address, fraught with such results, will be rejected. If there is a want of respect in its expressions, there is a violation of the constitution in the alternative in which it places the King. The Chamber has no right to demand its own dissolution. There is something fearful and withering to the heart in the resolution of an Assembly which demands its own ruin; which, betraying the confidence of the electors, wishes to withdraw itself from the duties imposed upon it by the country, and which it has to discharge alike towards the Crown and the people. And it is at the very moment when these duties are most imperious that, by a strange infatuation, it is proposed to desert the post which has been committed to you.

24. Continued.

"If the Ministers of the Crown inspire distrust—if the Deputies are informed of their secret projects, let them remain at their posts, watch over their projects, and thwart them. What does it signify, when the rights of the Crown are invaded—when the King is outraged—that your address is filled with protestations of devotion, of respect, and of love? What signifies it that you say, 'The rights of the King are sacred,' if at the same time you control him in the exercise of the powers which you have intrusted to him? What effect can such a sad contrast have but to recall the mind to times of fatal memory; to remind us by what steps an unhappy King was conducted, in the midst of protestations of fidelity and love, to exchange for the palm of martyrdom the sceptre which he had let fall from his hand. I am not surprised that the framers of the address should have said that they feel themselves '*condemned*' to hold such language to the King. And I also, more occupied with the future than the resentments of the past, feel that if I should adhere to the address, my vote would for ever weigh on my conscience as a withering condemnation.

"Whither are we going, great God? Are we to be

25. Concluded.

dragged along like slaves at the feet of that power which is called public opinion? If the power of the Crown consents to sink before that influence, it would no longer be the Crown; it would have mistaken its mission, neglected its duty, abdicated its authority. A great duty is reserved for the Ministry of the 8th August (Polignac's.) It is called on to consolidate the work of the Restoration, to combat and destroy the spirit of faction, to found general unanimity on the accord of religion and knowledge, to extirpate from our codes the arbitrary principles of the Republic and the Empire. A Minister who advances on such a line cannot but meet with the support of the country. Have you any right to compel the King to dismiss his Ministers? Do you not see that such a pretension menaces our whole institutions? If it is conceded, what becomes of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of the Charter? Where is the independence of the executive power? What will remain of the royal authority? The King will not consent to the concession now demanded. He cannot consent to it, because his rights are sacred, because he is bound to transmit them intact to his successors, because he has sworn to maintain our institutions, and he will abide by his oath. His Ministers do not disguise from themselves the difficulty of their duties; but, convinced of their importance, they will not fail in their discharge. He whose power has called them to their posts has alone the right to dismiss them. As long as it seems meet to him to retain them in his service, they will continue faithful to it; nothing will shake their resolution, nothing will wear out their constancy."[1]

[1] Moniteur, March 5, 1830; Ann. Hist. xiii. 41, 42.

26. Answer of M. Guizot and the Liberals.

On the other hand, it was contended by M. Guizot, who, like his great antagonist, made then his first appearance on the parliamentary arena: "One power alone now makes itself felt in France, and feels itself entirely at its ease, and that power is the press. Never, in my opinion, was its action more salutary or necessary. It is

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it, and it alone, which during seven months has frustrated all designs against our liberties, and disappointed all hopes; but that preponderance of the press is fearful, and bespeaks a dangerous and distressing state of society. This general perturbation in the state, and in all the constituted authorities, is an evil foreign to the usual and healthful state of society, and it is to it that it behoves us to apply a remedy. We are told that France is tranquil; that the public order is nowhere disturbed. True: externally, peace is everywhere preserved; nó reports disturb the general tranquillity; but does the evil I have pointed out exist the less? Is it less grave, less alarming, less important in the eyes of all serious or reflecting men? It is more to be apprehended than many riots, more serious than the disorders such as have for a long time agitated England.

27. Continued.

"Such open disorders are symptoms which power cannot fail to recognise: it is unavoidable, when they break out, that Government should become aware of grievances, and endeavour to rectify them. With us no such warning exists: the danger, unknown, unheeded, lurks in the bosom of society. Its surface is tranquil—so tranquil, indeed, that Government is tempted to believe that the depths can never be stirred, and itself beyond the reach of all danger. Our words, gentlemen, the freedom of our words, is the only warning which power can receive amongst us; the sole voice which can penetrate to the King, and dissipate his illusions. Let us beware, then, of weakening their force; let us beware of softening our expressions; let them be respectful, even tender; it is our duty to be so, and no one has accused your committee of being awanting in that respect; but let them not be timid or doubtful. Truth has already difficulty enough to penetrate into the cabinets of kings; let us not send in its light pale and feeble; let it be such that it is alike impossible to misunderstand our meaning, and to doubt the loyalty of our sentiments.

"The fact is, that, in the midst of universal protestations of devotion and fidelity, there exists a vague disquietude which disturbs the security of the country; and that disquietude proceeds from the distrust which the country entertains of the present Ministry, and the reciprocal distrust which the Ministers entertain of the country. This fact is notorious; no one can deny it; it strikes every mind. So strong is this distrust on the part of the Ministers of the Crown, that it has even entered into the speech which they have composed for the King. Reciprocally, the country has no confidence in the Ministers; and it is of the nature of such feelings mutually to inflame each other. It is impossible to conceal, in vain to disguise, that there is no sympathy whatever between the Ministers of the Crown and the country. But we are living under a constitutional monarchy, of which it is an indispensable condition that a concurrence should subsist between the King and the majority in both Chambers. It is in vain to say our attempts to restore such a concurrence are an invasion of the Royal prerogative—a stripping the King of his legitimate power. Such is neither the object nor the language of the address. No attempt is made in it to dictate to the King what should be done. The existence of the evil is only indicated, leaving it to his Majesty to apply the remedy which his wisdom may dictate. But when the Ministers of the Crown have spoken in the speech from the Throne of *Force*, it is surely permitted to the Chamber to allude to the law. I vote for the address, and against the amendment." [1]

28. Concluded.

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 31, 38.

So great was the impression produced by the speech of M. Berryer, who was then for the first time heard in the Assembly, that M. Royer-Collard said, "This is not only an orator, but a power which has appeared amongst us." But it was all in vain: the Opposition was too strongly rooted in the Chamber and the country to be overcome by any reasoning how convincing, any eloquence how persuasive soever. The address, as it originally stood, was

29. Vote on the subject.

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voted, and the amendment, which was intended to soften it,* rejected by a majority of 40, the numbers being 221 to 181. That majority, considerable as it was, did not convey an adequate idea of the real strength of the Opposition; for 30 of the minority were detached from their ranks by the conciliatory terms of the amendment on which the vote was taken, so that the real strength of Ministers was only 150 out of 402. This great majority was produced by the defection of the whole Left Centre to the Opposition side, headed by M. Agier, a liberal Royalist, who by this defection overturned, in the first result, the throne—in the last, the liberties of his country.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 42, 43; Lam. viii. 188, 189; Cap. x. 324.

30. Measures of Ministers in consequence.

Ministers were thunderstruck by this majority, which was much larger than they had anticipated; but they were not deterred by it from pursuing the course which they had adopted. They answered it by the immediate dismissal of all the public functionaries who had taken a part in the hostile vote. One of the most remarkable of these was M. Calmon, Director-general of Registers and Domains. He received his *congé*, and his situation was offered to M. Berryer; but he replied, "I am too young as yet in the Chamber to deserve a situation, and next year I will perhaps deserve a higher one." The place was bestowed on M. de Suleau, a young writer of talent on the Royalist side, who had the courage in this crisis to ally himself to its fortunes. But several able men, especially in the diplomacy, hastened to resign their offices, or declined uniting themselves to the Administration. M. de Chateaubriand resigned his situation as ambassador at

* The amendment on the address proposed, and on which the vote was taken, was in these terms:—"Cependant notre honneur, notre conscience, la fidélité que nous vous avons jurée, et que nous vous garderons toujours, nous imposent le devoir de faire connaître à votre Majesté, qu'au milieu des sentimens unanimes de respect et d'affection dont votre peuple vous entoure, de vives inquiétudes se sont manifestées à la suite des changemens survenus dans la dernière session. C'est à la haute sagesse de votre Majesté de les apprécier, et d'y apporter le remède qu'elle croira convenable. Les prérogatives de la Couronne placent dans ses mains augustes les moyens d'assurer cette harmonie constitutionnelle, aussi nécessaire à la force de la Couronne qu'au bonheur de la France."—*Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 37, 38.

Rome, and returned to literary poverty when he heard that Government were determined to resist the majority of the Chamber. M. Marcellus, formerly his *chargé-d'affaires* when ambassador in London, refused the situation of Under-secretary of State to Prince Polignac; and M. Lamartine declined a similar offer of the direction of foreign affairs, from a dread that a violation of the Charter was in contemplation. Polignac on this occasion expressed himself in the most earnest manner as to no permanent violation of the Charter being in contemplation, but only a temporary suspension of it, to secure its durability in future times.[1] *

[1] Lam. viii. 189, 190; Cap. x. 325, 326; Chateaubriand, Mém. d'Outre Tombe, ix. 178.

It was resolved in the Council that the King should receive the address, surrounded by all the majesty of the throne, but that he should return a severe answer to the deputation. M. Royer-Collard, as President, presented and read it with a faltering and moved voice; for he was overwhelmed with the magnitude of the crisis, and the mild but yet dignified manners of the King. Charles answered, when it was concluded, "I have heard the address which you have presented to me in the name of the Chamber of Deputies. I had a right to reckon on the concurrence of the two Chambers to carry out the good which I meditated; my heart is grieved to hear from the deputies of the departments that such concurrence is not to be looked for.[2] I have announced my resolution in my speech at the opening of the session; that resolution

31. The King's answer to the Address. March 18.

[2] Ann. Hist. xiii. 44, 49; Cap. x. 328, 329; Ordonnance, March 19, 1830.

* "Le Prince m'écrivit pour m'appeler à Paris, et pour me confier la direction des affaires étrangères. Je répondis en m'excusant sur ma jeunesse et sur mon insuffisance. 'Eh bien,' me dit-il avec bonté et du ton du reproche, 'vous êtes donc du nombre de ceux qui me calomnient, en m'accusant de vouloir renverser les institutions qui soutiennent à la fois le trône et la liberté. Vous croyez, donc, que je rêve un coup d'état?' 'Non, mon prince,' lui dis-je, 'je ne crois pas qu'un coup d'état soit dans vos pensées; mais je crois qu'un coup d'état est dans la fatalité inévitable de la position que le Roi et le Ministère prennent devant le pays.' M. le Prince de Polignac alors m'entraînant dans son grand cabinet, et se promenant avec moi d'un bout à l'autre, pendant deux heures d'un entretien confidentiel et passionné, protesta avec énergie, evidemment sincère, contre toute pensée de renverser ou même d'atténuer la Charte, et me conjura, avec plus de force, de croire en lui, et d'accepter le poste de confiance qu'il me gardait dans son Ministère."—LAMARTINE, viii. 191.

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is immovable; the interests of my people forbid me to depart from it. My Ministers will make known to you my intentions." In effect, on the following day, in the midst of an uncommonly full house, the Minister of the Interior put into the hands of the president an ordonnance of the King, which prorogued the Chamber until the 1st September following.

32. Prorogation of the Chambers, and general agitation it excited.

This bold and decided step, which, like a similar measure resorted to by Charles I. in England, was in effect a declaration of war against the Chamber, excited general surprise; it was not supposed the King was capable of so much resolution, or of adhering so perseveringly to one course of policy. It was foreseen that such a prorogation, on the eve of a costly expedition to Algiers, and with no provision for the current expenses of the season, could only be the prelude to a dissolution. What a dissolution would lead to, in the present excited state of the public mind, it was not difficult to foresee. In effect, the King had made up his own mind to go through with all the measures which he deemed essential to maintain the prerogatives of the Crown, and the Cabinet was so submissive to his will that no resistance on their part was to be apprehended. "The Chamber," said he, "has played a high game in attacking my Crown, but I have answered them as a king." The Ministers respectfully proposed the question to him whether he should yield to the injunction of the address, and change his Ministry? "No," replied the King; "that would be a degradation of the Crown, and an abdication of the royal prerogative. Besides, what ministry could come to an understanding with such a Chamber? When I wished to change the Martignac Ministry, whose concessions, received by ingratitude, led me to the edge of the abyss, I consulted Royer-Collard as to the men who would be likely to carry with them a majority of the Assembly."[1] "None could do so," replied the statesman, discouraged by the incoherence of the elements of the Assembly over which he

1 Lam. viii. 192, 197; Cap. x. 329, 330; Ann. Hist. xiii. 46; Lam. viii. 201, 202.

presided. One of the Cabinet, when the address was presented, suggested to the King whether it might not be possible still to come to an accommodation with the Chamber, and to get a majority? "A majority!" replied the King hastily, revealing his secret thoughts, "I should be sorry to gain it; I would not know what to do with it."

33. Prosecutions against the press.

The prorogation of the Chamber was immediately followed by several political banquets, at one of which M. Odillon Barrot presided at Paris, where everything was said that could inspire vigour and resolution in the Liberal party. No obstacle was thrown by Government in the way of these assemblages; but it was otherwise with the licentiousness of the press, which had now reached an unparalleled height. Several prosecutions took place against the leading Liberal journals, particularly the *National*, the *Globe*, the *Nouveau Journal de Paris*, and the *Journal du Commerce*, which were followed by convictions and sentences of considerable severity. Alarmed at the menacing aspect of public affairs, the courts of law now took part with the prosecution in these cases as much as in the preceding years they had inclined to the other side. Some articles at the same time appeared in the *Moniteur*, which disavowed the intention of resorting to violent measures ascribed to the Government by the Liberals; but they excited little attention, and as the Royalist journals continued not the less strongly to inculcate the necessity of having recourse to a *coup d'état*, the opinion became universal that such a measure was really intended, and that Government was only waiting for a favourable opportunity for promulgating it.[1]

[1] Moniteur, March 29, April 5, April 7, 1830; Ann. Hist. xiii. 47, 50.

34. Report of the Finance Minister. May 15, 1830.

During the sort of interregnum which prevailed between the prorogation of the Chamber and the publication of the ordonnances, two occurrences took place, well worthy of a place in history, from their present importance and their consequences in future times. The first of these was a report by the Minister of Finance on the

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state of the country, dated 15th May 1830, which threw the most valuable light on that momentous subject, and the progress the nation had made under the Government of the Restoration; the second, the expedition to Algiers, not less important to the commercial and maritime interests of the kingdom, and the ultimate fate of Islamism, and balance of the Christian and Mahommedan powers.

35. Its important statistical details.

From the report of the Finance Minister it appeared that the population of France, which in 1821 amounted to 30,304,340 souls, inhabiting 5,886,727 houses, the average rent of which was 49½ francs a house, and the entire value 303,832,734 francs, had increased in 1830 to 31,657,429 souls, inhabiting 6,396,008 houses, at an average annual value of 66 francs, amounting in all to 384,008,125 francs. This exhibited an increase of a third in the average annual value of houses during those nine years, of a fourth in their entire value, and an increase of 1,300,000, or about a thirteenth, in the numbers of the whole inhabitants. But the relative increase in the proportion of rural and urban dwellings was not less decisive as to the comparative advance in the great divisions of society than the sum total was of their common prosperity; for in 1821 only 169,810,754 francs belonged to towns, and 134,021,980 francs to rural localities; while in 1830 no less than 211,806,483 francs arose from the former, and 172,201,642 francs to the latter. With reason, the Finance Minister concluded that this was "the evident consequence of the increase of population, of the general wellbeing of society, and of the numerous buildings which since 1820 have been constructed upon all points of the territory."[1]

[1] Rapport du Ministre de Finance, May 15, 1830; Moniteur, May 17; Ann. Hist. xiii. 50, 51.

The direct taxes exhibited a great increase in all branches, especially those on houses and windows, during the same period. The general result was 325,000,000 francs between the original imposition and the *centimes*

additionels, or local burdens, derived from the direct taxes. The charges of collection were 16,200,000 francs, or 5$\frac{1}{16}$ on the total sum received by the treasury; and this large sum was obtained after 91,865,000 francs had been remitted to the proprietors from the sums exigible by law, by the indulgence of the Government. The increase was still more marked in the indirect taxes, for they had risen, without any new burdens having been imposed, from 163,000,000 francs, in 1818, to 212,000,000 in 1828; while the charges of collection, which had been 18 per cent in 1813, and 14½ in 1818, had been reduced in 1828 to 12½ per cent. The treasury exhibited an equally favourable result; the receipts were 1,030,782,656 francs (£41,200,000), and the expenditure was 1,026,617,152 francs,—a state of matters which, considering the large military establishment, exceeding 200,000 men, on foot in the empire, and the large sum set apart for the sinking fund, bespoke in the clearest manner the general well-being and prosperity of the country.[1]

36. Indirect taxes and general revenue.

[1] Rapport, May 15, 1830; Ann. Hist. xiii. 52, 53.

The details presented in regard to the public debt were still more important, for they exhibited in one view the vast benefits conferred by the Government of the Restoration, and formed, as it were, the testament bequeathed by the elder branch of the Bourbons to the country. The public debt, according to this statement, consisted of 3,949,553,337 francs (£158,000,000), and the annual interest to 170,328,205 francs (£6,800,000). The capital redeemed by the sinking fund amounted to 755,402,140 francs, and its annual charge to 37,503,204 francs. The annuities charged on the treasury, and which were divided among 187,173 parties, amounted to 56,984,196 francs; and the entire annual charge of the debt, interest of capital sums and annuities, was 322,752,660 francs.[2] Of the pensions only 1,825,604 francs were civil, 5,986,000 francs ecclesiastical, while the military were 47,643,000 annually,—a curious proof of

37. Public debt.

[2] Rapport, May 15, 1830; Ann. Hist. xiii. 53, 54.

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how entirely the resources as well as inclinations of the French, even in peace, had run into the profession of arms. The debt contracted for the indemnity to the emigrants, nearly a fourth of the whole, was included in this enumeration.

38. General prosperity which prevailed in the country.

It need hardly be said, after these statistical details, that the country had eminently prospered under the Government of the Restoration, especially during its later years; and that in no former period had benefits so general and important been conferred upon all classes of society. Under the Government of its ancient Kings, since the year 1822—that is, during a period of only eight years—the imports and exports of France had increased 50 per cent, and the tonnage of the shipping nearly 25 per cent.* The annual value of agricultural production over the whole kingdom had risen to 945,353,962 francs, drawn from 12,659,773 arable hectares (30,800,000 acres), being at the rate of 72 francs per hectare, or nearly 18s. an acre. The difference between this average value of agricultural produce and that of Great Britain, notwithstanding the great advance in industry and prosperity made in France during the Restoration, is very remarkable,[1] for the average value of agricultural produce per acre in this country has never been

[1] Statistique de la France (Agriculture,) Tableau O.

* TABLE SHOWING THE EXPORTS, IMPORTS, AND TONNAGE OF FRANCE DURING THE UNDERMENTIONED YEARS.

Years.	Imports.	Exports.	Tonnage out and in.
	Francs.	Francs.	
1822	426,179,193	385,168,711	1,351,681
1823	361,828,242	390,754,431	1,389,422
1824	454,861,597	440,541,901	1,494,424
1825	533,622,392	667,294,114	1,499,156
1826	564,728,610	560,508,769	1,687,872
1827	565,804,228	602,401,276	1,614,823
1828	607,677,321	609,922,632	1,661,584
1829	616,353,397	607,818,643	1,649,494
1830	638,388,433	572,664,064	1,638,593

—*Statistique de la France (Commerce Exterieur)*, 13, 14.

estimated by competent observers at less than £6 sterling per acre.

It is very remarkable, that while the prosperity of the country had increased in this prodigious ratio during the Restoration, its discontents had fully kept pace with it, and they had now reached the highest point at the very time when the wellbeing of the people was most universal and conspicuous. The smiling aspect of the fields, the busy activity of the commercial towns, the animation of the seaports, the splendour and increasing edifices of the capital, were equalled only by the general discontent and sullen disloyalty which pervaded these scenes of prosperity and happiness. What was still more remarkable, the classes among whom the discontent was the greatest, were the very ones which had been most largely benefited by the government of the Bourbons, and most severely crushed by that which had preceded it. The proprietors, altogether excluded from participation in the government under the despotism of Napoleon, had been let into a large share of it under that of the Restoration, were generally averse to their benefactors, and sighed for the return of their tyrants. The burgher class, reduced almost to nullity during the latter years of the Empire, had prospered immensely under the pacific reign of the Bourbons, and from its influence in the elections had well-nigh got the government of the state; and it was all but unanimous against the Government which had fostered and protected, while it worshipped the memory of that which had insulted and ruined it. The "avocats" were the special object of hatred and obloquy with Napoleon, the "ideologues" were to him a perfect horror, and the press was retained by him in the closest fetters, while all these classes had been in an especial manner cherished, protected, and admitted to almost unlimited power by the Bourbon Government; and the only return they made, like the serpent in the fable, which the husbandman

39. General prosperity and discontent.

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warmed in his bosom, was to turn round and sting their benefactor. This memorable example proves the fallacy of the opinion generally entertained, that no disturbances are to be regarded as serious if the material comforts of the people are duly attended to, and of the truth of the distinctions drawn in a former work between troubles originating in real grievances, which may be expected to be alleviated by their removal, and such as arise from the thirst for political power, which are only increased by such comforts as tend to increase the pugnacious propensities of the people.[1]

1 Capefigue, Hist. de Louis Philippe, i. 250, 251; Hist. of Europe, c. iii. § 152.

40. Expedition to Algiers.

The other event which occurred at this period was the expedition to Algiers, which gave a lasting settlement on the African shores to the French arms, and was the third of the great shocks which were given in this century to the Ottoman power. This diminutive state, which had so long withstood all the hostility of the European powers, and exercised its hostility almost without opposition on their subjects, had eluded the resolution of the European powers at the Congress of Vienna to terminate the making of slaves by the states of Barbary, and had continued to exercise on other nations the acts of piracy which had been stopped as to the English by the victory of Lord Exmouth in 1816. Its defences on the sea-side had been materially augmented since the terrible bombardment which they then underwent, and the mole and sea batteries were in a situation to bid defiance to the most formidable attack from naval forces. But the land defences had not been equally attended to; and as the French were determined to assert the honour of their flag, and emancipate themselves from a disgraceful tribute to barbarians as the English had done, the Government resolved on an attack in the rear with land forces.[2] As the town was situated on the slope of a hill, and entirely commanded, like Genoa, by the heights in its rear, which were not defended by any adequate fortifica-

2 Lam. viii. 203, 204; Ann. Hist. xiii. 63, 64.

tions, there was good reason to expect that they might be mastered by a vigorous attack, and the city taken without any farther resistance than a combat in the open field.

41. Grounds of the quarrel with Algiers, and negotiations with England on the subject.

The pretence of the rupture with Algiers was a dispute about a sum of 2,000,000 francs (£80,000), which was owing by some French merchants to the Dey of Algiers for grain, on the occasion of which the Dey had given a slight tap to the French consul with a fan which he held in his hand, in presence of the other European envoys. Prince Polignac, who was thirsting for a pretext to illustrate his administration by some brilliant exploit, and was desirous of exciting the army by success on the eve of a civil conflict, seized with alacrity on this insult to demand reparation; and as the Dey, with characteristic Mahommedan obstinacy, refused to make any, orders were given to prepare an expedition, composed of land and sea forces, on a great scale at Toulon. The intelligence of these preparations, and of the magnitude of the scale on which they were made, excited the alarm of the English government, which, ever since the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt in 1798, had felt the utmost jealousy of any warlike preparations on the part of the French in the Mediterranean. Lord Aberdeen, in the most earnest manner, required explanations from Prince Polignac, who long eluded the demand, by answering that they were intended, like those of the English in 1816, only to obtain reparation from the Algerines, and not to make any permanent settlement or conquest in the country. The English government was, or professed to be, satisfied with these explanations, and the preparations for the expedition went on, if not with the approbation, at least without the open resistance, of the Cabinet of St James's.[1]*

[1] Cap. x. 357, 359; Ann. Hist. xiii. 66, 69; Lac. iv. 419, 421.

* "My Lord,—Le retard mis par le gouvernement Français, à donner sur ses intentions ultérieures relativement à Alger des explications plus précises et plus officielles, *a causé ici une grande surprise.* Les promesses de M. de Polignac à cet égard ont été si fréquentes et si positives que le gouvernement de sa Majesté

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42. Magnitude of the expedition, and its departure.

Accordingly the French government in the whole of April pursued their preparations not only at Toulon, but at Brest, Havre, and Cherbourg, with the utmost vigour. The Duke d'Angoulême in person superintended the armament at the first of these harbours; and with such activity were they carried on, that by the 3d May the whole was assembled at Toulon ready for sea. The land and sea forces were both immense. The former consisted of three divisions, mustering in all 37,500 combatants, with 180 pieces of artillery, most of them of heavy calibre: the latter of 11 sail of the line, 23 frigates, 70 smaller vessels, 377 transports, and 230 boats for landing the troops. The magnitude of these forces, which much exceeded those employed in the far-famed expedition of Napoleon to Egypt thirty years before, conveyed a striking idea of the manner in which the strength and resources of France had increased during the peace and repose of the Restoration. The vast accumulation of forces in Toulon, the crowds of soldiers, guns, and brilliant uniforms in the streets, the splendid spectacle of the squadron which covered the bay with its sails as far as the eye could reach, filled every breast with enthusiasm, and multitudes flocked from all quarters to behold the magnificent armament. The command was solicited by Marmont; but Prince Polignac bestowed it in preference on Bourmont, the Minister at War, who was thus withdrawn from the direction at Paris at the most critical period of the monarchy.[1] The embarkation was completed on the 11th May, amidst the

May 11.

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 70, 75; Lam. viii. 207, 211; Lac. iv. 422, 423.

ne peut comprendre encore les motifs d'un pareil délai. Il faut le dire, cette affaire commence à prendre une tournure fâcheuse, et par éveiller des soupçons qui d'abord étaient bien éloignés de notre pensée."—*Le Comte d'*ABERDEEN *à Lord* STUART DE ROTHESAY, *Ambassadeur Anglais à Paris*, 4 May 1830; CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, x. 358. On being pressed to declare his ulterior intentions as to Algiers, the French writers declare Prince Polignac answered to the English, with becoming spirit, "La France insultée ne demanderait le secours de personne pour venger son injure, et elle n'aurait besoin de personne pour ce qu'elle aurait à faire de sa nouvelle conquête."—*Considérations sur le Régence d'Alger*, 142, *par M. le Baron* LUCHESINI DE ST DENIS. —*Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 71, note.

cheers of an immense multitude of spectators; and the Duke d'Angoulême, intoxicated with the splendour of the spectacle, returned to Paris with the assurance that "all is safe with an army animated with such a spirit."

43. Landing at Sidi-Feruch, near Algiers.

Contrary winds, however, detained the fleet in the neighbourhood of the Bay of Palma till the 10th June, when it again set sail, and hove in sight of Algiers on the 13th of that month. By the advice of two junior captains, who alone had declared a landing practicable, when all the senior officers had said it could not be attempted, the fleet was directed to the peninsula of Sidi-Feruch, situated at five leagues from the capital, where the disembarkation was effected with surprising order and celerity on the two following days. At first no enemies were to be seen; but ere long the invaders were surrounded by fifteen thousand active and intrepid horsemen, who, although repeatedly repulsed from the masses of the troops by the fire of the squares, batteries, and ships, hovered incessantly round, cut off detached bodies and stragglers, and prevented all predatory expeditions or foraging parties beyond the range of their guns. Great difficulty was at first experienced in getting water; but on the 16th, a violent storm, accompanied by torrents of rain, came on, and after that the soldiers found water everywhere in the sand, by digging a few feet beneath the surface. Constant skirmishes and frequent combats went on for some days, but at length the forces on both sides being collected, and the French solidly established on the coast, with all their guns and stores, both parties prepared for a decisive conflict. The Turks and Arabs consisted of forty-five thousand men, for the most part admirable cavalry; and their camp was situated on a strong position on the neck of the promontory, within cannon-shot of the French advanced posts, and barring their farther progress into the interior.[1] The French had full thirty thousand effective men in the field, armed and equipped

June 14.

June 16.

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 75, 81; Lac. iv. 425, 427.

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in the best possible manner, animated with the very highest spirit, and supported by a hundred guns.

44. Battle of Sidi-Feruch. June 19.

At daybreak on the 19th, the Mussulmans descended from their position, and advanced towards the invaders' lines. The French infantry, like the English archers at Azincour, had put rows of stakes with the points outwards towards the enemy, to break the violence of the shock of such formidable bodies of horse; and the troops, stationed directly behind them, stood with their muskets in their hands, three deep, ready to receive them with a rolling fire. The Osmanlis advanced with loud cries and the utmost impetuosity; and such was the vigour of the onset, that in many places they broke fairly through both the stakes and the lines, and the sabres of the Bedouins were seen, in the centre of the bivouacs, in close conflict hand to hand with the European bayonet. The battle seemed more than doubtful, when Bourmont, who had the eye of a great general, brought forward his reserves out of the camp, and charged the assailants in flank, when disordered in pursuit; while the broken infantry, re-forming in the rear, advanced again with a rolling fire against the Turks, now engaged with their assailants in flank. The double shock proved decisive. The Osmanlis were driven back in confusion; and the French, preceded by their guns, which poured in grape on the retreating mass with prodigious rapidity, succeeded in entering the enemy's camp pell-mell with the fugitives, and made themselves masters of their cannon, ammunition, and baggage.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 84, 85; Lac. iv. 426; Cap. x. 360, 365.

45. Second victory of the French. June 24.

When the Turks, who in the first instance had made an orderly retreat, and replied vigorously to the fire of the pursuers, saw their camp and guns taken, they were seized with a universal panic, and dispersed on all sides. Their loss in killed and wounded was above three thousand, while that of the French did not exceed five hundred—so decisive a superiority had the skill and discipline of the Europeans acquired over the most formidable forces of the desert. It was the fire of the guns on their

dense masses which produced so great a loss to the Arabs. For some days after this great victory Bourmont remained quiet, strengthening his position, completing the disembarkation of his heavy artillery, and clearing out an old Roman road, protected by blockhouses, for their conveyance to the ramparts of Algiers. Gradually the Mussulmans recovered from their consternation; and having engaged in several skirmishes, in which their light horsemen asserted the superiority over the European—which since the days of Hannibal they have invariably maintained—and received considerable reinforcements, ventured on a general attack on the French camp. Twenty thousand men, June 24. for the most part mounted on hardy steeds, advanced to the attack, with loud shouts and the utmost intrepidity. But the divisions Borthezene and Loverdo moved out of the trenches, as they approached, in the same order, and with the same success, as on the 19th. The terrible fire of grape, issuing from the guns between the columns, threw the enemy into disorder, and they were soon hurled back in utter confusion, and pursued two leagues with great loss. In this pursuit, Amadie de Bourmont, son of the commander-in-chief, fell at the head of his company of grenadiers, while gloriously following up the advantage which his intrepidity had in a great degree contributed to gain.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 89, 90; Lac. iv. 426; Bourmont's Despatch, June 26, 1830.

46. Commencement of the attack on Algiers, and fall of the Emperor's Fort.

Nothing now could prevent the approach of the French to Algiers; and although their advance was seriously impeded by the light troops of the Arabs, who disputed every tenable position, and impeded every movement, yet they gradually drew near, and ground was opened before the town on the 30th June. The attack was directed, in the first instance, against the Emperor's Fort, a quadrangular fortification erected on the ground occupied by the Emperor Charles V. three hundred years before, when engaged in his calamitous attack on Algiers. This fort was perched on the summit of the plateau which surmounted the town, and in consequence commanded

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every part of it. The batteries were armed on the 3d, and the fire opened on the 4th July. Never, except on occasion of Lord Exmouth's attack in 1816, had such a cannonade been heard on the African shores. The ships of the line approached the mole, and attempted to distract the attention of the enemy by an incessant fire on the sea defences; while the land batteries, armed with a hundred guns of heavy calibre, thundered with extraordinary vigour on the ramparts of the Emperor's Fort. The Algerines replied with the utmost intrepidity from above three hundred guns, and the town, enveloped both on the land and sea side in flames and smoke, resembled the crater of a huge volcano suddenly burst forth on the side of the hill. But notwithstanding the courage and constancy of the Mussulmans, the superior fire of the besiegers soon made itself felt. The Algerine guns one by one were dismounted; huge breaches began to yawn in the ramparts; the gunners were in great part killed or wounded, and at length driven from their batteries; the survivors sought refuge in a great tower which stood in the centre of the fort. But here a frightful catastrophe awaited them. In the midst of a terrific cannonade, a loud explosion was suddenly heard; the sides of the tower were seen to gape, an immense column of smoke issued from its summit, which rose to the height of above five hundred feet; and immediately after the walls fell, and a mass of ruins, dismounted guns, and dead bodies, alone showed where the building had stood. Nothing dismayed by the fearful spectacle, the French grenadiers rushed through the wreck to the assault, and before a few minutes were over they were entirely in possession of the Emperor's Fort.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 92, 93; Lac. iv. 427, 428; Dépêche de M. Bourmont, July 5, 1830.

47. Fall of Algiers. July 4.

The Dey, who had flattered himself with the hope that this stronghold would arrest the enemy until the rainy season set in, when their attack would of necessity be suspended, was seized with the utmost consternation when he beheld it carried amidst such circumstances of horror

by the besiegers, and their troops in possession of a commanding position, from which bombs and cannon-shot reached every part of the city. Passing, in the true Mussulman spirit, from the height of confidence to the depths of despair, he immediately prepared to submit, and before two hours were over the white flag was hoisted on the ramparts. It was attempted to obtain more favourable terms, and to appease the wrath of the conquerors by ample concessions, without abandoning the national independence. But the French government had resolved on a permanent acquisition. Marshal Bourmont received the Algerine envoy seated amidst the ruins of the Emperor's Fort, surrounded by his whole staff; the English consul in vain offered his mediation; and at length it was agreed that the Dey should surrender Algiers, with all its forts and warlike stores, but be permitted to retire wherever he chose in safety, with his wives, children, and whatever belonged to him personally; and that the lives and property of all the inhabitants should be respected. On the following day the gates were surrendered, and the French army, in great pomp, with their artillery in front, entered the city. The fruits of the conquest were great beyond example, and much exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the conquerors. In the treasury were found gold and silver to the amount of 48,500,000 francs (£1,940,000), the accumulated fruits of several centuries of piracy; and on the walls and ships of war were 1542 pieces of artillery, of which 677 were bronze guns of the most approved construction. The entire value of the spoil was 55,684,000 francs, besides nearly as much more in houses, which belonged to the government, and passed to the conquerors. Seldom had spoil so mighty attended success in war; but the French soldiers found a still more precious recompense for their toils in the grateful tears of the crews of the brigs Silène and l'Aventura, which had been liberated with many others from slavery by their conquest.[1] The total loss of the

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 97, 98; Lac. iv. 427, 428; Bourmont's Depêche, July 6, 1830.

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victors was 2300 men, of whom 600 were killed, and they enhanced the lustre of their conquest by religiously observing the capitulation, and respecting the lives and property of the inhabitants.

48. Statistics of Algiers.

ALGIERS, which thus fell under the French dominion, and became a lasting European settlement on the coast of Africa, has a territory subject to its influence, which, in the time of the Romans, contained ten millions of inhabitants, but was now thinly peopled by seven or eight hundred thousand souls, composed chiefly of Bedouin Arabs and Moors, with an intermixture of Jews, Turks, and Europeans.* In 1838, when a census of the population was taken, and the limits of the French dominion had been finally settled by the capture of Constantine, a stronghold of great importance in the interior, it was found that the European population in the capital and dependent cities amounted to 20,078 inhabitants, and the Asiatic and African to 29,488—a disproportion by no means great, and nothing to that which obtains in Calcutta, Madras, and the other cities in British India. The soil is in many places extremely rich, and peculiarly adapted for the cultivation of wheat, as is proved by the fact that, even under all the oppressions of Mahommedan misrule and Arab depredations, there was sold in Algiers of native growth 81,994 hectolitres of wheat and barley, equivalent to 180,000 quarters. In ancient times, as is well known, Libya, with Egypt and Sicily, was the granary of the Roman empire, and the interruption of its commerce on occasion of the revolt of Gildo brought the capital to the straits of famine, so feelingly deplored in the beautiful

* They were thus classed :—

Turks and janizaries,	8000
——— their children,	32,000
Moors,	400,000
Bedouin Arabs,	120,000
Atlas tribes,	200,000
Jews,	20,000
	780,000

—*Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 82.

lines of Claudian.* The revenue was only 2,273,000 francs, including 500,000 francs of tribute from European powers, disguised under the name of consular presents; so little had human industry developed the boundless gifts of nature. Notwithstanding its natural riches, however, this valuable acquisition has proved of little real value to France; its revenue has never approached its expenditure; the native population has never been arrayed in its defence; and the government is maintained solely by seventy thousand French troops, more than double the number of the English soldiers who ever clustered round the standards of Great Britain on the boundless plains of Hindostan.[1]

[1] Statisque d'Algerie, i. 127, 159; Ann. Hist. xiii. 82, 83; Baron Inchman, 142, 157.

49. Secret agreement with Russia for extending the French frontier to the Rhine.

This important expedition, which was likely to have so important an effect on the destinies of France and of the world, was not undertaken by the French Government without extensive projects for the future, and the promise of powerful support for the present. It was the first of a series of measures intended to revive the military spirit of the French nation, to restore its confidence in itself, to bind anew the people to the sovereign by the strong ties of national glory, and to turn their passions from social struggles to national objects. It was intended to follow it up by the advancing the frontier to the Rhine —a project which Chateaubriand confesses in his Memoirs he had long cherished, and would ere this time

* "Advenio supplex, non ut proculcet Araxem
Consul ovans, nostræve premant pharetrata secures
Susa, nec ut rubris aquilas figamus arenis.
Hæc nobis, hæc ante dabas: nunc pabula tantum
Roma precor: miserere tuæ, pater optime, gentis.
Extremam defende famem.—
Tot mihi pro meritis Libyam Nilumque dedere,
Ut dominam plebem, bellatoremque senatum
Casibus æstivis alerent.—
Nunc inhonorus, egens, perfert miserabile pacis
Supplicium, nulloque palam circumdatus hoste
Obsessi discrimen habet. Per singula letum
Impendet momenta mihi, dubitandaque pauci
Præscribunt alimenta dies."

CLAUD., *de Bello Gildonico.*

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have carried out if he had remained in power, and which had remained a secret but sacred deposit in the archives of the Cabinet. But as both the attack on Algiers and the appropriation of Belgium and the Prussian provinces on the Rhine would necessarily bring them into collision with Great Britain and Prussia, the French Government had secured to themselves a powerful ally to support them in their advances. The determination to assert the prerogative in France, and shake off the dependence on the Chambers, had, as a matter of course, been cordially approved by the Cabinet of St Petersburg, with which that of the Tuileries had been brought into close and confidential communication. The result was a secret agreement that Russia should support France in the eventual extension of its frontier to the Rhine, and France Russia in the advancing its standards to Constantinople. Prussia was to be indemnified for the loss of its Rhenish provinces by the half of Hanover, Holland, for the sacrifice of Belgium, by the other half. But this agreement, how carefully soever veiled in secresy, came to the knowledge of the British Government; and it was the information they had obtained in regard to it which led to the warm remonstrances against the occupation of Algiers, and to the immediate recognition of Louis Philippe by the Duke of Wellington's Administration.[1]

[1] Louis Blanc, Dix Ans de Louis Philippe, i. 139, 140.

50. Dissolution of the Chambers. May 16.

While these successes, glorious to the French arms, were in progress on the African shores, and which alone, of all the conquests since the Revolution, remained a lasting acquisition to France, the Government at home was advancing in the infatuated career on which they had resolved. Great hesitation for some time prevailed in the Cabinet as to the course to be pursued with regard to the Chamber of Deputies. But at length the favourable intelligence brought by the Duke d'Angoulême, as to the disposition of the army which had embarked at Toulon, decided the majority of the Cabinet, and a dissolution was resolved on. The ordonnance, accordingly,

appeared, appointing the colleges of departments to meet on the 23d June, those of arrondissements on the 3d July, and the Chamber to meet on the 3d August. This determination, however, was not taken without great difference of opinion in the Cabinet, which led to the resignation of M. de Courvoisin, the Keeper of the Seals, who was succeeded by M. Chantelauze, President of the Royal Court at Grenoble, and of M. de Chabrol, the Minister of Finance, whose place was given to M. de Montbel, the Minister of the Interior, who again was succeeded by M. de Peyronnet, a man of known capacity and vigour. The dissolution was accompanied by a touching proclamation of the King to the electors, in which he charged the former Chamber with having mistaken his intention, and called on the electors to rally round the throne.[1] *

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 59, 114; Moniteur, May 17, 1830; Lam. viii. 220.

51. Result of the elections.

So confident were the Liberals that their cause would be promoted by this dissolution, that they offered no complaints on the subject. They set themselves with their wonted vigour to improve the advantage thus put in their way; the electoral committees soon were everywhere in activity; the press resounded with the most vehement denunciations against the Ministers, and the *coup d'état* against the public liberties which was supposed to be in contemplation; and before the elections began, it had become evident that the Liberal majority, so free from being diminished, would be materially augmented by their result. When they commenced, every successive post brought a fresh defeat to Ministers. Out of the 221 members who had voted with M. Agier in favour of the address by the former Chamber, 202 were returned; it was soon ascertained that the Opposition

* "La dernière Chambre a méconnu mes intentions; j'avais droit de compter sur son concours pour faire le bien que je méditais; elle me l'a refusé. Comme père de mon peuple mon cœur s'en est affligé; comme roi, j'en ai été offensé. Hâtez-vous de vous rendre dans vos colléges; qu'une négligence répréhensible ne les prive pas de votre présence; qu'un même sentiment vous anime, qu'un même drapeau vous rallie: c'est votre rôi qui vous le demande, c'est un père qui vous appelle. Remplissez votre devoir; je saurai remplir le mien. CHARLES."—*Moniteur*, 17 May, 1830.

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numbered 270 votes, the Ministry only 145, in which last was included 13 who were dubious, having voted for the amendment of Lorgerit in the former Chamber. Even the departmental colleges had gone against Government; a third of the Opposition came from their ranks. Encouraged by this success, the Liberal leaders in Paris proceeded vigorously and systematically in their opposition; orders to organise a general opposition to taxes were sent down to all the departments, and every preparation was made, though still in a legal way, to overthrow the influence and nullify the action of Government. So strongly were the feelings of the people excited by the thoughts of the coming struggle, that the intelligence of the conquest of Algiers, which was received in the middle of the election, awakened no other feelings but those of consternation and spite on the part of the majority. The passions of party got the better of the love of country, and the Liberals, as the Royalists had done before them, instead of rejoicing, deplored a success which threatened to postpone, perhaps destroy, their hopes of overturning the Government.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. 115, 116, 117; Lac. iv. 434, 435; Lam. viii. 220, 221.

52. Resolution of the Cabinet.

The King and Ministers, however, were noways deterred by the untoward result of the general election. It was evident from the returns that it was hopeless to look for a majority, or even an equality, of voices in the Chamber; and as the Opposition was so determined that a refusal of supplies might be looked for, no resource remained but a COUP D'ETAT, and forcible change of the Constitution. Long and earnest debates went on in the Cabinet on the course which should be pursued, and an able and interesting memorial was addressed to the King by his Ministers. After much and anxious deliberation, it was agreed that M. Royer-Collard should be consulted as to the temper and probable course of action of the new Chambers, and Charles X. accordingly asked him, "Do you believe that, if the budget were presented to the Chamber, it would reject it?"—"Possibly it might not,"

answered the President; "but in any event, the discussions to which the law on the finances would lead, would shake the monarchy to its foundation." This answer strongly influenced the King's mind, and he openly expressed the opinion that a *coup d'état* had become unavoidable. "Gentlemen," said he to his Ministers, "I will inform you in a few words of the course which I mean to pursue, and which I have already frequently explained. My firm resolution is to maintain the Charter. I will not depart from it on any point, but I will not permit others to do so. I hope the new Chamber will be composed of wise men, who will respond to my intentions. Should it unhappily prove otherwise, I shall know, without departing from the course marked out by the constitution, to cause my rights to be respected, which I regard as the only guarantee for the public tranquillity and happiness of France. Such are my intentions; it is for you to second them in the part of the Administration intrusted to each of you in particular." [1]

[1] Lam. viii. 244; Cap. x. 361, 362.

53. Resolution of the Cabinet on a *coup d'état*, June 29 and July 7.

It was on the 29th June that the *coup d'état* was first seriously discussed in the Cabinet, and on July 7th the subject was resumed; and it was finally agreed to, though under the strongest resolution of secresy ere it was adopted. This resolution proceeded on a speech of M. de Chantelauze, who placed the following alternatives before the Council: "Either to suspend entirely the constitutional régime, and govern in an arbitrary manner on strong principles, or to declare null the whole elections of those who had voted with the 221, or to dissolve the new Chamber as soon as the new elections were terminated, and convoke a new one on an electoral system established on an ordonnance framed on such principles as might secure a majority to the Crown—and in either case to precede the declaration by a vast display of civil and military force, by placing twenty or thirty thousand men in each of the towns of Paris, Lyons, Bordeaux, and Rouen, and declaring these cities in a state of siege. After a long

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discussion, it was agreed to recur to the 14th article of the Charter, which seemed to confer, in extreme cases, a dictatorial power on the King,* and, 1st, To suspend the liberty of the press; 2d, Dissolve the new Chamber of Deputies; and, 3d, Establish a new electoral system which might be in harmony with the rights of the Crown. The project met with the cordial approbation of the King, who said, "It is not the Ministry, be assured; it is the Crown itself which is attacked; it is the cause of the throne against revolution which is now at issue. One or other must succumb. I have lived longer than you, gentlemen; your age does not permit you to recollect, as I do, how revolutions and the revolutionists proceed. I have over you the unenvied advantage of years. I recollect what occurred in 1789. The first step which my unhappy brother made in retreat before them was the signal of his ruin. They too made protestations of their fidelity to the Crown; they too limited their open demand to the dismissal of its ministers. He yielded, and all was lost. They pretend now to aim at nothing but your dismissal. Their language to me is, 'Dismiss your Ministers, and we shall soon come to an understanding.' Gentlemen, I will not dismiss you, —in the first place, because I am attached to, and have confidence in you; in the next, because, if I dismissed you, they would end by treating you as they have done my son and myself, and us all, and as they have treated my brother. No! Let them conduct us, if they please, to the scaffold; but let us fight for our rights, and if we are to fall, fall sword in hand. I would rather be led to execution on horseback than in a cart." [1]

[1] Lam. viii. 225, 226; Cap, x. 381, 385; Lac. iv. 436, 438.

On the 24th July, M. de Chantelauze presented to the King an elaborate and eloquent report, which may be regarded as the preamble of the ordonnances, and the state-

* The 14th article of the Charter was in these terms:—"Le Roi est le chef suprême de l'état, commande les forces de terre et de mer, déclare la guerre; fait les traités de paix, d'alliance, et de commerce; nomme à tous les emplois d'administration publique, et *fait les règlemens et les ordonnances nécessaires pour l'exécution des lois et la sûreté de l'état.*"—*Charte*, art. 14.

ment of the grounds on which they were rested for all future times. "Sire!" said he, "your Ministers would be unworthy of the confidence with which your Majesty honours them, if they hesitated any longer to place before your eyes a picture of our internal circumstances, and to point out, for the consideration of your wisdom, the dangers which menace us. At no period, during the last fifteen years, have the dangers presented themselves under an aspect more grave and afflicting. Despite an amount of material prosperity to which our annals can offer no parallel, signs of disorganisation and symptoms of anarchy manifest themselves in all points of the kingdom. A malevolence, active, ardent, and indefatigable, labours to sap the foundations of order, and to ravish from France all the happiness it has enjoyed under the sceptre of its king. Skilful in working out all discontents, and in exciting all hatreds, it foments among the people a spirit of distrust and hostility towards power, and seeks to sow everywhere the seeds of trouble and of civil war. It is by the violent and ceaseless action of the press that can be alone explained the frequent changes and interior violence of the country. It has not permitted France to establish a regular or stable government, nor to turn its attention to the numerous reforms called for in its internal administration. Every ministry formed since 1814 has been the object, and soon has become the victim, of these incessant and often groundless attacks. The press has thus succeeded in sowing the seeds of disorder in the strongest minds, shaking the firmest convictions, and producing, in the midst of a prosperous society, a confusion of principles which is ready for the most desperate attempts. It is by anarchy in opinions that the way is prepared for anarchy in the state.

54. Report on the ordonnance by M. de Chantelauze. July 24.

"It is impossible to qualify in too strong terms the conduct of Opposition in recent circumstances. After having themselves provoked an address derogatory to the honour and destructive of the rights of the Crown, they

55. Continued.

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have not scrupled to proclaim it as a sacred principle, that the 221 who voted that address should be re-elected, and their offensive principles forced upon the Crown. When your Majesty repelled that address as offensive, and declared your resolution to maintain the just rights of the Crown, so openly compromised, the periodical press has not only made no attempt to soften, but it has renewed and aggravated the offence. With a not less envenomed spirit it has persecuted alike religion and its ministers. It would, were it possible, extirpate to the last drop the religious sentiments of the people. Can it be doubted that, in attacking the foundations of the faith, in drying up the fountains of public morality, and turning into ridicule the ministers at the altars, the object is to overturn the throne? Listen, Sire! to the cry of indignation and terror which arises from all parts of the kingdom, from all persons of property, intelligence, and wisdom. All implore you to preserve them from a return to the calamities which their fathers or themselves have had so much cause to lament. These alarms are too real not to be attended to, too legitimate not to command attention. We must not deceive ourselves: we are no longer in the ordinary circumstances of a representative government. The foundations on which it is rested have been destroyed. A turbulent democracy, which has penetrated into the sanctuary of the laws, strives to substitute itself in place of the legitimate powers. It disposes of the majority of elections by means of journals and election committees. It has paralysed so far as it could the exercise of legitimate authority, by denying it the prerogative of dissolving the Chamber. By that very attempt the constitution has been shaken; by the next it will be overturned. Your Majesty has alone the power to prevent such a catastrophe, and place authority on its legal and just foundations.

56. Concluded.

"The Charter has provided the only remedy against such calamities. The 14th article has invested your Majesty with the power, not, without doubt, to change

our institutions, but to consolidate and render them immovable. Imperious necessity forbids any further delay in the exercise of that supreme power. The moment has arrived in which it is necessary to have recourse to the measures which may restore the spirit of the Charter, but which are beyond the reach of all ordinary resources, and in the vain pursuit of which they have all been exhausted. These measures, Sire! your Ministers do not hesitate to recommend to you, deeply convinced that they are those which power owes to justice."[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 119, 120; Lam. viii. 230, 234.

57. Lamartine on this report.

"It must be admitted," says an eloquent historian of the Liberal school, "that the grievances recounted in this eloquent preamble were too well founded in truth. The abuses of the press and the violence of public opinion were real evils. The new impulse which the press and freedom of discussion had given to thought and liberty, had often led it astray, as it will often do before it assumes the regularity and equilibrium of the divine mind and the power of self-direction, like all other passions abandoned to themselves, under the guidance only of morality."[2] There can be no doubt that this observation of Lamartine is well founded. In truth, matters had come to such a pass that royalty and the democracy could not coexist in France: no aristocracy, as in England, existed to preserve a balance between them; they stood face to face, each armed for the strife, ready in the lists, and one or other of them must be destroyed.

[2] Lamartine, Hist. de la Restauration, viii. 235, 236.

58. The ordonnances, July 25.

The famous ordonnances, which were the immediate cause of the overthrow of the Crown, and the ruin of the elder branch of the house of Bourbon, were six in number, but the three first only were of material importance. The first suspended the liberty of the periodical press, and prohibited the publication but of such journals as were authorised by Government. The license was to be in force only for three months, and might be recalled at any time. It applied to all pamphlets below twenty leaves. The second dissolved the new Chamber, on the allegation of

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the arts which had been used to deceive the electors as to the real intentions of the Government. The third, on the preamble of the necessity of reforming the Electoral Law according to the principles of the constitution, and to remedy the evils which experience had brought to light, and of the powers applicable to such cases vested in the King by the 14th article of the Charter, reduced the number of deputies to 258, being the number fixed by the 36th article of the Charter: the colleges of departments were to elect an equal number of representatives with those of arrondissements; and the electoral franchise was reduced to the possession of property paying the requisite amount of direct taxes by the exclusion of the suffrage founded on patents; the duration of the Chamber of Deputies was fixed at five years; and the colleges of departments, composed of the fourth of the electors paying the highest amount of direct taxes, were to choose at least a half in the general list of candidates proposed for the colleges of arrondissements. The prefects were re-invested with all the powers with which they had been invested prior to the act of 1828. Neither the intervention of third parties, nor an appeal to the ordinary courts of law, were permitted to interfere with the prefects in the preparation of the electoral lists.[1]

[1] Moniteur, July 26; Ann. Hist. xiii. 120, 121; Ordonnances, July 25, 1830.

59. Signing of the ordonnances. July 25.

The King and Ministers met at St Cloud on the morning of the 25th July to sign the ordonnances. The vast interests at stake, the crown of France about to be put in peril, its liberties, which seemed to be menaced, had caused many to pass a sleepless night, and impressed all with the solemnity of the occasion. The Baron de Vitrolles, who, albeit not in the secrets of the Cabinet, had a suspicion of what was going forward, had entreated the Minister of Public Instruction the day before to pause before it was too late, for Paris was in a state of extreme agitation. The prefect of the police, however, gave the most satisfactory assurances on the state of the capital, concluding with the words, "Advance boldly: I will

answer with my head for the immobility of Paris." Notwithstanding these statements, however, the Ministers were deeply impressed with the step which was about to be taken; every countenance was grave and serious; reflection had added to their anxiety, but not taken away from their courage. Prince Polignac, after reading the preamble and the ordonnances, presented them to the King to sign. Charles turned pale: he hesitated some time before taking the irrevocable step; and at length, after casting his eyes to heaven, he exclaimed, "The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that it is impossible to do otherwise than I do;" and with these words he signed the ordonnances. The Ministers all countersigned them in silence; despair was painted on every visage; none really hoped anything from the step, but all felt it was a duty to take it. They did so with the resignation of martyrs, not the spirit of conquerors.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 239, 240.

60. Reflections on the ordonnances.

Whatever opinion may be formed of these ordonnances—which were the death-warrant of the French monarchy—one thing is perfectly clear, that however adverse to the passion for self-government which had sprung up with the mild government and freedom of the Restoration, they were noways at variance either with the letter or spirit of the constitution, as settled by the Charter, or with subsequent practice as approved by the Liberal party themselves. The most important change they effected was on the electoral system, the corner-stone of all representative government, and they brought it back, both as to the numbers of the Chambers and the qualification of the electors, to what had been fixed by the Charter. This was done, no doubt, by an ordonnance, not an act of the legislature; but the alteration on the constitution which it abrogated had itself been introduced by an ordonnance alone (14th July 1815); and the change on the Electoral Law, on 5th September 1816, which gave such additional weight to the Liberal

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party, was effected by a royal ordonnance alone, not only without the opposition, but with the cordial approbation of the whole Liberal party in France.[1] What an ordonnance had done, an ordonnance could competently undo. All the subsequent changes on the electoral system, with the exception of the one passed by the Chambers in July 1820, had been effected by ordonnances alone, in virtue of the powers conferred on the King by the 14th article of the Charter, and not a whisper had ever been heard that he had exceeded his powers in introducing them. And although, without doubt, the restrictions on the press were of so violent a kind that they were inconsistent, if long continued, with the existence of freedom, or the free action of the people on the Government, and could not have coexisted long with a real representative constitution; yet, considered as a mere *temporary* restriction, to enable the Government to surmount a passing difficulty, they were not beyond the powers vested in the King by the 14th article of the Charter, like those conferred on the consuls by the senate in arduous times—"Caveant consules ne quid detrimenti res publica capiat." And subsequent experience has abundantly proved that a severe restriction on the liberty of the press was absolutely indispensable in France; for every government that has since arisen, whatever its origin had been, has been obliged to commence a war to the knife with the press, and that which supplanted Charles X. has itself been overturned by it.

[1] Ante, c. iii. §§ 15, 132.

61. Total want of preparation for the *coup d'état* on the part of Ministers.

But whatever opinion may be formed on this point, upon which men, according to their previous prepossessions, will probably be divided to the end of the world, one thing is perfectly clear, and will admit of no doubt, that the *coup d'état* was determined on by the French government with a want of preparation to meet its consequences, which was not only highly reprehensible, but absolutely inconceivable. The preamble of the *coup d'état*

proves that the Ministry were fully aware how strongly the current of public opinion was running in favour of Liberal opinions, how strong was the passion for self-government, and that the most violent resistance might be expected to any regulation tending to abridge these dispositions. By the ordonnances the Government drew the sword, and threw away the scabbard, and perilled the Crown and constitution of France upon the doubtful issue of arms. Prince Polignac was at once Prime Minister and Minister at War in the absence of Marshal Bourmont; and he had assured the Cabinet, in reply to a question as to the means of resisting any insurrection in the capital, that "no popular movement was to be apprehended, and at all events Paris was sufficiently garrisoned to crush any rebellion, and guarantee the public tranquillity." What, then, were the forces with which Prince Polignac proposed to coerce Paris, when in the most violent state of effervescence, and when supported by a large and powerful party in every town of France? They consisted in all of 11,550 men, and twelve pieces of cannon, with six rounds of grape-shot to each gun! Of this diminutive force only the Royal Guard, 4600 strong, could be relied on in a contest with the people, or, in fact, did its duty in that which immediately succeeded. This was the more reprehensible, as fifteen battalions and thirty-four squadrons of the Guard were at towns at no great distance from Paris, who might easily have been brought up before the conflict commenced, but were too far off to take a part in it when it actually arose. Such were the forces with which Prince Polignac proposed to combat a city containing two hundred thousand men capable of bearing arms, of whom at least a half had actually borne them in the line or the civil service; forty thousand discontented National Guards *who still had their arms*, and one-third of which male population consisted of natural sons, without either known parents, children, or property, ready to engage in or second any

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rebellion, however desperate, which promised them elevation or plunder. And to make the thing complete, the command of this little garrison was given to Marshal Marmont, an able and experienced officer, but extremely unpopular with the army, on account of the share he had in the capitulation of Paris in 1814; and he was kept entirely in the dark as to the *coup d'état*, or the necessity which existed for previous preparation or vigorous measures.[1]*

[1] Capefigue, Hist. de Louis Philippe, i. 397; Lam. viii. 241.

62. First effect of the ordonnances. July 26.

The ordonnances agreed to by the Cabinet and the King, and signed on the 25th, were secretly printed on the night of that day, and appeared in the columns of the *Moniteur*, and affixed to the walls of Paris on the morning of the 26th. The first effect was such as in appear-

* The garrison of Paris, when the conflict commenced, consisted of—

	Infantry. Batt.	Men.	Cavalry. Squad.	Men.
Royal Guard.				
Infantry,	8	3,800	...	...
Cavalry,	...	...	8	800
Artillery, 12 pieces,	...	150	...	...
		3,950		800
Line.				
Infantry,	11	4,400	...	...
Fusileers, 14 companies,	...	1,100	...	...
Gendarmerie,	...	700	...	600
		6,200		600
Total,		3,950		800
		10,150		1,400

The remainder of the Guard, fully 18,000 strong, was thus stationed—

	Infantry. Batt.		Cavalry. Squad.
Caen,	3	Compiègne,	1
Rouen,	3	Meaux,	6
Versailles,	5	Melun,	1
St Denis,	2	Fontainebleau,	6
Vincennes,	1	Corbeil,	6
Orléans,	3	Versailles,	12
	17	Sèvres,	2
In all, 15,000 men.			34
		In all, 3,400 men.	

—*Etats Militaires*, given in Capefigue, *Histoire de Louis Philippe*, i. 397, and *Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 12.

ance to justify the assertions of Prince Polignac and the Minister of Police, that the public peace would not be disturbed, and that no reason for apprehension existed. Though a *coup d'état* had long been predicted by the Opposition journals, and was generally looked for at no distant period, it was not expected at that particular time; and the Parisians, in full enjoyment of the most magnificent weather, rose on the morning of that day, expecting only to inhale the enjoyments of summer in their highest perfection. The appearance of the ordonnances, which were instantly repeated from mouth to mouth, excited at first surprise and stupor rather than indignation. Men knew what to think of such an audacious step. Crowds, not of rioters, but of anxious and agitated persons, were formed at the doors of the offices of the public journals, and in some of the most frequented parts of the city. Some applauded, many blamed, none were indifferent to the step which had been taken. The day, however, passed over without any alarming demonstrations having taken place, although in the universal anxiety which prevailed the experienced eye might discern the symptoms of an approaching storm. The truth was, the people had no leaders as yet prepared for such an emergency; and though it was known that the leading Opposition barristers, M. Odillon Barrot, Dupin aîné, Mauguin, Barthè, and Merithon, had met with the leading editors of journals and writers on the Liberal side, and consulted on what was to be done, nothing had transpired as to the result of their deliberation, and the day passed over without any disturbance.[1]

1 Capefigue, Hist de Louis Philippe, i. 402, 403. Ann. Hist. xiii. 123, 124; Lam. viii. 246, 247.

63. Commencement of the insurrection. Signing of the protest. July 27.

Appearances, however, rapidly changed on the morning of the 27th. The editors and proprietors of the Opposition journals, deeming, according to the opinion of these celebrated lawyers, the ordonnances illegal, had resolved on resisting them; and a solemn protest had been agreed upon, in which they were denounced as unconstitutional, and resistance was openly threatened. "The Govern-

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ment," said these courageous men, "has lost the character of legality which commands obedience; *we resist it* in so far as we are concerned: it is for France to determine how far resistance should extend." Forty-four proprietors, contributors to, and editors of journals, met in the office of the *National*, and signed the memorable protest, which became in a manner a patent of nobility in after times. M. de Laborde was the president of that meeting, and, among others of lesser note, the protest bore the signatures of M. Thiers and M. Correl, M. Corte, the editor of the *Temps*, and M. Baude. And however much we, who have been instructed by the event, may lament the consequences of this decisive step, which first hoisted the standard of insurrection against the ordonnances, it is impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the gallant men who, inspired by the love of freedom and their country, hazarded their heads in open resistance to what they deemed illegal acts on the part of the Government.[1]

[1] Capefigue, Hist. de Louis Philippe, i. 407, 408; Ann. Hist. xiii. 125, 127; Lam. viii. 248, 249.

64. The first disturbance. July 27.

Matters were brought to a crisis by an event which occurred on the forenoon of the 27th. The majority of the journals, and all the Royalist ones, had yielded to the ordonnances, and taken out the requisite licenses from the Government. The latter were loud in their praise of the *coup d'état*, and maintained it was imperatively called for by the circumstances of the country. But the editors of a few of the ultra-Liberal journals were determined to make no such concession, and conceiving, perhaps with justice, that an act of the legislature could alone deprive them of their legal rights, resolved on resistance. Their journals accordingly appeared without the requisite license, and with the protest of the Opposition journals in their columns. This open defiance of Government was immediately followed by an order issued to seize the refractory journals, and close their printing offices and places of sale; and a commissary of police, accompanied by two

gendarmes, repaired to the offices of the *National* and the *Temps*, situated in the Rue de Richelieu and Boulevard des Italiens, to enforce the order. The editors and proprietors of these journals, however, opposed the most resolute resistance to the police. When summoned to submit in name of the Government, they called on the police to abstain in the name of the law. A blacksmith, who was sent for to force open the door of the hotel occupied by the *Temps*, declined to act in obedience to the orders of the police; a second was sent for, and the mob took his tools from him; and the doors were at length only forced open, and seals put on the printing-presses, by a workman who was said to have been employed in making the fetters for the convicts in the galleys. These proceedings, which occurred in the most populous and frequented parts of Paris, excited the most vehement agitation. A vast crowd assembled in the streets where the seizures had been effected, whose language and gestures bespoke the extreme passions with which they were animated. The general ferment was worked up to a perfect frenzy by a judgment of the Tribunal of Commerce, a court in the first instance at Paris, which ordained a printer in the employment of the *Courrier Français*, who had refused to print that journal without a license, for fear of contravening the ordonnance, to do so within twenty-four hours, on pain of imprisonment, seeing "that the ordonnance, being contrary to the Charter, would not be held obligatory, neither on the sacred person of the King, nor on the citizens whose rights it infringed." [1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 126, 127; Lam. viii. 258, 259; Cap. iv. 417, 418; Moniteur, July 28, 1830.

65. Attitude and extraordinary security of the Court. July 27.

The King and Ministers, who had been overjoyed at the success with which the ordonnances had been received on the 26th, were not awakened from their delusion by the events of the 27th. On the first of these days, so little had any serious resistance been anticipated, that the King had gone on a hunting party to Rambouillet; and even on the day following, the Court remained at St Cloud, which, for the service of the palace, deducted

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twelve hundred men from the few battalions of the Guard, the only ones who could be relied on for the defence of Paris. Reports were received from all the police-offices; but though they in general spoke of crowds in the streets, a general suspension of business, and great agitation in the public mind, yet, with an infatuation that now appears inconceivable, no efficient steps were taken to guard against the approach of danger. None of the Liberal leaders were arrested; no additional troops were brought into Paris, though eighteen thousand of the Royal Guard were quartered in the towns in the vicinity; and no instructions were sent to the prefects in the departments to take any extraordinary precautions, or how to act at all in the critical circumstances which were approaching. By a negligence still more reprehensible, no provision whatever was made for furnishing rations or water, or extra ammunition, to the troops on active service; and during the conflicts of the succeeding days, when they were under arms almost without intermission night and day, under a burning sun, they remained without any regular supplies, and were for the most part indebted for food to the humanity or policy of their enemies.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 127; Lam. viii. 259, 260; Cap. i. 417, 419.

66. Rapid progress of the insurrection. July 28.

When, on the morning of the 27th, Marmont commenced the active duties of the command of the garrison of Paris, with which he had been invested by the King, he was petrified at its small amount; for after deducting the non-effective and the Guard on service at St Cloud, it did not exceed ten thousand men, of whom not more than four thousand were of the Guard, upon whom reliance could be placed in a conflict with the people. He immediately made his dispositions; but before his orders could reach the troops, the agitation had assumed the most threatening appearance, and it was evident that a most serious conflict was approaching. The people everywhere descended into the streets, and collected in immense multitudes in and around the principal points

in the city. The Rue de Richelieu, the avenues of the Palais Royal, and the neighbourhood of the Hôtel des Affaires Etrangères, where the council of Ministers sat, were soon beset by vast crowds. The Rue St Honoré and the boulevards, the whole way from the Place de la Bastile to the Place de la Madeleine, were filled with multitudes, as yet unarmed, but whose looks and gestures told that they were prepared for any enterprise, however audacious. Cries of "*Vive la Charte!—à bas les Ministres!*" were heard from the crowd. So threatening did the aspect of things soon become, that orders were given to close the gates of the Palais Royal, and some detachments of gendarmerie and troops of the line were stationed around it to enforce the order. Soon the ominous cry was heard in the crowd, "*Vive la ligne!—vivent les frères et enfants du peuple!*" The grievous mistake was committed of leaving the troops, under arms but inactive, close to the people, and in communication with them. Soon their sympathy with the multitude appeared by their opening their ranks, and letting the human torrent flow through without resistance, amidst loud cheers from the people. The only symptom of collision which appeared was in front of the palace of the Duke of Orléans, where the troops were fired upon from the windows of a house. They answered by a general discharge at the windows, by which several persons were killed, among whom was an American, who had fired the first shot, and struck one of the soldiers.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 259, 261; Ann. Hist. xiii. 129, 130; Cap. i. 416, 417.

67. Meeting of the Liberal chiefs at Casimir Perier's.

Meanwhile an assembly of the leaders of the Liberal party had taken place at the house of M. Laborde, in the Rue d'Artois, on the evening of the 26th, and another, more numerously attended, at the hotel of M. Casimir Perier. Thirty persons, nearly all members of the Chamber of Deputies, were there assembled. Their names, many since known in the rolls of fame, prove how large a part of the intellectual strength of France was already arrayed

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against the Government.* Opinions, as might have been expected in an assembly of men of such information and intelligence, were much divided as to the course which should be pursued. All agreed in condemning the ordonnances, and holding them illegal, and a violation of the Charter; but as they had been promulgated by authority, and were obviously to be enforced by power, it was not so clear what course should be pursued by the friends of liberty and order. The young and courageous were clear for instantly taking up arms; the more reflecting and prudent hesitated at openly resisting the Government, and hazarding the newborn liberty of France on the perilous issue of the sword. The discussions were still going on, when a deputation arrived, professing to come from the electors of Paris, which cut the Gordian knot, by declaring that, as the ordonnances had evidently and openly violated the constitution, and the Government were preparing to support them by force, nothing remained but to have recourse TO INSURRECTION; that many of the master-manufacturers had already thrown their workmen into the streets, and that they were prepared in a body to support them with their whole moral and physical strength. Deputations from various bodies of young men succeeded, who, with the courage and rashness of youth, declared that they were ready instantly to take up arms, and praying the deputies to place themselves at their head. The discussion, which now became very animated, was still going on, when the sound of discharges of musketry in the streets, and the clank of charges of cavalry on the pavement, interrupted the deliberations;[1] and the persons assembled separated, without having come to any other resolution but that of meeting on the

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 130, 134; Lam. viii. 259, 262; Cap. i. 3, 5.

* They were MM. Mauguin, Bavoux, Chardel, De Lobau, Voisin de Gartempe, Persil, Louis, Dupin aîné, Charles Dupin, Berard, Mechin, Camille Perier, Odier, Lefebvre, Vassal, Audry de Puyraveau, Sebastiani, Gerard, Villemain, Guizot, Auguste St Aignan, Labbey de Pompières, Baillot, Bertin de Vaux, Delessert, Maréchal Duchaffant, Milleret, Mathieu Dumas, Salverte, De Schonen.—*Tribune*, 28 July 1830. *Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 130.

following day at the house of M. Audry de Puyrayeau, in the Faubourg Poissonnière.

68. Marmont's plan of operations, and commencement of the conflict.

Marmont's plan of operations was based, like that of Napoleon in repelling the attack of the sections in 1795, on the defence of the Tuileries, Louvre, and Carrousel, as a vast fortress in the centre of the city. Three battalions of the Guard were stationed in the Place Carrousel and in the Palais Royal, two battalions of the Guard with two guns in the Place Louis XV.; three battalions of the line on the boulevards, from the Madeleine to the Place of the Bastile; and a battalion of the Guard in the Rue des Capucins, in front of the Hôtel des Affaires Etrangères, where the Ministers were assembled. Unlike Napoleon, however, he resolved to send out detachments in various directions into the interior of the city, to disperse assemblages and overturn BARRICADES, which were already beginning to be formed in its most narrow and crowded districts. The first barricade which was met with was across the Rue St Honoré, where it passed the Palais Royal. After a volley in the air, which had not the effect of intimidating its defenders, the troops fired a point-blank discharge, which killed one old man and wounded several. The barricade was immediately carried, but the combatants succeeded in carrying off the dead body, which they paraded through the streets in the centre of the town, to excite the ardour of the people. The other detachments which were sent out succeeded in passing all the barricades, and restoring a certain degree of order in the crowded centre of the city; but the effervescence, so far from being diminished, was hourly on the increase; dropping shots, heard in several directions, kept alive the excitement, and the frequent cries of "*Vive la Ligne!*" wherever the troops of the line were stationed, proved with how much reluctance that portion of the military found themselves in the conflict, and how confidently the people trusted to their being faithless to their duty, and joining their cause. Meanwhile several

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armourers' shops were broken open in the centre of the city, and the most vigorous preparations were made to prepare for the conflict which was approaching on the succeeding day. The only measure of defence adopted on the other side was to declare Paris in a state of siege, which was done by an ordonnance signed by the King at St Cloud, at eleven at night—a step which, without adding to the military strength at the disposal of the marshal, tended only still further to inflame the public mind.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 129, 130; Lam. viii. 263, 265; Cap. ii. 3, 5; Lac. iv. 458, 459.

69. Vehement contest on the 28th.

The night of the 27th passed over without disturbance, but it was the calm which precedes the tornado. Early on the morning of the 28th, the populace appeared in the streets in the Faubourg St Antoine and St Marceau, so well known in the worst days of the Revolution, in great numbers, armed with muskets, pistols, swords, bayonets, axes, and pickaxes. "Furor arma ministrat." This huge and disorderly multitude, which swelled as it advanced, rolled onwards to the Rue St Denis, and, passing that thoroughfare, began to approach the position occupied by the military. The people were everywhere to be seen unpaving the streets, felling trees on the boulevards, overturning omnibuses, dragging furniture out of houses, and fastening together carts to form barricades. The small detachments of troops who could alone be spared from the central position around the Tuileries could not be everywhere. In most places these operations went on without opposition of any sort, and with an order and rapidity which was inconceivable. Nor did the multitude remain long unarmed behind their intrenchments. With equal rapidity they betook themselves to all the places where arms were to be found; the whole gunsmiths' shops in the central parts of the city were soon broken open and pillaged of their contents; many of the police stations and guard-houses were forced, and the arms they contained taken out and distributed among the people. Soon the arsenal, the powder-manufactory des Deux Moulins, and the depôt of artillery of St Thomas Aquinas, were broken

into, and everything they contained distributed among the people. Nearly the whole arms belonging to the National Guard, above forty thousand, were now put in requisition, and not a few of their uniforms were to be seen in the streets. Encouraged by these cheering appearances, the people surrounded the Hôtel de Ville; its slender garrison of sixteen men withdrew without opposition, and that important post fell into the hands of the insurgents. Instantly they ascended to the top of the building, sounded the tocsin, and displayed a huge tricolor flag from its roof. The well-known symbol excited universal enthusiasm, the gates of Nôtre Dame were soon broken open, another tricolor flag waved from its summit, and the dismal clang of its tocsin recalled to the few survivors who had witnessed it the appalling commencement of the 10th August 1792.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 134, 135; Lam. viii. 265, 266; Cap. i. 7, 8; Lac. iv. 462, 463.

70. Measures of the Government and Marshal Marmont.

All this, which was so important in its results, that, literally speaking, it amounted to a revolution, passed under the eyes of the constituted authorities without any serious resistance having been anywhere attempted. Four-fifths of Paris were already in the hands of the insurgents, the tricolor flag was displayed from twenty churches, a hundred barricades were erected in the streets, a hundred thousand men in arms, without anything more having been attempted to resist the movement than a few charges of gendarmerie in the streets, a few shots from the foot-soldiers, and a few guard-houses resolutely defended by the troops intrusted with their defence. These events, succeeding each other with stunning rapidity, at length roused the Government to vigorous measures, and Marshal Marmont received orders to act offensively against the insurgents. The few troops at his disposal were rapidly concentrated around the Tuileries; five battalions of the Guard arrived in the Place of the Carrousel; two Swiss battalions were posted in the Place Louis XV.; three squadrons of lancers and eight guns were placed in the Carrousel, beside the former, being the only ones employed

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that day—for the four howitzers which completed the battery were, from motives of humanity, left in the Hôtel des Invalides, and never used at all. These eight guns had only four rounds of grape-shot! Five hundred men arrived at eleven o'clock from Vincennes, and three squadrons of *grenadiers-à-cheval* from Versailles, which raised the force intrusted with the defence of that central point to three thousand infantry and six hundred horse, all tried men of the Guard. The foot-soldiers had twenty rounds of ball-cartridge each, but no provisions or water, though the sun of the dogdays shone with extraordinary severity. There was no persuading the Government that anything more than a military promenade would take place. Three regiments of the line occupied the boulevards from the Place Vendôme to the Bastile, and extended to the cuirassiers of the Guard, who were in the barracks of the Celestins. The 15th light infantry was despatched to occupy the Pantheon and the Palais de Justice, but these were in the hands of the insurgents before it arrived at them. [1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 136, 137; Cap. ii. 9, 10; Lam. viii. 266, 267; Lac. iv. 463; Moniteur, July 30, 1830.

71. Marmont's offensive measures, and their temporary success.

Encouraged by this addition to the slender military force at his disposal, Marmont resolved on offensive operations. With this view, he formed three movable columns, with orders to penetrate into the centre of the city, now wholly in the hands of the insurgents. The first was to march by the quays to the Hôtel de Ville, the second by the boulevards to the Place of the Bastile, and the two were to unite at the entrance of the Rue St Antoine, and bar the exit from that revolutionary district; while the third, consisting of two battalions of the Guard, was to march through the heart of the city to the Marché des Innocens, after occupying which, it was to debouche on the Rue St Denis, and by occupying that important thoroughfare separate its eastern from its western portions. Success in the first instance attended these operations. The first column, under the orders of General Talon, a bold and experienced officer, advanced, preceded

by two pieces of cannon, along the quays, and, opening their fire at the entrance of the Place de Grève, which was crowded with insurgents, by a few discharges cleared the square, and regained possession of the Hôtel de Ville. This important success might have been rendered decisive had there been an adequate number of troops at hand to occupy the post in force, and pursue the ulterior operations which had been directed. But at this critical moment the treachery of the troops of the line paralysed all the successes of the Guard. The 15th regiment refused to support the Guard at the Hôtel de Ville; the officers broke their swords, the soldiers drew their cartridges in presence of the people. The insurgents, headed by the scholars of the Polytechnic School, who now lent to the cause of insurrection the fire of their enthusiasm and the assistance of their skill, filled the quay opposite the Place de Grève, from whence they opened a heavy fire on the battalion of the Guard in possession of the place; while the 15th regiment, which had got under shelter, quietly beheld the destruction of their comrades, now surrounded in their conquests. Encouraged by this defection, some of these gallant youths rushed across the bridge, and fell under the balls of the Guard. One of the foremost, who bore a tricolor flag, exclaimed, with his last breath, "My friends, recollect that my name is d'Arcola."[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 268, 271; Ann. Hist. xiii. 137; Cap. ii. 9, 11.

72. Operations of the second column.

The second column, which was to advance by the boulevards to the Place of the Bastile, encountered no serious opposition till it arrived at the Porte St Denis, when it was met by the huge multitude which was proceeding to the eastward from the Faubourg St Antoine. After a few discharges the insurgents gave way; but it was only to take refuge in the lateral streets which extend into the boulevards, where, under shelter of the barricades, they kept up a vigorous fire on the flanks of the advancing troops. They continued to move forward, however, and reached the Place of the Bastile; but there the fire was

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so violent from the windows and loopholed houses with which it was environed, that they were unable to keep their ground, and moved on, following the line of the boulevards to the bridge of Austerlitz, which they crossed, intending to regain the centre of the city by the left bank of the Seine. A detachment, which proceeded up the Faubourg St Antoine, stormed in gallant style six barricades in that revolutionary quarter; but they were at length obliged to retire from the incessant fire which was opened upon them from the windows of the houses along the street. Retiring, they accidentally met a squadron of cuirassiers in the Place de la Bastile; and the two together succeeded in making their way across the centre of Paris to the Place de Grève. When they arrived there, they found General Talon gallantly defending, with the Guard, the Hôtel de Ville, which he had won; but, instead of assisting him in his heroic resistance, the 50th regiment took refuge in the interior court of the building, and the soldiers composing that corps gave up their cartridges to General Talon, whose firmness nothing could shake, and who, with his faithful Guards, prolonged a now hopeless defence.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 142, 144; Lam. viii. 271, 272; Cap. ii. 10, 12.

73. Disaster of the third column.

The third column, which was composed almost entirely of the Swiss Guard, had a still more difficult duty to discharge, for it was destined to advance by the Rue St Honoré to the Marché des Innocens, through the densest part of the city, where the narrowness of the streets and the height of the houses exposed the soldiers, almost in single file, to the murderous fire which issued from the windows. It succeeded in storming all the barricades erected across the Rue St Honoré; but on arriving in the Marché des Innocens, the fire from the windows on all sides was so violent and well directed that great numbers of the troops fell. General Quinsonnas, however, who commanded them, at length succeeded in establishing himself in the square, and the sustained fire of the Swiss silenced that from the windows. Quinsonnas took advantage of that success to send a battalion, with

two pieces of artillery, to clear the Rue St Denis; but though it succeeded in doing that, and reaching the Porte St Denis, it sustained a very severe loss, and the colonel himself was severely wounded. After remaining some hours at the Porte St Denis, expecting the 5th and 53d regiments, which were to have come by the boulevards, but had gone on, as already mentioned, to the bridge of Austerlitz, the commander, finding himself surrounded by insurgents, resolved to retire; but as the Rue St Denis was again closed by barricades, he could only do this by the boulevards, where the felling of trees and construction of similar barriers was already begun; and it was with great difficulty and considerable loss that he succeeded in making his way back to the Place Vendôme. Meanwhile the situation of Quinsonnas, left with his battalion in the Marché des Innocens, became every moment more critical. After four hours' incessant firing, the ammunition of the men was found to be exhausted; and the communication with the Tuileries was so completely cut off that it was only by disguising one of his officers that he was able to inform Marmont of his perilous situation. The marshal had only one battalion at his disposal, but that he instantly despatched to his relief; and the two together succeeded, after great difficulty, and storming several barricades, in forcing their way to the Seine, from whence they effected their retreat to the central position around the palace. Meanwhile the brave defenders of the Hôtel de Ville sustained with courage the not less valiant assaults of the numerous bodies of insurgents with which it was surrounded; and it was still in the hands of the Guard, when orders arrived at night-fall for its evacuation, and the concentration of the troops from all quarters around the Tuileries. This was effected under cover of the darkness without serious loss.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 145, 151; Lam. viii. 271, 273; Lac. iv. 463, 464.

While these bloody combats were taking place, so much to the disadvantage of the royal cause, in the streets of Paris, a sort of Provisional Government had become

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74. Proceedings of the Liberal chiefs. July 28.

established on the side of the insurgents. At the meeting agreed on the preceding day at the hotel of M. Audry de Puyraveau, a much larger number of influential persons was assembled: a gaining cause seldom lacks adherents. M. Lafitte and General Lafayette were there, the latter having arrived in haste the preceding night on the first intelligence of the disturbance in Paris. His appearance, and the weight of his name, so well known in the most stormy days of the first Revolution, determined the deputies: the violent party, headed by M. Mauguin, M. Audry de Puyraveau, and M. Lafitte, obtained the ascendancy over that of M. Guizot, Villemain, and Thiers, who were desirous to withstand the ordonnances as long as possible only by legal means. The latter, disapproving of insurrection, had withdrawn to the country. "Legal means," observed Lafayette, "have been cut short by the ordonnances in the *Moniteur*, and the discharges of artillery you hear in the streets. Victory can alone now decide the question." But although resistance was thus resolved on, it was not so easy to agree upon the appointment of a provisional government. Already the cry was heard in the streets, amidst "Vive la Charte!" and "Vive la Ligne!" "*Des Chefs et l'Hôtel de Ville!*" The necessity of a government, the first and greatest want of mankind, was already felt among those who were arrayed against it; and the street leaders had nominated General Lafayette, General Gérard, and the Duke de Choiseul, as a provisional authority. A proclamation, without their knowledge, but signed with their names, was placarded on the walls of Paris on the 28th. But as there was some doubt of their accepting the perilous office of dictators, it was conferred on General Delonny, who on the night of the 28th, after its evacuation by the Royal Guard, took possession of the Hôtel de Ville, and issued three edicts in the name of the Provisional Government for the preservation of the public monuments,[1] the care of the wounded, and the appoint-

[1] Cap. ii. 23, 25; Lam. viii. 273, 276; Lac. iv. 464, 465; Ann. Hist. xiii. 152, 153.

ment of municipal authorities. But the only body really entitled to appoint such a provisional government had not yet taken a decided resolution; the deputies assembled at M. de Puyraveau's separated at midnight on the 28th, without having determined on anything except a meeting on the following day at the hôtel of M. Lafitte.*

75. State of affairs at St Cloud, and firmness of the King. July 28.

Meanwhile the alarm had spread to St Cloud, and the court had fallen into a state of consternation great in proportion to the ill-founded confidence of the preceding days. The repeated discharges of artillery heard during the whole day, and which increased in so alarming a manner towards night, spread a mournful panic and sad presentiments over the palace, and already defection, that woeful precursor of revolutions, was to be seen among the courtiers. Persons with telescopes placed on the heights above the palace descried the tricolor flag flying on the summits of Nôtre Dame and St Sulpice; and a despatch from Marmont, dated 4 P.M., announced the alarming state of matters in the metropolis, and the necessity of instant orders how to act. In this extremity the King alone preserved the calmness called for in such a crisis. He sent orders to "Marmont to concentrate his troops and act in masses," and despatched directions to Polignac to recall the regiments of the Guard from the towns in which they were in garrison around Paris, and to the camps at St Omer and Juniville, to break up and move the troops they contained with all haste to the capital;—a wise precaution, which, taken earlier, might have altered the issue of the conflict, but which was now taken too late to have any sensible influence upon it. The Duchess d'Angoulême was absent; the Duke was at St Cloud, but did nothing but abuse Prince Polignac; the Duchess de Berri, with the ardent enthusiasm of her

* Their names were M. Mauguin, Lafitte, Audry de Puyraveau, Bavoux, Lafayette, Gérard, Sebastiani, Villemain, Casimir Perier, Lobau, Maréchal de Laborde, Vassal, Duchaffant, Guizot, Chardel, Méchin, Bertin de Vaux.—*Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 152, 153, notes.

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character, had thrown herself, heart and soul, into the cause of the Ministers, and anticipated the speedy defeat of the insurgents; while her two children, the one ten, the other nine years of age, in the simplicity of childhood, played at a game founded on the events going on in the metropolis, Mademoiselle heading the rebels, and the Duke de Bordeaux at the head of the Royal Guard repulsing them. The council of Ministers sat in permanence at the Tuileries, but there was no persuading Prince Polignac that there was any serious danger. He persisted in maintaining that putting Paris in a state of siege was all that was required. Even when informed by Marmont on the evening of the 28th that the troops of the line had passed over to the people, and that the Guard alone was to be relied on, he said with the most astonishing *sang-froid*, "Well, if the troops have gone over to the insurgents, we must fire upon the troops."[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 151, 152; Lam. viii. 282, 283; Cap. ii. 35, 36, 39.

76. Feelings of the combatants during the night.

The night which followed was a melancholy one in Paris, and not less so to the insurgent leaders than the royal troops. The excitement of the contest was suspended; but the silence and the darkness brought with them what was yet more terrible, for with them came the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future. That the Government would be overthrown there could be little doubt, now that the troops of the line had for the most part deserted its defence, and passed over to the people; but what was to succeed it? Was a republic to be installed, with its massacres, its executions, its Marats and Robespierres? and was a second inundation of the Cossacks, perhaps never to retire, to cross the Rhine and overspread the fields of France? No one could tell what a day would bring forth; and great as had been the indignation excited by the appearance of the ordonnances, it was now as nothing compared to the terror excited by the probable success of those who opposed them. The unwounded combatants alone, wearied with a conflict which had now continued almost without intermission for forty

hours, sunk into sleep, and reposed peaceably, stretched on the pavement or behind their barricades; but numbers passed a melancholy night. Food there was none for the soldiers; scarce a drop of water was to be had to assuage their burning thirst; the wounded, weltering in their blood, lay stretched on the stones, for nothing to remove them had been provided; and even the bravest felt that the contest was hopeless, now that the troops of the line had deserted them, and that nothing remained but to fall with honour amidst the ruins of the monarchy.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 281, 282; Cap. ii. 44, 45.

77. Forces on the opposite sides on the morning of the 29th.

On the morning of the 29th, fifteen hundred infantry and six hundred horse of the Guard arrived at the Tuileries; but they did little more than compensate the losses of the preceding day in killed and wounded, and nothing at all to make up the huge gap in the defences of the monarchy which the general defection of the troops of the line had occasioned. Fifteen thousand men and fifty guns would have been barely sufficient to defend the position of the Tuileries against a hundred thousand combatants, the most of them well armed and disciplined, who surrounded it; and Marmont had not more than five thousand effective men and eight guns to repel the assailants. His little army was thus disposed: two Swiss battalions occupied the Louvre; two other battalions of the Guard were stationed in the streets around the Carrousel, the Rue St Honoré, and the Rue de Rivoli; the Rue Castiglione, the Place Vendôme, and the Rue de la Paix, were occupied by two battalions of the line, who were yet faithful to their oaths; a Swiss battalion, which had arrived the evening before from Reuil, occupied the Place de Carrousel; three battalions of the Guard and a regiment of the *chasseurs-à-cheval* were placed in the garden of the Tuileries and the Champs Elysées. The ground on which they stood was all of Paris that remained to the King; all the rest was in the hands of the insurgents, who with loud shouts pressed in on every side, and kept up an incessant dropping fire on the Royalist outposts who surrounded the palace.[2]

[2] Ann. Hist. xiii. 155, 156; Cap. ii. 43, 44; Lam. viii. 281, 282.

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78. Mission of M. Arago to Marmont.

The deputies who met at Lafitte's in the morning resolved on one more pacific effort before they openly hoisted the standard of insurrection. Already M. Lafitte, who was, in secret, entirely in the Orléans interest, had despatched a confidential messenger to Neuilly, to inform the Duke verbally of what was going on; and he had returned with the ominous words, "*I thank you.*" * But it was necessary to be cautious, and avoid any step which might seem to unnecessarily precipitate hostilities. For this purpose they despatched M. Arago, the celebrated philosopher, who was an intimate friend of the marshal, to confer with Marmont. They met in the middle of the Carrousel, where Marmont was on horseback, surrounded by his staff, while the ceaseless roar of musketry on all sides announced how near the danger had approached. Arago, in the first instance, proposed to the marshal that, like the troops of the line, he should pass over, and unite his arms to those of the people. "No!" replied he instantly; "propose nothing which would dishonour me." Arago next implored him to lay down the command, and retire to St Cloud, offering his sword to the King for his personal defence, but withdrawing from the contest occasioned by the faults of his Ministers. "You know well," said Marmont, "whether or not I approve those fatal and odious measures: but I am a soldier; I am in the post which has been intrusted to me. To abandon that post under fire of sedition, to desert my troops, to be wanting to my prince, would be desertion, flight, ignominy. My fate is frightful, but it is the *arrêt* of destiny, and I must go through with it."[1] Arago still insisted, and the conference was still going on, when officers, covered with dust and blood,

[1] Cap. ii. 44, 45; Lam. viii. 280, 282; Ann. Hist. xiii. 154, 156; Louis Blanc, i. 272.

* "Le plan de M. Lafitte était arrêté. Il s'approche de M. Dudart: 'Hier je vous ai prié de vous rendre à Neuilly. A l'avertissement, que je lui faisais donner, le Prince a répondu, "*Je vous remercie.*" Veuillez retourner auprès de lui, *Entre une Couronne et un Passeport, qu'il choisisse.* Si je réussis, je ne lui ferai point payer ma commission de banque; si j'échoue, il me désavouera.'" —LOUIS BLANC, *Dix Ans de Louis Philippe*, i. 272.

came to request reinforcements for the outposts most warmly engaged. "I have none to send them," replied the general, in despair; "they must defend themselves." After a long and melancholy conference, Arago withdrew, having in vain endeavoured to induce Marmont to desert his duty, but leaving him not the less convinced that further resistance was hopeless, and that the last hour of the monarchy had struck.

79. Decisive resolution of the deputies at M. Lafitte's.

The deputies assembled at the hôtel of M. Lafitte now no longer hesitated. A deputation they had sent the preceding day, to have a conference with Polignac and the Ministers, had been refused admittance at the Tuileries. It was determined to appear no longer as mediators but as principals in the fight, to hoist the tricolor flag, put themselves at the head of the movement, and close the door against all reconciliation, by declaring the King and his Ministers public enemies. This decisive resolution was taken at six in the morning of the 29th, at the hôtel of M. Lafitte. General Sebastiani alone protested against a resolution which amounted to a dethronement of the sovereign. M. Guizot remained silent and pensive; Lafayette was overjoyed at seeing the wishes which he had formed during forty years so nearly approaching their accomplishment. Orders were immediately sent to the Hôtel de Ville to make arrangements for the reception of provisional authorities, and to the insurgents to prepare for the offensive, and a general attack on the position of the Tuileries on all sides. Meanwhile the Royalist outposts which surrounded it, sensible of their weakness, drew back in all directions; and soon the uniforms of the Guard were to be seen only in the close vicinity of the Louvre and the palace. Though the successor to the monarchy, or the form of government, was not yet divulged to the people, they were not the less resolved on by the leaders of the insurrection. Early in the morning, M. Audry de Puyraveau had been despatched to request General Lafayette to come to

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Lafitte's. In going there, Audry de Puyraveau met in the Rue d'Artois a number of people in a violent state of excitement, to whom M. Mignet exclaimed, "Be quiet, my friends; this evening you will have the Duke of Orléans for your King." Lafayette, however, had other views; he had visions of a dictatorship for himself. After he had come to Lafitte's, a deputation from the Republicans came to offer the military command of Paris to Lafayette and General Gérard. The second answered in an evasive manner; the first accepted the proferred honour with puerile eagerness. "Gentlemen," said he to the persons assembled at Lafitte's, "I am pressed to take the command of Paris." "If we cannot now find M. Bailly, the virtuous mayor of 1789," cried M. Bertin de Vaux, "let us at least congratulate ourselves that we have found the illustrious chief of the National Guard." Lafayette accepted, and proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville, the headquarters of the insurgents, accompanied by an immense concourse of Republicans. For a day he had the destinies of France in his hands.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 290, 291; Cap. ii. 47, 48; Ann. Hist. xiii. 154, 155; Louis Blanc, i. 273, 276.

80. Interview with M. de Semonville and M. d'Argout.

During the night the information they received from all quarters of Paris as to the defeat of the Royalist forces, and the report of Marshal Marmont as to the impossibility of his maintaining his position at the Tuileries with the small force at his disposal, opened the eyes of Ministers to their real situation. Orders were despatched with the utmost expedition to the regiments of the Guard stationed at Orléans, Rouen, Beauvais, and other places, to move instantly on Paris; but this resolution, which, adopted earlier, might have altered the whole course of events, was now too late: before the directions could even reach the troops, all was decided. The Ministers were on the point of setting out for St Cloud to lay the state of matters before the King, and, if necessary, tender their resignations, when a deputation of four members of the House of Peers made their appearance at the gates of the Tuileries, and in virtue of their privilege as peers

demanded an audience. They were M. de Semonville, M. d'Argout, M. de Vitrolles, and M. de Girardin, who had been at St Cloud with the King the evening before, and came fortified with his last resolutions. They were admitted, accordingly, and painted in the strongest colours, and without either circumlocution or disguise, the frightful state of the metropolis—the entire population in insurrection, the troops of the line joined to the insurgents, and the Royal Guard, the last resource of the monarchy, hemmed in on all sides, and all but made prisoners in the ancient palace of its kings. Prince Polignac answered, "The question at issue is the authority of the King and his prerogative; in my opinion, the monarchy is lost the moment a concession is made." These representations, however, which were too obviously supported by facts to permit their truth being seriously doubted, had such weight with the Ministers that they consented to take M. de Semonville and M. d'Argout with them to St Cloud. Before setting out they called in Marmont to hear his opinions as to the means of defence which yet remained to them. "You may tell the King," said the marshal, "that come what may, and though the entire population of Paris should rise up against me, I can hold this position for fifteen days without further reinforcements. This position is impregnable." When the party arrived at St Cloud at nine o'clock, the whole state of affairs was laid before the King; but, trusting to this representation of Marmont, he remained immovable. "Sire!" said M. de Semonville, on taking his leave, "if in an hour the ordonnances are not revoked, there is no longer either a King or a monarchy." "You will surely allow me two hours," replied the King, with polite irony. M. de Semonville upon this threw himself on his knees, and exclaimed, "The Dauphin, sire! think of the Dauphin!" But even this appeal to the sensibility and early recollections of the King failed, and the deputation withdrew without having effected any accommodation.[1] Prince Polignac, in entering

[1] Lam. viii. 294, 297; Cap. ii. 52, 55, 66; Ann. Hist. xiii. 158, 161.

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the royal cabinet, met M. de Semonville coming out. "You have been demanding my head," said he, making, while smiling, the sign of decapitation. "It matters not; I was determined the King should hear my accuser."

81. The Louvre is carried by the insurgents.

But while these events were in progress at St Cloud, matters were so precipitated at Paris that an accommodation was no longer possible. One by one the whole barracks there, stripped of their defenders, had fallen into the hands of the insurgents; the Hôtel de Ville, where General Dubourg had assumed a fleeting dictatorship, had become their headquarters, where General Lafayette was established; the whole left bank of the Seine opposite the Tuileries was in their hands; and dense masses of them, headed by the scholars of the Polytechnic School, had come close to the artillery of the Guard in the Rue St Honoré, opposite the Louvre. Already a sort of parley had taken place between them; and the officer in command, fearful of taking so strong a step on his own responsibility, had sent to Marmont to say his pieces were charged with grape, and asking if he might fire? He was forbidden to do so, and immediately the guns fell into the hands of the insurgents. At the same time, the regiment of the Seine, stationed in the Place Vendôme, opened its ranks to let them into the garden of the Tuileries. Informed of this shameful treachery, Marmont ordered M. de Salis, who commanded the two battalions of the Swiss Guard in the Carrousel, to send one of them to occupy the important position of the Place Vendôme, which barred the great entrance by the Rue de la Paix from the boulevards, which were crowded with insurgents. M. de Salis, desirous to relieve the battalions which had combated since daybreak in the colonnade of the Louvre, with the insurgents in and around the church of St Germains l'Auxerrois opposite, gave orders for them to retire, with a view to their being sent to the Place Vendôme, and another in the Carrousel to take their place. During the transposition the fire from the colon-

nade ceased for a few minutes, and the insurgents opposite, thinking it was a permanent retreat, rushed with the utmost vehemence across the Place St Germains l'Auxerrois, and stormed the building. In an instant the windows were broken through, the gates forced open, the stairs mounted, the inner court of the Louvre carried; and the bravest of the insurgents, forcing their way through the interior doors and communications, penetrated into the gallery of the Museum, from the inner windows of which they opened a plunging fire upon the Swiss, who still remained in the Place of the Carrousel. Upon this, seeing themselves assailed both in front and flank, a sudden panic seized the troops there, and they fled in wild disorder under the arch of the palace into the garden of the Tuileries. By a strange coincidence they passed over the same spot where their predecessors had gloriously fallen on the 10th August 1792. Marmont, regaining his resolution with the approach of danger, hastened to the rear, which was retiring before the insurgents, did everything that courage and conduct could suggest to arrest the disorder, and succeeded in restoring some degree of order, withdrawing the troops in tolerable array into the Champs Elysées. He was the last man who left the garden of the Tuileries.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 298, 300; Cap. ii. 67, 70; Ann. Hist. xiii. 162, 165; Lac. iv. 492, 495.

82. Decisive effects of this success.

This success proved decisive, as a similar advantage had invariably done through all the phases of the former Revolution. Since the bones and sinews of France had been broken by the Constituent Assembly, by the destruction of the nobility, the church, and the incorporations, no power has existed in France capable of withstanding any party in possession of the capital, its treasury, post-office, and telegraph. They were all soon entirely in the hands of the insurgents. The only posts of importance still occupied by the royal troops—the Invalides and barracks of Babylone, where the Swiss were located—were evacuated, the latter after a severe conflict, in which great numbers of the gallant defenders perished, and the troops

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in them rejoined their comrades in the Champs Elysées. One melancholy event alone darkened the universal triumph, and cast a tragic yet heroic air over the fall of the monarchy. A hundred Swiss, placed in a house at the junction of the Rue de Richelieu and the Rue St Honoré, who, in the confusion of the retreat, had been forgotten, defended themselves to the last, and perished, like their predecessors on the 10th of August, to the last man. Several Swiss, betrayed by their uniform, were pursued and massacred by the people; but with these exceptions, which happily were not numerous, the insurgents made a noble use of their victory. They broke, indeed, into the Tuileries, the Louvre, and the palace of the Archbishop of Paris, traversed their stately galleries and splendid halls, and evinced their hatred of royalty by firing at several of the pictures, piercing them with their bayonets, and tearing in pieces the gorgeous furniture and decorations of the princesses' apartments. The archbishop's palace was sacked, and the cellars of the Tuileries emptied of their contents. But, with these exceptions, they abstained from acts of pillage; they disdained to sully the victory of the people by the exhibition of vulgar vices; and the municipal authorities at the Hôtel de Ville took the most vigorous measures to arrest the disorder, and preserve the public monuments from injury. Meanwhile the Royal Guard, sad and dejected, pursued their way under the triumphal arch at the barrier of Neuilly, erected to commemorate the glories of their predecessors in the Grand Army; and the regiments of the line, which had joined the insurgents, withdrew to their barracks, amidst external applause and secret shame.[1]

[1] Ann. Hist. xiii. 164, 167; Lam. viii. 301, 304; Cap. ii. 69, 71; Lac. iv. 495, 497.

83. Marmont's first interview with Charles X. at St Cloud. July 29.

Meanwhile Marmont, having stationed his troops in the Bois de Boulogne, where all pursuit and hostilities ceased, galloped across the wood to St Cloud, to lay the account of his disasters before the King. "Sire!" said he on arriving, "it is my painful duty to announce to your Majesty, that I have not been able to maintain your

authority in Paris. The Swiss, to whom I intrusted the defence of the Louvre, seized with a sudden panic, have abandoned that important post; carried away myself by the torrent of fugitives, I was unable to rally the troops till they arrived at the arch of the Etoile; and I have ordered them to continue their retreat to St Cloud. A ball, directed at me, has killed the horse of my aide-de-camp by my side. I regret it did not pass through my head; death would be nothing to me compared to the sad spectacle which I have witnessed." The King, without addressing a word of reproach to the marshal, raised his eyes to heaven; he recognised the fortune of his race. Then he desired Marmont to take his orders from the Duke d'Angoulême, whom he had appointed generalissimo of his armies. He then directed the Ministers to be called in; and before they could enter, intelligence arrived of the final evacuation of Paris, and retreat of the troops towards St Cloud.[1]

[1] Cap. ii. 70, 71; Lam. viii. 305, 306; Lac. iv. 503, 504.

84. Deliberation in the Council.

The final interview of the King with his Ministers was not of long duration. Events had crowded on one another with such rapidity that there was scarcely any room for doubt or hesitation. The metropolis had been lost, the government changed, the monarchy overthrown, in a single day. Waterloo itself had not been more decisive. The monarch opened the conference by detailing the disastrous news communicated by Marmont, and the concessions pressed upon him by M. de Semonville and M. d'Argout, which were such a capitulation as amounted to a practical abdication of the crown. Struck with consternation, the majority of the Council thought nothing remained but to yield to a force which they had not the means of resisting. M. Guernon de Ranville, though he had counselled an accommodation the evening before, when the victory was still undecided, now, like a true soldier, strongly supported the opposite side. "The throne is overturned, we are told," said he; "the evil is great; but I believe it is exaggerated. I cannot believe

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that the monarchy is to fall without a combat. We must recollect that the deplorable fighting in the streets, which we have witnessed during the last two days, though it has unfortunately caused much blood to flow, does not constitute the energetic resistance which we are entitled to expect from the best troops in Europe. Happen what may, Paris is not France; the masses may be for a moment deluded by the promises of Liberalism, but they do not desire revolution. The Chambers desire it still less; the majority of the army is still faithful; the Guard, shaken a moment, will soon resume its fitting attitude; if the Crown does not abandon itself, with such support it will triumph over this fresh revolutionary attempt. If, however, the Genius of Evil is again to prove triumphant, if the legitimate throne is again to fall, let it fall with honour; shame alone has no future. It is indispensable to recall some of the ordonnances, not to satisfy the insurgents, but because it is just to do so—because the interests of the Crown require such a concession. The government of the King was in the legal path when it dissolved the Chamber, for it had a right to do so; his Majesty will be all-powerful against the revolutionists when he is supported by the Chamber. Should this line be adopted, it will be necessary to postpone, by a few days, the opening of the Chamber, which is fixed for the 3d August; and, above all, to appoint another place of assembly than Paris, which is expressly permitted by the Charter."[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 308, 311; Cap. ii. 70, 71; Ann. Hist. xiii. 109, 111.

85. The King submits, dismisses his Ministers, and sends for M. de Montemart.

These courageous sentiments were strongly supported by the Duke d'Angoulême. "I regret," said he, "that the majority of the Council does not go into these ideas. If we are reduced to the terrible necessity of prolonging the strife, we shall find numerous auxiliaries in the fidelity of the provinces; but even if we are abandoned by all—if this sun is to be the last which shines on the monarchy, let us at least dignify our fall by perishing with arms in our hands." Had the King gone into these

sentiments he might have preserved the throne, for the insurgents in Paris were powerless out of its streets, and twenty thousand of the Royal Guard, who might speedily have been assembled, would have enabled the Royalists to keep the field till the remainder of the army and the provinces had declared themselves. But, like Louis XVI., he had the resignation of a martyr, not the spirit of a hero. He had the moral courage requisite to undertake bold designs, but not the physical energy necessary for their execution. He discerned, as he thought, the stroke of fate, and prepared to submit with patience to its infliction. Turning to the majority of the Council, who recommended submission, he said, "Do what you think best, my cause is conquered." Upon this the final resolution was taken, and the King signed an ordonnance, revoking the former ordonnances, dismissing the Ministers, and appointing M. de Montemart President of the Council, M. Casimir Perier to the Interior, and General Gérard Minister at War. It was an attempt at capitulation for the monarchy. The Duke d'Angoulême, silent, but quivering with indignation, paced round the table where the signing of the ordonnance was going on. The Ministers for the last time left the council chamber, with tears in their eyes and despair in their hearts.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 311, 312; Cap. ii. 70, 71; Lac. iv. 504, 505.

86. Ineffectual attempt to make a Ministry under M. de Montemart.

It belongs to a succeeding volume to recount the important events which at this period took place in Paris, and which prepared the ascent of the Duke of Orléans, so well known afterwards as LOUIS PHILIPPE, to the throne. A few pages will suffice to narrate in this the melancholy story of the elder branch of the Bourbons, till they left as exiles their native land. Every hour brought intelligence of fresh defections, of the immense agitation in Paris, the insurrection of Versailles and the other towns in the vicinity, of the treachery of new regiments of the line. The Guard alone remained faithful, a glorious example of fidelity and honour amidst the general defection of their companions in arms. M. de Montemart was a nobleman

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of ancient family, vast possessions, and honourable character, trained to arms, and as brave as steel; but he wanted the political skill and moral resolution to conduct the affairs of the monarchy in the desperate circumstances in which it was now placed. But this was immaterial; had he possessed the talents of Sully, the energy of Henry IV., and the firmness of Cardinal Richelieu, the result would have been the same. The fiat of the Almighty had gone out against the monarchy; nothing remained but to survive the shipwreck. M. de Montemart accepted the perilous mission with the utmost reluctance, and only in obedience to the earnest request and positive mandate of the sovereign. But his mission entirely failed of success. In vain were new ordonnances of a liberal character prepared in haste by the new Minister and sent to the Hôtel de Ville, to negotiate with the Provisional Government there established, of which Lafayette was President. "*It is too late,*" said M. de Schonen, a dependant and intimate friend of Lafayette; "the throne of Charles X. has melted away in blood." In vain the command of the National Guard was offered to Marshal Maison. General Lafayette had already accepted it, and the whole force was by this time arrayed against the monarchy. In vain M. Lafitte, M. Bertin de Vaux, and M. Guizot, and some others, who had become fearful of the rapid progress of the revolution, strove to obtain a hearing for the envoys of the King, and suggested the possibility of still coming to an accommodation. Their voices were drowned by vehement cries from all parts of the hall. "IL EST TROP TARD!—plus de transactions, plus de Bourbons!" broke forth on all sides; and M. de Vitrolles and M. d'Argout, who had come on the mission, returned to St Cloud with the conviction that the cause of the monarchy was lost.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 320, 326; Ann. Hist. xiii. 170, 173; Cap. ii. 77, 81; Lac. iv. 506, 509.

Convinced that it was no longer possible to resist, Charles, on the return of the envoys, signed an unqualified revocation of the ordonnances, and ordered Prince Polignac, whose presence at the court was a continual object

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of jealousy to the revolutionists, to retire from St Cloud. He had already, in secret, made up his mind that a resignation of the crown had become unavoidable, and he sought time only to be able to fall with dignity and decorum. He abhorred the idea of civil war; he could resign his crown or his life for his people, and what he conceived to be his duty, but he could not be instrumental in shedding their blood. Prince Polignac entirely shared these dispositions. When parting from M. de Montemart at St Cloud, he pressed his hand, and said, "What a misfortune that my sword has broken in my hand! I would have secured the Charter on an indestructible foundation." * It was in the spirit of the Charter, and to secure it in future times, by founding it on the basis of property and religion, that he intended for the time to abrogate it. Meanwhile the popular party at the Hôtel de Ville, amidst cries of "*A bas les Bourbons!*" "*Plus de Bourbons!*" published a proclamation, signed by Count Lobau, M. Audry de Puyraveau, M. Mauguin, and M. de Schonen, the sentence of death to the monarchy—Charles X. "has ceased to reign in France." But even this did not satisfy the extreme Liberals, who, as usual in such convulsions, had got the ascendancy. "Nous sommes trahis: on veut nous imposer Henri V.; ce n'est pas pour Henri V. que nous nous sommes battus!" was the general cry.[1]

87. Completion of the Revolution at Paris. July 30.

1 Ann. Hist. xiii. 174, 176; Lam. viii. 328, 331; Cap. ii. 77, 81; Lac. iv. 510, 512.

M. de Montemart made a last effort to open negotiations with the revolutionary authorities at the Hôtel de Ville. Alone, in a peasant's dress, with his coat over his arm, as if overcome with the heat, he set out on foot from

88. Last attempt at a negotiation. July 31.

* In the estimation of Prince Polignac, the contest in which he had engaged the monarchy was a holy war for the support of religion. In his secret meditations he said, "Avec quelle douleur l'examen de certains dispositions de la Charte, nous a-t-il démontré que la foi de nos pères, que la religion Chrétienne, s'y trouve blessée dans des points sensibles et importants! Tous les cultes également autorisés et protégés peuvent offrir, dans l'état du Roi très-Chrétien, le spectacle d'outrages continuels dirigés contre l'autel du vrai Dieu." With truth does Lamartine observe on this passage, "Là est tout le secret du règne de Charles X et des ordonnances." It was the ambitious intolerant spirit of the Romish faith which was the moving spring of the whole.—See LAMARTINE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, viii. 329, note.

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St Cloud, passed with difficulty the outposts of the two armies, and succeeded in getting into Paris through a breach made in the wall that surrounds it. But he soon saw there that his mission was fruitless. The tricolor flag floated on the summit of every steeple, every tower, every public edifice; the arms of the King, the ensigns of royalty, were nearly all effaced; no one ventured to mention the name of the Bourbons but as an object of horror and derision; death awaited any man rash enough to propose their restoration. Worn out with fatigue, covered with dust and sweat, M. de Montemart yet feared that he would be recognised, and refused admittance at the Hôtel de Ville, and he gave the revocation of the ordonnances to his friend M. Collin de Sussy, who consequently carried them to that centre of the insurrection. They were received only with contempt and derision; and M. de Montemart returned to St Cloud, convinced by the evidence of his own senses that the cause of royalty was lost.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 330, 332; Cap. ii. 96, 104; Ann. Hist. xiii. 180, 184.

89. The Duke of Orleans refuses the lieutenancy-general of the kingdom. July 31.

The return of the Duke of Orléans to Paris, which took place on the following day, and the lead which he immediately acquired among the revolutionists, induced Charles X. to make a last effort to raise the Crown from the dust. Everything promised success to such an attempt. The Duke had been overwhelmed with acts of kindness from the royal family; he had himself owed the final restoration of his immense possessions to Charles X., and he always professed the most unbounded gratitude for the gift.[2] Everything conspired to recommend to him an alliance with the royal family. Their common descent from Louis XIII.; the cause of the throne, to which, failing Henry V., he was the next heir; the noble feeling of disinterested loyalty; the selfish principle of individual interest,—all tended to recommend it. Charles X. offered him the lieutenancy-general of the kingdom, in order to guard the Crown during his minority for the Duke de Bordeaux, in whose favour the King and the Duke

[2] Ante, c. xii. § 4.

d'Angoulême offered to renounce it. Had he accepted the mission, his descendants would in all probability have sat upon the throne of France, for the Duke de Bordeaux to this day has no heirs, and the Orléans family has ever since been the first in the order of succession. The simple course of honour and of duty would have secured for himself, in the first instance, the substantial power and importance of royalty; for his children, the inheritance of the crown of France. But he refused the offer; he yielded to the whisperings of ambition; he swerved from the cause of duty under the attractions of a diadem, and he was elevated to greatness only to be punished by losing it. He lost the crown for his rightful sovereign, but he lost its reversion also for his descendants; he died discrowned in a foreign land, and his children, now exiles, and destitute, having lost their property, their honours, their inheritance, remain a lasting monument, not of the mutability of fortune, but of the immutability of the laws of justice in the Divine administration.[1] *

[1] Lam. viii. 356, 358; Chateaub. ix. 314, 315.

* In making these observations, the Author is well aware of the many extenuating circumstances which may be pleaded in favour of the Duke of Orléans' defection from the throne; and it will appear in the next volume, when his accession comes to be narrated, that full weight is given to them. But he can admit no paltering with honour and duty; treason is not the less treason though it may be less condemned because it succeeds. If the maxim be true, "Noblesse oblige," under what obligation did he lie, who, the second in descent of the noblest family in Europe, was at the same time the first subject in France, and the largest recipient of the royal munificence? The readiness with which the French in every age have rallied round the standard of success, renders it probable that, even in the first instance, a cordial union of the Royal and Orléans branches of the house of Bourbon would have secured the throne for both. But even had it been otherwise, what would have been the result in the end of an adherence to the path of honour and duty? Suppose that the torrent of republicanism had been so violent, that in the first instance it was irresistible, and that the Duke of Orléans joined the royal cause only to share its fall, what would have succeeded? A republic so oppressive, so absurd, so ruinous, that it would have run the course of madness, extravagance, and detestation, as quickly as it did when erected on the ruins of the Orléans dynasty in 1848. And when the inevitable hour of its fall came, in what a different situation would *the united Royalist and Orléans parties*, the cause of the white flag, then *sans peur et sans reproche*, have been from what it now is—disunited, at variance, discredited, supplanted by the Imperial party, the common enemy of both!

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90. Violent scene between the Duke d'Angoulême and Marmont.

The failure of the attempt to enlist the Duke of Orléans among the supporters of the royal cause, and the increasing pressure of the revolutionary forces, induced Marmont to enter into a sort of capitulation for the royal troops, in virtue of which hostilities were immediately to cease between them, and a proclamation to that effect was issued by him. This step, which was in a manner a surrender of the royal cause, excited the most violent indignation in the breast of the Duke d'Angoulême, who, so far from thinking of submitting, was forming plans for the defence of the strong position of St Cloud, where he proposed to rally the whole Royal Guard, call upon the troops from the camps of St Omer and Nancy, and with their united force, eight-and-thirty thousand strong, march again upon Paris, and restore the royal authority in the capital. Such was the indignation of the prince at what he conceived to be the treachery of the marshal that he openly called him a traitor, and in attempting to snatch from him his sword, wounded himself in the hand. Marmont was immediately put under arrest; but the King, trained to endure suffering, and more master of his passions, soon after ordered him to be set at liberty, and restored his sword to him. This violent scene, however, and the near approach of the revolutionary forces, which were now close to St Cloud, induced the monarch to withdraw himself to Trianon, where he assembled a council of his former Ministers, as M. de Montemart had not yet returned from Paris, and had not been heard of for four-and-twenty hours. But while they were still in deliberation, and discussing the formation of a powerful *corps d'armée* at St Cloud, composed of the Guard and such of the regiments of the line as were still faithful, the Duke d'Angoulême, who had been left in command of the rear-guard at St Cloud, arrived with the disheartening intelligence that the regiments of the line posted at the bridge had refused to fire upon the insurgents, who had, in consequence, passed the bridge, occupied St Cloud,[1] and were

[1] Lam. viii. 368, 379; Cap. ii. 201, 205; Ann. Hist. xiii. 186, 187.

preparing to march on Trianon. On receipt of this intelligence, it was resolved to fall back at all points on Rambouillet, where the court arrived with the Royal Guard, still twelve thousand strong, at midnight, in the deepest state of depression.

91. Abdication of Charles X. August 1.

Charles arrived at Rambouillet fully determined to abdicate for himself in favour of his grandson; he preferred anything to the horrors and chances of a civil war. He recognised in his reverses the chastising hand of Providence, and he determined to submit in silence and resignation to the infliction of its punishment. The Duke d'Angoulême was strongly of an opposite opinion, and preferred the chances of a conflict, but, submissive in all things to the will of his father, he waived his opposition. On the following morning, accordingly, the King assembled his family around him, and announced his intention of abdicating in favour of his grandson, the Duke de Bordeaux, as his son, the Duke d'Angoulême, shared his sentiments, and renounced his right of succession to the throne. He intimated this resolution in a letter to the Duke of Orléans, requiring him, in the character of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, conferred on him by the revolutionary authorities at Paris, and confirmed by the King by royal appointment, to proclaim the accession of Henry V. to the throne, authorising him at the same time to administer the government during his minority.* Here, then, again the path of honour and duty was

" RAMBOUILLET, 2 *Août* 1830.

* "Je suis trop profondément peiné de maux qui affligent ou qui pourraient menacer mes peuples pour n'avoir pas cherché un moyen de les prévenir. J'ai donc pris la résolution d'abdiquer la couronne en faveur de mon petit-fils; le Dauphin, qui partage mes sentimens, renonce aussi à ses droits en faveur de son neveu. Vous aurez donc, en votre qualité de Lieutenant-Général du Royaume, à faire proclamer l'avènement de Henri V. à la couronne. Vous prendrez d'ailleurs toutes les mesures qui vous concernent pour régler la forme du gouvernement pendant la minorité du nouveau roi: ici je me borne à faire connaître ces dispositions; c'est un moyen d'éviter bien des maux. Vous communiquerez mes intentions au corps diplomatique, et vous me ferez connaître le plutôt possible la proclamation par laquelle mon petit-fils sera reconnu Roi sous le nom de Henri V.—CHARLES."—*Annuaire Historique*, xiii. 188, 189. CAPEFIGUE, ii. 211, note.

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opened to the Duke of Orléans; but he again declined to follow it, and, instead of obeying the royal mandate, and issuing the proclamation required of him, he made every preparation for resistance. At the same time, however, with detestable hypocrisy, he wrote a letter to Charles X. in answer, so respectful and affectionate that it entirely disarmed the suspicions of the falling monarch.* An army, composed of twelve or fifteen thousand men, hastily got together and half-armed, was directed to march out of Paris on Rambouillet, and Messieurs Schonen and Odillon Barrot and Marshal Maison were sent forward as a deputation to impress upon the King the necessity of an immediate and unqualified resignation for himself and his descendants, and every preparation was made to compel his embarkation for England.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 382, 388; Cap. ii. 209, 210; Ann. Hist. xiii. 139; Moniteur, Aug. 2, 1830; Louis Blanc, i. 374, 375.

92. Revolutionary army which set out from Paris for Rambouillet.

The cortège of the revolutionary forces set out from Paris on the 3d August; it was deemed at the time no slight stroke of policy, on the part of the revolutionary chiefs, that they succeeded, on this pretext, in getting rid of twelve or fourteen thousand unruly defenders, who, whatever they might be to their opponents, were unques-

* "M. Dupin conseilla au Prince de faire au message de Charles X. une réponse catégorique, et propre à séparer nettement la cause de la maison d'Orléans de celle de la branche aînée. Il alla jusqu'à se charger de la rédaction de cette réponse. La lettre qu'il écrivit était rude et sans pitié. Le Duc d'Orléans la lut, et dit, 'Ceci est trop grave pour que je ne consulte pas ma femme. Il passe dans une pièce voisine, et reparaît quelques instants après, tenant à la main la même enveloppe, qui fut remise à l'envoyé de Charles X. La lettre, que cette enveloppe contenait, émut doucement le vieux monarque; elle était *affectueuse et pleine de témoignages de fidélité.* Charles en fut si touché que, dès ce moment, toutes ses hésitations s'évanouirent. Charles X. n'avait jamais eu pour le Duc d'Orléans la même répugnance que beaucoup d'hommes de la Cour. Il en avait donné récemment une preuve éclatante en ordonnant au Général Trogof de confisquer tous les exemplaires des *Mémoires de Maria Stella*, libelle dirigé contre le Duc d'Orléans, et que les courtisans faisaient circuler à Saint-Cloud avec une joie maligne. *Il fut donc charmé de trouver dans ce Prince le Protecteur de son petit-fils;* et convaincu que la loyauté du Duc d'Orléans était la meilleure garantie de l'avenir royal destiné au Duc de Bordeaux, il réalisa sans retard un projet qu'il n'avait encore conçu que vaguement. Non-content d'abdiquer la Couronne, il usa de l'empire absolu qu'il exerçait sur le Dauphin *pour le faire consentir lui aussi à une abdication, et il crut au salut de sa dynastie.*"—LOUIS BLANC, *Dix Ans de Louis Philippe*, i. 374, 375.

tionably most formidable to their own government. Variously armed with muskets, sabres, pistols, pikes, iron bars, and fowling-pieces, the motley assemblage were conveyed, for the most part in omnibuses and cabriolets, towards Rambouillet. The whole royal carriages had been pressed into the service, and conveyed a considerable number. The advanced guard, consisting of veterans and National Guards, which alone preserved the appearance or order of soldiers, was under the orders of General Excelmans. General Pajol, who commanded the whole, and who was too experienced a soldier not to know the value of such a disorderly rabble in the open field, trembled at every step lest the opening of a masked battery, or a charge of cavalry of the Guard, should throw the whole into confusion, and drive it headlong back to Paris. Careless of the future, the strange multitude proceeded gaily on their way, in great part still blackened by the smoke, and animated by the spirit of the barricades, singing the Marseillaise and other revolutionary songs; while the frequent discharges of muskets from the ranks told the commanders but too clearly how unskilful their followers were in the use of arms, or how little inured to military discipline. Several persons in the staff were wounded by these stray shots, and General Pajol himself feared for his life at the hands of his own troops.[1]

[1] Lac. iv. 521, 522; Lam. viii. 387, 393; Cap. ii. 220, 221; Louis Blanc, i. 377, 379.

93. Falsehoods told the King by Marshal Maison.

When the three commissioners who preceded this revolutionary rabble were introduced to the King at Rambouillet, he asked them with the voice of authority—"What do you wish with me? I have arranged everything with the Duke of Orléans, my lieutenant-general of the kingdom." So thoroughly was the unfortunate monarch, who judged of others by what he felt in himself, persuaded of the loyalty and good faith of that prince, that that very morning he had made the Duke of Luxembourg, who commanded the Guard, publish an address to that body, in which he assured them of the same situations and rank in the service of that sovereign

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which they had enjoyed in his own. Odillon Barrot upon this took up the word, and impressed upon the King the necessity of submitting, in the interest of the Duke de Bordeaux, whose name had not as yet been implicated in the debates, to a necessity which could no longer be avoided, and of the extreme inexpedience of founding his throne in blood. The King was calm and decided; he was still undetermined whether or not to try the fate of arms. "If the King," said he, "would avoid involving the kingdom in unheard-of calamities, and a useless effusion of blood, it is indispensable that his Majesty and his family should instantly leave France. There are *eighty thousand men* who have issued from Paris, ready to fall on the royal forces." The King upon this took Marshal Maison into the embrasure of a window, and said, "Marshal Maison, you are a soldier and a man of honour; tell me, on *your word of honour*, is the army which has marched out of Paris against me really eighty thousand strong?" And a French soldier and marshal answered, "Sire! I cannot give you the number exactly, but it is very numerous, *and may amount to that force.*" "Enough!" replied the King; "I believe you, and I consent to everything, to spare the blood of my Guard."* With that he gave orders for the departure of the court for Cherbourg, to embark for England, the common refuge for the unfortunate of all ranks and parties and countries.[1] Marshal Maison had not long before been placed by Charles X. at the head of the army which he had sent to Greece, as has been already narrated in the history of that coun-

[1] Lam. viii. 389, 390; Cap. ii. 224, 226; Lac. iv. 522, 523; Ann. Hist. xiii. 191, 192; Louis Blanc, i. 400.

* M. Louis Blanc's account of this important interview is substantially the same. "M. Odillon Barrot prit la parole avec assurance. Il parla des horreurs de la guerre civile, du danger de braver des passions encore incandescentes. Et comme Charles X. insistait sur les droits du Duc de Bordeaux formellement réservés par l'Acte d'Abdication, l'orateur lui représenta, d'une voix caressante, que ce n'était pas dans le sang qu'il fallait placer le trône de Henri V. '*Et soixante mille hommes menacent Rambouillet*' ajouta le Maréchal Maison. A ces mots le Roi, qui marchait à grands pas, s'arrête et fait signe au Maréchal Maison qu'il désire l'entretenir en particulier. Après quelques moments d'hésitation le Maréchal y consent. Alors le regardant fixement, 'Monsieur,' lui dit le Roi, '*je crois à votre loyauté—je suis prêt à me fier* à votre parole; est-il vrai que

try. France and its army were far from the day when the dying Chevalier Bayard said to the pursuing and conquering Constable de Bourbon, "Pity not me; pity those who fight against their king, their country, and their oath."

94. Journey to Maintenon, and farewell to the Guard. Aug. 4.

The die being now cast, and the final resolution taken, the King gave orders for the journey to Cherbourg on the following day. The intelligence of this determination caused the few regiments of the line which still adhered to his standard to take their departure. But nothing could shake the fidelity of the Guard, which, in undiminished strength, though with sad hearts and mournful visages, followed the long cortège of carriages which was conveying their sovereign and the royal family into exile. They halted the first night at Maintenon, the splendid seat of the family of Noailles, built by Louis XIV. for his favourite queen, where they were received with noble generosity by its illustrious owners; and there, on the following morning, the King bade adieu to the greater part of the Guard, reserving only for his escort to the coast the *Gardes-du-corps* and *Gendarmerie d'Elite*, with six pieces of cannon, under the command of Marmont, on whom he had generously bestowed it, to show he retained no rancour for the events at Paris and St Cloud. The whole Guard was drawn up in the park and on the road as the royal cortège passed them, and they presented arms for the last time to their sovereign. No words can express the emotion which was felt on both sides. His faults, his imprudences, were forgotten in the

l'armée Parisienne qui s'avance soit composée de soixante mille hommes?'—'OUI, SIRE.' *Charles X. n'hésita plus.* Le Duc de Luxembourg publia un Ordre du Jour, pour apprendre aux Gardes, que leur position sous Henri V. serait la même que sous Charles X.: tant le vieux Monarque avait de peine à se persuader qu'il eût un successeur dans le Lieutenant-Général. Il le croyait si peu qu'il chargea M. Alexandre de Girardin d'aller prendre à Paris 600,000 francs sur le trésor; et comme il était revenu qu'on craignait qu'il n'emportât les diamants de la Couronne, il repoussa cette supposition avec beaucoup de véhémence et de dignité. Pourquoi d'ailleurs aurait-il emporté des diamants qu'il savait faire partie de l'héritage de son petit-fils."—LOUIS BLANC, *Dix Ans de Louis Philippe*, i. 400, 401.

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magnitude of his fall; they saw only their monarch in misfortune, and the last of a long race of sovereigns, with his whole family, driven into exile by his own subjects. Grief swelled every heart; few dry eyes were seen in the vast and noble array. The countenance of the King was sad, but calm; conscious of the purity of his intentions, he submitted to the chastisement of Providence with the resignation of a martyr. The Duchess d'Angoulême, inured to suffering, appeared to rise in dignity and heroism, amidst all the disasters which surrounded her. The Duchess de Berri, in male attire, and with her children in her hand, seemed scarce able to comprehend more than they the magnitude of the stroke which had deprived them of their inheritance. The King at length was melted into tears, and not a dry eye remained in the ranks when the royal infants were, for the last time, presented to their aching eyes.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 391, 393; Cap. ii. 377, 379; Lac. iv. 526, 529.

95. Journey to Cherbourg.

The journey to Cherbourg lasted twelve days—a prolonged period of agony, during which the discrowned King and his unhappy family tasted, drop by drop, the cup of humiliation, suffering, and exile. The route was made to avoid the great towns, so that the King had never the mortification of seeing the royal arms supplanted by those of the Duke of Orléans, who had been proclaimed King on the 6th August. The peasantry in the villages through which they travelled, and where they passed the night, were silent and respectful: they neither received them with acclamations nor with scoffs. There is something in great reverses which, in all but the most savage bosoms, melts to pity, or overawes into silence. Marmont, during the whole journey, rode on horseback at the right of the King's carriage, and many of the greatest nobles of France added to the lustre of their historic names by their fidelity to misfortune. The Duke of Luxembourg was there, and the Duke de Guiche; the Duke de Levis and the Duke de Polignac; Auguste de la Rochejaquelein—a name which sustained itself with honour amidst

every reverse of the monarchy—and the Prince of Croz; the Count de Mesnard, the Count de Brissac, Baron Dumas, preceptor of the Duke de Bordeaux, and Madame Gontaut, governess of his young sister. Madame de St Maure, the Countess de Bouillé, and several other ladies of distinction, were there also, and added to the dignity of their rank by the display of the fidelity by which it is ennobled. Great apprehensions were entertained of some disturbances in Normandy on their passage through, as there had been many acts of incendiarism during the preceding convulsions, but everything passed over in peace. The fall of the monarchy had hushed into silence every lesser passion. No tricolor flag or ensign of revolution met his eye. At Carentan only he received, in the *Moniteur*, the account of the successful usurpation of Louis Philippe. He read it in silence, and laid down the paper without uttering a word of reproach. The only act of treason which he heard of during the journey was by his first subject.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 395, 396; Cap. ii. 381, 382.

96. Adieu to the last of the Guard at Valognes. Aug. 9.

The exiles remained two days at Valognes, to give time for the vessels which were expected to come round to Cherbourg; and as the districts where danger had been apprehended were now passed, Charles took the opportunity to dismiss the remains of his faithful Guard. He assembled around him the officers and six of the oldest privates of the companies and squadrons which yet composed his escort. The Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, the Duchess de Berri, and the royal infants, were by his side. The King received from them the standards on which their fidelity had shed so much lustre, and thanked them for their devotion in words interrupted by sobs. "I receive," said he, "these standards, and this child will one day restore them to you. The names of each of you, inscribed on your muster-rolls, and preserved by my grandson, will remain registered in the archives of the royal family, to attest for ever my misfortunes,[2] and the consolation I have received from

[2] Lam. viii. 394, 396; Cap. ii. 387, 390; Lac. iv. 527, 528.

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your fidelity." Sobs here choked his voice; the whole royal family which surrounded him, all the circle around, were melted into tears. The King and royal family then put off all the ensigns of royalty, and assumed the garb of exiles, suited to their destiny and their misfortunes.

97. Last interview of the King and Prince Polignac.

From Valognes Charles wrote two letters, one to the King of England, and another to the Emperor of Austria, recounting his dethronement, and requesting an asylum in their dominions. As he received the requisite permission from the English Government first, he set out for Cherbourg on the 11th. Before setting out, he ordered Prince Polignac to leave him. He did not, like Charles I., offer his Minister as a holocaust to appease the wrath of his people. "Set off," said he; "I order it. I recollect only your courage; I do not impute to you our misfortunes. Our cause was that of God, of the throne, and the people. Providence often proves its servants by suffering, and defeats the best designs, for reasons superior to what our limited faculties can discern; but it never deceives upright consciences. Nothing is yet lost for our house. I go to combat with one hand, and to negotiate with the other. Retire behind the Loire, where you will find an asylum from the vengeance of the people in the midst of my army, which has orders to assemble at Chartres." Profoundly moved, the Prince kissed the King's hand and retired. His arrest, trial, and imprisonment, will form an interesting episode in a subsequent volume of this History.[1]

[1] Cap. ii. 390, 391; Lam. viii. 399, 400; Ann. Hist. xiii. 248, 249.

98. His embarkation at Cherbourg. Aug. 16.

From the summit of the hill which overlooks Cherbourg, the King first beheld the sea on which he was about to embark. It was thought an attempt would be made on his life on going through the streets. The Duchess d'Angoulême no sooner heard this than she mounted the chariot with him, determined to share his dangers. Nothing of the kind, however, occurred. The streets were crowded as the exiles passed along, but no seditious cries or murmurs assailed their ears in the last

city of their country which was impressed by their footsteps. The tricolor flags were removed from the windows as they moved along, to spare the vanquished monarch the sight of his humiliation. The carriages did not stop in the town, but passed on at once to the place of embarkation, from which the crowd were excluded by barricades. On descending from the carriage, at the place of embarkation, the whole royal family burst into tears; the infants even, unconscious as yet what they were losing, wept bitterly. Such was the emotion of the Duchess d'Angoulême that she sank in a swoon. M. de la Rochejaquelein aided her to step on board, and leave her country for ever. At least, the last arm on which she rested was that of one of the noblest of its sons. M. de Charette, another Vendean officer, whose name was a presage alike of heroism and misfortune, conducted the Duchess de Berri. Charles himself, who alone retained his self-possession, was the last who stepped on board—like the captain who, on a shipwreck, sees all the crew out of the vessel before he leaves it himself. The few faithful officers who yet attended him then kissed his hand, which they bathed with their tears. The discrowned sovereign then shut himself up in his cabin to conceal his emotion. The *Great Britain* packet-boat had the honour of conveying the illustrious exiles. Not a gun was fired as the last of the long line of sovereigns left his country. In silence the vessel ploughed through the melancholy main, and steered for Scotland, where the cold courtesy of the English Government had for the second time offered them an asylum in the ancient palace of Holyrood: very different from what Louis XIV. had given, in his misfortunes, to James II. They there rested at last in the scene of the sorrows of Queen Mary, and of the transient gleams of prosperity which illuminated, ere they were shrouded in darkness, the fortunes of Charles Edward.[1]

[1] Lam. viii. 439, 440; Cap. ii. 393, 396; Ann. Hist. iii. 251, 255; Moniteur, Aug. 20, 1830.

Thus fell the dynasty of the Restoration—and fell, to

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99. Reflections on the fall of the Restoration.

all appearance, never, as a hereditary house, to be restored. The main object of the first Revolution having been the abolition of hereditary privileges, and the extinction of hereditary descent, it was scarcely to be expected that the highest rank and station in the country was to be exempted from its influence. To throw open all objects and situations to all, to open to all alike the career of ambition, was the end to which the nation so passionately aspired; and was it to be supposed that the highest prize in the lottery was not to be placed in the wheel? This, accordingly, is exactly what has happened. With the exception of the fifteen years of the Restoration, during which the ancient race, imposed upon them with difficulty, bore the weight of a crown of thorns, every monarch since 1789 has been elected, as in ancient Rome, by the people and the army. Napoleon, Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon, have been successively chosen from different families amidst general transports, and the two first precipitated from the throne amidst universal obloquy. Fickle in everything else, the French have been faithful to one thing only—their love of change. But we are not to ascribe this to any peculiar inconstancy of character in the French nation from which other races are exempt. All people under similar circumstances would do the same. The destruction of a hereditary aristocracy renders the maintenance of a hereditary throne impossible. One successful revolt, which overturns a throne, leaves the nation which has effected it no alternative but a repetition of similar violent changes. It was so in ancient Rome, when the fervour of the Gracchi and the civil wars of Marius terminated in the elective military despotism of the Cæsars. Even that family could not long keep the throne. The great name of the Dictator could not secure it for his successors. It passed into other hands, and became the prize of the most popular citizen, the most fortunate soldier. An elective military despotism is the natural, and perhaps inevitable, compromise between the popular passion, which,

having once tasted of the sweets of choosing a master, will never after forego the gratification, and the state necessity, which renders it indispensable that the power, when once conferred, should be of the most despotic description.

100. Charles's error in the conflict.

It is evident that the fall of Charles X. was immediately brought about by his refusal to submit to the first principle of a representative government, that of taking his Ministers from the majority of the popular branch of the legislature. There can be no doubt that it is often very galling to a sovereign to be obliged to do so; and that it seems very like depriving him of the liberty in choosing his confidential servants, which is accorded to the meanest of his subjects. Still it is the fundamental principle of a constitutional monarchy; and if a sovereign accepts such a throne, he is bound to conform to its conditions. The point at issue between Charles and the Chamber of Deputies was, whether he was to maintain, contrary to their wishes, the ultra-Royalist Administration he had chosen; and although not absolutely bound to defer to their wishes in the first instance, yet, having tried the last resort of a dissolution, and received from the nation a legislature equally determined on the subject, it was his undoubted duty, as a constitutional monarch, to obey. Chateaubriand has recorded his opinion that if he had done so, and given office to five or six Liberal leaders, who were dying to be ministers, he would have weathered the storm, and transmitted a peaceful and honoured throne to his descendants.

101. Difference between the situation of France and England in this respect.

In justice, however, to Charles X. and his last Administration, it must be observed, that the question of a change of ministers presented itself under a very different aspect to them from that which it wears in this country. With us, for above a century past, the rivalry of dynasties has ceased; no one but a few heated Radicals dreams of an entire change in the form of government. Immense efforts are frequently made by one party to displace another, but it is with no intention of altering the constitu-

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tion, but only of dislodging their political opponents, and placing themselves at the head of government. But the case was very different in France. There the contest of dynasties and of forms of government not only continued, but was in full force. The Orléans family still in secret nourished their pretensions to the throne, and not a few of the leading men in Paris were in their interest; the Napoleonists openly conspired to overthrow the Bourbons, and restore Napoleon II. and the tricolor flag; the Republicans held the threads of a vast conspiracy, which extended over the whole country, embraced a considerable part of the army, and even some of the Guard, and was headed by men of the greatest talent and most revered names in France.

102. Secret objects of the Liberal Opposition in France at this period.

It is now known by the best of all evidence—the admission, *after success*, of their ablest and best-informed partisans—that during the whole Restoration the Liberal party were engaged in one vast conspiracy for the overthrow of the elder branch of the house of Bourbon, that their parliamentary leaders were at its head, and, that veiled under ceaseless protestations of inviolable respect for the royal family was a secret design to extirpate them by all possible means, not even excepting the dagger of the assassin and the torch of the incendiary. With shame must history confess that the most renowned leaders of the Assembly, General Lafayette, M. Benjamin Constant, M. Manuel, M. Audry de Puyraveau, M. d'Argenson, and, in fact, all the chiefs of the Opposition, were the heads of the secret conspiracy, which had for its object to accomplish this end by these detestable means, and by the aid of this detestable hypocrisy.* In these circum-

* "La Charbonnerie s'étendit en fort peu de temps dans tous les quartiers de la capitale. Elle envahit toutes les écoles. Je ne sais quel feu pénétrant circula dans les veines de la jeunesse. Chacun gardait le secret, chacun se montrait dévoué. Les devoirs des Charbonniers étaient d'avoir un fusil et cinquante cartouches, d'être prêts à se dévouer, *d'obéir aveuglément aux ordres de chefs inconnus*. . . . Il existait alors un comité parlementaire dont M. de Lafayette faisait partie. Lafayette, averti du secret de leurs efforts, consentit à entrer dans la Charbonnerie. Il entra dans la *Haute Vente*, et parmi ses collègues de la Chambre les plus hardis le suivirent. Les choses en vinrent

stances it was a very different thing for Charles X. to take his ministers from among these sworn and secret enemies, from what it would have been for George IV. to send for Earl Grey instead of Lord Liverpool. It was more analogous to the situation of Queen Anne, with whom a change of ministry from Marlborough and Godolphin to Bolingbroke and Harley was equivalent to, and the first step towards, a change of succession from the Hanoverian to the Stuart family; and the risk of such a substitution was probably not less than it would have been, in the days when Cicero risked his life in defence of the constitution of his country, for the Roman people to have chosen their consuls from among the companions of Catiline.

103. Great error of the King in the ground he took for resistance.

But admitting all this—conceding that the Liberal party were irrevocably alienated from the Bourbons, and leagued together in secret, by every means, legal or illegal, to effect their overthrow—still it is not the less apparent that the King committed a signal and fatal mistake in inducing the conflict on the ground which he actually assumed. He took his stand upon his prerogative; he insisted upon his right to choose his ministers without control, as Charles I. had done upon his right to appoint officers to the militia without the concurrence of Parliament. In

au point que, dans les derniers jours de l'année 1821, tout était prêt pour un soulèvement à la Rochelle, à Poitiers, à Niort, à Colmar, à Neuf-Brisach, à Nantes, à Béfort, à Bordeaux, à Toulouse. Des Ventes avaient été créées dans un grand nombre de régiments, et les changemens même de garnison étaient, pour la Charbonnerie, un rapide moyen de propagande. Le comité supérieur, chargé de tous les préparatifs du combat, déploya une activité extraordinaire. Trent-six jeunes gens reçurent l'ordre de partir pour Béfort, où devait être donné le signal de l'insurrection. Ils partirent sans hésitation, quoique convaincus qu'ils marchaient à la mort. Les bases de la constitution de l'An III. étaient adoptées, et les cinq directeurs du Gouvernement Provisoire furent MM. de Lafayette, Corcelles père, Koechlin, d'Argenson, Dupont de l'Eure: c'est-à-dire, un homme d'épée, un représentant de la Garde Nationale, un manufacturier, un administrateur, un magistrat. Manuel usa de son influence sur quelques-uns d'entre eux, et notamment sur M. de Lafayette, pour les dissuader du voyage de Béfort; toutefois il partit, et le 1er Janvier 1822, à quelques lieues de Béfort, la chaise de poste qui transportait le Général et son fils fut rencontrée par une voiture où se trouvaient MM. Corcelles fils et Bayard. 'Eh bien! quelles nouvelles?'—'Tout est fini, tout est perdu, Général.' Lafayette, désespéré, changea de route et retourna à Lagrange, sa maison de campagne."—Louis Blanc, *Histoire de Dix Ans du Règne de Louis Philippe*, i. 96, 99.

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form, and according to the letter of the constitution, he was entitled to do so; in substance and reality he was not. Even if there had been no doubt on the subject, it would have been wise to have tried the experiment of dividing the Liberal party, by taking their leaders into office, before perilling all upon the irrevocable issue of the sword. Great is often the effect of such a transposition upon the ideas of men. Power is a very different thing when wielded by ourselves, and when exercised over us by others. Many who go to church to scoff, remain to pray. Even supposing that the republican tendency of the Liberal party was unchangeable, and that their leaders would have dethroned the King by acts of parliament as effectually as they did by the erection of barricades, still it was to the last degree unwise for Government to take its stand on a doubtful ground, and still more to maintain it by unlawful means. Everything in such a conflict depends on external appearances and the *first* acts; the vast majority of men are entirely governed by them. It is of the utmost importance to let the first illegal step be taken by your adversaries. The clearest knowledge obtained of an intention on the part of a body of men to commit high treason, will not justify the arrest of their leaders before some overt act demonstrating that intent has been committed: a party will always deny illegal intentions till they have been irrevocably manifested by deeds, and they will be believed by all who sympathise with them in opinion, till the contrary is forced upon them by incontrovertible evidence.

104. Extraordinary want of preparation on the part of the Government.

Still more deserving of reprobation was the conduct of the Polignac Administration in the preparations which they made to support the Crown when the conflict was once engaged. They were well aware that the ordonnances would provoke resistance; it was not to be supposed that a party which had been conspiring for fifteen years to overthrow them would abandon the contest without a struggle, especially when they had gained the immense advantage of beginning the conflict on legal

grounds, and to resist what was in appearance at least an invasion of the constitution. The Ministers had themselves been the first to draw the sword, and must have made up their minds to abide its issue. What preparations, then, had they made to meet a conflict on which the salvation of the dynasty, and with it the liberty of France, depended, in a city which could turn out a hundred thousand combatants, of whom nearly a half were old soldiers or national guards, who *still had their arms?* They had collected eleven thousand men, of whom only one-half were Guards, upon whom reliance could be placed, eight guns, and four rounds of grape-shot for each gun! Magazines of provisions, carriages for the wounded, stores of any kind, there were none. Not a loaf of bread was to be had by men who had been eighteen hours under arms; not a drop of water to assuage the thirst produced by the sun of the dog-days, then darting his rays with unwonted intensity. Prince Polignac, calm and serene, not because he had provided against danger, but because he shut his eyes to it, flattered himself that he had forty thousand men at his disposal, because there were that number quartered within a circuit of twenty-five miles round Paris; forgetting the rapidity with which events succeed each other when the conflict once begins in the streets of a city, and that it was of little moment what number of men were at Versailles, St Cloud, or Courbevoie, if the insurgents were in possession of the Hôtel de Ville, the Tuileries, and the telegraph. When Marshal Soult suppressed the insurrection at the cloister of St Meri, in the following year, he assembled eighty thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon—a force as great as that which fought at Austerlitz. With truth did Metternich say, when the proceedings at Paris were reported to him, "I would be less alarmed if Polignac was more so." Talleyrand was well aware of the vital importance of maintaining the Tuileries, on the part of any who would retain the government of France.[1] When informed, on the

[1] Louis Blanc, i. 165, 259.

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29th, that they had been evacuated, he walked to the time-piece on the mantel-piece, and observing the hour, said, "Mark it well for future time, that to-day, at ten minutes past twelve, the elder branch of the Bourbons ceased to reign in France."

105. Great fault of Government in not at once arresting the leaders of the Liberals.

Equally marked by incapacity was the conduct of Government in not at once, when the insurrection began, arresting its known leaders, and all those who, from their position in the Chambers or in society, were likely to be at its head. During the whole time it continued, those leaders were in consultation at the hotel of M. Lafitte, without any escort; Louis Philippe, who supplanted Charles X. on the throne, was at Neuilly, without guard or protection of any sort. A squadron of gendarmes could have arrested all who, when the crisis was at its height, either disposed of or accepted the crown. Yet nothing of the kind was thought of until the morning of the 29th, when a warrant to arrest the Liberal leaders was put into the hands of Marmont, who was persuaded by Arago not to execute it. Such infatuation appears almost inconceivable; but its ruinous consequences are put in the clearest light by the decisive effects which, on a similar crisis, attended the opposite course pursued by Prince Louis Napoleon. On the night of 1st December 1852, on the eve of his *coup d'état*, the whole chiefs of the Liberal party and two-thirds of the National Assembly in Paris were arrested, and quietly lodged in Vincennes, or the other forts adjacent. The consequence was, that next day, when the insurrection broke out, it speedily died away from want of leaders; and the astonished Parisians, who never fail to range themselves on the side of success when it is once decisive, instead of attempting to avenge the insult on the majesty of the legislature, amused themselves with anecdotes of the consternation evinced by some of its members when roused from their slumbers at midnight by the gendarmes.

Notwithstanding, however, these immense faults in preparations and conduct, which sufficiently proved that the Royalist Ministry were wholly unequal to the crisis which they themselves had induced, it is more than probable that, if the troops had all remained steady, and done their duty, the insurrection would have been suppressed, and the monarchy, and with it the liberties of France, preserved. It was the defection of the troops of the line, who constituted the half of the whole disposable force, which ruined everything. At the decisive moment, it was the treachery of the regiment of the line stationed in the Place Vendôme, which, by rendering the removal of the battalion of Swiss from the façade of the Louvre necessary, occasioned the loss of that important post, and with it the fall of the monarchy. When it is recollected that the whole weight of the contest, during the three days, fell on the Royal Guard, not five thousand strong, which with heroic fidelity performed its duty, while the regiments of the line were worse than useless, because they betrayed important posts confided to them, it is evident that the conflict might have had a very different issue had the whole garrison of Paris, small as it was, remained faithful to its oaths. Here, as in the commencement of the first French Revolution, and afterwards in that of Spain, it was the shameful defection of the troops of the line which rendered the insurrection in the first instance successful, and in the end utterly subversive of the cause of freedom, for which its disgrace was incurred.

106 Ruinous effects of the treachery of the troops.

What has been the final result to the liberties of France, and with them the cause of freedom throughout the whole world, of this desertion by the French soldiers of the first of military duties, that of fidelity to their King? Has it been to confirm those liberties, and extend that freedom? Has it not, on the contrary, been to destroy the first and check the growth of the last? His-

107. Ruinous effects of this military treachery on the cause of freedom in France.

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torians of all parties now refer to the fifteen years of the Restoration as the only one in which real freedom prevailed in France; in which individual liberty was safe, public discussion unrestrained, the authority of the Crown tempered by the weight of the legislature, general prosperity established on the firm basis of universal security. Is there any one who will refer to the reign of Louis Philippe, the National Assembly, or Louis Napoleon, as exhibiting similar features? What is to be expected from the insurrection of soldiers—or, what is the same thing, the desertion of their duty in presence of insurrection—but the establishment of the empire of the sword?—and was the fair superstructure of freedom ever erected on such a foundation? Which proved most difficult for the Republicans to deal with—Prince Polignac and his priests, or Marshal Soult and his cuirassiers? Who induced the iron rule of the last, instead of the feeble administration of the first? Who but the soldiers who forgot their oaths amidst the cheers of the multitude, and for ever ruined the cause of freedom in their country by establishing it on the basis of treachery and treason? There was no danger to liberty from the ordonnances of July, even had they been carried into full execution; Polignac and his feeble Cabinet could never have withstood the united resistance, exerted in a legal channel, of a whole nation. But the case was very different with Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon, who were supported by the bayonets of four hundred thousand men, directed by the vigour and capacity of the empire. A nation may well despair of freedom which, after half a century of conflicts, in which victory has always remained to the strongest, finds itself in presence of such an armed multitude.

In justice to the soldiers who were guilty of this disgraceful tergiversation, however, it must be observed that the Government and military authorities committed a signal mistake in leaving the troops as they did, for days

together, in presence of the mob, without either food to support their strength or action to invigorate their spirits. Marshal Victor had long ago pointed out the danger of such measures. "Soldiers," said he, in a Cabinet Council, "are easily seduced from their duty, when long *kept in presence of the multitude in a state of inactivity;* when in action or movement the military spirit revives, and they may be fully relied on."[1] The Duke of Wellington evinced his thorough appreciation of this important truth, when on the memorable 10th April 1848 he kept the powerful array of troops which he had collected to guard the avenues to the capital *entirely out of sight,* but with orders to turn out and act with the utmost vigour the moment they were directed to do so. The troops, during the three days that the contest lasted in Paris, were kept constantly standing in the open street close to the insurgents, generally in conversation, and often provided with food and water by them. It was thus that they heard the words which soon circulated with fatal rapidity through their ranks: "The nation promises a marshal's baton to the first colonel who joins the cause of the people."[2]

108. Great error of the military commanders on this occasion.

[1] Ante, c. xii. § 25.

[2] Louis Blanc, i. 269.

The treachery of the troops, however, which beyond all question was the immediate cause of the fall of the monarchy, though in some degree owing to this imprudent disposition, must in the last resort be ascribed to a different and more powerful cause. It is in the composition of the army, and especially of the officers, that the real cause of the disaster is to be found. Louis XVIII. meant well, but he signed the death-warrant of the monarchy when he affixed his name to the regulations, at the time so popular, which provided for the progressive rise of the *privates* to the rank of officers.[3] The effect of this system, coupled with the general destruction of the class of gentry in the country by the first Revolution, was that, as already mentioned, the Minister at War assured Charles X. that there were not three hundred officers in

109. Cause of this in the composition of the French army.

[3] Ante, c. vi. § 54.

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the whole army who had 1000 francs (£40) a-year independent of their "pay."[1] The great majority of the officers had originally been privates; they still associated, even messed with them; were little superior either in station or circumstances to their former comrades, and were thoroughly imbued with their ideas and wishes. The class was entirely awanting, so well known in Britain, of gentlemen for the most part connected with the landed aristocracy, whose younger sons generally, from choice or necessity, entered the army as a profession, and who, when there, still were influenced by the feelings and guided by the honourable habits of their ancestors. The French army, until the fatal era of the Revolution, when the nobility were so largely imbued with the liberal delusions of the times, and in many cases took the lead in revolt, was perfectly faithful through all changes to their oaths. The uniform steadiness and fidelity of the English army to its duty under all circumstances, to which under Providence our happy exemption from the horrors of revolution is mainly to be ascribed, is beyond all question the result of its officers being drawn from a particular class of men. When that class is changed, its fidelity will no longer be beyond the risk of temptation. The purchase of commissions is the great security for the continued fidelity of those intrusted with the sword, for it confines their acquisition to the class which is influenced by the sentiments of honour.

[1] Ante, c. xvi. § 90.

110. Military errors committed on the occasion.

Experience, on occasion of the Revolution of July, had not as yet taught military men the mode of combating an urban insurrection, or enabled discipline and skill to assert their superiority in street fighting and the storming of barricades, as it has since done. The force, too, at the disposal of Marmont, was, after the defection of the troops of the line, so utterly inadequate to the defence of the principal posts in the capital, especially from the small amount of artillery, that it would be unfair to ascribe any fault to that gallant but

ill-fated commander on that account. Napoleon with five thousand regular troops and fifty guns defended the position of the Carrousel in 1795, against the assault of thirty thousand national guards; and if Marmont had possessed an equal number of guns, he would probably have done the same. But with eight pieces of cannon, and four rounds of grape-shot to each gun, the thing was impossible. Still, without ascribing any fault to him, it must be observed, for the instruction of military men on similar crises in future, that with the limited means at his disposal his dispositions were eminently hazardous. To send three columns of troops, not mustering more than eighteen hundred combatants each, into the heart of a city in a state of insurrection, and when fifty thousand old soldiers or national guards were to be combated, was to expose them to certain destruction. The long columns approaching through the narrow streets were exposed as they advanced to an incessant dropping fire from the houses; and when they halted in a square or open place, every avenue to it was of course closed with barricades, and the troops, isolated from each other and from the general-in-chief, were besieged in the position they had won. Dreadful loss, discouragement, and disaster were inevitable under such circumstances. What Marmont should have done with his little force was what Napoleon did in 1795—viz., concentrated all his troops in the Place of the Carrousel and around the Tuileries, and not attempted offensive operations in the heart of the city till the arrival of reinforcements from the adjacent towns had quadrupled his tiny array.

111. Mode of combating an urban insurrection.

The way of combating an urban insurrection, as now ascertained by experience, is this: If the general in command has only a small and inadequate force at his disposal, let him concentrate it in the strongest position he can get, and defend himself there till reinforcements enable him to resume the offensive. When he is in a condition to do so, he should make no attempt to storm the barricades at first, but advance with two guns and

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a howitzer in front towards the nearest, and fire as rapidly as possible at the barricade with round shot, while the howitzer, with *small charges* of powder, throws bombs over it among the crowd behind. In nine cases out of ten a few rounds of this sort will shake the barricade, unless it is of stone and great strength, so as to render it passable, and disperse its defenders. Meanwhile a file of foot-soldiers should advance before the guns, on each side of the street, close to the wall, with orders to fire instantly into every window from which a shot issues. As each of these files can only be exposed to the fire from the windows *opposite*, or from the barricade, they will sustain much less loss than if they moved forward in close column in the middle of the street, exposed to a plunging fire on both sides. If the barricade still holds out, a few sappers and miners, who should be with each of such columns, or soldiers armed and equipped as such, should be sent into the houses adjoining it, with orders to work their way through the partitions, till they come into the rear of the barricade, when a plunging fire from the windows will speedily render the position no longer tenable.

112. Dangerous influence of the Parti-prêtre on the Government.

The great cause of the unpopularity of the Government of the Restoration, during its later years, was the influence which the *Parti-prêtre* had acquired in the Cabinet, and the efforts which they were visibly making to acquire the direction of the education of the young, and with it of the entire country. This influence was much less, so far as Charles X. was concerned, than was generally supposed; for though strongly impressed in his later years with religious ideas, that monarch was far from being the slave of the priests, and went into their measures rather from the belief that it was by them alone that a counterpoise to the influence of the revolutionary passions could be obtained, than from a blind submission to their authority. But the ruin which those measures brought on the monarchy affords a memorable proof of the extreme danger of surrendering the national councils to the direction of

such a party, especially when they belong to the Roman Catholic religion. Often highly estimable in private life, invaluable when their labours are confined to their proper sphere, works of religion, instruction, and charity, ecclesiastics are in general the most dangerous of all councillors in affairs of state. They are so, precisely on account of the very qualities which in their own sphere render them so valuable. They regard the furthering of the tenets of their faith, and the extension of their political influence, as a matter of conscience—a sacred duty, which at all hazards must be fulfilled. Thus they acquire the habit of looking only to the tendency of measures, and disregarding altogether all considerations connected with their practicability, or the consequences which, under existing circumstances, they are calculated to have. Such a disposition may be a suitable preparation for the crown of martyrdom, but it is the one of all others most calculated to cast temporal crowns to the ground; and if a monarch, in an age of advancing intelligence, desires to lose his throne, he cannot take any means more effectually to attain his object, than by surrendering himself to the direction of such a party.

113. Strange vehemence of the opposition which the Restoration experienced in France.

Even, however, after giving full weight to this consideration, there is something very strange, and almost inexplicable, in the violent opposition which the Government of the Restoration experienced in France. It had given the inhabitants of that country the whole objects for which they contended in the first Revolution, and which they had so passionately endeavoured to attain through such oceans of blood. They enjoyed in the highest degree the great elements of liberty, freedom of conscience, universal and unrestrained discussion on public affairs, trial by jury, representative institutions; and in addition to this, the race of their ancient monarchs had given them, what they had proved incapable of earning for themselves, internal prosperity and external peace. Such had been the blessings which these circumstances

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had induced, that they had not only given the people unexampled general prosperity, but entirely restored the national finances, and all but healed the wounds which, in the chase of more popular institutions, the nation had inflicted upon itself. Writers of all parties now concur in these sentiments; they all contrast the mild government and general freedom of the Restoration, with the stormy dissensions, corrupt influences, and iron rule which have alternately prevailed since its fall.

114. Though the constitution was then as popular as the country could bear.

If the constituency was small, and the franchise high, subsequent experience gives no countenance to the idea that either could have been established on a more popular basis, with any advantage to the cause of freedom. Universal suffrage, by an overwhelming majority, placed the imperial crown, with absolute power, on the head of Louis Napoleon. It is difficult to imagine the freedom of the press more fully established than it was in a country where it proved itself adequate to overturn a dynasty; and even the few extracts from the parliamentary debates contained in these pages will demonstrate how thoroughly the independence of the tribune was established. Yet with all these advantages, alike social and political, with which it was attended, the Government of the Restoration, from first to last, was the object of the most impassioned and persevering hostility in France: the leading members of the Opposition, in and out of Parliament, were engaged in a ceaseless conspiracy to overturn it by all means, legal or illegal; and though, in the final struggle, it appeared as the aggressor, yet it was so in form, and not in reality. The Crown was driven to the desperate expedient of a *coup d'état*, because the parliamentary opposition had brought matters to such a pass that the government could no longer be carried on without an entire abandonment of the prerogative — just as the weaker state is often forced to be the first to commence hostilities, from the ceaseless pacific encroachments of the stronger.

Without doubt this general and long-continued hostility is in some degree to be ascribed to the disastrous circumstances which had preceded the return of the ancient kings. Though the Bourbons were in no degree implicated in the wars of the Revolution, and, on the contrary, had done their utmost to avert them, yet they were never able to get over the obloquy cast upon them, in common estimation, of having succeeded to the throne in consequence of the greatest external calamities France had ever known. It was notorious that they had approached Paris in the rear of the allied armies; that, but for the overthrow of the national arms, they would never have ascended the throne. Indescribable was the mischief which this unfortunate circumstance did to the royal cause. "*Post hoc ergò propter hoc*" is a rule of thought sufficiently common with mankind under any circumstances; and when the events which fortune had placed in close juxtaposition, were the double capture of Paris and the replacing of the ancient dynasty on the throne, it was no wonder that they were generally considered to be cause and effect. In vain did the Royalist writers observe that the Bourbons were not responsible for the wars of the Empire; that they were undertaken by a usurper, in opposition to their interest and against their will; that they were not brought in contact with them till the defeats had been experienced, and then interfered only to mitigate their effects, and obtain better terms for the vanquished than they otherwise could have gained. All this, how true and just soever, was as nothing in assuaging the soreness of the public mind: the Count d'Artois had first appeared with Schwartzenberg's army; Louis XVIII. had entered Paris the day after Blucher and Wellington; his ministers had signed the treaties abandoning the frontier of the Rhine,—and that was enough.

115. Obloquy thrown on the Bourbons from their having succeeded after the national disasters.

The national disasters which preceded the fall of Napoleon, however, might in the progress of time have come

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to be forgotten, had the Government of the Restoration been able to continue the system of universal conquest, and of making war maintain war, which he so successfully pursued. But, unfortunately for them, though fortunately for the world, this had become impossible. The memory of the double capture of Paris operated as a continual restraint, if not upon the wishes of the people, at least on the measures of Government; the Germanic Confederation stood ready with four hundred thousand men to check any attempt to cross the Rhine. So far from pursuing schemes of foreign conquest, the wisest and most far-seeing governments, after 1815, were employed with anxious schemes to avert a *third* capture of the capital, by surrounding Paris with a girdle of detached forts. As much as this prudential awe was a blessing to the other states of Europe, by averting the scourge of war, which had so often been let loose upon them from behind the iron frontier of France, did it augment the difficulty of governing and retaining in subjection its gallant and aspiring inhabitants. For the first time, for two centuries, the French were kept in a state of compulsory peace. This was not only the utmost violence to the warlike propensities which in every age have been their great characteristic, but in an especial manner imposed a barrier to the passions which brought about and were fostered by the Revolution.

116. Effect of the continuance of peace in France.

117. Which thwarted the strongest passions of the Revolution.

The grand object and moving power in that convulsion was individual ambition. Their cry was not for liberty, but equality: their object was not that every man should be left in peace to enjoy the fruits of his toil in his own sphere of life, but that every man should be elevated into a sphere above that in which he had been born and bred. Hence the animosity against the aristocracy, whether of rank or talent, by which it was characterised through all its phases, and the outcry for an equal division of property, which was gratified by the Revolutionary law of succession. Napoleon, well aware of the strength of this passion, and the extent to which it had been fanned

by the marvellous glory won and fortunes made by plebeian ability during the Revolution, contrived to avoid the difficulty, and avert the tempest from his own head, by turning it upon those of his neighbours; and hence his constant affirmation that conquest was to him the condition of existence, and that the moment he ceased to advance he would begin to decline. So great was the difficulty of governing revolutionary France without the aid of foreign war to drain off the national passions, that it is more than doubtful whether the vast genius and iron hand of Napoleon would have been equal to the task. Certain it is that he shrunk from undertaking it. To the Bourbons, with inferior ability, and without the prestige of his name, was left the difficult duty of governing France when in a state of compulsory peace, and coercing the strength of the Revolution without any gratification to its passions. It is not surprising that they failed in the attempt.

118. Which was the reason why the expeditions to Spain and Algiers were undertaken.

Chateaubriand was so well aware of the difficulty of it, that he undertook the Spanish war mainly to avoid it, by reviving the passion for war in France, and contemplated breaking through the treaties of Vienna, and establishing Bourbon monarchies in South America, to afford a vent to the ardent desires of his countrymen. So great was the effect of the Duke d'Angoulême's expedition upon the feelings of the French, that it had well-nigh established the elder branch of the house of Bourbon on the throne: followed by the regaining the frontier of the Rhine, it would unquestionably have done so. The expedition to Algiers was undertaken with the same view; and it was to have been followed by an attempt at a coalition of the Continental powers against England, which was to have been stripped of Hanover, out of which Holland and Prussia were to have been indemnified for the loss of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces. Had this project been adopted, and proved successful, it is more than probable that Henry V. would have been on the throne of

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France at this moment, and all its subsequent convulsions would have been prevented.

119. Political reasons on which these projects were founded.

That such a breach of the treaties of Vienna would have been a flagrant violation of national faith, and a most ungrateful return for the aid given to the house of Bourbon during the war, is sufficiently evident. But, considered in reference to the mere interests of the Bourbon dynasty, it must be regarded in a different light. It promised stability to that dynasty, if stability can ever be acquired by acts obviously based on injustice. Before we absolutely condemn Chateaubriand and Polignac for entertaining such projects, we must recollect the situation in which they were placed, and the country they had to govern, when placed at the helm of affairs after the Revolution. Passionately thirsting for military glory, and looking back with idolatrous veneration to the recent period when so much of it had been acquired, the French suddenly found themselves stript of, and without the means of regaining it. Universally desirous of individual elevation, the great majority of them were destitute of the means of obtaining it: panting for wealth, they were without commerce; sighing for territorial distinction, they were without land; colonies they had next to none, for they had lost them all during the war, and regained few on the peace; foreign commerce, domestic industry, were only beginning slowly to recover under the tutelary arms of the Bourbons from the disasters of the Revolution. The soil of France, almost entirely divided among four millions of separate proprietors, could afford scarce the means of the most wretched subsistence to any of its owners. Thus the ambition and necessities of thirty millions of men were thrown back upon the Government; and even the thirty thousand commissions in the army, and hundred and thirty thousand civil situations at the disposal of the Government in the Tuileries, were as nothing among such a multitude. Each place given away made one ungrateful and three discontented.

Thus a change of dynasty came to be desired in France, after the Restoration had existed a few years, from the same reason which invariably, after a similar period, renders an administration unpopular in Great Britain, viz. the multitude of expectants who are kept out of place. And this pressure was much more strongly felt in France than it has ever yet been in Great Britain, from the want of the invaluable vent which extensive colonies and an immense foreign commerce have so long afforded to the ceaseless energy of the inhabitants of the latter country. France, with a weak and discredited Government, was left, without commerce or colonies, in presence of the most formidable of all domestic foes—a mass of revolutionary energy and educated indigence.

120. Ruinous effects of the destruction of the aristocracy in France.

Had the aristocracy survived in France, as it did in England, the storms of the Revolution, it would perhaps have been possible for the Government to have withstood these difficulties, because the press, and with it public opinion, would have been divided, and then a counterpoise to the excesses of one party might have been found in the determination of the other. But as the aristocracy had to all practical purposes been destroyed during the Revolution, and the House of Peers was little more than an assembly of titled placemen, this important element in national stability was awanting in France. The vast majority of the press was on one side, and hostile to the Government, simply because the vast majority of its readers were, from the causes which have been mentioned, leagued together for its overthrow. So far from being a preservative against error, the journals had become the greatest possible propagators of it, for they incessantly re-echoed its delusions, and gave additional publicity to its misrepresentations. Pleading in open court is an admirable thing, if both sides are heard; but if one side only is allowed to speak, justice will be better administered if it is left to the charge of the judge. In France

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one side only was allowed to speak, for there was no party to fee the other side. The Royalist journals, though conducted with great energy and ability, and often adorned by the genius of the greatest men in France, could not produce any lasting impression on the nation, simply because they had so few readers—because the classes were so limited in number, and so impoverished in fortune, whose interests or feelings led them to take in their effusions. Whoever will reflect on this circumstance, and observe how entirely in Great Britain the balance of parties is preserved by that free discussion on all sides which results from the existence of great and opposite nearly balanced parties in the state, will readily perceive what important effects must have resulted in France from the concentration of nearly all the argument and all the declamation on one side.

121. General absence of the restraint of religion in the towns.

In these circumstances the only bond of union left which could have united the higher and lower orders was that of a common Religion, and its precepts were the only effective restraint which could have been imposed on the national passions. But as if everything had conspired to render impossible the establishment of freedom in France, the influence of this mighty agent was not only lost to its cause, but turned over to the other side. Revolutions are often the consequence of a diseased state of the public mind, and they occur at times and under circumstances when there are no real grievances either to justify or explain them. The malady in France was mainly owing, in the first instance, to the intolerant domination of the Roman Catholics; the movement in 1789 was more against the altar than the throne. Voltaire was its apostle rather than Rousseau. Freedom of thought, intellectual liberty, the birthright of man and the chief spring of human improvement, was their great aspiration. So strong was this feeling that it survived all the changes of the Revolution: the Jesuits were the

objects of antiquated dread, when they should have been perhaps rather an object of pity; and the church was regarded as the worst enemy of freedom, even when, stript of their property, cast down from their station, its members had become state pensioners, nineteen-twentieths of whom were "passing rich on forty pounds a-year." By the concurrent voice of all the annalists and historians of the time, the unpopularity of Charles X., and the combination of parties against him, which ultimately produced the *coup d'état* of July 1830, was mainly owing to the advances which the priests made during his reign, and the belief that their influence in secret ruled the determinations of Government. Incalculable were the effects of this jealousy of the sacerdotal power, this divorce of the cause of order from that of religion. "God and the King" was no longer the cry of the French monarchy; the throne and the altar were severed in general thought. The example of Great Britain, where the union of these great principles has in every age produced such important effects in upholding the cause of freedom and order, is sufficient to prove what must have resulted from their entire separation in France.

122. Number of natural children in the great towns.

In addition to all this, there was another circumstance also, a consequence of the disruption of all moral principles at the Revolution, which had throughout the whole Restoration an important effect in rendering the populace of towns ungovernable during pacific periods, and which, when the conflict commenced, operated with decisive and fatal effect against the Government. This was the multitude of *natural children* who had come to form part of the population of the metropolis, and all the other great towns in the country. From the statistical tables, published by authority of the French government in that magnificent work, the *Statistique de la France,* it appears that in them all the proportion was about two legitimate to one illegitimate; in other words, the natural children

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formed *a third* of the entire population.* Accordingly, M. Dupin says that "every third child you see in the streets of Paris is a bastard." In London the proportion is one in thirty-six—the effect, it is to be feared, of the immense mass of promiscuous concubinage which there prevails, under circumstances where a law of nature renders an increase of the population from that source impossible. Social and political writers have hitherto considered the state of things chiefly in reference to the index it affords to the state of public morality; but the example of France proves that it is also attended with most important effects in a political point of view.[1]

[1] Dupin, Force Commerciale de la France, i. 272.

123. Effect of this in a political point of view.

Foundlings and natural children do not always remain children; they grow up to be men and women. When they do so, in what state do they find themselves? For the most part ignorant of their parents, and bred up in infancy at a distance from the place of their birth, and without the education of the parental roof, they are at the age of puberty thrown into society without any of the safeguards which under other circumstances afford a barrier against the indulgence of the passions, whether political or personal. In the female portion it is easy

* Legitimate and Illegitimate Births in the three principal Cities in France, from 1825 to 1831.

Years.	Paris.		Lyons.		Bordeaux.	
	Legitimate.	Illegitimate.	Legit.	Illegit.	Legit.	Illegit.
1825	19,214	10,039	3354	1965	2375	1170
1826	19,468	10,502	3637	2022	2563	1214
1827	19,414	10,392	3547	2093	2508	1164
1828	19,126	10,475	3712	1966	2520	1283
1829	18,568	9,953	3548	1980	2488	1156
1830	18,580	10,007	3361	1836	2594	1239
1831	19,152	10,378	3550	1940	2441	1270

—*Statistique de la France*—Population, pp. 421, 460.

Foundlings over all France, 1831 to 1835, . . .	618,849
Total births in same period, ...	4,874,778

Or somewhat more than 1 to 8. It is in the great towns the natural children are so numerous; in the country they are comparatively rare.—*Statistique de la France*—Administration Publique, pp. 89, 143, 227.

to foresee the result: a *soubrette* speedily finds herself a mother, and gets quit of her offspring by depositing it in the basket of the foundling hospital, in the same way in which she herself had been deposited. But what comes of the boys? The answer is obvious. An "enfant trouvé de Paris" at a certain age turns into a "gamin de Paris," just as naturally, and almost as necessarily, as a chrysalis after a certain time becomes a butterfly. It is impossible it can be otherwise. Without known parents or relations, uneducated in infancy, destitute of property, incapable of succession, he is liberated from all the restraints which in the case of other men act as a restraint on the passions. Paternity even, that powerful moulder of the feelings, has little effect on him; the foundling hospital relieves him at once from the burden and affections of a father. The effect of a *third* of the entire population in great towns being composed of persons of this unsteady and dangerous description cannot be over-estimated, and has never yet received due consideration.

124. It produced 80,000 bastard combatants in Paris.

There were in 1830 about a million of persons in Paris, and the villages in its immediate vicinity. A third of this number, or three hundred and thirty thousand persons, were bastards, without either property, relations, domestic education, or hopes of succession. A fourth of these, or eighty thousand men, were capable of bearing arms. Here, then, was constantly in Paris a mass of eighty thousand combatants, utterly destitute of all the restraints which in the case of other men affect the passions, and ready at any time to join in any tumult which promised to overturn the Government, and open to them the agreeable prospect of immediate plunder and ultimate command of the country. Truly the sins of the Revolution had come home to roost; Paris had become ungovernable, from the effect of the very license of manners which the Revolution had introduced. And it was in SUCH a city, and in presence of such a force, that Prince

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Polignac thought he was quite safe in hazarding a *coup d'état* with eleven thousand men, one-half of whom could alone be trusted, eight pieces of cannon, and four rounds of grape-shot to each!

125. Curious circumstance which mitigated these evils.

In truth, the evils arising from this prodigious accumulation of natural children in a densely-peopled and corrupted metropolis were so great, that they would have worked out their natural result in overturning a free, and establishing in its stead a despotic government, were it not for a very curious circumstance, which in a considerable degree counteracted their pernicious tendency. This was, that the foundlings were for the most part not brought up at Paris. The directors of the foundling hospitals wisely sent the greater number to the country to be nursed; and so great was the number of children which there required to be provided for, that wet-nurses came up to Paris from the whole country round, to the distance of a hundred and fifty and two hundred miles, got the children away with them, and were soon to be seen walking on the roads from Paris with the little innocents on their backs. Arrived at home, the foundling was almost always carefully tended: the allowance from the hospital was sufficiently large to form a considerable addition to the earnings of the family; natural affection soon came to the aid of interested motives; the little stranger was bred up with his foster brothers and sisters; when he grew up, he sat at the same board, played at the same games, attended the same school, and shared the same bed; and so strong was the attachment which thus sprung up among the playmates, that the recall of the little strangers by the hospital was regarded as the most dreadful misfortune by the whole family. So keenly do the foster-mothers feel the severance, that they have been seen running for days together beside the caravan which carried away their little ones, entreating with piteous cries to get them back, and offering to keep them for nothing.* It is estimated

* M. de Lamartine made a most interesting speech on the subject in the

that ten thousand children are in this way annually sent out of Paris to be nursed in the country, and out of the corruption of cities is poured a pure stream of life into the country. Yet is this alleviation of the evil greater in appearance than reality; for the foundlings, when they grow up, even though trained to rural labour, find they cannot, from the want of considerable proprietors, find employment in the country; they have no little freehold of one or two acres, like their foster brothers and sisters, whereon to exert their hands; the destitution of their situation at length breaks upon them, and they in general are driven to take refuge in the crowd of cities, to conceal their descent and procure subsistence.

126. Decline in the material comforts of the working classes.

In justice to the people of Paris, however, it must be observed that their distress had, towards the latter years of the Restoration, come to be such, that a convulsion of some sort was almost unavoidable. The decline of the material comforts of the working classes, from the effects of the Revolution, had been incessant, and had now reached an alarming height. The prosperity which existed was confined entirely to the bourgeois or trading classes. Between 1789 and 1840, the supply of animal food for the metropolis had not materially increased, although, during the same period, the number of inhabitants had *doubled*, having advanced from 500,000 to 1,000,000; in other words, the share falling, on an aver-

Chamber of Deputies, on 30th April 1838. "Demandez à votre propre cœur, demandez-le à ces convois presque funèbres de ces enfants expatriés, que nous rencontrons par longues files sur nos routes,—le front pâli, les yeux mouillés, les visages mornes, et qui semblent interroger les passants du regard et demander à quel supplice on les mène. Démandez-le (j'ai été vingt fois témoin moi-même de ces lamentables exécutions)—demandez-le à cet enfant que votre gendarmerie vient enlever de force à celle qui a été jusque-là sa mère, et qui se cramponne à la porte de la chaumière, dont on vient l'arracher pour jamais! Demandez-le à ces pauvres mères qui courent de chez elles chez le Maire, de chez le Maire à la préfecture, pour faire révoquer l'ordre inflexible; qui, ne pouvant se décider à le voir partir, prennent l'engagement de le nourrir gratuitement; qui le livrent quelquefois au conducteur du convoi, puis, se repentant, courent à pied jusqu'à vingt ou trente lieues après lui, pour le redemander et le rapporter dans leurs bras."—*Œuvres de* LAMARTINE—*Tribune et Politique*, i. 149, 150.

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age, to each inhabitant, had sunk to a half of its former amount.* The annual consumption of beef, by each inhabitant of Paris, was in 1830 little more than *half* of what it was before the Revolution broke out in 1789: in the former period it was 24 kilogrammes, in the latter it was 47. Even including the richest rural districts of France, the consumption in Paris of animal food had sensibly declined during the Restoration: in 1816, though a year of uncommon distress, it was 62 kilogrammes per head; in 1833 it was only 55.† Compared with the situation of the working classes in England, the condition of those in France is miserable in the extreme. The animal food consumed on an average by each Frenchman is not a *third* of what is eaten by an Englishman: in the former country it is 20 kilogrammes in a year; in the latter, 68. Each Frenchman consumes on an average *sixteen* ounces of wheaten bread a-day, each Englishman *thirty-two*; the former one ounce and two-thirds of meat, the latter six ounces.[1] The difference would be incredible, were it not substantiated down to the minutest particulars by the admirable statistical

[1] Mounier, ii. 32, 34, 40.

* Population and Consumption of Animal Food in Paris during the following Years:—

Years.	Population.	Oxen.	Cows.	Calves.	Sheep.
1789	524,186	70,000	18,000	120,000	350,000
1812	622,636	72,268	6,929	76,154	347,568
1830	885,558	71,634	16,439	73,947	364,875
1840	1,000,000	71,718	20,684	73,113	437,359

—*Rapport par la Commission Royale*, Aug. 31, 1841; and Mounier, *Stat. de la France*, ii. 175, 201.

† Consumption of Animal Food in the Northern Departments.

Year.	Population of northern Department.	Kilogrammes consumed.	Proportion per head.
1816	1,193,000	74,896,871	62.78
1820	1,184,000	77,630,907	60.28
1833	1,532,783	85,630,686	55.86

—*Stat. de la France (Archives Stat.)*, 203, 219.

returns obtained by the French government, and arranged with consummate skill, in that magnificent work, the *Statistique de la France*, published at Paris during the reign of Louis Philippe, a work which speaks as much for the powers of administration and research possessed by the French people, and the public spirit of their Government, as its contents do as to the widespread disasters occasioned by the Revolution.

127. Causes of this miserable state of the working classes.

It appears, at first sight, no easy matter to account for this rapid deterioration in the condition of the working classes in France, and especially in its capital, when it is recollected that by far the greatest part of the landed property of the country was divided amongst them during the Revolution, and that since the Restoration the country had been constantly at peace, and its imports and exports had both increased nearly a half. But a little consideration must be sufficient to show that this very division of the land was the very thing which had reduced the working classes, especially in towns, to such a deplorable condition. The great trade in every country, as Adam Smith long ago observed, is that between the town and the country; in Great Britain, even with its comparatively narrow territory and gigantic commerce, the home trade is double that of all the branches of foreign trade put together. When the landed aristocracy was destroyed in France, the church hierarchy confiscated, and two-thirds of the property of the fundholders swept away, by far the greatest part of the home market for the industry of towns was annihilated. Scarce any purchasers of the luxuries of the metropolis, the silks of Lyons, or the finer cotton goods of Rouen were to be found but in the employés of Government, the diplomatic body, and strangers whom the splendour of Paris had attracted within its walls! The five or six millions of landed proprietors among whom the territory of France had come to be divided, the majority of whom had not *five pounds a-year of annual income*, while only 6684 had an income

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above £400 a-year, could not by possibility furnish any market for the luxuries or manufactures of the great cities. The utmost which the vast majority of them could do, was to maintain themselves in the most economical and miserable manner.*

128. Way in which the division of land affected the industry of the country.

This extraordinary and unparalleled division of land in France, the result in the first instance of the confiscation, and next of the equal law of succession established at the Revolution, operated to the prejudice of the industry of towns in two ways. In the first place, it deprived the artisans and producers of all the finer or more costly fabrics of the vast market for their produce, which they should, and, but for these confiscations, would have found in the surplus produce of the labour of the country, and in the wants of its labourers. It was all eaten up at home, and scarce any was left for them. In the next place, by extinguishing the class of employers of rural labour in the country, and vesting the land in hands so miserably indigent that they could hardly support themselves, far less give employment to others, it necessarily threw a crowd of labourers from the country into the great towns in quest of employment. How could

* The separate *properties* contained in the Tax-office books in France were, in

1815,	10,083,751
1826,	10,296,693
1835,	10,893,526

But as several properties in different places often belong to one owner, the Government authorities calculated in 1835 that there were 5,446,763 separate landed proprietors in France. There are 43,000,000 hectares (107,500,000 acres) of cultivable land in France; being about 20 acres on an average to each proprietor. They are thus distributed:—

2,602,705	have an income of	50	francs, or	£2	a-year.
875,997	...	100	...	4	...
757,126	...	200	...	8	...
369,603	...	300	...	12	...
342,082	...	500	...	20	...
276,615	...	1000	...	40	...
170,579	...	2000	...	80	...
23,777	...	5000	...	200	...
16,596	...	10,000	...	400	...
6,634	...	above 10,000	above	400	...

—*Statistique de la France*—Agriculture, p. 179; MOUNIER and RUBICHON, *Statistique de la France*, i. 101.

the 3,500,000 proprietors having from £2 to £4 each a-year from their properties, find money to employ labourers on their little patches of ground? or employment on them, if they had the money? The thing is obviously out of the question; and so vast and universal was the effect of this circumstance during the Restoration, that it appears from a report of the Minister of the Interior in 1829, that the average produce of grain crops was under two quarters an acre, there being 32,800,000 acres under cereal crops, and their entire produce 60,597,000 quarters.* In England, the average produce of grain crops is two quarters and five bushels; and in Scotland, with a much inferior climate and soil, three quarters.[1] In France, the entire profits of cultivation from 124,000,000 acres are £63,000,000 annually, or not quite ten shillings an acre; while in England, during the period from 1815 to 1831, 32,332,000 acres under cultivation yielded annually £45,753,000 of rent, being about £1, 8s. an acre, besides the profit of the farmer (probably 12s. more)—in all, £2; being just FOUR TIMES that yielded by a similar space under cultivation in France! And so far has this wretched system gone in destroying the class of respectable farmers in France, that the great military monarchy which in 1812 sent 100,000 horses into Russia, and in 1815, from its own resources alone, produced the 18,000 splendid cavalry which, at Waterloo,[2] all but

[1] M'Culloch's British Empire, i. 476.

[2] Stat. de la France, *voce* Agriculture, 93, 107; Mounier, i. 334, 338, ii. 110.

* AVERAGE ANNUAL PRODUCE OF FRANCE IN GRAIN CROPS, &c., AND AREAS ON WHICH GROWN.

Cereal Crops.	PRODUCE.		AREAS.	
	Hectolitres.	Or Quarters.	Hectares.	Or Acres.
Wheat, . . .	69,154,463	23,0[illegible]1,484	6,546,869	14,000,000
Barley, . . .	16,444,030	5,48[illegible],316	1,164,632	3,032,000
Oats, . . .	48,899,652	16,277,884	3,000,623	7,514,262
Rye, . . .	27,772,613	9,257,534	2,573,100	7,560,000
Maize, . . .	7,610,280	2,543,423	631,194	1,534,231
Meslin, . . .	11,824,914	3,941,304	910,426	2,342,000
Spelt, . . .	132,055	44,015	4,733	9,781
Total in Cereal crops	181,842,079	60,597,954	13,831,877	32,800,000
„ Potatoes,	96,180,714	32,060,240	920,689	2,280,000
„ Buckwheat,	576,321	1,439,122	651,235	1,564,000

—*Statistique de la France*—Agriculture, pp. 187, 241; and MOUNIER, i. 309-313.

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replaced Napoleon on the imperial throne, was, at the close of the Restoration, obliged to *import* annually from 37,000 to 40,000 horses to mount the cavalry, at an expense of seven or eight hundred thousand pounds.*

129. Immense burdens on the land in France.

Small as is the produce of the soil, under the present system of cultivation and division of property in France, in proportion to the extent of arable land in the country, the proportion of that produce which is really enjoyed by the owners and cultivators of the soil is still smaller. Such is the weight of the direct taxes, in that country rendered unavoidable by the known impossibility of levying an adequate revenue by the indirect, and such the magnitude of the burdens attaching to the soil in the shape of government burdens, interest of mortgages, expenses of conveyances and judicial sales, and law charges consequent on its division among such a prodigious multitude of separate proprietors, that *not a third* of the entire produce of the land remains at the disposal of the proprietors. The land-tax is about 300,000,000 francs (£12,000,000) annually. The mortgages on the land amount to the enormous sum of 11,000,000,000 francs, or £440,000,000; the interest of which, with the relative charges, is 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000. The law expenses connected with the judicial sales and transfers of landed property cost annually 200,000,000 francs (£8,000,000) more.† This leaves only 480,000,000 francs, or £19,200,000, to be enjoyed by the 5,500,000 proprietors of land, or less than FOUR POUNDS A-YEAR

* In ten years, from 1831 to 1840, there were *imported* into
France, 346,181 horses—or annual average, . 38,164
Exported, 71,973—or annually, . . . 7,997
Cavalry horses bought abroad in 1831, . . 37,038
Which cost 17,808,343 francs, or, £712,000
Do. bought in 1848, ... 37,643
Which cost 23,138,253 francs, or, £920,000
—*Statistique de la France*—Agriculture, pp. 127, 210; MOUNIER, ii. 110.

† The enormous taxes levied on succession and transfer of land in France, and the law expenses consequent on them among such an immense body of small proprietors, is one of the greatest evils bequeathed to France by the confiscations of the Revolution. In 1837 and 1838, the number of properties

EACH PROPRIETOR. On this miserable pittance are to be maintained 24,000,000 persons engaged in the cultivation of the soil! In these circumstances, it is not surprising that there is so little surplus produce left to be employed in encouraging the industry of the four millions of persons who inhabit thirty-nine of its principal towns, including Paris: the only thing to be wondered at is, how the rural inhabitants can exist at all. In fact, they could not do so were it not that, as is the case with the ryots of Hindostan, or the fellahs of Egypt, necessity had taught them the means of supporting life upon the smallest possible amount of subsistence.[1]

[1] Mounier, Agric. de la France, i. 170, 295, 296; ii. 81; Stat. de la France (Agric.), 270, 289.

130. Crowding of the inhabitants of towns from these causes.

Not only does this ruinous division of land, and consequent impoverishment of the rural population, preclude the possibility of any improvement in the cultivation of the soil, or the commencement of any undertakings which require capital to carry them on, but it operates in the most serious manner, and with overwhelming force, upon the urban population. Unable to find employment in the country, the rural inhabitants, who have not land enough to maintain them and their families, are driven by necessity to take refuge in the great towns, where alone there is any regular provision established for the poor. In the rural districts there is none. Thus the towns, and especially the capital, become burdened with an immense mass of needy persons, clamorous for bread,

transferred in France by compulsory sale and succession, and the sums realised by them to the exchequer, stood as follows:—

Year.	No. of Jud. Sales.	Produce of Tax.	Successions.	Produce of Tax.
1837	1,163,626	79,348,552 fr., or £3,214,000	522,221	30,764,124 fr., or £1,234,000
1838	1,176,563	85,622,449 .. 3,428,000	502,389	32,738,013 .. 1,309,000

—*Rapport du Ministre des Finances*, 1839; MOUNIER, i. 130, 131.

Value of lands transferred in France from 1825 to 1835:—

By inheritance, . . . 9,317,287,867 francs, or £372,000,000 nearly.
By gift, . . . 2,145,199,412 ... 85,800,000 ...
Sale, voluntary and judicial, 11,885,799,262 ... 475,000,000 ...

—*Tableau du Ministre des Finances* (M. Martin), 1837; MOUNIER, i. 111.

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who have permanently left the country, and taken up their abode there, in search of employment, legal relief, or charity. This evil is felt, in a certain degree, in all the great cities of old and long-civilised communities; but it was experienced in an extraordinary degree in France, in consequence of the combination of circumstances which had deprived labour of its ordinary encouragement in the country, and driven it into the great towns. And when there, the same circumstances deprived it of the employment which it otherwise would have found in the expenditure of the nobility and wealthy landed proprietors; for their estates were all swept away, and divided among a swarm of indigent peasants, who, so far from having any surplus produce to expend on the luxuries, could barely find the means of existence in their own habitations.

131. Effect of the destruction of commercial capital during the Revolution.

Two other circumstances, of overwhelming importance, contributed in a powerful manner to the same disastrous result. The first of these was the almost entire destruction of commercial and manufacturing capital in France, from the profuse issue of assignats during the Revolution, the confiscation of two-thirds of the national debt at one blow in 1797, and the long-continued stoppage of foreign commerce from the English blockade during the war. Such was the effect of these concurring circumstances, that almost the whole wealth existing in France in 1789 had been swept away, and the only capital which existed in the country was in the hands of a few bankers, who had made fortunes during the terrible game of hazard of the Revolution, and a great number of tradesmen, who had made money from the expenditure of the Government *employés*, the diplomatic body, and the affluence of strangers since the peace. The second circumstance which told with disastrous effect upon the national industry was the loss of nearly all their colonies, partly by the insane emancipation of the negroes, in 1790, in St Domingo, and partly from the English conquests during

the war. When it is recollected that the colony of St Domingo was in so flourishing a state in 1789, that its exports to France were to the value of 119,000,000 francs, or £5,000,000 sterling nearly, and its imports 189,000,000 francs, or £7,567,000; and that the trade between the two countries maintained 1600 vessels and 27,000 sailors—more than *double* the trade of the whole West India islands to Great Britain at this time,—it may be conceived how serious has been the loss to the mother country from the train of disasters which has deprived her of this invaluable vent for its surplus population.[1]

[1] Dumas, viii. 112; Hist. of Europe, c. ii. § 7.

132. Excessive general competition, and wretched state of the working classes.

The result of this disastrous combination of circumstances was an excessive, and to the poor most ruinous, degradation of situation in the labouring classes. *Excessive competition* was the grand characteristic of the period which succeeded the Revolution. It pervaded all classes, penetrated all ranks, affected all situations. In the more elevated in station or affluent in circumstances, it appeared in an unbounded and insatiable thirst for Government employments; in the burgher class, in an incessant struggle for business; in the working, in a terrific strife for employment. In all it was produced by one cause, perfectly sufficient to explain the phenomenon, and of universal application—viz., absolute inability to procure a livelihood in any other way. The middle and working classes had cast down the barriers which heretofore had guarded with unjust and jealous care the exclusive domain of the aristocracy; the portals were thrown open to all, but the multitude which rushed in at the vacant entrance encountered a still greater difficulty in the struggle with each other. Multitudes were pressed to death or trodden under foot in the strife at the doorway; those whose robust frames enabled them to make good their entrance, found themselves, when they had got in, squeezed and jostled by a clamorous crowd in as needy circumstances as themselves. There was not a single trade, profession,

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or employment which was not choked by multitudes threefold greater than could be provided for. To such a length did this go in beating down the wages of labour and degrading the condition of the working classes, that the earnings of workmen in Paris were *not half* of those enjoyed during the same period in London, even when the difference in the price of provisions was taken into account; and two-thirds of the whole inhabitants of Paris died in public hospitals.[1] *

[1] Louis Blanc, iii. 90, 92.

133. Want of any representation of the working classes.

The causes which have been mentioned arose from such deep-rooted sources of evil, and were so obviously the consequence and punishment of the sins of the first Revolution, that it is probable that no legislative measures of any sort could have afforded the nation any sensible relief. But in addition to all this there was a peculiar evil, felt with acute suffering by the working classes: they had not even the comfort of complaining. By the constitution of the Chamber of Deputies, as fixed at the Restoration and by the *coup d'état*, 5th September 1816,

* In Paris, in 1841, there were 105,087 persons admitted into the public hospitals, of whom 15,583 died there. The total deaths in the metropolis in that year were 24,524, so that nearly two-thirds of the deaths were in public hospitals.—*Statistique de la France, (Administration Publique)*, 227.

"Que de désastres! Les gros capitaux donnant la victoire dans les guerres industrielles, comme les gros bataillons dans d'autres guerres, et le LAISSEZ-FAIRE aboutissant, de la sorte, au plus odieux monopole; les grandes exploitations ruinant les petites; le commerce en grand ruinant le petit; l'usure s'emparant peu à peu du sol; la *féodalité moderne pire que l'ancienne*; la propriété foncière grévée de plus d'un milliard, les artisans qui s'appartiennent faisant place aux ouvriers qui ne s'appartiennent pas: les capitaux s'engouffrant sous l'impulsion d'une avidité honteuse: tous les intérêts armés les uns contre les autres, les propriétaires des vignes contre les propriétaires des bois, les fabricants de sucre de betteraves contre les colonies; les provinces du Midi contre celles du Nord, Bordeaux contre Paris: ici, des marchés qui s'engorgent, désespoir du capitaliste; là, des ateliers qui se ferment, désespoir de l'ouvrier; le prolétaire valet d'un millionaire, ou, en cas de crise, cherchant son pain entre la révolte et l'aumône; le père du pauvre allant à soixante ans mourir à l'hôpital, et la fille du pauvre forcée de se prostituer à seize ans pour vivre, et le fils du pauvre réduit à respirer, à sept ans, l'air empesté des filatures pour, ajouter au salaire de la famille: le lit du journalier, imprévoyant par la misère, *horriblement fécond*, et le prolétariat menaçant le royaume d'une inondation de mendiants. Voilà quel tableau présentait alors la société."—LOUIS BLANC, *Dix Ans de Louis Philippe*, iii. 90, 91. A picture of the effects of revolution, by one of its most ardent supporters.

with the cordial concurrence of the Liberal party over all France, *the working classes were entirely shut out of the representation.* As the franchise was confined to those paying 300 francs (£12) of direct taxes, equivalent to about £20 in Great Britain, it was of course confined to the wealthier classes; and as the landed aristocracy was almost entirely destroyed, those wealthier classes were to be found only in the burgher or trading part of the community, or the persons in the employment of Government. The *bourgeoisie*, accordingly, was alone represented, and they were under a hundred thousand in number, while the immense mass of the working class, who numbered above thirty millions, were wholly unrepresented. The Liberal press, being entirely under the direction of the burgher class, in whom power was substantially vested, afforded no vent for the sufferings of the *Proletaires*, whatever it did to the discontent of the shopkeepers; and thus society was in the most perilous of all states—with the passions of a Revolution still burning, the forms of representation in existence, but the reality of class government established.

134. Were the ordonnances illegal?

When so many causes tending to produce a disruption in society were in operation, and so many treacheries undermined the Government, the merit or demerit of the final act by which the collision was induced are of comparatively little importance. Sooner or later, and probably ere long, it must have come on. It has been already stated that the Polignac Cabinet acted most unwisely in making themselves even the aggressors on the public liberties, and still more imprudently in doing so with but inadequate preparations for a contest. But if the question be put, whether the ordonnances were absolutely illegal, and justified the resistance they experienced? a very different opinion must be formed. According to our ideas in England, where any invasion of established law, except by the act of the three branches of the legislature, is illegal, they unquestionably were a breach of the constitution.

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But that was *not* the constitution of France, either according to the letter of the Charter or the interpretation put upon it by the united voice of the whole Liberal party in France. The 14th article of that deed expressly recognised an overruling power to alter the constitution as residing in the sovereign, to be exercised when the safety of the state imperatively required it. Thenceforward it was only a question of circumstances whether the existing state of affairs called for or warranted the exercise of that dictatorial power; and it had repeatedly been exercised, under circumstances less critical than those in which Charles X. was at last placed, not only without any opposition from, but with the cordial and loud approbation of, the whole Liberal party in France.

135. Previous instances of royal ordonnances not objected to.

When Napoleon fell, after the Hundred Days, and a new legislature required to be convoked, the deputies existing when he landed at Cannes were not summoned, but a royal ordonnance was issued on 13th July establishing the representation on an entirely new basis;[1] and on that footing the Chamber assembled, and all the subsequent acts were rested. On 5th September 1816, a royal ordonnance was again issued, establishing the representation in many respects on a basis so essentially different that it at once altered the character of the legislation, and brought the Liberal party at length into a majority, and changed all the subsequent measures of Government.[2] When a vote of the House of Peers condemned this great innovation, the Executive again interposed, and by the creation of sixty-three peers gave the Liberals the same majority in the Upper House which the previous *coup d'état* had given them in the Commons.[3] All these stretches of the Executive, being in favour of the Liberal party, were not only nowise opposed, but lauded to the skies, by their leaders both in the legislature and the press, as not only dictated by consummate wisdom, but entirely constitutional. When the reaction took place in consequence of the Spanish War, and a new *coup d'état*

[1] Ante, c. iii. § 15.

[2] Ante, c. iii. § 132.

[3] Ante, c. vi. § 96.

on the Royalist side was deemed necessary in the House of Peers, it was effected by the royal ordonnance of 1827, which created seventy-six new peers; and though this stretch was condemned as unwise, it was never stigmatised as unconstitutional by the Liberal party.[1] When the undefined powers vested in the Crown by the 41th article of the Charter had been thus explained and understood by the subsequent practice of all parties, and especially the Liberal, on so many occasions, it is impossible to say that the ordonnances which induced no greater change than the preceding ones had done were illegal. They might well be condemned by the Liberals as unwise and inexpedient; but their own previous conduct had shut them out from the plea that they were a violation of the constitution. *Coups d'état*, how violent soever, have in truth, ever since the Revolution, been part of all French constitutions. The 14th article of the Charter only recognised a dictatorial power in the sovereign, which previous as well as subsequent experience has proved to be indispensable.

[1] Ante, c. xvi. § 69.

136. Reasons why *coups d'état* are necessary in France.

It had become so, in consequence of the magnitude of the changes effected and sins committed during the first Revolution. This is the essential point of distinction between the English and the French Revolutions, and the cause of the great difference in the subsequent history of the two countries. Both the Great Rebellion and the change of dynasty in 1688 passed over England without any material change in the distribution of property, the representation of the people, or the balance of power in the state. The last convulsion, so far from being of a republican, was decidedly of an aristocratic character: it fixed the Government upon a firmer basis—that of landed and monied wealth *united*—than it had ever before rested upon; it revealed, by the family it placed on the throne, and the party it seated for seventy years in power, the secret of constitutional government, which is to sway the legislature by influence, not brave it by prerogative. In

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France, on the other hand, this was rendered impossible, because the influence of the aristocracy on the material interests, and of the church on the moral feelings of the country, had been destroyed during the Revolution. The *third* element in constitutional monarchy—that of landed property collected round the throne, and identified with its interests—was awanting; what little power was left to it, was all thrown on the other side. The only influences left in the state were those of the Executive and the *bourgeoisie*, and between them, accordingly, the contest exclusively lay; the cultivators, cast down to the rank of the fellahs of Egypt or the ryots of Hindostan, were of no weight in the political system. There being thus only two powers in the state, politics were reduced to a perpetual struggle between them; and when it became very violent, the machine of government was brought to a dead lock, and a *coup d'état* became indispensable. It will appear in the sequel whether this observation does not afford the key to the whole history of France since the Revolution. "The French Revolution," said Napoleon, "has proposed a problem as insoluble as the direction of balloons."

137. Conduct of the King.

Ill-judged at first, ill-advised during the progress of the convulsion, weak and irresolute towards its close, the conduct of Charles X. was dignified and magnanimous when the crisis was over, and Providence, as it appeared to him, had cast him down from the throne as a punishment for his sins. In this respect he was as superior to Napoleon in adversity, as he had been inferior to him in prosperity and in the previous conduct of the struggle. There was no fretting against the stroke of fate, no repining against destiny when its decree was once irrevocably pronounced. No longing after past greatness, no womanish anxiety for the retention of title when the reality of power was gone, disgraced the last days of the fallen monarch. In silence and meekness he bowed to the stroke of fate; magnanimously, but yet simply, he descended from the

throne of his fathers. The discrowned heir of a long line of kings stands forth at Holyrood in bright contrast to the dethroned soldier of fortune at St Helena—a memorable proof of the eternal truth, that it is in the heart that the real issues of life are to be found, and that the highest intellectual gifts fail in inspiring that equanimity in adversity which religion confers upon the humblest of her votaries.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LITERATURE OF FRANCE DURING AND AFTER THE RESTORATION.

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1. Great effect of the Revolution on the literature of France.

If the literature of England after the war gave proof of the animating influence of the contest in drawing forth the national talent, and giving a more lofty and dignified tone to the national thought, the same effect was conspicuous in a still more remarkable degree in the sister kingdom. The literature of France during the Restoration presents one of the most brilliant epochs of which modern Europe can boast—certainly inferior to none which have adorned the annals of that celebrated country. If it was less measured than that of Louis XIV., it was more varied; if it exhibited less of the rules of art, it had more of the originality of nature. The dreadful tragedies with which the period commenced, the unparalleled glories by which they were followed, the mournful catastrophe in which they terminated, had roused every feeling of the human heart, and called forth every power of the human mind. The principles of composition, the maxims of taste, the rules of art, which had been all-powerful in a former period, were at once broken through by the wail of nature. Her passions, roused to the very highest pitch, absolutely required vent; they burst through the conventional restraints of ancient days with the force of a deluge. Then was seen how strongly both the thought and composition of a

country are impressed by the events which have agitated it, and how indelible were the traces which the *débacle* which had passed over the world had left in the human mind.

2. Its distinguishing features.

The great characteristic of the new school of French literature was mingled *Reaction and Romance.* The experience they had had, the sufferings they had undergone, had taught them the former; the thirst for excitement, the *besoin* of strong emotions, had rendered necessary the latter. The days had gone past when the theatre was to resound only with the pompous eloquence of Corneille, the refined tenderness of Racine; they were equally over when history could find vent in the sonorous periods of M. Fontanes, or the graceful flatteries of the Empire. The visions of Rousseau had expired, at least in all thoughtful minds, with the blood of Robespierre; the dreams of Sièyes with the despotism of Napoleon. The universal suffering which had been undergone had produced a universal reaction against the political measures, a general distrust in thoughtful minds of the principles of the Revolution. A quarter of a century in time had given centuries of experience; and the great moral lesson was not lost upon the gifted spirits of that eminently intellectual people. The multitude in towns, indeed, still blindly adhered to the doctrines of the Revolution, and execrated its sufferings without abjuring its principles; but the thinking few, who went beyond the surface of things, and sought in delusion in thought the remote but certain cause of disaster in event, came to discover the sources of present suffering in the errors of former opinion. The passion for innovation had worn itself out; it had led to its natural results in an immense augmentation of human suffering, and produced a reaction as violent, in consequence, as the former enthusiasm in its favour. The love of novelty in men of original thought was succeeded by its direct opposite, the reverence for antiquity; and in the highest class of minds the

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study of the olden time came to supersede the reveries of a dreamy futurity. The ancient faith and the ancient times resumed their sway over the leaders of thought; and while Chateaubriand portrayed to an admiring world the genius and beauties of Christianity, Guizot in a philosophic spirit traced its historical blessings; and the two Thierrys investigated, with antiquarian learning and critical acuteness, the most important epochs in the dark ages.

3. Violent antagonism between the opposite schools.

But it was not unmixed good which resulted from this reaction; the usual proportion of good and evil, of truth and falsehood, appeared in the mingled streams of visionary ideas and experienced knowledge which flowed forth on the unlocking of the fountains of thought. The dreams of the Revolutionary school, the prospects of social amelioration which they had presented, were too flattering to the great body of the people, too charming to all inexperienced minds, to be relinquished without a struggle as violent in the realms of thought as had taken place in the tented field. Hence there arose opposite schools at this period in France, each of which was headed by leaders of the highest abilities, and whose works have taken a lasting place in the literature of their country and of Europe. The one supported the ancient faith and the ancient institutions, the other the modern ideas and the modern speculations. The former at this period, indeed, numbered all the greatest men in its ranks; and its doctrines were too strongly supported by recent experience to admit of their being rejected by many who had minds capable of discrimination or reflection. But no one need be told that the great majority in all ages and countries have neither the one nor the other; nor is it less certain that the bulk of those who read in every period are regulated in their opinions, not by the great of their own, but the great of the preceding age. It takes a generation or two for the light of new ideas to flow down from the elevated summits where it first strikes, to the plains and valleys below. Hence the wide gulf

between the principles of the two great schools into which France was divided on the termination of the Revolution, and a degree of antagonism between the opinions of the urban masses and the ideas of the highest class of writers, fraught with melancholy presages for future times.

4. Character of the romantic school.

But while there was this wide difference between opinions on political or philosophic subjects in France in the lighter branches of literature, no such struggle was visible. The classical school was at once and universally superseded by the romantic. On the theatre, in poetry and romance, the same change was conspicuous. The stately verses of Corneille, indeed, were still the subject of general admiration; the exquisite pathos of Racine was felt as charming as in the days of the Grand Monarque. But no more Corneilles or Racines appeared. The necessity of event, the thirst for excitement, the passion for tragic incident, swept over the world with the force of a deluge. It invaded and speedily overwhelmed every department of literature, every branch of thought, every class of society. Not only no one withstood, but no one attempted to withstand it. The strongest supporters, the most devoted adherents of the ancient ideas, adopted the new system in composition even more readily, and with more effect, than their opponents: it was their boast that they would combat their enemies with their own weapons—wound them by a shaft out of their own wing. Hence the communication of a new and as yet unknown charm to compositions intended to stem the progress of innovation. The old thoughts were clothed in new language; the old doctrines arrayed in modern garb; the truths of reason decked with the charms of imagination. Instead of resting only on the precepts of the schools, the traditions of the Church, the modern writers borrowed the aid in supporting them of all that could attract the fancy or warm the heart. Abundance of materials were at hand

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to awaken these emotions in the romantic incidents and picturesque manners of the olden time, and the chivalrous feelings which, despite all attempts to extirpate them, still lingered in every noble heart in modern Europe. So skilful was the use made of these auxiliaries, so vast the aid which the ancient doctrines received from modern genius, that it may safely be affirmed they never have been so powerfully supported; and whoever wishes to have his conservative principles aided by all the charms of imagination, will do well to devote his days and his nights to the great authors who have risen out of the French Revolution.

5. Pernicious character of their works of imagination.

But in works addressed to the imagination merely, and intended to amuse or excite the great body of readers, the pernicious influence of the overturning of all principle by the Revolution, and the incessant craving for excitement which its catastrophe had produced, was painfully conspicuous. There no reaction was to be seen against evil; on the contrary, the most unreserved obedience to its dictates was evident. The writers who strove to amuse or interest the public, whether in novels, the romance, or the drama, soon gave token of the confusion of ideas in the vast majority of readers which the Revolution had produced, and the necessity under which every author who aspired to be popular, or desired to make his labours profitable, lay, of bending to the prevailing tastes, and pandering to the too general depravity. Not merely were the ideas and the incidents romantic, but they were too often flagitious: if one chapter interested the imagination, and another moved the heart, it too often happened that a third was calculated to inflame the senses or excite the passions. So general has this pernicious and too seductive style become, that it may be considered as the grand characteristic of the modern school of French romance; which, if it contains more knowledge, and embraces a far wider field, and is written with much greater ability than that which preceded, and

in part occasioned, the Revolution, is only on that account the more dangerous, and the more calculated to corrupt and degrade the people to whom it is addressed.

6. Corrupt character of their drama.

But if this is true of nearly the entire school of modern French novels, what shall be said of its drama, or the numerous pieces which have appeared on the boards of the French opera and theatres? Here revolutionary confusion has appeared in its very worst aspect; and if the pieces which for the last thirty years have been popular on the Parisian stage are to be taken as an index of the general mind, it will not appear surprising that all moral influences have been extinguished amongst the people, and that, after trying in vain every form of freedom, no government should have been found practicable except the rude one of force. It is little to say that the unities, so long the subject of debate, have been perpetually violated; the far more important principles of morality, faith, and honour, have been systematically set at nought. To interest the feelings and excite the passions has been the universal object, not merely without any regard to the tendency of such productions, but with a decided preference for the more depraved. Murders and rapes, seductions and adulteries, incest and poisonings, succeed each other with a rapidity not only never exhibited in real life, but never before thought of in works of fiction. If the German drama is the glory, the French is the disgrace of our contemporary European literature; and whoever considers both with attention, and regards them, as they undoubtedly are, as indexes to the national mind in the two countries, will cease to wonder that the Fatherland was victorious in the strife which so long existed between them; and that to the tragedies of the former has been awarded the immortality of virtue—to the melodrama of the latter the ephemeral success of vice.

CHATEAUBRIAND is universally, and by all parties, recognised as the first writer in France during the Restoration, and second to none that ever appeared even in that intellec-

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7. Chateaubriand.

tual land. The style of his compositions is very remarkable, and singularly descriptive of the influences which were at work in its formation. It breathes at once the spirit of the olden time and the aspirations of the Revolution: it is redolent of the piety of the Crusader not less than the ardour of the Republican. He has all the gallantry of chivalry in his heart, all the devotion of loyalty in his bosom, but not a few of the dreams of republicanism in his head. He himself said, that he was "Aristocrat du cœur, mais democrat par pensée;" and the spirit of his writings, not less than the tenor of his actions, prove that the combination, how unusual soever, really existed in his case. The descendant of an ancient family in Brittany, having had his earliest impressions formed by his mother, a woman of uncommon abilities, in the solitude of the family château, which was washed by the waves of the Atlantic Ocean, he was rising into manhood when he beheld his nearest relations cut down by the scythe of the Revolution, and was himself driven, bereft of everything, in the extremity of poverty, to seek refuge in London, where he maintained himself for several years with great difficulty by his pen, and where his earliest composition, the *Essai Historique*, was first ushered forth to the world.[1]

[1] Chateaub., Mémoires d'Outre Tombe, i. 5, 160.

8. Sketch of his life.

His ardent spirit, however, longed for action, and, debarred by the Revolution from service in his own country, he sought a vent for it in the excitements and dangers of foreign travel. His imagination had been strongly excited by the hopes of discovering a north-west passage; and he set out from England, supported by borrowed money, to engage in the perilous adventure of exploring it by land. He was not so fortunate, and in truth had not the means, which have since given such celebrity to other names; but literature has no cause to regret his failure as a geographical discoverer, for his travels in Canada have given birth to many of the most brilliant images, and not the least interesting of his works—his *Travels in America*, and beautiful tale of *Atala and Réné*.

After the accession of Napoleon to the consular throne had opened to him the theatre of his own country, he returned to Paris, and published his immortal *Génie du Christianisme*. The fame which this great work immediately acquired, attracted the notice of Napoleon, who was always on the look-out for genius in any department; and he had just accepted from him the situation of Minister in the Republic of the Valais, when the execution of the Duke d'Enghien took place; and Chateaubriand had the courage to hazard his own life, by resigning his appointment. Owing to the intercession, however, of Napoleon's sister, the Princess Eliza, he escaped that peril, and was permitted to leave France. He spent the time of his exile in a pilgrimage to Greece and the Holy Land, the fruit of which is to be seen in his charming *Itinéraire*, and brilliant romance of *Les Martyrs*, in both of which the glowing skies and deathless associations of the East are portrayed with graphic power and a poetic spirit. The wrath of Napoleon having passed away, as it generally did; after the first burst was over, he was enabled to return to Paris, where he lived in retirement, occupied with literary pursuits, till the restoration of the Bourbons, to which he powerfully contributed by his celebrated pamphlet, *Buonaparte et les Bourbons*, opened to him, after a life of toil and poverty, the reward and the promotion of political power.[1]

[1] Chateaub., Mémoires, i. vi.

9. His character as a writer.

The previous events of Chateaubriand's life may be read in almost all his writings, as clearly as in the very interesting Memoirs which he has bequeathed to the world as the record of his eventful career. His great characteristic is the impassioned and enthusiastic turn of his mind; and this, as in all other persons of a similar temperament, has not only impressed his imagination with all the varied images which have at different times been reflected on his mind's retina, but deeply affected his thoughts, by all the reflections which genius could gather or combine from the varied events or objects which have been presented to

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it during an eventful career. All that he has seen, or read, or heard, seems present to his mind, whatever he does, and wherever he is. Master of immense information, thoroughly imbued at once with the learning of classical and the traditions of Catholic times, gifted with a retentive memory, a poetic fancy, and a painter's eye, he brings to bear upon every subject the stores of erudition, the images of imagination, the charms of varied scenery, and the eloquence of impassioned feeling. Hence his writings display a reach and variety of imagery, a depth of light and shadow, a vigour of thought, and an extent of illustration, to which there is, perhaps, nothing comparable in any other author, ancient or modern. He illustrates the genius of Christianity by the beauties of classical conception; inhales the spirit of ancient prophecy on the shores of the Jordan; dreams on the banks of the Eurotas of the solitude of the American forests; contrasts the burning sands of the Nile with the cool waters of the Mississippi; visits the Holy Sepulchre with a mind alternately excited by the devotion of a pilgrim, the curiosity of an antiquary, and the enthusiasm of a Crusader. He combines in his romances, with the ardour of chivalrous love, the heroism of Roman virtue and the sublimity of Christian martyrdom. His writings are less a portrait of any particular age or country, than an assemblage of all that is grand or generous or elevated in human nature.

10. His beauties.

He drinks deep of inspiration at all the fountains where it has ever been poured forth to mankind, and delights us equally by the accuracy of each individual picture, and the traits of interest which he has combined from every quarter where its footsteps have trode. With the instinct of genius, he discovers at once the grand or the charming alike in every action he recounts or object he describes, and never fails to throw over the whole the glow of his own rich and impassioned mind — "Nihil quod tetigit non ornavit." * But while every page of his writings

* "Nought has he touched and not adorned."

reveals in thought or expression the genius by which he was inspired, it betrays also the peculiar predilections to which he was inclined. He was a man of the olden time, stranded by fate on the storm-beaten shores of the Revolution. His sympathies were all with the feudal and Catholic, but his intercourse was with the modern and freethinking world. This tendency appears not less clearly in the character of his writings than the tenor of his thoughts. His style seems formed on the lofty strains of Isaiah, or the beautiful images of the Book of Job, more than on all the classical or modern literature with which his mind is so amply stored. He is admitted by all Frenchmen, of whatever party, to be the most perfect master of their language in the period in which he lived, and to have imported into it beauties unknown to the age of Bossuet and Fénélon. Less polished in his periods, less sonorous in his diction, less melodious in his rhyme, than these illustrious writers, he is incomparably more varied, rapid, and energetic; the past, the present, and the future rise up under the touch of his magic hand before us, and we see how strongly the stream of genius, instead of gliding down the smooth current of ordinary life, has been broken and agitated by the cataract of Revolution.

11. His influence in reviving the spirit of Christianity.

To this writer must be ascribed the principal share in the great moral revolution which characterised France in the half-century which succeeded the Revolution — the reaction in favour of Christianity. It was in the disastrous days which succeeded the triumph of infidelity and democracy in France that he arose, and, like all great men destined by nature to be the leaders of thought, he immediately broke off from the herd of ignoble writers, who followed the stream of public opinion. Amidst a deluge of infidelity, he bent the force of his lofty mind to restore the fallen but imperishable faith of his fathers. In early youth, indeed, he was at first carried away by the fashionable scepticism of the times, and in his *Essai His-*

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torique, which he published in London in 1792, in which the principles of virtue and natural religion are unceasingly maintained, he seems to have doubted whether the Christian faith was not crumbling with the institutions of society, and speculated what system of belief was to arise on its ruins. But misfortune, the great corrector of the errors and vices of the world, soon changed these faulty views. In the days of exile and adversity, when by the waters of Babylon he sat down and wept, he resorted to the faith of his fathers, and inhaled in the school of adversity those noble maxims of devotion and duty which have ever since regulated his conduct in life. Undaunted, though alone, he placed himself on the ruins of the Christian faith, renewed with herculean strength a contest which the talents and vices of half a century had to all appearance rendered hopeless, and, speaking to the hearts of men, now purified by suffering and cleansed by the agonising ordeal of revolution, scattered far and wide the seeds of consolation in the resources of religion. Other writers have followed in the same noble career; Guizot, Barante, and Amadée Thierry, have traced with historic truth the beneficial effects of Christianity on modern society, and deduced from revolutionary disaster the last conclusions as to the adaptation of its doctrines to the wants of humanity; but it is the glory of Chateaubriand to have come forth alone, the foremost in the fight, to have planted himself on the breach, when it was strewed only with the dead and the dying, and, strong in the consciousness of gigantic power, stood undismayed against a nation in arms.

12. Peculiarity of his style on religious subjects, and its apology.

The peculiarity of the contest in which this great man was thus involved, both explains the object he had in view in his writings, and the new style of language and species of imagery which he introduced into religious composition. The days were gone past, and he knew it, when Rome could speak, at least to the highly-educated portion of mankind, in the voice of authority, or in which a submissive

world would receive on its knees whatever pontifical pride or priestly cupidity might prescribe for belief. It was the assumption of these powers, the spreading and drawing close of these chains, he well knew, which had occasioned the general revolt against the Romish Church. Equally in vain would it be to address a world heated by the passions and roused by the sufferings of the Revolution, in the calm and argumentative strain in which the Protestant divines taught their contented and prosperous flocks the doctrines of the Reformation. For the new times a new style was required. To effect his purpose, therefore, of reopening in the hearts of his readers the all but extinguished fountains of religious feeling, he summoned to his aid all that learning, or travelling, or poetry, or fancy could supply; he called in the charm of imagination to aid the force of reason, and scrupled not to make use of his powers as a novelist, a historian, a descriptive traveller, and a poet, to forward the great work of Christian renovation. Nor was he mistaken in his estimate of the effect which these new weapons in the contest would produce. It is by persuasion, not constraint, that all great revolutions in opinion in ages of intelligence are effected. It is the indifference, not the scepticism, of men that is chiefly to be dreaded: the danger to be apprehended is, not that they will say there is no God, but that they will live altogether without God in the world. It is therefore of incalculable importance that some writings should exist which lead men imperceptibly into the ways of truth, which should insinuate themselves into the tastes and blend with the refinements of ordinary life, and perpetually recur to the cultivated mind, with all that it admires, or loves, or venerates in the world.

13. His defects.

If with these many brilliant and noble qualities Chateaubriand had united an equal amount of strength of mind and solidity of judgment, he would have been one of the most remarkable men that modern Europe ever produced, and equally eminent in the cabinet as a

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statesman, as in the fields of literature as an author. But this was very far from being the case: indeed, till the fleetness of the racer is found combined with the strength of the charger, such a combination may be regarded as hopeless. The very circumstance which constitutes the greatness of the leaders of thought—clearness and originality of conception—disqualifies them, in the general case, from being successful as practical statesmen, or even renders them dangerous if they attempt it. They strive to carry their ideas into execution too early, and when the people are not prepared to adopt them; they forget how slowly original thought descends from the higher to the inferior strata of society; that the bulk of mankind are governed by the illustrious few among their grandfathers, not themselves. In addition to this, they are in general distinguished by an unbending disposition, and not unfrequently irritabilty of temper, the accompaniments or the failings of strong mental powers and profound internal conviction, but the qualities of all others least calculated to command esteem or conciliate affection among the majority of their countrymen. In addition to these defects, which Chateaubriand had in no small degree, he was consumed by a thirst for applause, and an inordinate vanity, wholly unworthy of his genius, and which in a manner disqualified him for the lead in the practical concerns of men. His *Mémoires d'outre Tombe*, amidst many brilliant ideas and much eloquent writing, contain pitiable proofs of weakness in this respect. The same propensity led him on many occasions to sacrifice his usefulness to his love of approbation, and rather to sink down in gloomy apathy at the progress of changes which he foresaw would prove ruinous, even to those who introduced them, than to exert his great powers in a manly spirit in the endeavour to counteract them.

Contemporary with Chateaubriand, and, like him, moulded both in sentiment and opinion by the events

of the Revolution, was another writer, of the other sex, but at the very head of all that female genius has ever effected in the works of imagination—MADAME DE STAËL. The daughter of M. Necker, and bred up in an amiable but exaggerated idea of his greatness as a statesman, she was, as a matter of necessity, early imbued with all those ideas of human perfectibility, and the unbounded virtue and intelligence of the middle and working classes of society, which, when practically applied, as a matter of necessity brought on the Revolution. The strength of this original bent was such that it survived all the experience of that convulsion, and consequently rendered her political writings estimable, rather from the genius they display, and the enthusiasm by which they are animated, than the judgment they evince, or the facts on which they are rested. Yet in cases where the influence of this disturbing element was less strongly felt, the native strength of her understanding made her take a just view of human institutions; and nowhere—not even in the writings of our own political philosophers—are more profound views to be found on the working of the English Constitution than in the eloquent treatise on the French Revolution.

14. Madame de Staël as a political writer.

But the real greatness of Madame de Staël is to be found in her romances and critical writings: *Corinne* and *De l'Allemagne* have rendered her name immortal. Notwithstanding the strength of her understanding, her imagination was still stronger: she was a perfect woman in all her emotions; and she both felt and has portrayed the affections with a truth and beauty which, if it ever has been equalled, has assuredly never been surpassed. The tender feelings in her were heightened by all that imagination, taste, and refinement could add to the native strength of passion; and her delicacy as a woman has led her to portray them with a pathos and refinement which must command the admiration of every succeeding age. Considered merely as novels, there is much that may be

15. Her character as a novelist.

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objected to both in *Corinne* and *Delphine;* in both the story is, in part at least, improbable, the catastrophe painful. Unfortunate love, ever the strongest and most lasting in this world, in both occupied her thoughts. If it be true, as has been often said, that a woman's imaginary conceptions are nothing but a picture of what has passed in her own breast, Madame de Staël had suffered much in life from the strength of her affections; and there was more reason than is ordinarily supposed in her well-known saying, that she would give all her talents to have Madame Recamier's beauty. But in the delineation of sentiment, in both these works, she has displayed a truth and knowledge of the human heart, as well as depth of feeling, which perhaps never was equalled. Her brilliant imagination and ardent genius appear not less conspicuously in the numerous disquisitions on subjects of taste, literature, and antiquity, which enrich the former. They are so skilfully introduced, that while they fascinate the mind of the reader by the justice of the sentiment, and the eloquence of the language in which they are conveyed, they all tend to enhance the interest felt in the heroine from whose impassioned life they chiefly emanate, and unfold the growth of the mutual passion from the identity of feeling in which it originated.

16. Her merits as a critic.

As a critic Madame de Staël possessed equal merits. She was distinguished by that first and greatest quality in judging of others—a vivid appreciation of their beauties, and a generous enthusiasm in discussing them. Unlike the generality of critics, who are too often envious and second-rate men, she admired greatness in others because she felt it in herself: she was so powerful that she could afford to be generous, and felt a sympathetic glow when she approached the works of genius, which she was conscious she was capable of emulating. Other critics, Schlegel and Bouterwek, may have exceeded her in the discrimination with which they have pointed out the blemishes in the great works of the German drama, but

none have equalled her in the generous enthusiasm with which she appreciated its excellencies. The masterpieces of Schiller, Goethe, and Klopstock are discussed with the ardent admiration of kindred genius, but at the same time with the discriminating judgment of genuine taste. It is said in Germany that it is no wonder the criticisms on Schiller are first-rate, for he wrote them himself; but probably that is the very reason why it may with safety be concluded that they are to be ascribed to the authoress whose name they bear. No man is a good judge of his own performances; and there is nothing in the prose writings of Schiller which either approaches to the genius of his poetical compositions, or warrants the belief that he could have written the eloquent pages of *De l'Allemagne.*

17. Her merits as a philosopher.

As a philosophic writer, Madame de Staël cannot be assigned so high a place. It is seldom that women are equal to men in that department; and nothing is more certain than that, if they were, they would lose the distinctive mark and principal charms of their sex. A philosophic woman may be the object of respect, but never by possibility of love, and there are probably few women who would willingly make the exchange. The peculiarities of Madame de Staël's mind, which rendered her so admirable in criticism, so charming in romance, made her little qualified to grapple with the evils or unfold the real principles of action in a world in which the selfish bear so large a proportion as they do in that which surrounds us. We read her disquisitions on the French Revolution and the English Constitution with pleasure, not unmixed with admiration; but it is the admiration of a fairy tale, in which fancy is so largely mingled with reality that it is regarded, on the whole, as a work of imagination. Her ardent mind led her to indulge in the dreams of perfectibility, her enthusiastic temperament to embrace the visions of optimism. Had she been a less charming woman, she would have been a much better philosopher. A practical acquaintance with

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mankind in all grades, such as a man only can acquire, and an elegant woman is necessarily without, is indispensable to a right appreciation of the probable working of the human mind in the complicated relations of society; and such an acquaintance will probably lead to conclusions very different from those formed by the benevolent dreams of the philanthropist, or the ardent soul of the dramatist.

18. Guizot: his early rise.

If Chateaubriand, notwithstanding the brilliancy of his genius, or in consequence of that very brilliancy, was little qualified to act in public affairs, or to form a dispassionate opinion regarding them, the same cannot be said of the next great author who rose into greatness with the Restoration—M. GUIZOT. This very eminent and accomplished man followed the King to Ghent, and contributed so powerfully to support the cause of the Bourbons during the Hundred Days by his pen, that on their second Restoration he was appointed to a situation of trust under Government. But he was not in the Cabinet; his political greatness had not yet begun. He is one of the men, few in England, but many in France, who have risen to political greatness solely from the force of their literary talents, and have been not so much selected by their sovereign for a minister, as forced upon him by the concurrent voice of their country. He is one of the few, too, who has proved himself equally qualified for both departments, who is not less eminent as a man of letters than as a practical statesman. His public career began as a lecturer on history; it ended by his playing the most important part on the theatre which forms history itself. The reason is, that in his mind, as in that of Marlborough, the intellectual and imaginative faculties are equally balanced; the judgment is not less matured than the conception is vast, and the *coup d'œil* extensive.

While this rare combination explains how it has happened that he has risen to eminence in both those generally

inconsistent careers, it teaches us what to expect and what not to expect in his literary compositions. He is neither imaginative nor pictorial; he neither speaks dramas to the soul, nor pictures to the eye. He seldom aims at the pathetic, and has little eloquence save what springs from the intensity of his thoughts. He is not a Livy nor a Gibbon, still less a Lamartine or a Macaulay; nature has not given him either poetical or descriptive powers. He is a man of the very highest genius, taking that word in its loftiest acceptation; but it appears not in the narrative of particular events, but in the discovery of general causes. It is in the tracing the effects of these causes through all the mazes of human events, in developing the operations of changes in society which escape ordinary observation, in seeing whence man has come in this world, and whither he is going, that his greatness consists; and in that, the loftiest region of history, he is unrivalled. There is no writer, ancient or modern, who has traced the changes of society, and the general causes which determine the fate of nations, with such just views, and so much sagacious discrimination. He is not so much a historian as a discourser on history. If ever the spirit of the philosophy of history was embodied in a human form, it is in that of M. Guizot. Robertson and Montesquieu are the only authors who approach to him in that respect, and, being the first, their merit was perhaps the greater. But Guizot has followed out the subject with a wider glance and more varied learning than either, and he has embodied in his views a more extensive view of human affairs, and more wisdom, from the stormy period in which he himself lived.

19. His peculiar style of thought.

The style of this great author is in every respect suited to his subject. He is by no means destitute of pathetic powers; many passages in his *History of the English Revolution*, as well as in his literary essays, prove that he has a mind feelingly alive to the impressions both of the beautiful and the touching. But it is only when his

20. His style of writing.

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subject absolutely requires it that he gives the reins to his disposition in this respect: in general he does not aim at the higher flights of fancy, and appears to coerce, rather than indulge, what perhaps, as in all men of genius, was the original bent of his mind. He scarce ever attempts to warm the soul or melt the feelings; he is seldom imaginative, and never descriptive, although his *Essay on the Fine Arts* proves the absence of this has not arisen from want of power to be either. But he is uniformly lucid, sagacious, and discriminating, deduces his conclusions with admirable clearness from his premises, and occasionally warms, from the innate grandeur of his thoughts, into a glow of fervent eloquence. He seems to treat of human affairs as if he viewed them from a loftier sphere than other men—as if he was elevated above the usual struggles and contests of humanity, and a superior power had withdrawn the veil which shrouds their secret causes and tendency from the gaze of sublunary beings. He cares less than most historians to dive into the secrets of cabinets; attaches little, perhaps too little, importance to individual character, but fixes his steady and piercing gaze on the great and lasting causes which in a durable manner influence human affairs.

21. His mode of viewing human affairs.

He views them not from year to year, but from century to century; and when considered in that commanding view, at a distance from the din and interest of individual action, it is surprising how much its importance disappears. It seems in the highest degree important while they live, because the men who ostensibly govern society appear at first sight to be the real authors of the changes which they introduce, or in which they bear a part. But the lapse of time, or the succession of other actors, generally reveals their secondary agency, and brings to light the real persons who put in motion the tide, by the ebb or flow of which society has been so violently agitated. Statesmen, or even generals, scarcely ever accomplish anything which had not been already prepared by general causes.

They sail often triumphantly along the stream, and make an able use of its strength and swiftness, but it is not they who put the current in motion; they embark on the waves when they see them flowing impetuously forward, and aim only at shaping their own course according to their direction. It is the men who had previously determined this direction, who had imprinted their own on the general mind, who are the real directors of human affairs: it is the giants of thought who in the end govern the world. Kings and ministers, princes and generals, warriors and legislators, are but the ministers of their blessings or curses to mankind. But theirs is only a posthumous power; it is seldom that their dominion begins till they themselves are mouldering in their graves.

22. His chief publications.

Guizot's largest undertaking is his edition of Gibbon's *Rome;* but though he has enriched the *Decline and Fall* with some notes of value, and many observations of interest, he cannot be said to have added much to that wonderful History. Even his learning and industry, though they found much to subtract from, could discern little to add to the work of the immortal Englishman. He has also begun a *History of the English Revolution,* to which he had been led by his publication of a collection of memoirs relative to that convulsion, in twenty-five volumes; but this work has only got the length of four volumes, and comes to the conclusion only of the second act in that mournful tragedy. It is lucid, able, and impartial, but it wants dramatic power, and has attained no great success. It was in his lectures from the chair of history at Paris that his genius shone forth in its proper sphere and its true lustre; and there he has produced works stamped with the signet-seal of immortality. His *Civilisation en France,* in five volumes, and *Essais sur l'Histoire de France,* and *Civilisation Européene,* each in one volume, are the fruit of his labours in that chair, and in all the same profound thought, sagacious discrimina-

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tion, and lucid view are conspicuous. But by far the greatest of them all is the *Civilisation Européene*, and it throws a clearer light on the history of society in modern times, and the general progress of mankind from the exertions of its inhabitants, than any other work in existence. The accession of Guizot to the Ministry of Louis Philippe for several years put a stop to his literary labours, to which his expulsion from office and ruin of fortune by the Revolution of 1848 has given a fresh impulse. But though the same mind may be discerned in them all, it is in his earlier works that the originality of his genius and vigour of his thought are chiefly conspicuous. Experience and reading often add much to the illustration of original conception, or the facts by which it is to be supported, but they seldom extend the conception itself. Intellectual capacity often exists to a very advanced age, but the creative power is seldom seen except in early life; and there is perhaps no man of original thought, the germ of whose ideas was not formed before he was thirty years of age.

23. Lamartine.

If ever two great men stood in striking contrast to each other, it was Guizot and his victorious antagonist in the strife which overturned the throne of Louis Philippe. If the turn of their respective minds is considered, it will not appear surprising that Guizot was the conservative minister, LAMARTINE the democratic leader, on that occasion. As much as the former is distinguished by historical knowledge, patient research, and sober judgment, the latter is characterised by ardent imagination, dramatic power, and pictorial splendour. Such is the vividness of the conceptions of this charming writer, such the fervour of his eloquence, and the brilliancy of his fancy, that they have tinged truth itself with the colours of fiction, and led to much really true being discredited in his writings, merely from the glow of the language in which it was conveyed. Like Macaulay, he is at once both a poet and a historian—a strange combination, according

to the ordinary idea formed of the qualities requisite for the latter, but not unlikely to lead to greatness, if the former character is in due subordination to the latter; and the opinion of Mr Fox is well founded, that history, in the art of composition, is to be placed next to poetry and before oratory.

24. His defects as a historian.

If Lamartine's accuracy of research, patience of investigation, and sobriety of judgment, had been equal to his vividness of fancy, warmth of imagination, and fervour of eloquence, he would have made the greatest and most popular historian of modern times. But, unfortunately, this is very far from being the case; and in truth, these qualities of mind are so opposite, that probably to the end of the world they never will be found united in equal proportions in the same individual. He forms his opinions from his impressions, not his impressions from his opinions; "impressionable comme une femme" is his true characteristic. Not that he wants a clear intellect or the reasoning faculty; on the contrary, he possesses both in a very high degree, as several *short* passages and passing reflections in all his works demonstrate. But such is the ardour of his mind and the brilliancy of his conceptions, that these qualities are kept in abeyance, or concealed amidst the lustre of the language in which they are enveloped. He thinks from what he feels, not feels from what he thinks; and the former impressions are in general so forcible that he loses all control over them by the power of the latter. Such is the power of his descriptions, and his passion for dramatic effect, that even in portraying or narrating what is strictly true, his works pass for a creation of imagination, and those who follow in his footsteps are often surprised to find how much they are founded in reality. Whoever has tracked his wanderings along the shores of the Mediterranean, must be aware that he has not so much exaggerated what he had seen in his descriptions, as seen them through a Claude Lorraine medium; and those who have followed his steps in the History of the Girondists and the

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Restoration, as the author has done, must often do him the justice to say, that much of what passes with ordinary readers for fiction, is in reality only a dramatic narrative of real events.

25. His defects.

He is a sincere and devout believer in human perfectibility, a circumstance which explains how it has happened that, though of noble birth, he is attached to democratic principles; though inspired with generous feelings, he was instrumental in establishing a sordid and vulgar republic. Nearly all of similar habits and descent, who become the partisans of such changes, are led into them by that amiable illusion. Of course it deprives his historical and political writings of all weight in the formation of rational and lasting opinion; the first requisite in all productions which are to have that effect, is a correct estimate of the average character of, and of what may reasonably be expected from, human nature. Like all fanatics, whether in religion or politics, he is wholly inaccessible to reason, and beyond the reach of facts, how clear or convincing soever. Accordingly, his belief in human perfectibility and the virtue of the masses is unshaken, although he has himself confessed, in his *History of the Revolution of* 1848, that he himself and all his followers would have been thrown by the mob into the Seine, when assaulted in the Hôtel de Ville on April 10 of that year, if they had not been protected by three battalions of the Garde Mobile.

26. His want of authorities in his writings, and personal vanity.

He never on any occasion gives the authority on which any historical statement is founded,—a defect which not only deprives his works of all value as books of reference, but often does great injustice to himself, by leading his readers to imagine that the whole narrative is fiction, and that he gave no authorities because he really had none to give. He is inspired, like Chateaubriand, with the most inordinate and contemptible vanity, which is in an especial manner conspicuous in the history of the important events

in which he himself bore a share, and has made his beautiful episode of "Raphael," which none who know the human heart can doubt is in the main founded in truth, to pass with the generality of readers for a mere romance, in which a vain man has recounted imaginary *bonnes fortunes*. But these, and many other weaknesses, which have proved fatal to his political weight and reputation, must be forgotten when we recollect what is really estimable in his character and elevated in his sentiments; and in particular, the admirable presence of mind and heroic courage with which he contended with the savage multitude in the Hôtel de Ville in the beginning of the Revolution of 1848, and prevented the convulsion which he himself had so large a share in producing from terminating in a second Reign of Terror.

27. Sismondi.

SISMONDI, if the most valuable qualities of a historian are considered, is the greatest writer in that department which France has ever produced. He is by no means, however, the most popular, and never will become such. He has much, as a historian, which we desiderate in Lamartine; but, unfortunately, Lamartine has much which we desiderate in him. Indefatigable in research, patient in investigation, cautious in conclusion, benevolent in feeling, he is at the same time philosophic in thought, liberal in religious, and independent in political principle. He has interspersed his lengthened narrative with general reflections, which for depth of thought and justice of observation never were surpassed. But he is neither dramatic nor pictorial, seldom kindles the imagination, and still seldomer touches the heart. Extensive research and copious information are his great characteristics, and in these respects it is impossible to consult a more valuable writer. Unlike Lamartine, he gives his authority for every material fact asserted, and has filled his pages with such a multitude of official documents, that they often rather wear the aspect of a collection of state

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papers than a literary composition. This patient examination of, and constant reference to authority, render his works invaluable as books of reference, and as a storehouse of authentic information; but, unfortunately, they have very much impeded their popularity. No human ability can render lengthened quotations from state papers, letters, or deeds interesting; and where the judicious system is not adopted, of throwing them into notes or an appendix, though the work may be valuable as a repertory of information, it will never be interesting as a history. This defect is so conspicuous in Sismondi, whose Annals of the Italian Republics have swelled to sixteen, of France to two-and-thirty volumes, that perhaps no reader has ever got through the whole of both; and he himself is so sensible of it, that he has published admirable abridgments of each, which contain nearly all the philosophic conclusions that render the larger works so valuable and have attained deserved popularity. But this very circumstance shows a great deficiency in the original works; no abridgment of histories, written with pictorial ability or dramatic power, ever had any success; you might as well attempt to abridge *Waverley* as Gibbon's *Decline and Fall.*

28. His social and political essays.

Least popular with the present generation of all his works, because most adverse to general opinion, the *Social and Political Essays* of this profound thinker and erudite scholar are perhaps the most valuable. They are entirely original, and they run directly adverse to the current of general thought; it is not surprising, therefore, that they have made very little impression on the generation among which they appeared. He himself has told us that they have had very few readers, and that he does not think they would have had one if the English parliamentary reports had not established facts which could be explained on no other principle. It by no means follows from this, however, that the doctrines he has advanced are not in themselves just, and in the highest

degree important to the future happiness of mankind; present popularity in works of abstract thought is an indication of coincidence with general opinion, but by no means either of truth or ultimate success. Few physicians, and none above forty, would admit during his life Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood; ages elapsed before the Copernican system forced itself on general belief; and public opinion in Italy unanimously supported the Inquisition, when they prosecuted Galileo for asserting that the earth moved.

29. His political opinions.

Sismondi is a Protestant and a Republican; he deems kings and nobles are useless excrescences upon society; and his political *beau ideal* is a collection of republics, with no established faith, and held together, like the American Union, only by the slender bond of a federal alliance. It is from the influence, therefore, of no prepossession against the present tendency all over the civilised world to popular institutions, that he has so strongly and ably at the same time inculcated the doctrine that this tendency is fraught with the most serious evils which at present desolate, and in the end will occasion the entire ruin of Europe. These evils, according to him, do not arise from forms of government, nor are they to be ascribed to faulty legislation; they originate in the nature of things, and are the direct consequence of that state of society which is generally considered as fraught with unlimited blessings. The accumulation of capital, the increase of machinery, the spread of manufactures, the growth of large towns, the cheapening of provisions, the free circulation of labour in an old community, which are commonly regarded as the surest symptoms of general prosperity, in his view are the unmistakable indications of social disease and the prognostics of approaching ruin. In them he sees the sad effects of the undue preponderance of capital, and the desperate consequences of the principles of unlimited competition and free trade, when applied to the labouring classes of the community. Probably there is no dis-

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interested person who contemplates the present state of society, whether in France or the British Islands, who will hesitate to admit that these views are well founded, and that the causes of decay which proved fatal to the colossal fabric of the Roman empire are even now in full activity in both countries. But they do not warrant the gloomy and desponding conclusions which Sismondi draws from them, any more than the increasing ills which accumulate round individual old age justify melancholy views in regard to the human race. The evils arising from the sway of capital and the principle of competition to the great bulk of the community are not imaginary, but they are partial, and are the means by which Providence, at the time when such a change has become necessary, checks the growth of aged communities, and provides for the dispersion of the human race. He who is not convinced of this by the simultaneous growth of the evils in the Old World and the opening of the reserve treasures of California and Australia in the New, would not be persuaded though one rose from the dead.[1]

[1] Sismondi, Essais Sociales, 3 vols.

30. Auguste and Amadée Thierry.

The two THIERRYS belong to the same school as Sismondi, but they have eschewed the chief faults which have impeded the popularity of his voluminous publications. We perceive in them the same untiring industry and patient research by which the historian of the Italian republics is distinguished, and the same combination of antiquarian lore and accuracy of fact with general views and philosophic thought, which render his works so valuable. But the method taken of communicating this information is infinitely more skilful. Not less than he, they give the authorities for every paragraph, often for every sentence; but, unlike him, they do not swell the text with long and tedious quotations from original documents, but quote the material words relied on in a few lines, or even words, in a note. Perhaps this is sometimes carried too far, for, by giving only detached expressions

or sentences from the original writers, they suggest a doubt whether the sense is truly conveyed, and whether the context, if fully given, would not in some material respects contradict it. But there can be no doubt that it is a very great improvement on the more voluminous system, for it not only renders the text much shorter, but more continuous and uniform in style, and therefore interesting, than when there is a continual interruption to make way for antiquated quotations. And the result appears in the different success of the different writers; for the *History of the Conquest of England by the Normans*, by Auguste, and of the *Princes of the Carlovingian Race*, and of *Gaul under the Romans*, by Amadée Thierry, each in three volumes, have attained very great popularity, and gone through several editions; while the forty-eight volumes of the *History of France and of the Italian Republics* slumber in respected obscurity amidst the dust of our libraries.

31. Their opposite principles.

Although brothers, belonging to the same school of history, equally fond of antiquity, and adopting the same style of composition, the thoughts of these two very remarkable men are widely different from each other. Auguste, the author of the *Conquest of England by the Normans*, and of the *Essays on the History of France*, belongs to the Liberal school; he is almost a republican in politics, and, like others of his sect, anything but strongly influenced by religious impressions. But he is humane and philanthropic, and not only eminently dramatic, but often pathetic, in his narrative of important events. Amadée is the very reverse in thought of his brother; he is eminently Christian in his ideas, and has directed his great powers with remarkable success to the illustration from historical and antiquarian sources of the blessings which Christianity has conferred upon mankind. Upon considering his luminous writings, and comparing them with the arrogant dogmatism of the Roman Catholic writers at an earlier period, which all the eloquence of

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Bossuet could scarcely disguise, it is impossible to avoid seeing how much the cause of true religion has been advanced by the experience of suffering, and the wrench to general thought induced by the Revolution; and on how much more solid a basis the truth of Christianity is now erected than it was in the days of papal bulls and sacerdotal domination.

32. Michaud.

MICHAUD belongs to the same school, both in religious thought and historical composition, as Amadée Thierry, and he is an author of very great merit. His *History of the Crusades*, in six volumes, is by far the best narrative that has yet appeared of those memorable wars; and although it is not free from the great defect of the antiquarian school, in being somewhat overloaded with long quotations from monkish chronicles or contemporary annalists, it promises to be the most durable. For its success it is mainly indebted to the remarkable combination which the author exhibits of antiquarian research, with an ardent imagination and remarkable powers of description. So enthusiastic was his disposition, that it led him to make a pilgrimage to Egypt and the Holy Land, in order to be able to describe from his own observation, and verify with his own eyes, the scenes of the exploits of his heroes. This has led to one of the most interesting books of travel which ever was written, in which, perhaps, even more than in his *History of the Crusades*, the accomplished and enthusiastic author has shown how much interesting association and historical knowledge can add to the attractions even of the most beautiful scenes of nature. If Chateaubriand has visited the Holy Sepulchre with the mingled feelings of a classical scholar and a devout pilgrim, and Lamartine with the highly-wrought imagination of a poet and brilliant conceptions of a painter, Michaud has gone over the same ground with the heroic spirit of a Crusader; and the reader has now the extraordinary advantage, in the travels of these charming writers, of combining *all* the associations which can recur to the culti-

vated mind, in visiting the scenes which must ever be the most interesting of any on earth to the human race.

33. Barante.

BARANTE belongs to the same school as Michaud, and, like him, is an example of the reaction of genius against the infidel principles and innovating ideas of the Revolution. His greatest work, the *History of the Dukes of Burgundy*, has the same fault as the works of Sismondi and Michaud, that of being overloaded with unnecessarily long quotations from contemporary annalists and chronicles; but it nevertheless carries the reader on through ten volumes, by the talent for description and dramatic powers which the author possesses. He is inspired, like Sir Walter Scott, by the true spirit of chivalry, and carries us back, almost like that great magician, to the storming of castles, the jousting of knights, the distressed damsels and blood-thirsty tyrants of that poetical but unhappy period. He is generally understood to have been the author of the *Memoirs of Madame de la Rochejaquelein;* and if so, there is no author in any language who has exhibited greater graphic powers, or a more decided talent for educing interest from heroic incident or pathetic event.

34. Salvandy.

SALVANDY belongs to the same school as Barante and Michaud, but he is more philosophical and reflecting than either. His *History of Poland* evinces it. It contains all the pictorial power and picturesque effect of either of these writers, but more reflection and observation, and therefore it is more attractive to a reflecting mind. Nowhere so well as in his brilliant pages is to be found a development of the real causes of the mournful fate of that memorable people, the bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and yet the prey of every assailant within their own bosom; often victorious, but never capable of taking advantage of victory; ever jealous of authority, but never able to repress anarchy; the deliverer of Vienna in one age, and in the next blotted from the book

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of nations. In his pages, as in the *History of Ireland*, if written with equal wisdom, is to be found the most decisive proof of the great truth, that the first necessity of mankind in rude periods is a strong government, and that no calamities are so great, because none so irremediable, as such as deliver them up to the slavery of their own passions. Salvandy is a Liberal, but he is a Liberal of the new school—that is, warned by the errors and instructed by the sufferings of the Revolution. In his pages, accordingly, there is to be found constant reference to the historical blessings of, and present necessity for revelation; and when France had been for some years insane, after the triumph of the barricades in 1830, his sagacious eye first divined whither things under popular rule were tending; and his intrepid hand first drew aside the veil from the eyes of a suffering, and therefore repentant people.

35. Thiers: his principles.

The historians who have hitherto been considered have treated chiefly of the olden time, and their works exhibit the reaction in the human mind after the delusions and disappointments of the Revolution. But writers of great eminence are not awanting, who have treated of that convulsion itself, and, uninstructed by the lessons of experience, still endeavour to vindicate its principles, and apologise for the crimes of its authors. In the very foremost rank of this class of writers is to be placed M. THIERS, who, like most of the other modern statesmen of France, raised to eminence by his literary talents, has played an important part on the theatre of public affairs, and taken a share in the most decisive events which, during the last quarter of a century, have determined the fate of his country. His first work, and the one which raised him to eminence, but by no means his best, is the *History of the Revolution*, in twelve volumes. In it he endeavours to assert the principles and palliate the excesses of that convulsion; but he does this in a very singular way. It is by representing the latter as the inevitable consequence of the former, and the authors of all the bloodshed which

took place as impelled by an invincible necessity which it was impossible to resist, and for yielding to which, therefore, they were noways blamable. It is surprising that so acute an author did not perceive that such a doctrine, if really well founded, was more decisive against the possibility of self-government than any other that could by possibility be imagined; for if the practical application of Liberal principles leads of necessity to such results, what can be so great a misfortune as their extension among mankind? CHAP. XVIII.

36. His merits and defects.

M. Thiers has very great merits as a historian—in some respects greater than any who has recently appeared in France, fertile as it has been in great men in that department of literature. Not only is he ingenious, dramatic, and eloquent, but his writings abound in important general reflections, and often in just and generous appreciation of individual character. He himself affords the best illustration of the truth of his own beautiful observation, in reference to the meeting of M. Barnave with the Queen, in the journey from Varennes: "How often would factions the most opposite be reconciled, if they could meet and read each other's hearts!" But by far his greatest merit consists in the luminous survey he gives of countries, especially in relation to military events, and the clear and lucid manner in which he unfolds the principles of strategy applicable to the campaigns which he had to describe. In this he is unrivalled in civil, and never was exceeded by military historians; and his writings afford a striking proof how completely a strong native bent in the mind of an author can overcome the want of practical experience, or acquaintance with the actual operations of war. His chief defect is the almost entire absence of quotation of authority, and its inevitable consequence, great and frequent inaccuracy in details—a fault which, besides depriving his works of their chief value as books of authority, exposes him to constant well-founded attacks from that numerous class of writers who look to accuracy in these

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respects rather than general merit, and nibble at the corners of an edifice of which they are unable to throw down the pillars. In regard to English transactions, he labours under one grievous defect, which has made his works of little value in regard to its history: *he does not understand English*, a circumstance which renders him about as competent to write our annals as the author would be to convey an idea of those of France, if he could not read its language.

37. His History of the Consulate and Empire.

By far the best work of M. Thiers, and one which belongs to the highest class of political history, is his *History of the Consulate and Empire*, now in course of publication at Paris. It shows that his mind had grown immensely during the course of his political career, and cast off many of the indiscretions or errors of his more juvenile years. He is no longer the ardent student fresh from the revolutionary school, and ready, on all occasions, to share in its dreams, or palliate its excesses; but the experienced statesman, versed in the ways of the world, and taught by disaster the futile nature of all visions of perfectibility, founded upon the immaculate character of the great majority of men. His talent for military history seems to have increased with practice, and acquaintance with the leading generals of the period; and there is no work in existence which the general reader can consult with more pleasure, or the military with greater instruction, than his *History of the Campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram.* But in addition to this, his political opinions appear to have undergone a considerable change with the lapse of time, and a practical acquaintance with the duties of statesmanship. His mind is candid; and albeit bred in the school of Infidelity and the Revolution, his late volumes contain frequent allusion to Supreme Superintendence, and the punishment, even in this world, of the sins of men. But above all, his acquaintance with the secrets of cabinets and

state papers has led to his last work being enriched with a great variety of important information not to be met with in any other publication; and in no other work is there to be found so copious an account of the diplomacy of the Empire, and the internal legislation of Napoleon.

38. Lacretelle.

Inferior in genius to Thiers, and unacquainted, like him, with the practical duties of a statesman, M. LACRETELLE has still considerable merits, and will always hold a respectable place among French historians. His *History of France during the Eighteenth Century*, though not distinguished either by the philosophy of Guizot, the brilliancy of Lamartine, or the military descriptions of Thiers, is yet a very valuable work; and to one who wishes to obtain a general idea of the events of that momentous period, without diving into all its details, is perhaps the best that can be referred to. But by far his most masterly production is the *Histoire des Guerres de la Religion*; and it is not only highly interesting, but written with the brevity and general glance which is perhaps the most indispensable element for general success in historical compositions. In any other age or country he would have attained great and deserved eminence; but such is the constellation of historical talent which has arisen in France since the storm of the Revolution was succeeded by the lull of the Restoration, that he has already been eclipsed by more brilliant writers.

39. Capefigue.

M. CAPEFIGUE is both an abler and a more voluminous writer than Lacretelle, but such is the multitude of his publications that he is well-nigh buried under their weight. His works, like those of Voltaire, exceed a hundred volumes; and no one need be told that, among such a multitude, many must be of inferior merit, and made up, like the medicines of apothecaries, of drugs prepared by others. Some of his works are admirable; his *History of Louis XIV.* is by far the best which has ever been

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written of that momentous and interesting period. The works he has published on contemporary history, particularly the *History of the Empire and the Restoration*, are brilliant annals, interspersed with much fine description, and many striking observations. He is a devout Catholic, and therefore all his accounts of the Protestants are to be taken with some allowance; and a loyal Royalist, but there he is less to be suspected, for his mind in politics is eminently candid, and, in truth, often tinged with ultra-Liberal opinions. But his views are philanthropic, his disposition humane, and he is inspired with the quality of all others the most valuable in the narration of human events—a warm appreciation of the generous and noble, and detestation of the mean and the selfish in character or actions. His great defect is, that, in many of his histories, especially of the olden time, there is too much *bookmaking*, too copious quotations from original chronicles and legal instruments, and too little attention to the first requisite in composition—unity of effect. He has undertaken to write nearly a continuous History of France, from Charlemagne to Louis Philippe, and the entire series exceeds a hundred volumes. It need hardly be said, that it is altogether impossible that works of such magnitude can be either popular or generally read. They are the quarry-stones from which history is constructed, not history. Unity of style and composition is as indispensable in this as in any other of the objects of human thought; and in none is Hesiod's observation more applicable, that the half is often greater than the whole.

40. Michelet.

One historical writer, second in some respects to none which have preceded him in this department of literature, remains to be considered, and that is M. MICHELET. It is impossible to read the works of this very able and original writer, without being filled with the highest admiration for his genius, mingled with not unfrequent regret at its misapplication. No writer, ancient or modern, has

surveyed with a more keen and searching glance the annals of the olden time, or more ably and lucidly illustrated the successive migrations and settlement of the great families of mankind, as well as the distinctive marks which in every age have characterised the dispositions of their descendants. If any additional refutation were awanting of the long popular delusion of the Revolution, that man is the creature of institutions, or any farther confirmation of the profound observation of Montesquieu, that institutions are the creature of man, it would be found in his learned and interesting pages. His style is graphic, his mind at once dramatic and pictorial—great qualities in a historian, especially when accompanied by the industry and research which distinguish his writings. The signet-mark of genius is everywhere conspicuous. Unfortunately, that of judgment and wisdom is frequently awanting. There are many philosophic views, as well as much brilliant expression, in his history of the early periods of the French monarchy; but in his *History of the Revolution*, now in the course of publication at Paris, although these qualities are not awanting, there is such an intermixture of violence, prejudice, and passion, as must deprive that work not merely of all weight with future times, but even of all influence in promoting the views of the extreme democratic party to which he is attached.

41. Military histories and memoirs.

The number and extraordinary merit of the historical works which have now been noticed, all of which have issued from the press of Paris during the Restoration, may well excite surprise, and is the clearest indication both of the strong bent to historical and political subjects which the public mind has undergone since the Revolution, and of the reaction against the innovating doctrines which has taken place from the experience of their effects. But these works, numerous and able as they are, exhibit but a partial picture of the extent of this bent, or the deep hold which, from the intensity of former emotions, political works have

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taken of the general mind. The *military histories* and *memoirs* exhibit it in its full proportions, and they constitute a branch of literature so peculiar to France, and which has been worked of late years with such effect, that no account of the public thought in that country, during that period, can be considered as complete which does not bring it prominently forward. Both species of composition, indeed, have been long cultivated with signal success in France, as the military histories of Folard and Guibert, and Petito's collection of a hundred and sixty volumes of memoirs, prove; but the ability brought to bear upon them since the Revolution has been so remarkable that all former productions are thrown into the shade.

42. Napoleon Buonaparte.

In the very first rank, in both departments, is to be placed a man whose celebrity as an actor of history has been such that he is scarcely ever considered in his proper place as a narrator of its events—NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE. His genius, however, was such that it is hard to say whether it shines forth with most lustre in his own actions, or in criticising those of others—in military and political measures, or in the narrative of his own or his predecessors' achievements. In both, not only do the same clear intellect and brilliant imagination, but the same luminous view and burning thought, appear conspicuous. The great characteristics of his compositions, as of those of all men of the highest class of intellect, are clearness and force in ideas, and brevity and vigour in language. Burke is not more powerful in expression, Johnson more lucid in thought. But in addition to this, he had an ardent and poetical imagination, and it is easy to see from his expressions and style of expression, that if he had not equalled Alexander in the lustre of his conquests, he was qualified to have rivalled Homer in the brilliancy of his conceptions. Much doubt was at first expressed, on their appearance, as to whether the St Helena Memoirs were his genuine composition; but time has now vindi-

cated the author's opinion, expressed at the time, that it was surprising there should be any doubt on the subject, for nature did not in general produce two Napoleons in the same generation.

43. His merits and defects.

It is not to be supposed, however, from this, that either Napoleon's Memoirs, dictated to Generals Montholon and Gourgaud at St Helena, or his conversations, recorded by Las Cases and Drs O'Meara and Antomarchi at the same place, are unexceptionable works. On the contrary, in all the characteristic faults of his mind are conspicuous; and in the last, which were not revised by himself, and where his words were probably not reported with the fidelity of a Boswell, there is much reason to suspect the interpolation, in some places, of the impassioned ideas and ulcerated feelings of his attendants. But there can be no doubt that, in the main, they are a faithful transcript of his thoughts, if it was from nothing else than the brilliant genius, and identity with his acknowledged compositions, which they exhibit. With regard to his own Memoirs, there is no doubt their authenticity is unquestionable, and they exhibit his mind in its real proportions, with all its great talents and equally great deficiencies. Clearness and force of intellectual vision are the most remarkable features of the former, prejudice and prepossession of the latter. He saw his own side of every question with the utmost force, and expressed his views upon it with the greatest precision and vigour; but he was by no means equally accessible to considerations on the other side. Having made up his mind on any subject, he immediately closed the door against every opposite argument or fact; or rather, he closed the door when he *began* to think, and formed his opinions from his preconceived ideas alone. Hence the uniform vigour and clearness of his thoughts, and their frequent error and dangerous tendency—peculiarities which are not only conspicuous in his writings, but are the real explanations of his long-continued success and ultimate fall. Truth, in contested questions, is never to be elicited but

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by the attentive consideration and impartial weighing of *both* sides. It is well known what sort of decision a judge will give who makes up his mind upon hearing one party only. Durable success is to be attained in action in no other way. Temporary triumph may attend the adoption of one-sided ideas, but the reaction is generally as violent as the action. Hence it is that so many of the greatest men recorded in history have also been in the end the most unfortunate.

44. His disregard of truth.

In one respect, however, there is a peculiarity in Napoleon's writings which is less excusable, and the influence of which appears not less in the chequered events of his life. This is his entire disregard of truth when it interfered with his preconceived ideas, and the unblushing, or perhaps it should rather be said, *unconscious* effrontery with which he continued the most mendacious statements, after their falsehood had been demonstrated, not merely to others, but to himself. So far did he carry this extraordinary peculiarity, that we are told by his private secretary and panegyrist Meneval, that he formed an idea to himself, often totally unfounded, of the strength of the various corps and divisions in his army; and having done so, he issued his orders, and formed his expectations of them, as if they were of that strength, without the slightest regard to the returns of the commanders, which showed they were not of half the amount.* Unconquerable adherence to error, in point of fact, in the face of the clearest evidence, is, in like manner, often so characteristic of his writings, where any of his marked prepossessions is concerned, that one is apt to imagine that the account of the peculiarity given by his panegyrists is the true one, that his imagination was so ardent that his wishes were, literally

* "Dans le calcul des hommes qui devaient composer ses bataillons, ses régiments ou divisions, *il enflait toujours le résumé total.* On ne peut pas croire qu'il voulût se faire illusion à lui-même, mais il jugeait nécessaire de donner le change sur la force de ses corps. Quelques représentations qu'on lui fit, *il repoussait l'évidence, et persistait opiniâtrément dans son erreur volontaire de calcul.*"—MENEVAL, *Vie privée de Napoléon,* iii. 121.

speaking, the father to his thoughts, and that what he desired he really believed to be true. Like insane persons, he often reasoned on imaginary conceptions as if they had been real facts; but, unlike them, assuming the facts to be true, none ever drew from them more just conclusions, or argued with more mathematical rigour in regard to their probable consequences.

45. General Jomini.

Inferior to Napoleon in genius, and greatly so in vigour and condensation of expression, GENERAL JOMINI is much his superior in impartiality and solidity of judgment. His *History of the Wars of the Revolution*, in sixteen volumes; his *Life of Napoleon*, in four volumes; and that of *Frederick the Great*, in three volumes, are perhaps the most just and discriminating works on military strategy which modern Europe has produced. He traces with admirable sagacity and distinctness the most important events in war to the application or neglect of a few leading principles; and he does this in so simple and perspicuous a manner, that his views can be perfectly apprehended, not merely by the military, but the ordinary reader. He wants the vigour and brevity of Napoleon's expression, and his annals of the wars of the Revolution are characterised by the ordinary defect in military histories—undue length, and too great attention to subordinate details. He became conscious, however, of this defect, and in his *Life of Napoleon* events are simplified and *massed* as much as the most ardent admirers of *breadth* in composition could desire. Appreciated in the very highest degree by all military readers, his writings are not so generally read as they should be in France, from the circumstance of the author, a Swiss by birth, having left the service of Napoleon, and entered that of Russia, on the eve of the battle of Bautzen. It is natural that it should be so; but Jomini merely went over himself; he did not, like Ney or Marlborough, employ his power to destroy the prince who had bestowed it; and when the passions of the moment have

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subsided, there can be no doubt that his work will be the standard one on military strategy all over Europe.

46. General Mathieu Dumas.

Unequal to Jomini in military science or political thought, GENERAL MATHIEU DUMAS is greatly his superior in picturesque power and graphic effect. Like Xenophon, he has described with the fidelity of a soldier, but the soul of a poet and the eye of a painter, the most important events of Napoleon's life, in many of which he himself bore a conspicuous part; and he has done this with so much simplicity and elegance that few works in any age will bear a comparison with it. His description of the passage of the Splugen, in particular, and the operations of the corps which he commanded on the flank of the Austrians in 1801, on the confines of the Grisons and the Tyrol, as well as of the crossing of the St Bernard and campaign of Marengo, are among the most fascinating pieces of military history which ever were written, and will bear a comparison with the most admired passages in Xenophon or Livy. It is only to be regretted, for the fame of this eloquent writer, that his work, being in eighteen volumes, and only comprising nine years of Napoleon's campaigns, is too voluminous for the general reader; and hence it is regarded rather as a storehouse from which subsequent writers, and none more than the author, have drawn their most interesting materials, rather than a work which is itself to find its way into every well-furnished library.

47. General Pelet.

The work of Mathieu Dumas terminates with the Treaty of Tilsit; but the next great campaign of Napoleon has been recorded by another military writer in a kindred spirit, and with equal graphic power. GENERAL PELET, an ardent admirer of Napoleon and the whole Imperial régime, has at least done ample justice to one of his campaigns, for there does not exist in any language a more splendid military work than his account of the campaigns of Aspern and Wagram. It is in four volumes, and narrates only the events of a few months;

yet it is so interesting that there are probably few readers who do not regret its brevity rather than complain of its prolixity; and certainly there is no author who has felt how absolutely interest in narrative is dependent on minuteness of detail, who will affirm that he has erred on the side of excessive length. In truth, the events of that single campaign exceeded in interest and importance those of many entire pacific reigns. His account of the battle of Wagram, in particular, and the matchless exploit of throwing the bridge at Enzersdorf over the Danube on the night preceding that great event, amidst the war of elements and the louder roar of artillery, is a perfect masterpiece, and never, it may confidently be affirmed, will be surpassed in military history.

48. Count Segur.

If the campaign of Wagram has found a worthy annalist in General Pelet, and those of Austerlitz and Friedland in General Mathieu Dumas, that of 1812 has called forth the powers of another writer equally suited to its description—COUNT SEGUR. Although not a military man, but an officer in the Emperor's household, he was too near headquarters not to be familiar with military councils, and his situation gave him ample opportunities of becoming acquainted with the secret springs of the most important events. His disposition and turn of mind, dark and gloomy, but imaginative, qualified him in a peculiar manner to describe with force and fidelity the terrible disasters of the Moscow campaign, of which he had been an eyewitness. Exaggeration was impossible in such a case; the utmost stretch of the most gloomy imagination, coupled with the highest powers of pathos and description, fell short of the horrors of that dreadful catastrophe. He has, accordingly, by combining a dramatic account of the proceedings in the councils with a pictorial description of the sufferings of the retreat, produced a work which, in point of terrible and romantic interest, cannot be surpassed. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that many of his speeches were imaginary, or at least largely

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amplified from very scanty materials; but they are probably not more so than those which Livy or Sallust put into the mouths of their chiefs. There were no short-hand reporters in attendance in either instance, but both the ancient and modern authors have probably condensed into one speech the ideas which at the time were prevalent at headquarters, and which convey a faithful, though perhaps somewhat too dramatic a picture of the reasons advanced for and against every measure of importance. Many other authors—in particular, General Clausewitz and M. Chambray—have given narratives of higher authority and greater accuracy than Segur; but there is none who has equalled him in picturesque effect, powers of description, and consequent general popularity.

49. Baron Fain.

It was the good fortune of Napoleon to have as his private secretary, in his last and greatest campaigns, an author who has proved himself adequate to do full justice, and in some instances more than justice, to his merits in those memorable events. BARON FAIN, though bred a diplomatist, and neither a professional soldier nor a practised writer, has proved himself equal to either in his account of the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. His work on these is invaluable as an authentic, and, in general, veracious record of the greatest military events of which Europe has ever been the theatre, and in the last of which especially the military genius of the Emperor, at length freed from the restraint and the necessities of diplomatic negotiation, shone forth with unprecedented lustre. The materials on which Fain has constructed his narratives are for the most part official, and his narrative of events to a surprising degree correct and trustworthy. If it occasionally is tinged by an excessive admiration for, and desire to palliate the errors of his hero, that was scarcely avoidable in the situation in which Baron Fain was placed; and whatever may be said of sycophancy to prosperous, all mankind must respect fidelity to fallen greatness.

50. The Memoirs of France during the Revolution.

If the military histories of France, which appeared in such multitudes, and were distinguished by such ability, during the Restoration, is a striking proof how strongly, by the events of the Empire, the public mind in that country had been turned to warlike achievements, the still greater crowd of memoirs which issued from the press during the same period is a yet stronger proof how violently the passions of the people had been excited by the mournful catastrophes of the Revolution, and how insatiable was the thirst which all classes felt for the fullest details of all its tragedies. It seemed impossible to satisfy this craving. Volume after volume, work after work appeared, and almost all were bought up and read with the utmost avidity. Those which had any pretensions to authenticity were eminently successful; others, in the outset at least, not less so, which were soon discovered to have the signet-mark of forgery stamped upon them. The latter were often the most ably written and interesting,—a circumstance which is easily explained, when it is recollected that the great thirst for works of this description necessarily led to extensive attempts at imitation, and that the profits attending the most successful created quite a profession of literary men, who were admitted to the papers of some remarkable political character, and from the materials thus obtained reared up a voluminous work, which they dignified with the title of his own memoirs. The authorship of many of the most valuable of these was from the beginning known in the literary circles of Paris; as the *Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*, which is a most authentic and important work, is known to have been composed by M. d'Allonville from the papers of Prince Hardenberg; and the *Memoirs of Fouché*, by M. Alphonse Beauchamp, from the papers of that arch-traitor. But independent of these compilations, many of which are most valuable works, there are several memoirs by eminent persons of undoubted authenticity, which deserve to be noticed,

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as well from their intrinsic merit as from the talent and opportunities of knowledge which their authors enjoyed.

51. Bourrienne.

At the head of these must be placed M. BOURRIENNE, private secretary to Napoleon during the eventful period of the Consulate and the first year of the Empire, and himself a man of no ordinary discrimination and talent. His work is of great value, as containing an account of the conversations and habits of Napoleon during the eventful period of the Consulate and the first year of the Empire; and although he appears to have become afterwards involved in some pecuniary transactions, which led to his losing his situation, and being sent to a distant but lucrative banishment at Hamburg, yet his disgrace does not appear to have rendered him insensible to the merits of his early patron, or prevented him from giving a most interesting and faithful account of the years when he acted as his private secretary. His style is simple, clear, and unambitious; and the genuineness of the words which he puts into the mouth of his imperial master may in general be tested by the superiority of the ability which they indicate to that shown in those which he ascribes to himself.

52. The Duchess of Abrantes.

The DUCHESS OF ABRANTES is another writer of memoirs, whose peculiar situation and opportunities gave her advantages of no ordinary kind in delineating the character and habits of the great hero, as well as in observing and describing the manners of the age in which she lived. She had one great advantage over Bourrienne —she was intimate with the Emperor before he became great, and recounts the days when he came, with unblacked boots and without the costly luxury of gloves, to the Rue Vivienne to visit her mother, of whom he was enamoured, and when in one morning he proposed himself for that lady, and his brother Joseph and sister Pauline for her daughter and son. She traces his career from these youthful days till the period of his coronation, when, as she herself says, he "gave her a look of *intoler-*

able intelligence as he put the crown on his head," and thence till he took his melancholy way to St Helena. Nor are the memoirs of the gay and lively duchess confined to the details and pomp of the imperial court; she passes also in review the leading characters and events of the Consulate and the Empire, and gives a vast number of graphic sketches and interesting anecdotes of the illustrious men who then bore the fortunes of France on the points of their swords. A true woman, she is by no means unmindful of those lighter topics which more immediately concern her sex; her memory is as distinct for a ball-dress or a cashmere shawl, as for the words of a hero or the measures of a government; and when the antiquarian painter comes to portray in after times the scenes which occurred during the Revolution, the Consulate, and Empire, he will find ample materials for the costumes both of the ladies and gentlemen in her animated pages. Pecuniary embarrassments, and the loss of her husband's appanage by the fall of Napoleon, unhappily rendered it necessary for her to write for bread in her later years, and have lessened her reputation by spreading it over too wide a surface; but her earlier writings are deserving of a lasting place in French literature, and will always be referred to with interest, as well from the importance of the events and characters to which they relate, as from the discrimination and talent with which the portraits are drawn.

53. Chateaubriand and Lamartine as writers of memoirs.

So great is the crowd of writers who have devoted the leisure of their later years to recording for the benefit of posterity the reminiscences of the Revolution and the Empire, that they would alone fill the shelves of an extensive library; and few even of the largest collections either in France or elsewhere contain a complete assortment of them. But there are two writers of memoirs whose works will ever stand forth in bright relief, as well from the celebrity of their authors' names as the genius displayed in the works themselves, and the eloquence with

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which they are written. These are CHATEAUBRIAND and LAMARTINE. The character and beauties of these two illustrious writers appear in every page of their voluminous personal memoirs, and unfortunately their failings and weaknesses are equally conspicuous. In the twelve volumes which record the eventful career of the former is to be seen the ardent and yet melancholy cast of his disposition, the conflict of thought when the associations of the past were perpetually at war with the realities of the present, and the working of a mind fraught at once with the devotions of the olden time, the necessities of surrounding circumstances, and the aspirations of modern Liberalism. Advanced years, in those fascinating pages, have sometimes diminished his accuracy, but never clouded his genius or chilled his eloquence; and the records of a life in which the fervour and enthusiasm of youth were preserved to the verge of the grave, resemble rather the pages of a romance than the events of reality. Lamartine's fragments of memoirs in his *Confessions, Raphael,* and *Revolution of* 1848, are equally characteristic of his genius and disposition, at once ardent and reflecting, enthusiastic and visionary, chivalrous and free-thinking, humane and philosophic, imaginative and pictorial. As in his historical works he narrates real events in so dramatic and exaggerated a style that they often pass for fiction, so, in relating personal adventures, he clothes them in such brilliant colours that no one can believe that they are aught but the creations of his excited imagination, although as such they cannot be read without the deepest interest. Unfortunately, in both these great writers, the weaknesses of a little stand forth in bright light beside the elevation of a lofty mind; and the vanity they display in relating the passages of their eventful lives, especially with the fair sex, is so extreme, and, as it appears to us, so contemptible, that it would be the subject of serious regret if experience had not convinced every person acquainted with French literature that it is the prevailing foible of

the nation, which is particularly conspicuous in its literary men, and that the endurance of it is the price we pay for the pleasure derived from their genius and eloquence.

54. Cousin.

The reaction of the human mind against the infidelity and sins of the Revolution nowhere more clearly appears than in the writings of COUSIN. This very eminent man is too philosophic and clear-sighted not to see that religion is the great element which holds society together, and that, without its influence, all attempts either at individual or social amelioration must prove altogether nugatory; while at the same time he is too independent in thought to submit to the dictation of Jesuits, or yield to the grasping ambition of the Church of Rome. He has not chosen the only path which can safely lead through these opposite difficulties, which is the simple doctrines of the Gospel, as they are taught in the Protestant church; and in consequence he has fallen, in matters of faith, into a sort of dreary rationalism, which may be very well for philosophers, but never can be either popular or useful with the great body of mankind. Yet while all must lament in Cousin the absence of a simple and determinate faith, which can be embraced by and influence the majority of mankind, yet justice equally requires that a due tribute should be paid to the great service he has rendered to the cause of religion, by proclaiming the eternal truth, that education, if rested on any other basis, is likely to prove hurtful rather than beneficial, and illustrating this position with equal industry and ability by an examination of the institutions for the instruction of the people which have been established in the principal European monarchies.

55. M. Lamennais.

M. LAMENNAIS, with equal sincerity of principle, is more distinguished by genius in his writings, and has struck out more original and forcible ideas for the instruction of mankind. His influence and the fame of his works have been proportionally greater. A sincere Catholic, he has all the warmth of a true believer, and sees in the events

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around him manifestations only of the Divine judgments on mankind, and in the extension of the influence of the Romish faith the only guarantee for the virtue or happiness of the species. Yet has he not succeeded, by all his devotion, in securing the approbation of the Papal government; they have the jealousy of him which Louis had of Chateaubriand, which power scarce ever fails to have of genius. His style is sometimes obscure, his ideas abstract, his inferences strained; but there is no author of the present age who has seen deeper into futurity, or in whose writings a greater number of profound and original thoughts are to be found. His work on the human mind, in three volumes, is to the reflecting student a perfect fund of reflection; and, what is the decisive mark of a creative mind, it suggests even more than it teaches,—it starts ideas rather than elaborates them. The Protestant reader, accustomed to the calm discussion on religious subjects to which he has been habituated in his own country, is often startled by the intensity of his ideas, and the vehemence of the language in which they are conveyed; but a ready excuse for that failing may be found in the reflection, that in the moral, not less than the material world, action and reaction are equal and opposite, and that if the fanaticism of irreligion is ever to be successfully combated, it must be, not by the calmness of philosophy, but the fervour of devotion.

56. M. Villemain.

A striking proof how great is the ascendant which intellectual power has now acquired in France, is to be found in the fact that a great proportion of her cabinet ministers are literary men. M. VILLEMAIN is one of the most remarkable of these, and he has produced several works, which will stand the test of general admiration long after his official career as Minister of Public Instruction has passed into oblivion. His *History of the Literature of France during the Eighteenth Century* is a pleasing and just survey of a subject of great and lasting interest, but which it is extremely difficult to treat in

an agreeable manner. The difficulty consists in the multitude of authors who require to be noticed, when only a few of them have acquired any lasting reputation, and the embarrassment arising from a mere enumeration of names, when the spirit which animated them has been lost in the revolution of ages. Like the painter of a great historical piece, the author runs the risk of being buried under the multitude of his own figures. Strict attention to chiaroscuro, and great massing of light and shade, can alone surmount the difficulty. If a bright light is thrown upon one-tenth of the figures in the piece, it is enough, and often more than enough. M. Villemain has not altogether avoided the error of being too prolix in the enumeration of obscure and forgotten authors; but at least he has done so in a much greater degree than most of his predecessors. His criticisms on the theatre are particularly worthy of attention, and he evinces a generous enthusiasm in his admiration for the beauties of Shakespeare, without being blinded to the many faults of that wonderful man. On the subject of education, and the incalculable influence of the spread of knowledge, both upon the national fortunes and individual happiness, his views are equally just and enlightened, and point him out as the fitting person to be minister of public instruction in a country where so much still remains to be done to illuminate the general mind.

57. M. Ginguené.

If any proof were required of the difficulty of the task which M. Villemain has undertaken in giving a history of literature, and of the skill with which he has surmounted it, it would be found in the great work of M. Ginguené. That his elaborate *History of Italian Literature* is a very great addition to our literary treasures, probably none will be found to dispute; and the general sense of its value has been evinced in the liberal manner in which subsequent compilers, without acknowledging it, have availed themselves of his labours. But valuable as it is, and teeming with the stores of erudition as well as the delicacy of taste, his work will never be generally read;

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it is an encyclopædia, not a book—a dictionary rather than a history. Few will follow the example of the author, and go patiently through all the eleven volumes. The fault consists, not in the details, but in the general conception; not in the finishing of each individual figure, but in the want of mezzotinto to throw the great majority of them into fitting and becoming shade, so as to give sufficient relief and effect to the principal figures. It is true, it is no easy matter to do this; it is the great difficulty with which the political or military, as well as the literary historian has to contend; and it is the one on which the greatest number of considerable contemporary reputations have been shipwrecked. But it is not insurmountable; and in history, not less than in painting, the palm of immortality is reserved for him who has mastered it.

58. M. de Tocqueville: his great merits.

If Ginguené is in a manner buried under the stores of his own learning, and already forgotten, except as a storehouse of erudition, even in his own country, the same charge of want of generalisation cannot be made against the great political philosopher in France of the nineteenth century, M. DE TOCQUEVILLE. His fault is just the reverse of Ginguené's; it is not that he generalises too little, but that he generalises *too soon*. No man, since the days of Montesquieu, has equalled him in the depth of the views which he has formed of the working of republican institutions, or the principal dangers to be apprehended from them. His *Democracy in America*, especially the two first volumes of it, is to be placed in the same rank with the *Discorsi* of Machiavel, the *Essays* of Bacon, or the *Decadence de Rome* of Montesquieu. Reflection, and frequent study of that admirable work, have confirmed the author in this opinion, expressed on its first appearance fifteen years ago.[1] With inimitable skill, close observation, and deep thought, he has traced the working of republican institutions on the other side of the Atlantic, and to him we owe the profound observation, which every day's

[1] Blackwood's Magazine; Alison's Essays, iii. 347.

experience is more completely verifying, that the great danger of republican government is not its weakness, but its tremendous strength. When monarchy or aristocracy are *contending* with democracy, the government is often weak; but that is not because their opponent is feeble, but because he is strong. When the victory has been gained, this at once appears; no power capable of making any resistance remains, and intellect and genius, property and intelligence, thought and action, are alike prostrated beneath the hoofs of numbers, guided, it is true, by a section of the thoughtful few, but they are in general the most unscrupulous and dangerous of the community.

59. His errors.

It has been said that the great fault of M. de Tocqueville is, not that he has generalised too little, but that he has generalised too soon. He has forgotten that action and reaction are the law of nature, not less in the moral than in the material world. He would do well to remember the inscription engraved on a ring, presented by the Eastern sage to the sultan: "And this too shall pass away." Impressed, at the time when his great work was written, with the ceaseless progress of the democratic principle in France, and its complete triumph in America, he has forgotten that the greatest effort of mind is to make the "past the distant, and the future predominate over the present." He has seriously stated it as his deliberate conviction, that there is an evident and ceaseless progress both in Europe and America towards democratic institutions; that this progress is universal and irresistible, and that, for good or for evil, republicanism is the destiny of mankind in both hemispheres. What a commentary on this opinion does the government of France, under the presidence of Louis Napoleon, and the joyful acquiescence of seven millions of Frenchmen in his rule, afford on this prediction! Such ever has been, and ever will be, the fate of the prophecies of even the greatest political philosophers, who fix their eyes only

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on the strength of the current in which they are immersed, and forget that, when the strength of that current becomes dangerous to human happiness, there is *an under-current* provided by nature to correct its errors, and prove an antidote to its poison. That under-current is always put in motion by the lessons of experience, which point as clearly, in the long run, to the institutions suited to the human mind, and conducive to general felicity, as the passions of the human heart do to those which are fair and tempting in the outset, but utter ruin when firmly established. We must not be misled in this matter by the example of America;—democracy is there triumphant, and has been hitherto successful, because it is suitable to the physical circumstances of its inhabitants, and requisite for their expansion. It is the great moving power of artificial society, the expansive force which impels civilised man into the wilderness of nature. When the work is done, and the Transatlantic wilds inhabited, the experience of man will cast it aside, as it has already done in the old and peopled realm of France.

60. Cuvier.

If the literature of France, during the eighteenth century, may justly pride itself on the compositions of Buffon, that of the nineteenth is equally distinguished by the writings of CUVIER, by far the first of the inquirers into the pristine order of creation. Passing over the external surface of the crust of the planet which we inhabit, disregarding the species of man and animals which are now to be found upon it, he has dived into the recesses of nature, and discovered in the organic remains which lie imbedded in the strata of which the earth is composed, materials both to determine with perfect accuracy the form and habits of the animals or reptiles of which they are the skeletons, and the order of the successive periods in which they were created, and flourished upon the earth. There is no subject of human thought more fascinating, or fraught with more important and decisive proofs of the wisdom of God in the works of creation. It unfolds the wonderful truth,

that the crust of the globe we inhabit has been formed by successive stages, and at long intervals of time; and that the different species of animals which successively inhabited it were adapted, in their form, habits, powers, and instincts, to the different elements in which they were placed, and the varying physical circumstances of the globe in its successive stages of creation. Perhaps there is no subject of human contemplation which so decisively demonstrates the ceaseless agency and wisdom of the great Creator of inanimate and animated nature, for it tells us not of one, but *many successive creations*, and the progressive appearance and extinction in different strata still existing, and lying above each other, of different species of animals, each adapted with infinite wisdom to the circumstances of the stratum on the surface of which its existence was passed.

61. Humboldt

Akin to Cuvier in the extent of his physical knowledge and his insatiable thirst for information on the works of nature, HUMBOLDT has in his researches embraced a still wider, and to most readers a more interesting sphere. Though a German by birth and later residence, and the brother of the able and celebrated Prussian diplomatist, he belongs to the Parisian school of naturalists, and his principal works, published at Paris and in the French language, naturally associate his name with the illustrious men of that country in the days of its glory. He may without hesitation be pronounced to be the greatest scientific traveller which the world has ever produced. His mind has been cast in a very singular mould, but one which, when employed by the Creator, produces the most elaborate and valuable intellectual result. He is at once scientific and pictorial, accurate and discursive, philosophic and imaginative. He possesses that decided turn for analogy, and tracing out general conclusions, which is the distinctive mark of genius; while at the same time he is not less imbued with the cautious spirit and minute attention to details, which in physical

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not less than political science is the only secure foundation for the discovery of truth. If we read his descriptions of the peak of Teneriffe, the stages of the Andes, the shores of the Orinoco, the pampas of Buenos Ayres, or the falls of the Missouri, he appears one of the greatest painters of nature that ever existed. If we trace his footsteps along the swamps of the Amazon, the forests of Brazil, or the snows of the Cordilleras, he seems one of the most intrepid and indefatigable of travellers that ever sprung even from the race of Japhet. If we roam with him in *Cosmos* through the realms of nature, and the varied and boundless works of its Creator, he appears one of the most profound and far-seeing of philosophers. His mind affords a striking proof that, though rarely united, the imaginative are not inconsistent with the scientific qualities, and that it is in the combination of the two that the greatest strength and beauty as well as power of intellectual creation are to be found.

62. His indefatigable energy.

Above all, this great traveller and naturalist was imbued with the ardent spirit, the *feu sacré*, which incessantly pants after great achievements, and deems the labour of a lifetime a light price to pay for its renown. This ruling disposition appears in the ardour and impassioned eloquence of his style in some passages in his writings, not less than the painful research and minute investigation in others. The same ardent feelings had inspired the one and sustained the other. As this mental quality is the one of all others most inconceivable to ordinary men, so it is the distinguishing mark of those few minds to which Providence has assigned the doing of great things in the world. It is the true free-masonry of heroism. We see it in Napoleon, we see it in Nelson, we see it in Schiller, we see it in Chateaubriand, we see it in Humboldt. This disposition is evinced alike in peace and in war; in the council of kings as in the tented field; in the researches of the philosopher as in the burning

thoughts of the poet. It is in the combination of this ardent temperament with the patience and perseverance indispensable for great achievement, that the only sure foundation of great and lasting success or fame is to be found.

63. Poets: their decline in France.

The French are not a poetical nation. The clearest proof of this is to be found in the fact, that in an age of such varied and intellectual effort as that of the Restoration, poetry was far from being cultivated with success. Two poets only, during the whole period, have attained any note, and they were Delille and Béranger. A consideration of this fact, and a comparison of it with the corresponding period of literature in England and Germany, may perhaps lead to the conclusion that, although great poetic talent, as in the case of Milton, sometimes signalises the *rise* of freedom, yet the full development of popular institutions is unfavourable to its continued flourishing; and that, when fame and fortune attend the efforts of oratory or prose composition, from their influence on public assemblies, the temple of the muses is apt to be neglected. Certainly it is from no want of poetical disposition that there have been, since the rise of free institutions, so little real poetry in France; their prose writers often evince its fire. But the discussions of the forum have proved more attractive than the charms of imagination, and the disquisitions of the journalist more profitable than the fancy of the dramatist, and thence the decline of poetry in France.

64. The Abbé Delille.

The ABBÉ DELILLE has considerable merit as a poet; but he belongs to a school which is now well-nigh extinct in France. The *Jardins* and *L'Homme des Champs*, as well as *L'Imagination*, contain many beautiful lines and much amiable thought; but they are neither the lines nor the thoughts which suit the taste of the age, and thence they are already well-nigh forgotten. Formed on the model of the *Georgics* and Thomson's *Seasons*, they are couched,

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like Corneille's dramas, in stately Alexandrine verses, and paint often with beauty the repose and happiness of rural life. But such pictures were not suited to the temper of the age; they wanted the fire and animation desired by a generation which had experienced the throes, and been stirred by the passions of the Revolution. Delille, like many other writers, lived too late for his reputation; he was formed by one age, and appeared in another. Unfortunately, too, that other was the age which had passed away, not that which was approaching; and thence the decline of his reputation to an extent by no means warranted by his real merits.

65. Béranger.

If Delille failed because he was not the man of the age, BÉRANGER has succeeded because he was. Never did literature more thoroughly embody the feelings of a party, than his lyrical pieces did those of the Liberal party in France during the Restoration. Profound hatred of the Bourbons, and idolatrous worship of Napoleon, vain aspirations after the glories of the Empire, breathe in every page. Thence in a great measure undoubtedly their signal and remarkable success. But it would be unjust to ascribe that success entirely to their coincidence with the spirit of a large party in society. Their intrinsic merit is great and obvious. Béranger is imbued with the very soul of lyrical poetry; some of his best odes will bear a comparison with the most perfect of other countries, and are beyond all doubt the finest in that species of poetry of which French literature can boast. Like Campbell, Schiller, and Freiligrath, they contain the ideas of an ardent and heated generation, reflected back from an imaginative and poetical mind. There is doubtless much illusion and many false deductions in them: but exaggeration is the soul of lyric poetry; and it is well that it is so, for there is so much in life to render the mind prosaic, and extinguish the finer and more generous sympathies, that if poetry did not intervene to reawaken

them, they would be speedily buried under the weight of selfish desires and ordinary interests.

66. Paul Courier.

Akin to Béranger in principle and idea, though he wrote in prose instead of verse, PAUL COURIER deserves a place in the historical gallery of French literature, if not from the taste of his language or the delicacy of his feeling, at least from the energy of his thoughts and the raciness of his expressions. He is the exponent of the thoughts of that numerous class in France who had profited by the troubles, or been enriched by the spoils of the Revolution; and who, amidst the public disasters, had taken root in the soil with a strength which could never after be shaken. He was the orator, as Burns had been the poet, of the peasants; but he had not the refined mind or lofty aspirations of the Scotch ploughman—his mind was cast in a rougher mould, and composed of coarser materials. But he was not on that account the less effective with the class for which he wrote; on the contrary, he was the more so. He was the O'Connell of the Revolutionary proprietors; and, like him, his influence and reputation, immense with a party during his lifetime, has declined, until it has become almost extinct since his death. There is no security for lasting fame, either in politics or literature, but in the espousing of interests of great and lasting concern to mankind, or in the spread of sentiments which shall permanently float down the stream, from their buoyant qualities and elevating tendency.

67. Decline of the drama in France.

It is very remarkable, and singularly characteristic of the degradation of popular taste which the Revolution has induced in France, that the era of the Restoration has not produced one great dramatic poet. Dramatic *pieces*, indeed, have appeared in overflowing multitude, and many of them have enjoyed a brilliant reputation on the stage. But it has always been as short-lived as it was extensive; and if we would find the masters of the French drama, we must still revert to the writers of the age of

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Louis XIV. and Louis XV. Corneille and Racine, Molière and Voltaire, still shine in the upper firmament in unapproachable splendour, and their light only appears the brighter from the disappearance of the many falling stars which shoot athwart the lower regions of the atmosphere. The numerous dramatic pieces which, since the Restoration, have appeared in France, have no poetic merit, nor do they ever aim at it. Their strength consists in a skilful use of stage effect, in scenes of deep pathos or breathless interest, in melo-dramatic pomp or undisguised licentiousness. There is not one of the numerous writers who have catered to the prevailing taste of the public in this department, who has earned a lasting reputation, or deserves a place in a gallery of historical portraits. This is a very remarkable circumstance in an age of such general intellectual effort, in a country which has produced so many great dramatic writers, and in which theatrical representations are so passionately sought after, as France. It has obviously been owing to some general and irresistible cause; nor is it difficult to see what that cause is.

63. Causes of the decline of the drama in France.

The theatre is the place where either the corruption or elevation of the public taste first appears, because it is the place where the greatest number of all classes of the people are assembled together, and success depends on their instant decision. Scientific works are addressed to the learned few; the higher class of literary productions to a wider but still limited circle; but dramatic pieces are brought at once into contact with the whole ranks of society. In the different gradations of the theatre, every class of society finds its place, from the haughty noble to the humble artisan. As dramatic fame and success depend upon the immediate filling of the house with spectators, the popularity of any pieces which are brought forward indicates with perfect certainty the prevailing taste of the majority of the audience. The stately verses of Corneille

reflect the feelings of the high-born nobles and proud beauties who composed the court of the Grand Monarque, and filled the theatre of Versailles; the alternate pathos and buffoonery of Shakespeare, the mingled tastes of the mixed audience in the freer realms of England; the sustained elevation and heroic sentiments of Schiller, the feelings of the Fatherland during the years of mourning which preceded the glorious era of the war of liberation. Not less characteristic of the age in which it appeared than any which have preceded it, the modern theatre of France reflects the mingled violence and selfishness, corruption and licentiousness, thirst for excitement and desire of pleasure, which have been predominant in France since the Revolution. It is to be feared it is not less descriptive of the character of the general literature which is to succeed it. *Veluti in speculum* is the appropriate motto of the stage; but the mirror not only reflects the past, but foretells the future; and nowhere is the line of the poet more applicable—

"And coming events cast their shadows before."

69. Romance writers.

The romance writers of France since the Revolution evince the same peculiarities which have distinguished its drama; in fact, the latter is little more than a concentration of the thoughts and images of the former. It is difficult to give an account of these very remarkable productions, in which genius and licentiousness, thought and levity, observation and imagination, virtue and vice, generosity and selfishness, heroism and egotism, the past and the present, the images of antiquity, the passions of the moment, are so strangely blended together. If the object of these highly-gifted writers had been to present, for future ages, a picture of the chaos of the human mind when torn up from its ancient moorings, and turned adrift upon the stormy sea of revolution, they could not have done so in so effectual a manner as by the composition

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of these strange but often highly interesting productions. Graphic pictures of ancient manners and ideas, frequent use of the imagery of religion, considered as a relic of the olden time, singularly effective on the opera stage, but never to be considered as a restraint on present gratification; a deep knowledge of the human heart, especially when torn by its wildest and most discordant passions; glowing pictures of voluptuousness alternately with elevating scenes of heroism; the most tender touches of pathos, the most degrading acts of selfishness,—all that crime can accumulate that is most detestable, all that virtue can present that is most elevating, alternately employ their varied pencils. Life appears to them neither a scene of probation, in which suffering must be endured, nor a period of enjoyment, in which gratification can securely be obtained; but a journey, in which alternate storms and sunshine are to be experienced, altogether irrespective of the conduct of the travellers. Their object is not, like the Greek dramatists, to represent the picture of a heroic mind wrestling with the storms of fate, nor, like the best class of English novelists, to record the final triumph of virtue over the machinations of wickedness. What they aim at is to paint the human mind, stirred by every passion, yielding to every seduction, and experiencing the alternate transports and torments, gleams of sunshine and horrors of the tempest, consequent on such a concession to the impulses of wickedness.

70. Victor Hugo.

Victor Hugo is the first and most graphic of this school of novelists, in which Dumas, Eugene Sue, and so many others, have acquired such brilliant contemporary reputation. His works are extremely voluminous, and, considered as pictures of the manners and ideas of successive eras of French history, extremely interesting. The author of *Nôtre Dame* has given an equally graphic account of many other periods of French story, and mingled historic truth with all the interest

which romance, imagination, and licentiousness could communicate to its pages. Deeply versed in antiquarian and historic lore, he has adorned his pages with all the truthfulness and vivacity which the delineation of nature and the representation of reality can alone confer. Unfortunately, he has mingled with it the unbridled license and love of excitement which the passions of the Revolution have rendered essential to present success in France. He has gone far to barbarise the language of his country; there is in his writings as great a chaos of words as ideas; and if Racine or Molière were to rise from their graves, they would find half the words unknown to them. Gibbon has said with truth, that a very curious and valuable work might be written on the connection between words and things; nor is it surprising it should be so; for what are words but the expression of ideas? Judging by this standard, the Revolution has indeed produced a new world of thought in France; for most certainly it has all but created a new language.

71. George Sand.

Victor Hugo's mind is essentially picturesque and pictorial; he has considerable powers of the pathetic, but it is not his native bent. Very different is the case with the highly-gifted female writer whose works appear under the name of GEORGE SAND. She is endowed with powers in that respect which never were exceeded either by man or woman. She has all the strength of passion which characterises the former, and all the tenderness which is the most beautiful feature of the latter. Strange phenomenon! that the exquisite pathos and romance which distinguish her finer passages and more perfect works, should be combined with the open profligacy and undisguised licentiousness which are equally conspicuous in them; nay, that the same characters should alternately present the one and the other. It is said that a woman's conceptions in romance are nothing but a picture of what has really passed through her own

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heart; if so, what an extraordinary one has her genius exhibited of her heart, and the various crimes it has shared, the vicissitudes it has experienced! It is painful to see a mind in many respects so finely strung, and responding to some of the noblest feelings and most touching emotions of our nature, so deeply tinged by the prevailing passions and vices of the age as to have lost all sense of their real character, and ready to represent them, in works of imagination, as equally attractive with the most dignified and honourable sentiments in awakening the sympathies of the human mind.

72. Eugene Sue.

EUGENE SUE cannot be assigned so high a place as either of the preceding writers in a lasting estimate of contemporary merit, though his present reputation has been fully as great as that of either. It is impossible to deny to the author of *The Wandering Jew*, or the *Mysteries of Paris*, a very powerful imagination and creative fancy; but it is an imagination so wild, and a fancy so distorted, that foreign readers, at least, cannot appreciate them. There is a natural appetite in mankind for scandal and pictures of hidden profligacy; and whoever lifts up the veil, which so many are anxious to peep under, is sure, for the time at least, to enjoy an extensive popularity. But it is for a time only. Delineation of scenes of secret voluptuousness never can attain a lasting popularity, if it was for no other reason than this, that the sexes cannot speak of them to each other, and thus a great charm of works of imagination is lost. However much various peculiarities in human nature, which fall too prominently under the observation of the historian, may lead him to form an unfavourable estimate of it, there are others which have a directly opposite tendency, and demonstrate how many elements of the noble and the generous are mingled with a selfish alloy in our fallen nature. Not the least of these is the fact, proved from every page of literary history, that no work of genius ever attained to great and lasting fame which was not

of a pure and elevating tendency; and if the sin of genius devoting itself to works of an opposite tendency is great, the punishment is still greater, for it is that of ultimate oblivion. It is in this sense we are to understand the just observation of Sir Joshua Reynolds, not less applicable to literature than painting, "The present and future times are two rivals; he who courts the one must make up his mind to be discountenanced by the other."[1]

[1] Lectures on Painting.

73. Periodical literature of France since the Revolution.

Perhaps the most remarkable branch of French literature, during the Restoration, and unquestionably that which has exercised the most powerful influence on contemporary events, is the PERIODICAL. This mighty engine, which has now come to exercise so powerful an influence over the fortunes both of France and England, and which, for good or for evil, appears to be omnipotent, has acquired even a greater ascendancy in the former country than the latter. At least the journals have done so; for it is a remarkable fact, eminently characteristic of the different temperament of the people of the two countries, that while the Newspapers are more powerful in France, the monthly or quarterly literature is more influential in Great Britain. There are no Reviews or Magazines in France, which sway so powerfully the opinions each of their own sections of the community, as the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Quarterly*, the *Westminster*, and *Blackwood's Magazine*. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* is a most able periodical; but it deals more with science and literature, and with past than present events. It would appear that the sober-minded English, though they all read the daily press, often distrust its violence, or dread its misrepresentations, and reserve the moulding of their opinions for the more deliberate articles of the higher periodical literature; while the French, ardent, hasty, and impetuous, yield an instantaneous assent to the effusions of the daily press, which fall in with or inflame their preconceived impressions, and are often prepared to act on the

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most violent of their suggestions. It is well known that nearly all the revolutions which have convulsed France during the last sixty years have been prepared and brought on in this way; and it was this which made the Duke of Wellington say, that in Paris they conspired in the public squares.

74. Different class of writers in the daily press in France and England.

From this unbounded influence of the daily press on general opinion, and, through it, on the measures of Government, and the fate not only of administrations but dynasties, has arisen an important difference between the character of the journals and the class of men who write in them in the two countries. In England, till very lately, the highest class of writers very seldom wrote articles in the daily press; and if, on particular occasions, and to serve a special purpose, they did so, they endeavoured to conceal their names, and were often not a little ashamed if they were found out. Even in the monthly and quarterly literature, though they contributed largely, they endeavoured to keep up the *incognito*, and the essays were not collected and published, with the author's name, till his success in his avowed publications rendered it probable that they would be favourably received by the public. In France, on the other hand, not only were the leading journals on the Liberal and Royalist sides regularly and daily supported by the very highest writers both in point of talent and reputation, but, so far from being ashamed of, they gloried in it, and considered it their best passport to present influence and lasting fame. Chateaubriand, Guizot, Barante, Thiers, Lamartine, Eugene Sue, Dumas, Victor Hugo, and, indeed, all the popular writers of the age, contributed almost daily to the public journals, and their collected articles form not the least interesting, and perhaps the ablest part of their whole compositions. It is to this cause that the extraordinary ability of the public press during the Restoration, and the vast influence which it had on general opinion, is to be ascribed. Men of philosophic minds, and

possessing stores of information, seldom write so well, at least for the time, as when under the influence of political excitement; for that gives fire to thoughts matured by study, and based on previous reflection.

75. Causes of this difference. Destruction of the influence of property.

We are not to ascribe this importance merely to the greater excitability, and liability to immediate impressions, of the French than the English. At least, as much was it owing to the absence of those influences to the south of the Channel which on the north of it still exercised a predominating influence. The nobility were still erect in England, not only in their hereditary homes, but in political weight; the country gentlemen, though much curtailed of their importance, still lived, dispensed hospitalities, and enjoyed influence on their estates. It was in these two bodies that the ruling power in the State was still to be found; the inhabitants of cities, though daily rising in political consequence, had not yet become the rulers of the empire. It is on the inhabitants of cities, however, or those whose habits have been formed there, that the daily press acts with its principal force; the comparatively secluded life, rural occupations, and intellectual slowness of the inhabitants of the country, always render them more tenacious of old habits and ideas, and less amenable to modern influence. In France this class was entirely awanting; the division of the landed estates among the peasantry had extinguished the land as the seat of political influence, or of peculiar and influential thought. Everything depended on the opinions of the inhabitants of towns, the very class most liable to be swayed by the daily press. Thus the arena and rewards of composition for the public journals were different in the two countries: in England, the country was the seat of influence, the House of Commons the theatre of contest; in France, Paris and the chief towns were the ruling power, the disposition of their citizens determined the fate of parties, and they were almost entirely directed by the daily press. Hence the difference in the class of

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men who at that period in the two countries engaged in its animated and varied pleadings.

76. Owing also to facility of Revolution in France.

Add to this, the citizens of the metropolis had discovered a more summary and effectual method of asserting and securing their political supremacy than by the slow method of parliamentary influence. The Revolution had taught them on many occasions that, by means of a well-concerted urban tumult, especially if aided by any considerable defection on the part of the military, not only might the legislature be overawed, and the executive subdued, but the dynasty itself might, if necessary, be changed. The work of repeated conflicts, during a long series of parliamentary campaigns, might be done in three days. If victorious, the claims of the leaders of the daily press, by whom the minds of men had been prepared for the revolt, were at once recognised; the editors of newspapers became ministers of state. No one need be told that M. Thiers, M. Guizot, M. Lamartine, and a great proportion of the statesmen who have ruled France since the fall of Napoleon, were borne forward to power in this way—a thing to this day altogether unknown on this side of the Channel. It is not surprising that the greatest talent in France put into the newspaper lottery when such prizes were in the wheel. And, accordingly, the class of men who wrote in the public journals in Great Britain has been sensibly changed since their influence on political change has been rendered more direct; and it is sometimes now supported by the leading statesmen and first writers of the age.

77. Danger of this state of things.

However clearly we may perceive that this change is unavoidable, and that the influence of the public journals on general opinion, and through it on the measures of Government, in all free countries, is daily becoming more decided, it is impossible to contemplate the change without apprehension. The great danger of the daily press is, that it is led to inflame the passions of the moment; its profit, its fame, often its existence, depend on doing

so. Whatever is the prevailing inclination of the public mind, that the great majority of the daily press is sure to increase. But as the prevailing inclinations are just as often wrong as right, and founded in error as based in truth, it is impossible to contemplate without apprehension the growth of a power in the state capable of rendering any one of these errors omnipotent for the moment, and precipitating the nation, with the general concurrence of the influential masses, into a course of measures which may eventually prove its ruin. The well-known inability of the vast majority of men to contemplate or give long consideration to remote consequences, however obvious to the thinking few, renders this danger only the greater as the institutions of the state become more democratic: and the ultimate and certain triumph of truth over falsehood, of reason over delusion, affords no security whatever against these dangers; for though that may enlighten future ages, it will not prevent the errors of the present from working out their natural result; and if the state is destroyed, it is poor consolation for the victims in it to discover that they have been ruined by the consequences of their own folly.

78. The stage in France. Talma.

The decline of the drama in France since the Revolution, has necessarily drawn after it the degradation of the stage; for how can the powers of a mighty actor be exhibited in delineating a succession of murders and adulteries, of incests and poisonings, of hairbreadth escapes and atrocious deeds, such as form the staple of the modern or romantic drama in France? The great performers, whether male or female, have been confined, as a matter of necessity, to the legitimate drama. But although it with difficulty maintained its ground against the surging waves of the romantic school, yet it was not without a violent struggle it was overcome; and perhaps the brightest histrionic genius of France shone forth in the days which immediately preceded the fall of that noble art. At the very head of them all we must place TALMA, a performer so

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great that he has acquired a European reputation, and is worthy to be placed beside John Kemble and Mrs Siddons, whose genius then threw an expiring lustre over the English stage. He had not their great physical advantages; he had neither the Roman profile of the former nor the majestic beauty of the latter; his figure was short and thick; his countenance unexpressive; his voice, when raised high, degenerated into a scream. But all these disadvantages were more than compensated by the energy of his mind, and his wonderful power in the representation of passion: he acted with magical effect because he felt strongly, and was thoroughly in earnest—the best, perhaps the only security for success, whether in literature or art. Nothing could exceed the thrill of horror which ran through the audience in his representation of the more impassioned scenes. Those who have experienced a similar sensation from the performances of Mademoiselle Rachel can alone form a conception of it. To English spectators the principal fault of his acting appeared to be that his vehement gesticulation began too early, and went on too long; the demands on the vehement sympathies of the audience were too incessant. That peculiarity, however, belongs to the whole French school of acting, and arises, partly from the animated manners of the people, and partly from the experienced necessity of supplying, by the intensity of the representation, for the measured language and stately voice of the poet.

79. Madlle. Georges.

Contemporary with Talma, and, like him, one of the last stays of the legitimate drama in France, was MADEMOISELLE GEORGES. She was gifted with far greater natural advantages. Dark hair, a splendid bust, and commanding countenance, a fine figure, and majestic air, gave her, like Mrs Siddons, that command of the senses which, on the stage, is so important an element in general and lasting success. Her mental qualities were on a level with her physical advantages, and rendered her, during nearly twenty years, the most admired actress on the

boards of the Théâtre Français. She was not so vehement in her representation as either Talma or Rachel, but she was, perhaps, on that account only the more pleasing; the mind was less worn out, from the outset, with violent emotions, and therefore better fitted to feel them in their full intensity in the latter scenes, for which they were reserved. Nothing could exceed the magnificence of her declamations—the voice, the manner, the intonation were perfect. It was the spirit of Corneille embodied in the person of a splendid and fascinating woman.

Very different was the character of MADEMOISELLE MARS, who reigned as supreme in elegant comedy as Mademoiselle Georges did in the severer walks of tragedy. Her countenance was charming, and, without regular beauty, in the highest degree expressive; but her figure was large, which, but for the vivacity and youthfulness of her disposition, would have disabled her from the performance of those juvenile parts in which she so much excelled. This circumstance, however, as is often the case, made her appear young when she really was no longer so. She died at the age of sixty-three, and her passport to the last assigned thirty as her age. Her appearance on the stage, however, did not belie this flattering delusion. If the love of admiration is, *par excellence*, the great characteristic of French women, Mademoiselle Mars was the incarnation of their temperament. She was coquetry personified. Never did it appear in a more graceful and fascinating form, and never did it command a greater number of devout worshippers. Without ever being low, she was always attractive: hers were the charms of high-bred beauty, not the hoidenish romping of village maidens. She could descend to represent their festivities, to personify their characters, but it was always with an air of elegance. She was often on the verge, but never passed the limits of decorum, and the most refined taste could find nothing to except to in her most animated performances.

30. Madlle. Mars.

Last in this bright band, MADEMOISELLE RACHEL is

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81. Madlle. Rachel.

perhaps the most powerful, and in her genius the most gifted. She is the very reverse in personal appearance of Mademoiselle Georges or Mademoiselle Mars; her figure is fine and commanding, but it is thin rather than the reverse, and charms the eye by the grace of its movements, the loftiness of its height, not the fulness of its proportions. She seems to have been worn away by the intensity of her own feelings. But they are so vehement, that she sweeps everything before her when she gives them vent; it is like a torrent of lava issuing from the summit of Vesuvius. In the delineation of jealousy, in particular, she is unrivalled; every fibre, every limb, every muscle, quivers with the intensity of the emotion: her whole soul, like the Pythoness in the moment of inspiration, seems thrown into the writhings of her figure. It is these wonderful delineations of passion, in its most fiery moods, which have given her the colossal reputation she enjoys in every part of Europe. Strong deep feeling speaks a language which is understood in every clime. She has little of the tender in her composition, and seldom aims at its delineation; it is the violent, the scornful, the indignant feelings, which she represents with such marvellous effect. Her Phedre, Hermione, and Alzire, are masterpieces which those who have witnessed can never forget. It is melancholy to think that, as she is the greatest of French actresses, so she is the LAST; and that after she is withdrawn from the public gaze, not a vestige will remain on the stage which Corneille and Racine have immortalised, of the genius which so long added fresh charms to the representation of their dramas.

82. Architecture of Paris.

Of all the fine arts, ARCHITECTURE is the one which, since the Revolution, has made the most decided progress in France. Nothing strikes a stranger so much, on his first arrival in France, as the combined magnificence and pure taste of their public edifices. Built always of beautiful freestone, which, easily cut at first,

becomes hard by exposure to the air, they present, in their simplicity and elegance, a striking contrast to the combination of meretricious taste and perishable materials which are so conspicuous in most of the modern edifices of London. It is probably the very durability and hardness of their materials which have contributed to the chasteness of the style in which they are built. A fantastic or ill-regulated taste works with much more difficulty on granite or freestone than on plaster-of-Paris. Simplicity and chasteness of taste become in a manner a matter of necessity. The finest buildings of Paris—the Louvre, the Place Louis XV., the Pantheon, the Madeleine, the Bourse, the Hôtel des Invalides, the Pillar of Austerlitz—indeed, were completed by the magnificence of Louis XIV., or projected by the genius of Napoleon; but it is no slight proof of the sustained purity and elevation of the public taste that the stately style, begun by the first of these great men, and followed up by the second, has been continued by their successors. No changes of government, though they may have for the time suspended, have been able permanently to interrupt the progress of their magnificent edifices. The perpetual charm which these afford to the eye is not the least of the many attractions which permanently attract strangers in such numbers to the French capital.

83. Modern French school of painting.

If modern French architecture is remarkable for the imposing effect which it exhibits, and the purity of taste by which it is distinguished, the same cannot be said of its painting. Here the meretricious influence of artificial society is very conspicuous. It is not nature which the modern French artists have studied, but *operatic nature:* the gestures and expression of the theatre are conspicuous at every step; the glare of the stage-lamps is seen in every light and shade. The attitudes in their historical pieces are all taken from the opera, and exhibit that vehemence and contortion of figure by which their theatrical representations are distinguished,

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and which is so much at variance with the calm and severe simplicity of the old Italian school. So great has been the influence of the stage on the modern French school of painting, that it may be regarded as omnipotent, and has for ever precluded its artists from taking an elevated place in the pantheon of modern genius.

84. Le Gros.

The painter among them who is distinguished by the greatest simplicity, and who, therefore, has attained to the greatest excellence, is LE GROS. Such is the strength of his genius, and the severe masculine character of his mind, that it has caused him to surmount in a great degree the artificial and meretricious taste by which he was surrounded, and revert to the truth of nature and the severe simplicity of ancient art. His great piece of "Napoleon riding over the Field of Eylau the day after the Battle," is worthy to be placed beside the finest battle-pieces of Le Brun, both for grandeur of thought, chasteness of colouring, and generality of effect. There is no contemporary historical painting by any British artist which can be compared to it. The other historical painters of France are all stained by the great defect of the French school—that of imitating, not nature, but the stage. There is not in the world, a few brilliant pieces excepted, a more stupendous exhibition of accumulated bad taste and unnatural gestures than the great collection of Versailles now presents; it is worthy to be placed beside the marble monuments of Westminster Abbey, as a collection of the corruption and perversion of taste in an age boasting its civilisation and refinement.

85. Vernet.

To the general condemnation of the modern French school of painting, another exception must be made in the pictures of HORACE VERNET. He is great, because he has studied, not the theatre, but nature—because he has imitated, not the *figurantes* of the opera, but the habits and forms of actual existence. Like Landseer, he is one of the greatest painters of animals that ever existed; but, unlike him, he has in general represented

them, not in their own peaceful and happy retreats, but in connection with the excitement, the pursuits, and the animation of war. Bivouacs of the Old Guard, pickets of cavalry, night-scenes of the Arabs in the desert, charges of horse, evolutions of artillery, have alternately occupied his skilful and practised pencil. The African campaigns, in particular, with their desperate passages-at-arms, picturesque incidents, varied costumes, and collision of European with Asiatic military force, have furnished equally striking and favourite subjects for his brilliant genius. He is essentially a military painter; but in the choice of his subjects, and the figures which fill his canvass, he has availed himself of every accessory which the battle-field, the night bivouac, the march, the rest at noon, the watering-places, the preparation for action, the fall of the hero, the anguish of the wounded, could afford; and these varied subjects are delineated with a truth and fidelity of drawing, as well as simplicity of effect, which proves that he has studied in the only school of real greatness—the school of nature.

86. Conclusion.

Such is a brief, and, from the magnitude of the subjects embraced in it, most imperfect survey of the literature and genius of France during and subsequent to the Restoration. Feeble as the picture is, it is, however, instructive; it demonstrates how powerfully the general mind had been stirred in that great country by the Revolution—how many errors had been abjured by its suffering — how many illusions dispelled by its results. The survey in some respects is melancholy, in others cheering. If it demonstrates on what erroneous premises, and what delusive expectations, former opinions had been formed, it teaches us not less clearly that an overruling Providence can educe good out of evil even in the darkest and most melancholy period of the moral world. It tells us, still more, that the evil, however poignant and widespread, is transitory, but the good educed, the genius elicited, the truth evolved, is lasting

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in its effects. However bitter may have been the suffering in that great and guilty country during the last sixty years from the passions of its inhabitants, it has come to an end with the generation which endured it. But the genius of Chateaubriand, the philosophy of Guizot, the imagination of Lamartine, the thought of De Tocqueville, will prove a lasting bequest to the species, and never cease to instruct, elevate, and delight the future generations of men.

CHAPTER XIX.

DOMESTIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE DEATH OF LORD LONDONDERRY IN 1822 TO THE MONETARY CRISIS IN DECEMBER 1825.

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1822.

1. Paper either a representative of specie or a substitute for it.

It has been already stated,[1] that the effect of that marvellous discovery of modern times, a paper currency, is twofold, and that the greatest misfortunes which have befallen Great Britain during the last half-century have arisen from confining operations to one of them only. It is either a *representative* of gold and silver, or it is a *substitute* for them. Considered in the first view, it can, of course, only be expanded or diminished in proportion as the supply of the precious metals for the general use of the country is plentiful or contracted; for no representative can with safety be augmented, unless the thing represented has been proportionally increased. In this view, a paper currency is undoubtedly a great convenience, as it is so portable and easy of transference compared to gold or silver; but its chief effects in averting disaster or stimulating prosperity are not to be attained as long as it is limited in that way. It is when it is issued, under proper restrictions, by proper parties, and adequately secured, as a *substitute for the precious metals*, that it becomes so invaluable an element in national prosperity. When properly managed in this way, and sufficiently guarded against abuse, it becomes the greatest stimulus to industry, and the most valuable shield against

[1] Ante, c. 16.

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misfortune, which is known in pacific life; for it multiplies the reservoirs by which the former is to be nourished, and fills up the void by which the latter is induced. It sustains national industry, and prevents a shock to credit during those periods of frequent and almost periodic occurrence in a commercial community, when the precious metals are in a great measure entirely drained away from the country by the necessities of war or the changes of commerce, and brings it with safety through a crisis which otherwise might prove fatal to its fortunes. If used only as a representative of the precious metals, it not only does not alleviate or avert these evils, but it aggravates them in the most ruinous manner, because it expands the paper circulation when gold and silver are plentiful; and such an addition to credit and stimulus to speculation is not only unnecessary, but dangerous, and lands the nation in a vast variety of undertakings which of necessity must be abruptly abandoned, and ruin brought on those engaged in them, when the precious metals, and with them the paper resting on their basis, are withdrawn.

2. Light which experience has thrown on this subject.

Experience has now thrown a clear light upon this all-important but intricate subject. During the war, from 1797 to 1815, paper was a substitute for the precious metals, and it brought the nation prosperous and triumphant through all its dangers, and diffused general prosperity at a time when hardly a guinea was left in the country; but it was issued in such quantities, from the necessities of Government, that it more than doubled the price of all the articles of commerce, and exposed the nation to a grievous collapse, when, from the prospect of resuming cash payments, the circulation was materially contracted. The passing of the bill of 1819, which realised that prospect, and at once rendered paper the representative of gold only, at a time when, from the effects of the South American Revolution, the annual supply of the precious metals for the use of the globe had been reduced to a third of its former amount, of necessity contracted the cur-

rency so much that it sunk in England from £48,278,070 in 1818, to £26,588,000 in 1822; and, as a necessary consequence, lowered the price of all the articles of production and commerce fifty per cent. The misery produced to all the industrious classes by this prodigious fall of prices, when debts, taxes, and incumbrances of every description remained the same, was such as at length absolutely compelled Government to give an extension to the currency, which was done by the bill of 1822, extending for ten years the period during which small notes were to be retained in circulation. This, again, by retaining the fatal principle that paper was to be a representative of gold, not a substitute for it, landed the nation in the opposite set of dangers; and its domestic history, from 1822 to the end of 1825, is nothing but a development of the perilous effects of a plentiful paper currency, a representative of the precious metals, not a substitute for them, and based upon their retention.

3. Effect of the South American Revolution on the currency of Great Britain.

As the disastrous effects of the monetary system established in 1819 arose in a great degree from the violent contraction of the monetary circulation of the globe, from the effects of the South American Revolution, at the very time when the paper currency of Great Britain was rendered dependent on its retention, so the opposite set of dangers which were so fatally experienced in the country from the extension of the currency in 1822, was in an equal degree dependent on the extravagant ideas entertained of the boundless advantages to be derived from the emancipation of the South American colonies. Many causes conspired to bring about a revival of industry and enterprise in the end of 1822 and beginning of 1823. The very magnitude of the distress of the three preceding years tended, as it always does, to produce this result. Old clothes were worn out, new ones were required. The stringency of economy during past years had both rendered necessary a supply of articles of comfort, and provided little funds for their purchase. The price of wheat,

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which in the beginning of 1822 had been 48s. 6d., fell, from the effects of a good harvest, before the end of that year, to 38s. 10d., being the lowest point it had reached in the preceding twenty years.[1] Though this great fall bore hard upon the agricultural interest, it proportionally relieved the manufacturing, and let loose a considerable portion of the earnings of the working classes, hitherto absorbed in the purchase of food, for the acquisition of humble conveniences. This gave a stimulus to the home market for manufactures; and at the same period the foreign market was greatly extended, chiefly in consequence of vast shipments to South America, to the extent of which market it was thought no limits could be assigned. The exports to South America, which in 1818 had been £2,376,000, rose in 1822 to £3,166,000, in 1823 to £4,218,893, and in 1825 to £6,425,715.* The result was a very great increase in the *quantity* of manufactures produced in the year, though, from the fall in the cost of production, and consequent declared value of exports, it did not appear to the same extent in the parliamentary returns till the effects of the expansion of the currency began to appear in the general results.

[1] Tooke On Prices, ii. 115.

4. Causes which augmented the currency in 1823.

When these circumstances were preparing an increase of activity and industry in the manufacturing districts of the country, two circumstances of paramount importance occurred at the same time to enlarge the currency, in such a way as poured a flood of prosperity over the nation, but resting on so insecure a basis—the retention of gold—

* EXPORTS TO SOUTH AMERICA, INCLUDING BRAZIL, FROM 1817 TO 1825.

Years.	£	Declared value of exports.
1817, ...	2,147,497	41,492,312
1818, ...	2,651,337	46,112,800
1819, ...	3,995,757	34,881,727
1820, ...	2,921,300	36,126,322
1821, ...	2,947,237	36,333,102
1822, ...	3,166,714	36,650,039
1823, ...	4,218,893	36,375,342
1824, ...	5,572,579	38,422,312
1825, ...	6,425,715	38,870,851

—PORTER, 3d edit., 359.

as involved it in the end in the most unheard-of calamities. The first of these was the Small Note Bill, passed in July 1822, which extended the period during which small notes were to be issued, which was to have terminated in 1823, for ten years longer. The second was the virtual establishment, in the close of 1822, of the independence of the South American republics, which took place in 1822 by the general triumph of the arms of the insurgents, and the express recognition of their independence by Great Britain in July 1823.[1] It is hard to say which of these events contributed most powerfully to enlarge the currency, and with it to raise prices and stimulate industry throughout the country; for the first continued that admirable and convenient medium of exchange which is so suited to the wants of the community, that wherever it is allowed to exist it invariably banishes gold from the circulation; the second diffused the most boundless ideas of the endless supplies of the precious metals which would flow into the country when the inexhaustible mineral treasures of South America were worked by British enterprise and capital, and their produce brought direct to the Bank of England. The belief was universal, and most of all among practical sagacious men, that the supplies of specie would never again fail, now that South America had become independent. The El Dorado which was realised in 1852, by the discovery of the gold mines of California and Australia, was confidently anticipated thirty years earlier from the establishment of those republics; and that essential element in commercial prosperity, general confidence, was established from the very circumstances which rendered it most insecure.

[1] Ante, c. xii. § 104.

The effect of this expansion of the currency, of course, did not take place *immediately*, nor for a considerable time after the causes which induced it had come into operation. This is a very important observation, and affords the answer to many erroneous ideas which prevail on this subject. When a monetary panic arises, or

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5. The change of prices through extension of currency is not immediate, but gradual.

a sudden contraction of the currency takes place, the effect is often *instantaneous;* the whole industrial undertakings of the country may be thrown into difficulties, or ruined in one week. But the vivifying influence of an expansion of the currency is much slower in developing itself; it is the work of time, and generally does not become apparent for six months or a year after the change has come into operation. The reason is, that refusals to continue advances by bankers at once suspend or ruin the most important undertakings; but the extension of their accommodation does not immediately set these in motion, and till this takes place the change of prices does not appear. There is no immediate or necessary connection between the expansion of the currency and a change of prices; the result takes place slowly and gradually by the extension of credit by bankers, and its effect on the undertakings and industrial enterprise of the country. The one is analogous to the destruction of life, which may be accomplished in an instant; the other to its creation or growth, which can be effected only by the lapse of time. The change of prices, accordingly, and stimulus to industry produced by the extension of the currency in July 1822, did not come into operation till the spring of 1823, and continued through the whole of that and the succeeding year. The low prices of the close of 1822 were the effect of the contraction of the circulating medium in the three years preceding. In like manner the change of prices and stimulus to industry which resulted over the world from the discovery of the mines of California and Australia in 1850, did not take place in that year, or even the next, but came into full operation in 1852 and 1853.

The truth of these principles was fully demonstrated by the expansion of the currency, and corresponding rise of prices and stimulus to industry during the course of the year 1823. The average of bank notes in circula-

1823.

6. Effect of the expansion of the currency on prices in 1823 and 1824.

tion, which in 1822 had been £17,862,890, rose in 1823 to £18,629,540, and in November of that year was as high as £20,406,564. The increase in country bankers' notes was still more considerable; judging from the number of stamps issued, it was, as compared with 1821, a third, and a ninth as compared with 1822.* The effect on prices fully appeared in the course of the year: wheat, which was at 38s. 11d. in the end of 1822, rose in 1823 to 52s. 8d., and in 1824 to 64s. 3d. All these effects took place in a still more remarkable degree in 1824, when, in addition to the expansion of the currency, a general fever of speculation had set in upon the country. The Bank of England notes rose at the end of autumn in that year to £20,177,820, and the country bank-notes to £9,920,071;† and the paper under discount at the Bank,

* Stamps for Country Bank-Notes issued on 10th October, and Average Prices of Wheat.

Years.	£	Average Prices of Wheat per Quarter.
1820 ...	3,574,894 ...	54s. 6d.
1821 ...	3,987,582 ...	49s. 0d.
1822 ...	4,217,241 ...	38s. 11d.
1823 ...	4,657,589 ...	52s. 8d.
1824	4,822,174 ...	64s. 3d.

—Tooke *On Prices*, ii. 129, 390.

† Bank and Bankers' Notes in circulation, the Paper under discount at the Bank, and Price of Wheat and Cotton, from 1815 to 1825.

Years.	Bank Notes.	Country Banks.	Total.	Paper under discount at Bank 30th August.	Price of Wheat per Quarter.	Price of Cotton per lb.
	£	£	£	£	s. d.	s. d.
1815	27,261,650	19,011,000	46,272,650	20,660,694	55 7	1 9
1816	27,013,620	15,096,000	42,109,620	11,182,109	103 7	1 6
1817	27,397,900	15,894,000	43,294,900	5,507,392	84 0	1 6
1818	27,771,070	20,507,000	48,278,070	5,113,748	80 8	1 3
1819	25,227,100	15,701,328	40,928,428	6,321,402	66 3	1 1
1820	23,509,150	10,576,245	34,145,395	4,672,123	54 6	0 8½
1821	22,471,450	8,256,180	30,727,630	2,722,587	49 0	0 8¼
1822	18,172,170	8,416,430	26,588,600	3,622,151	38 11	0 8
1823	18,176,470	9,920,074	27,396,544	5,624,698	52 0	0 8
1824	19,927,800	12,831,352	32,761,152	6,655,343	64 3	0 9½
1825	26,069,130	14,980,168	41,049,298	7,691,464	63 0	0 9½

—Tooke *On Prices*, ii. 390, 401; *History of Europe*, App., chap. xcvi.

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which in 1821 had been only £2,722,587, rose in 1823 to £5,624,693, and in 1824 to £6,255,343. This great addition to the paper circulation was rested on a corresponding addition to the store of bullion in the coffers of the Bank of England, which increased to such a degree that in January 1824 it had reached the enormous amount of £14,200,000, from £3,595,360, which it had been in 1819, and £10,097,000 in 1822.[1]

[1] Tooke On Prices, ii. 133, 382.

7. Notice of the general prosperity in the royal speeches in 1823 and 1824.

The effect of this great addition to the circulation, both paper and metallic, of the country in 1823 and 1824, appeared in the most decisive manner in the prices of articles of commerce of all kinds. Wheat rose from 38s. in 1822 to above 60s. in 1821, an addition of above 50 per cent. All other kinds of agricultural produce, as well as the principal branches of manufacture, rose in a similar proportion.* The consequences were immediate, and encouraging in the highest degree. They were emphatically dwelt on in the speeches from the throne at the opening of Parliament in both these years. In February 1823 the King said: "Deeply as his Majesty regrets the continued depression of the agricultural interest, the satisfaction with which his Majesty contemplates the increasing activity which pervades the manufacturing districts, and the flourishing condition of our commerce in most of its principal branches, is greatly enhanced by the confident persuasion that the progressive prosperity of so many of the interests of the country cannot fail to contribute to the improvement of that great interest which is

* PRICES OF WHEAT, BARLEY, MEAL, COTTON, AND IRON, FROM 1823 TO 1825.

Years.	Wheat per Quarter.	Barley per Quarter.	Meal per Tierce.	Cotton per lb.	Iron per Ton.
	s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*	*s.* *d.*	*s.* *d.*	£ *s.*
1822	38 11	18 3	80 0	0 8½	6 0
1823	52 0	24 6	97 0	0 8	6 10
1824	64 3	32 2	82 6	0 9	7 0
1825	63 0	31 0	110 0	0 9½	11 10

—TOOKE, ii. 388, 401.

the most important of them all." And in the corresponding speech in February 1824, his Majesty said, in words still more emphatic and strong: "Trade and commerce are extending themselves both at home and abroad. An increasing activity pervades almost every branch of manufacture. The growth of revenue is such as not only to sustain public credit, and to prove the unimpaired productiveness of our resources, but to evince a diffusion of comfort among the great body of the people. Agriculture is recovering from the depression under which it laboured, and, by the steady operation of natural causes, is gradually reassuming the station to which its importance entitles it among the great interests of the nation. At no former period has there prevailed throughout all classes in this island a more cheerful spirit of order, or a more just sense of the advantages which, under the blessings of Providence, they enjoy. In Ireland, which has for some time past been the object of his Majesty's particular solicitude, there are many indications of amendment."[1]

[1] Royal Speeches, Feb. 1823 and 1824. Ann. Reg. 1823, 5; 1824, 3, 4.

8. Symptoms of increased general prosperity.

It was no wonder the speeches from the throne during these years made such special mention of the increasing prosperity of the nation, for the symptoms of it were universal.* The manufactures produced during the last six months of 1822 surpassed those of the preceding so much, that the average of that year considerably exceeded that of the preceding year by fully a fifth. During the

* EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1820 TO 1825.

Years.	Imports.	Exports. Official Value.	Exports. Declared Value.	Revenue.
1820	£32,438,650	£38,395,625	£36,424,652	£54,282,958
1821	30,792,760	40,831,744	36,659,630	55,834,192
1822	30,500,094	44,236,533	36,968,964	55,663,650
1823	35,798,707	43,804,372	35,458,048	57,672,999
1824	37,552,935	48,735,551	38,396,300	59,362,403
1825	44,137,482	47,166,020	38,877,388	57,273,869

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation* (3d edition), 366, 475.

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whole of 1823 and 1824, the same progress was still more conspicuous; although, from the increase being chiefly in the home market, the exports and imports gave no adequate indication of its real amount. Yet, such as it was, it was very considerable; and the great increase of the imports, in particular, indicated the increased prosperity of the people. The revenue exhibited the same symptoms of elasticity; for, notwithstanding a reduction of taxation in the years 1822 and 1823,* amounting to £7,000,000 sterling, it exhibited an increase of £4,000,000 in 1824 compared with 1822, and £5,000,000 compared with 1820. Agricultural distress, indeed, the sad bequest of the contracted currency of the three preceding years, was still very prevalent, especially in the commencement of 1823; and numerous county meetings were held, in which the general distress of the landed interest, and the necessity of the most unflinching reduction of expenditure, were emphatically urged. At one in Norwich, Mr Cobbett proposed, and carried against the united Whig aristocracy of the county, resolutions declaratory of the necessity of a great reduction of the standing army, a sale of the whole Crown-lands, an abolition of all sinecures, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and a sweeping measure of parliamentary reform.[1] But the rise in the value of agricultural produce, arising from the extension of the currency, ere long extinguished these ill humours by removing their cause; and the landed

[1] Ann. Reg. 1824, 2, 3; Martineau, i. 341.

* TAXES REPEALED FROM 1821 TO 1823.

Agricultural horses—1822,	£480,000
Malt, „	1,400,000
Salt, „	1,295,000
Hides, „	300,000
Assessed Taxes—1823,	2,300,000
Do., (Ireland,)	100,000
Tonnage,	160,000
Windows (Ireland),	180,000
Spirits (Ireland),	380,000
Do., (Scotland),	340,000
	£6,935,000

—*Ann. Reg.* 1823, p. 117.

interest, during 1824 and 1825, as they shared in the general prosperity, participated in the universal contentment.

9. Mr Wallace's picture of the country from 1815 to 1823.

Mr Wallace, the able President of the Board of Trade at this period, gave the following picture of the state of the country under the action of the monetary measures in progress, from 1815 to 1823. On 12th February 1823, he said in his place in Parliament: "The general export of the country, in the four years from 1815 to 1819, had decreased £14,000,000 in official value; and he took the official value in preference to the declared, because it was from the quantity of goods produced that the best measure was derived of the employment afforded to the different classes of the community. *In the year from 5th January* 1819 *to 5th January* 1820, *the export of the country fell off no less than* £11,000,000; and in looking at that part of it which was more completely only of British or Irish manufacture, he found that the difference in four years was £8,414,711; and that in the year from 5th January 1820 to 5th January 1821, there was a decrease of £8,929,629. Nobody, therefore, could be surprised that, at that period, the industry of the country appeared to be in a state of the utmost depression; that our manufacturers were most of them unemployed; that our agriculturists were many of them embarrassed; and that the country, to use the phrase of a friend of his in presenting a petition from the merchants of London, *exhibited all the appearances of a dying nation.* Though the condition of the agricultural interest was not as favourable as he could wish, still it was most satisfactory for him to state, that not only did the exports of last year (1822) exceed those of all the years to which he had been alluding, but also those of the most flourishing year which had occurred during the continuance of the war. In all the material articles there had been a considerable increase. The export of cotton had increased 10 per cent, and hardware 17 per cent; of linens 12 per cent, and of

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woollens 13 per cent; and the aggregate exports of 1822 exceeded those of 1820 by 20 per cent, and of 1821 by 7 per cent—notwithstanding a deduction was to be made from the exports of one great article, sugar, owing to a prohibitory decree of Russia, amounting to 35 per cent."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. viii. 100, 101.

10. Budget of 1823.

These favourable circumstances enabled Government to make considerable reductions of taxation during the years 1823 and 1824, and to exhibit a very flattering, though, as it proved, fallacious view of the public finances to the nation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated the revenue of the nation, in 1823, at £57,000,000 in the first of these years, and the expenditure at £49,852,786; leaving a surplus of £7,147,214. Of this large surplus he proposed to set aside £5,000,000, conformably to the resolution of 1821, for the reduction of debt, and the residue was to be devoted to the remission of taxation. This reduction was, on truly wise principles, to be effected on the direct taxation; and the duties selected for remission were the assessed taxes. They were lowered at once 50 per cent—a reduction which, on the window-tax, was estimated at £1,205,000; and on the whole assessed taxes, £2,200,000. The whole assessed taxes of Ireland, amounting to £100,000, were repealed, and the window-tax taken entirely away from the ground-floor of shops and warehouses, though connected with houses. The last reduction deserves to be noted as the first indication of the growing influence of that numerous body, *the shopkeepers*, who, in the end, acquired a very powerful influence in the direction of the State. This budget, the most favourable which had been laid before Parliament for many years, was received with loud cheers from both sides of the House.[2]

[2] Ann. Reg. 1823, 108, 109; Chancellor of Exchequer's Budget, Feb. 21, 1823.

11. Budget of 1824.

The budget of 1824 exhibited appearances not less favourable. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, on this occasion, had the satisfaction of announcing the agreeable intelligence, that the Emperor of Austria had agreed to pay £2,500,000 in satisfaction of loans of £6,000,000

made to him in 1795 and 1797. This unexpected windfall, which was not inaptly called a "godsend," enabled Government to exhibit a more favourable statement of the public finances than could have been anticipated even from the very prosperous state of the nation. The total revenue was taken at £57,385,000, including the repayments to account of the Austrian loan, and the expenditure at £56,332,924; leaving a surplus of £1,052,076, after applying £5,134,458 to the reduction of debt. This statement, however, was so far fallacious, as, by the arrangement regarding the Dead Weight, as it was called, or military and naval pensions, two millions now figured in the surplus which were in reality obtained by having made permanent, during forty-five years, an item of charge which otherwise would almost have disappeared by the progressive death of the recipients before that time; so that the surplus, but for that shifting of present burdens on posterity, would only have been £3,000,000. This surplus of £1,052,076 the Chancellor of the Exchequer took advantage of to remit to the nation part of the duty on rum, coals, wool, silk, and law proceedings, amounting in all to £1,262,000.[1]

[1] Budget, 1824; Ann. Reg. 1824, 86, 88.

12. Conversion of the Dead Weight.

The favourable state of the finances, and the high range of the public funds, which rose progressively to 84 in December 1823, and to 96 in October 1824, enabled the Chancellor of the Exchequer to carry through two measures which contributed, in a material degree, to relieve the pressure on the exchequer. The first of these was the carrying out the arrangement proposed in the preceding year for equalising, as it was called, the weight of the military and naval pensions, by transmuting them into a fixed charge on the nation for forty-five years. No purchasers had been found for these annuities during the distressed state of the money market in the preceding year; but the affluence of circulation, produced by the extension of the currency, now induced the Bank of England to take part of it, which they did by a contract

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which was to last five years. By this means there was a present saving, on the part taken, of £585,000 a-year effected: but a more delusive scheme never was proposed; for it was nothing but shifting the burden of present debt on posterity, and purchasing present relief by increasing future embarrassment. Such, however, was the pressure on the treasury, that the bill sanctioning this arrangement with the Bank was passed in the Commons by a majority of 140 to 91.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1823, 110.

13. Reduction of the 4 per cents to 3½.

The next measure which was carried was one of a very different character, and to which, neither on the ground of public faith or financial economy, could any objection be stated. This was the reduction of the interest on the 4 per cent stock to 3½. The amount of this stock was £75,000,000, and its annual charge £3,000,000. Dissentients were allowed six months to notify their dissension, in which case they were to be paid in full. A very small proportion of the holders of stock gave notice of their desire to be paid up; in consequence of which, the saving effected to the nation amounted to £375,000 a-year. This sum bore a small proportion to the whole interest on the debt, which was £28,000,000; but it was a step in the right direction, and illustrated the extreme improvidence of the system of borrowing adopted by Mr Pitt during the war, of giving a bond for £100 for every £60 advanced,—a system which precluded the possibility of paying off the 3 per cents, or reducing the interest on that stock till the funds had been for a considerable time above 100, which they have only been for a few weeks during the last half-century.* Had the stock all been borrowed in the 4 per cents, the reduction now effected would have been, not on £75,000,000, but on above £750,000,000, and the saving effected to the nation, not £375,000, but nearly £4,000,000 a-year.[2]

[2] Parl. Deb. x. 313, 314; Ann. Reg. 1824, 85, 86.

A third important change was effected in the finances of the country in the year 1823, which might have conferred incalculable benefits upon the nation, had it been

14. Simplifying of the National Debt accounts, and provision for the permanent reduction of the National Debt.

steadily adhered to in subsequent times. Hitherto the public accounts connected with the National Debt had been so mystified, by issues of exchequer bills and other temporary devices, that it required no small effort of attention on the part of those professionally trained to the subject to understand them; and to the great majority of persons they were altogether unintelligible. To remedy these evils, Mr Robinson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, adopted the manly course, worthy of the chief finance-minister of a free country, of so simplifying the accounts connected with the public debt that they might be intelligible, not only to the members of the legislature, but to every one who paid attention to the subject throughout the country. With this view he placed, by Act of Parliament, the reduction of the debt on its true footing; namely, the annual issue from the treasury of a *certain sum for its reduction.* To effect this, a bill was brought forward, founded on resolutions of the House, which provided, among numerous details calculated to simplify the public accounts, that for the future there should be set apart, and issued out of the consolidated fund, to be placed to the account of the commissioners of the public debt, the annual sum of £5,000,000, to be applied to the reduction of the National Debt,—which sum was to be charged upon the consolidated fund, to be issued by equal quarterly payments, the first beginning on 5th April 1823. There can be no doubt of the wisdom and propriety of these enactments; and happy would it have been for the nation, if, now that it had attained majority, and been intrusted with the direction of its own affairs, it had shown more wisdom and foresight than its guardians had done during its long minority. But the result has been just the reverse. It was shown by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the debate on this subject, that during the seven years which had elapsed from 1816, when the debt had attained its highest point, there had been paid off £19,700,000 of funded, and £4,984,000 of

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unfunded debt, in all £25,000,000 in round numbers,—which would have been £35,000,000 more, but for the reduction of the 5 per cents, which added £10,000,000 to the public debt. The sinking fund of £5,000,000, so anxiously provided for by this Act, would in the next thirty years, if preserved inviolate, have paid off with the growing interest nearly £300,000,000 of the public debt. Whereas, under the popular inspection and control, nothing whatever has been done during that period towards its reduction; for in 1824 the public debt was £781,122,222, and in 1849 it was still £777,603,818; and the interest paid on the debt was, in 1825, £28,060,287, and in 1849 it was £28,323,961![1]*

[1] Porter's Progress of the Nation, 475; Parl. Deb. viii. 345, 347; Ann. Reg. 1823, 111.

The favourable state of the public finances, arising from the growing prosperity of the nation, enabled Government, in 1824, to carry through several gracious and praiseworthy acts, of lasting benefit to the interests of religion, science, and art in the country. Out of the

* Actual Revenue and Expenditure of the United Kingdom in 1823 and 1824.

	Income (Net), 1823.		Income, 1824.
Customs,	£11,498,762	...	£11,327,741
Excise,	25,342,828	...	26,768,039
Stamps,	6,801,950	...	7,244,042
Taxes,	6,206,927	...	4,922,070
Post-Office,	1,462,692	...	1,520,615
From Trustees of Dead Weight,	4,675,000	...	4,660,000
Lesser payments,	1,684,140	...	2,918,898
	£57,672,299	...	£59,362,405
	Expenditure, 1823.		**Expenditure, 1824.**
Public Debt Interest,	£28,064,784	...	£27,979,068
Interest on Exchequer Bills,	1,131,121	...	1,087,283
Naval and Military Pensions,	2,800,000	...	2,800,000
Civil List and Expenses,	2,140,806	...	2,721,301
Army,	7,351,991	...	7,573,026
Navy,	5,453,191	...	6,161,818
Out-pensioners,	155,000	...	...
Ordnance,	1,364,328	...	1,407,308
Miscellaneous,	1,953,366	...	2,449,148
Do.,	522,464	...	595,035
	£56,704,687	...	£58,188,062
Surplus applied to reduce Debt,	£6,710,984	...	£6,587,802

—*Ann. Reg.* 1823, 246; 1825, 296.

unexpected windfall arising from the partial repayment of the Austrian loan, Ministers proposed and carried through a grant of £500,000, to aid in the building of churches, especially in the manufacturing districts, where, notwithstanding the former grant of £1,000,000 for the same purpose, the want of church accommodation was still lamentably felt. In addition to this, there was granted to his Majesty £300,000 from the same fund, to be paid in three years, for repairing and enlarging Windsor Castle: a grant which was laid out with equal taste and judgment, and has produced the magnificent addition which now adds so much to the effect of that noble structure. In the preceding year, the Sovereign had made to the nation the munificent gift of the splendid library of his late father, valued at £65,000, which had been intrusted to the trustees of the British Museum, and which now adorns the noble gallery set apart for it in that superb edifice; and on this the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to bestow the sum of £57,000 out of the Austrian loan, on the purchase of M. Angerstein's beautiful collection of pictures, which laid the foundation of the present National Gallery in Trafalgar Square. Thus in all departments the ease of the finances was making itself felt, and the surplus at the disposal of Government was devoted to the noblest purposes—the extension of the means of religious instruction, and the formation of establishments which might diffuse the light of knowledge and refinement of taste among the people.[1]

15. Grants for new churches, Windsor Castle, and the National Gallery.

[1] Parl. Deb. viii. 600; x. 314, 317.

The preceding detail, uninteresting to many as it may appear, leads yet to general conclusions of the very highest interest, and second in importance to none educed in the course of this History. This is, that the nation, during the peace, when it possessed the advantages of a currency adequate to its wants, was able, without any extraordinary external advantages, not only to enjoy three years of unbroken and increasing domestic felicity, but during that

16. Prosperous state of the country during the three years it had an adequate currency.

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period to remit nearly £12,000,000 of annual taxation,* and still uphold a real sinking fund, arising from an excess of income above expenditure of £5,000,000 a-year. Such was the effect of these circumstances, that the National Debt, which in 1821 was £801,565,310, had sunk in 1826 to £778,128,265, being a reduction of £23,000,000 in five years.† Let these figures be kept in mind, when the progress of the debt and financial situation of the country, in the disastrous years which followed the renewed contraction of the currency in 1826, come to be taken into consideration, and it will then be seen whether the greater part of the sufferings which the nation has since undergone has not arisen from our own acts, and whether the embarrassment of finances under which we still labour is not of our own creation.

17. Ministerial changes from 1822 to 1825.

It has been already mentioned that, upon the death of Lord Londonderry in August 1822, Mr Canning was, by the voice of the nation rather than the choice of the Sovereign, to whom he was personally distasteful owing to the part he had taken in the affair of Queen Caroline, appointed to the important office of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Several other changes took place at the same time, or shortly after, all indicating the change

* TAXES TAKEN OFF IN GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1822 TO 1825 INCLUSIVE.

1822,	£2,139,101
1823,	4,185,735
1824,	1,801,333
1825,	3,676,239
	£11,802,408

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, 436 (3d edition).

† NATIONAL DEBT FUNDED, FROM 1821 TO 1826.

1821,	£801,565,310
1822,	795,312,767
1823,	796,530,144
1824,	791,701,612
1825,	781,123,222
1826,	778,128,265

—PORTER'S *Parliamentary Tables*, i. 6.

which was taking place in the balance of parties, and the increasing weight which the popular interest was acquiring in the Government. Mr Vansittart, who had so long conducted the financial affairs of the country through a period of uncommon anxiety and difficulty, was promoted to the House of Peers under the title of Lord Bexley; and he was succeeded in his important office by Mr Robinson, a man of eloquence and ability of the school of Canning, and eminently qualified to earn popularity for himself and the Government, by falling in with, and sometimes taking the lead in, the popular fancies of the day. Mr Huskisson, whose great abilities and vast statistical knowledge had long given him the lead in all questions of social and political economy, and who was deeply imbued with Liberal views, was made President of the Board of Trade, with a seat in the Cabinet, in room of Mr Wallace, whom bad health obliged to retire. Lord Amherst was appointed Governor-general of India in room of Mr Canning, who had been nominated to that office before his appointment as Foreign Secretary; and Lord Stewart, the ambassador at Vienna, who had succeeded to the title and estates of his brother, the Marquis of Londonderry, was recalled, and succeeded by Sir Henry Wellesley. All these changes were of one character; they tended to augment the Liberal influence in the Government, and of course stamp a Liberal character on its measures. They indicated the progressive growth of the commercial and middle class in the community, which had become such that, though as yet represented only in the indirect way in the Legislature, it had made its influence felt there to such a degree as rendered it impossible to carry on the Government in any other way but by attention to its interests and in conformity to its wishes. Lord Eldon felt the change, and saw that the era of new influences was approaching.[1] He wrote at this period to Lord Liverpool, who still remained Premier, that "he had no

Jan. 31, 1823.

[1] Twiss's Life of Eldon, ii. 466, 468.

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wish to remain Chancellor, and that they who do remain, and especially that officer, stand a very good chance of being disgraced." *

18. Liberal measures of the Cabinet.

The ascendancy which the commercial and trading interest had now acquired in the Cabinet speedily made itself apparent in the measures brought forward by the Government. They were all of one character, tending to further the interests and promote the wishes of the great manufacturing and commercial class, which, after progressively increasing in the House of Commons, had now made its way into the Cabinet, and in a manner acquired the direction of the Government. The chief person who took the lead in this great innovation was Mr Huskisson, whose name stands connected with several of the greatest and most momentous changes in the commercial policy of Great Britain, and who for good or for evil has indelibly impressed his signet-mark upon the annals of his country.

19. Character of Mr Huskisson.

Mr HUSKISSON was a statesman of a different character from any who had yet ruled or influenced the destinies of England. He had neither the persevering energy of Mr Pitt, nor the ardent soul of Mr Fox, nor the playful eloquence of Mr Canning; but in thorough mastery of one great branch of government he was superior to them all. He was one of the statesmen who have arisen with the vast extension of statistical and commercial informa-

* "The *Courier* of last night announces Mr Huskisson's introduction into the Cabinet: of the intention or the fact I have no other communication. Whether Lord Sidmouth has or has not, I do not know; but this is rather too much. Looking at the whole history of these gentlemen, I don't consider this introduction, without a word said about the intention, as perhaps I should have done if certain persons had been introduced into the Cabinet; but turning out one man and introducing another in the way that this has been done, is telling the Chancellor that he should not give them the trouble of disposing of him, but that he should cease to be Chancellor. What makes it worse is, that the great man of all has a hundred times most solemnly declared that no connection of a certain person should come in. There is no believing one word anybody says; and what makes the matter still worse is that everybody acquiesces most quickly, and waits in all humility and patience, till his own time comes. I have written to Lord Liverpool before this news came, that I have no wish to remain Chancellor; and, to say the truth, I think those who do remain, and especially that officer, stand a very good chance of being disgraced."—LORD ELDON *to* SIR W. SCOTT, January 31, 1823.—TWISS's *Life of Eldon*, ii. 468.

tion within the last half-century, and who, by devoting himself almost exclusively to that branch of political science, had become thoroughly master of it. His information on commercial subjects was immense; there was no manufacturer or merchant who did not find him as well informed as he himself was on the details of his own particular branch of business. His natural talents were considerable, and they had been sedulously improved by application and industry; but they were of the solid and substantial, not the captivating kind. His judgment was sound, his sagacity great, his views enlarged, his disposition philanthropic; but he had neither the glance of genius nor the fire of enthusiasm in his composition. He was a powerful debater, a sound reasoner, and from his thorough knowledge of every subject on which he addressed the House, he never failed to command ready and respectful attention. He was the man of all others qualified to lead the opinions of practical men of business, who looked to facts rather than oratory, and were more likely to be convinced by an array of figures than by all the flowers of rhetoric; and as they were every day making their way in greater numbers into the legislature, his influence soon became very great. Strongly impressed with the evil effects of the restrictive system which had so long obtained in commercial matters, and especially the clog upon manufacturing industry which arose from the heavy duties imposed on many articles of its raw material, he bent all the force of his powerful mind to lighten the wheels of industry in this particular. Yet was he not so great a theorist as not to know that there are exceptions to all rules, however in the general case well founded; and though a decided Free-Trader so far as commerce and manufactures are concerned, he admitted and earnestly enforced an exception in the case of that great branch of labour which provides for the subsistence and independence of nations.*

* William Huskisson was born on March 11, 1770. He was descended from

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20. Sketch of the Navigation Laws.

The first subject to which, after his accession to office, the attention of this able statesman was directed, was the Navigation Laws, and to him we owe chiefly the introduction of that great change in our commercial policy known by the name of the RECIPROCITY SYSTEM. To understand this subject, it is necessary to premise that, by a law passed during the Protectorate of Cromwell, which was confirmed and declared permanent after the Restoration by 12 Charles II. c. 18, it had been provided that no merchandise of either Asia, Africa, or America should be imported into Great Britain in any but English-built ships, navigated by an English commander, and having at least three-fourths of their crew British. Besides this exclusive right conferred on British shipping, discriminating duties were imposed, so that goods might still be imported in foreign ships from Europe, but they were more

a family of ancient standing but moderate fortune in Staffordshire, and received the elements of education in his native county. Early in life he was sent over to Paris to complete his education, and arrived there just in time to witness, and in some degree share, the enthusiasm excited by the capture of the Bastile in 1789. He then became member of the Club of 1789, and formed an intimacy with Franklin and Jefferson, as well as the leaders of the Revolution in Paris, a circumstance which exercised a powerful influence upon his thoughts and turn of mind during the whole remainder of his life. He was first brought into Parliament in 1796 by Lord Carlisle for the borough of Morpeth, and was soon after appointed Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, in which situation his business talents were soon discovered, and he enjoyed the intimate friendship of Mr Pitt and Mr Dundas, and was often called to their councils. In 1801 he retired from office with Mr Pitt, but was reinstated in his former situation in 1804 on his return to the helm, and he continued there, with the exception of the brief period of the Whigs' tenure of power, till Mr Canning's retirement in 1809, when he withdrew along with his brilliant friend, and became a leading member of that section of the Tory party which was now in open hostility to the Government. In 1814 he was appointed a Commissioner of the Woods and Forests, which situation he held till his appointment as President of the Board of Trade and a Cabinet Minister in January 1824. During this period he devoted himself almost exclusively to subjects of trade, navigation, and political economy; and such was his abilities that he had become, before his appointment to the Board of Trade, the instructor of statesmen and leader of the House of Commons on these subjects, which were daily becoming of more importance in Parliament and public opinion. He was a member of the Bullion Committee in 1810; and the return to cash payments in 1819 was mainly brought about by his influence, which was also strenuously exerted to procure the introduction of the reciprocity system on a limited scale in 1821, and to lay the foundation of Free Trade in 1822.—*Huskisson's Speeches and Life*, i. 1, 49, 235.

heavily taxed than if imported under the English flag. Under this system the trade of Great Britain was carried on for a hundred and fifty years, without other nations having attempted any retaliatory measures; it was under it that England acquired the sceptre of the waves, and a colonial empire which encircled the earth. Such results speak for themselves; they require no support from argument, and fully justify Adam Smith's remark: "When the Act of Navigation was made, though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous Act may have proceeded from national animosity. They are *as wise, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most consummate wisdom.* National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended—the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England. The Act of Navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it. As defence, however, is of more value than opulence, the Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England." [1]

[1] Wealth of Nations, b. iv. c. 2.

21. Retaliatory measures of other nations.

But how wise soever this Act may have been when it was first passed, and however splendid the results which followed from the steady adherence to it, the time at length came when it could no longer be maintained in its pristine rigour. The very completeness of its success, the magnitude of the benefits which it had conferred upon Great Britain, prepared its downfall. They made other nations desirous to adopt a system from which England had derived such great and obvious benefits. Thence the commencement of the *retaliatory system* and the war of tariffs—a state of pacific hostility, in which the old and rich state, where prices are high because money is plentiful, is in general beaten by the young and poor state,

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where prices are low because money is scarce. This accordingly took place as soon as the termination of the war, by closing the military hostility, opened the door to the commercial rivalry of nations. The Americans, who had already begun to follow in the footsteps, in this respect, of the mother country, soon after the establishment of their independence passed a navigation law similar in its main provisions to that of England; and as this state of smothered war of tariffs was found to be equally disadvantageous to both countries, a treaty was concluded in 1815, which put the vessels of the two countries upon the footing of equal duties and entire reciprocity. This system was found to work so well in the case of the United States, that it led to its adoption, on a partial scale, with other countries; and it was the success of this experiment which led to its being engrafted on the general policy of Great Britain by the Act of 1823.[1]

[1] Porter's Progress of the Nation, 386, 387, 3d edition.

22. Mr Wallace's five Free-trade bills in 1822.

The new system was first introduced on a general scale in 1822, when Mr Wallace brought forward five bills, which effected a very important alteration on our commercial system. The first of these bills repealed various statutes, now obsolete, in relation to foreign commerce before the passing of the Navigation Act.[2] The second repealed various laws from the Navigation Act downwards, including that part of the Navigation Law itself which enacted that goods of the produce of Asia, Africa, and America should not be imported except in British ships, with three-fourths of the crew British sailors. By the third, certain enumerated goods were allowed to be brought to this country from any port in Europe, in ships belonging to the port of shipment. Ships belonging to Holland, which by the Navigation Act could not be allowed to enter English ports with cargo, were placed upon the same footing as the ships of other countries. South American produce, which before the passing of this Act could be brought only from certain ports of Spain and Portugal, was now permitted to be imported direct from the places

[2] 3 Geo. IV. cap. 41, 44.

of growth in ships of the country, the only exception to this concession being against places to which British ships were not admitted for the purposes of trade. The fourth bill regulated the trade between our North American and West Indian colonies, and other places in the same quarter of the globe. It permitted the entry, under certain duties, of various articles from any foreign country in America or port in the West Indies, either in British vessels or in vessels belonging to the country of shipment, and the goods so imported might be again exported to any other colony, or to the mother country. The fifth bill made it lawful to export in British ships, from any colony to any foreign port in Europe or Africa, any goods that may have been legally imported into the colony, or which were of its own growth or manufacture, and to export certain enumerated articles in British ships to any such colony, from any foreign port in Europe or Africa. By means of these relaxations the West India colonists were enabled to draw their supplies from any country in Europe, Africa, or America, and to send their produce in return to such markets as should hold out the greatest inducement.[1]

[1] 3 Geo. IV. cap. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45; Porter, 387, 388, 3d edition.

23. Menaces of retaliatory measures by Prussia. Feb. 1823.

The advantages which the United States of America, and the West India colonies of Great Britain, derived from these great relaxations, naturally led other countries to desire to participate in them, and the method which they adopted to secure this advantage was to threaten heavy retaliatory duties on British shipping, unless the burdens imposed on them by the Navigation Laws were reduced. Prussia was the first to adopt this system. In spring 1823, her cabinet intimated to the British Government, that, unless some relaxation was introduced into the English Navigation Laws for their benefit, they would retaliate by heavy corresponding duties upon British ships entering the Prussian harbours. In consequence of this threat, the whole matter was brought seriously under the consideration of the British Cabinet, and the result was the introduction of the RECIPROCITY SYSTEM, which first

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made a great and general change on the British commercial system. By this Act, 4 Geo. IV. c. 77, and 5 Geo. IV. c. 1, his Majesty was authorised, by Order in Council, to permit the exportation and importation of goods in foreign vessels, on payment of the same duties as were chargeable when imported in British vessels, in favour of all such countries as should not levy discriminating duties upon goods imported into those countries in British vessels; and farther, to levy upon the vessels of such countries, when frequenting British ports, the same tonnage duties as were levied on British vessels. A power was, on the other hand, vested in the Crown by these Acts of Parliament, to impose, by Order in Council, additional duties upon goods and shipping, against any countries which should levy higher duties in the case of the employment of British vessels in the trade with those countries. These changes fell in so completely with the spirit of the age that they met with a very feeble opposition, and passed the House of Commons by a majority of 5 to 1.[1] They were thus introduced on 6th June, 1823, by Mr Huskisson, as President of the Board of Trade:—

[1] Porter, 388, 389.

24. Mr Huskisson's argument in favour of the Reciprocity System.

"Although the plan now to be submitted to the House is most important, and an entire departure from the principles which have hitherto governed our foreign commerce, yet the plan is so clear, and the benefit to be derived from it so obvious, that little is required to make the country see the propriety of adopting it. It is well known that it had been for a long time, indeed ever since the passing of the Navigation Act, the policy of the country to impose upon cargoes brought in foreign vessels higher duties than on those imported in British bottoms; and also in many instances to allow smaller drawbacks upon articles exported in foreign than upon those exported in British ships. Now, whatever might be thought of the policy of such a system, it was all very well as long as the nations with whom we traded acquiesced in it. But when once the attention of those countries was called to it, it was

not likely that such an inequality would be allowed much longer to exist. Accordingly, it was found that the principal commercial nations in the world, after Great Britain and our great rival in trade the United States of America, feeling the pressure of the tax, immediately commenced the retaliatory system, by imposing duties upon all articles imported into that country by British ships. The consequence of this was, that great embarrassment and inconvenience arose in the commerce of the two countries. Portugal, perceiving the success which had attended the course adopted by the Americans, soon obliged us to place hers upon the same footing. The government of the Netherlands in 1821 passed a law allowing a premium of 10 per cent upon all articles imported in Dutch vessels, which was, in fact, if not in form, imposing a duty of 10 per cent upon the cargoes of all other vessels. This change, though adopted in 1821, only came into operation in the beginning of 1823; and since that time it had been strongly felt in the trade of the two countries. Prussia had also raised the dues upon our vessels, and had intimated, in a manner not to be mistaken, that she would more fully adopt the retaliatory system if we continued our present policy.

"In such a state of things, it was quite obvious that we must adopt one of two courses. Either we must commence a commercial conflict, through the medium of protective duties and prohibitions (a measure of impolicy which, it is believed, no man will now propose), or we must admit other powers to a perfect equality and reciprocity of shipping duties. The latter appears to be the course which we are bound to adopt. Its effect, I am persuaded, will be to lead to a great increase of the commercial advantages of the country; while, at the same time, it will have a tendency to promote and establish a better political feeling and confidence among the maritime powers, and abate the sources of commercial jealousy. It is high time, in the improved state of civilisation of the world, to establish more liberal principles, and show that

25. Continued.

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commerce was not the end, but the means of diffusing comfort and enjoyment among the nations embarked in its pursuit. Those who have the largest trade must necessarily derive the greatest advantage from the establishment of better international regulations. When England abandons her old principle, the United Netherlands, and the other powers who are now prepared to retaliate, will gladly concur in the new arrangement.

26. Concluded.

"I am prepared to hear from the other side that the proposed alteration will be prejudicial to the British shipping interest. In this observation I cannot concur. I think, on the contrary, that the shipping interest of this country has nothing to apprehend from that of other nations. When the alteration in the Navigation Laws was first projected, similar unfavourable prognostications were made by part of the shipping interest, but these anticipations have proved to be entirely unfounded. The shipping of Great Britain is perfectly able to compete with that of other countries. It is quite time to get rid of the retaliatory principle, which, if carried to the extreme of which it is susceptible, must injure every species of trade. One sort of shipping would be carrying the trade of one country, and then returning without any equivalent advantage to make way for the countervailing regulations of another power, or else to return in ballast. What would be thought of an establishment, if a waggon should convey goods to Birmingham, and afterwards return empty? The consumer would, it was probable, be little satisfied with such a way of conveying his merchandise. The consequence would be, that there would necessarily be two sets of waggons to do that work which was now performed by one, and that, too, at a considerable increase of price on the raw material. We are not now able to carry on a system of restriction, labouring, as we have for some time been, under many and unavoidable restrictions. Our trade and commerce, it is true, are rapidly improving; but they still require that we should adopt every measure

by which either could be fostered or improved. What I propose is, that the duties and drawbacks should be imposed and allowed upon all goods equally, whether imported or exported in British or foreign vessels, giving the King in council a power to declare that such regulations should extend to all countries inclined to act upon a system of reciprocity, but reserving to the same authority the power of continuing the present restrictions with respect to those powers who should decline to do so."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. ix. 795, 798.

27. Answer by the shipowners.

So entirely were the views here developed by Mr Huskisson in unison with those of the vast majority of the House of Commons, that the following paragraphs of the speeches of Mr Robinson and Mr Marryat contain all which is to be found in the parliamentary debates in opposition to this great innovation. "The resolutions proposed, if carried into effect, will increase the difficulties under which the shipowners at present labour. Parliamentary returns prove that the shipping of the country is far from being in the prosperous state which is represented. From 1821 to 1823 there had been a falling off in shipbuilding to the extent of 161 ships and 122,000 tons. During the same period there had been a decrease in our navigation to the amount of 732 ships, 129,000 tons, and 8000 seamen. Such had been the consequence of the system recommended by the political economists. The end of that system will be to drive the trade of Great Britain into the hands of foreign countries. This is the only country in Europe which is abandoning the system of protective duties. A few years ago, when America obtained some concessions from us, she wished to obtain similar advantages from France, but the French government would not yield, but on the contrary imposed a light duty on importations from America, who, in her turn, did the same with respect to France. The views of the Free-Traders may be favourable to the mercantile interests, but they are certainly prejudicial to shipowners and builders.

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28. Concluded.

"The proposed system has been reduced to experiment, and what has been the result? The reciprocity system has been for eight years established with America, and the consequence has been, very great disadvantage to the shipping engaged in that trade. Five-sixths of the carrying trade between Great Britain and America is now carried on in American ships. If the protection to British shipping, which alone has hitherto enabled our shipowners to compete with those of foreign states, is removed, it is indispensable that the duties on Baltic timber, which at present are such a clog on our shipbuilding, should be removed, or at least materially reduced. Unless this is done, it is quite impossible we can compete with foreign nations, who have their wood at their own door, and navigate their ships for wages half in amount to that which our shipowners are obliged to pay to their sailors."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. ix. 801, 802.

29. Effect of these acts.

Mr Huskisson's resolutions were passed by a great majority, and carried into effect by acts of Parliament in the same session. Under the authority of these acts, reciprocity treaties were concluded by Government with the principal trading countries in the world, so as to give the reciprocity system the fairest possible trial.* There is no doubt that the facilities to the transit of goods afforded by these acts have contributed to the extension of our foreign commerce; but they have been attended with effects proportionally disastrous to our shipping, and which threaten, at no distant period, to

* COUNTRIES WITH WHICH RECIPROCITY TREATIES WERE CONCLUDED, UNDER AUTHORITY OF THESE ACTS OF PARLIAMENT.

France.	Hamburg.	United States.
Austria.	Hanover.	Mexico.
Russia.	Mecklenburg Strelitz.	Texas.
Sweden.	Mecklenburg Schwerin.	Uraguay.
Norway.	Oldenburg.	Bolivia.
Denmark.	Frankfort.	Venezuela.
Prussia.	Portugal.	New Granada.
Netherlands.	Two Sicilies.	Grenada.
Lubeck.	Greece.	Rio de la Plata.
Sardinia.	Turkey.	Brazil.
Bremen.		

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, 389, 3d ed.

undermine the whole foundation of our national independence. The ablest writers on the Free-trade side admit the depreciation which, since their introduction, has taken place in the value of British shipping. "A great depreciation," says Mr Porter, "has undoubtedly taken place in the value of ships in this country. The general fall of prices, however, has not borne harder upon the owners of ships than the holders of other species of property. Overlooking this obvious cause of depression, and seeing that not only were they underbid by the owners of British ships built with cheaper materials, *but also by the foreign shipowner, whose vessel was built still more cheaply*, they forget the circumstances which had in a manner compelled the Government to relax our Navigation Laws, and attribute their losses and disappointments to the reciprocity treaties. There is not any class of persons in this country, with the exception, perhaps, of the landholders, which has made such loud and continued complaints of distress as the shipowners have done since the peace of 1815."[1]

[1] Porter's Progress of the Nation, 389, 390.

30. Effect of the Reciprocity System on British and foreign shipping.

Experience has now thrown a clear and steady light on this subject. The reciprocity treaties have now been in existence for thirty years, and were so for five-and-twenty before the general repeal of the Navigation Laws took place, and the result, both upon the general shipping of the country and the proportion of British and foreign tonnage with the principal countries with whom reciprocity treaties have been concluded, affords decisive evidence of the great discouragement which has by them been given to British shipping, and of the progressive increase of foreign tonnage over it which has in consequence taken place. From the subjoined tables, taken from Mr Porter's Parliamentary Tables, it appears that, under the protective system, the British tonnage employed in our trade from 1801 to 1821 had *increased*, from 922,594 to 1,599,274; the foreign tonnage had *declined*, during the same period, from 780,155 to 396,256;—in other words,

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during these twenty-two years the proportion of British to foreign shipping had doubled.* Whereas, during the next twenty-five years, from 1823 to 1848, the British tonnage had advanced from 1,664,186 tons to 4,565,533 tons; that is, increased 270 per cent nearly: but the foreign had increased from 469,151 tons to 2,035,690; that is, it had advanced about 450 per cent, or nearly twice as fast as the British during the same period.† And

* TABLE SHOWING THE PROGRESS OF BRITISH AND FOREIGN SHIPPING FROM 1801 TO 1821, BOTH INCLUSIVE.

ENTERED INWARDS.							
Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total.	Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total.
1801	922,594	780,155	1,702,709	1812	Records	Records	Records
1802	1,333,005	480,251	1,813,256	1813	burnt.	burnt.	burnt.
1803	1,115,702	638,104	1,753,806	1814	1,290,248	599,287	1,889,535
1804	904,932	607,299	1,512,231	1815	1,372,108	746,985	2,119,093
1805	953,250	691,883	1,645,138	1816	1,415,723	379,465	1,795,188
1806	904,367	612,904	1,517,271	1817	1,625,121	445,011	2,070,132
1807	Records	Records	Records	1818	1,886,394	762,457	2,648,851
1808	lost.	lost.	lost.	1819	1,809,128	542,684	2,351,812
1809	938,675	1,697,692	1,697,692	1820	1,668,060	447,611	2,115,671
1810	896,091	2,072,244	2,072,244	1821	1,599,274	396,256	1,995,530
1811	Rec. burnt	Rec. burnt	Rec. burnt				

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, 397.

† TABLE SHOWING THE PROGRESS OF BRITISH AND FOREIGN SHIPPING FROM 1822 TO 1849, BOTH INCLUSIVE.

ENTERED INWARDS.							
Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total.	Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total.
1822	1,664,186	469,151	2,133,337	1836	2,505,473	988,899	3,494,372
1823	1,740,859	582,996	2,556,761	1837	2,617,166	1,005,940	3,623,101
1824	1,797,320	759,441	2,556,761	1838	2,785,387	1,211,666	3,997,053
1825	2,144,598	958,132	3,102,730	1839	3,101,650	1,331,365	4,433,015
1826	1,950,630	694,116	2,644,746	1840	3,197,501	1,460,294	4,657,795
1827	2,086,898	751,864	2,839,762	1841	3,361,211	1,291,165	4,652,376
1828	2,094,357	634,620	2,728,977	1842	3,294,725	1,205,303	4,500,028
1829	2,184,525	710,303	2,894,828	1843	3,545,346	1,301,950	4,847,296
1830	2,180,042	758,828	2,938,870	1844	3,647,463	1,402,138	5,049,601
1831	2,367,322	874,605	3,241,927	1845	4,310,639	1,735,079	6,045,718
1832	2,185,980	639,979	2,825,959	1846	4,294,733	1,806,282	6,101,015
1833	2,183,814	762,085	2,945,899	1847	4,492,094	2,253,939	7,196,083
1834	2,298,263	833,905	3,132,168	1848	4,565,533	1,960,412	6,525,945
1835	2,442,734	866,990	3,309,724	1849	4,884,210	2,035,690	6,919,900

—PORTER, 397, 3d edit.

such has been the impulse given to foreign in comparison with British shipping, since the entire repeal of the Navigation Laws in 1849, that the tonnage outwards of British shipping, in the month ending 5th March 1854, was 264,747, while the foreign was 223,456; in other words, they were *nearly equal;* and the growth of foreign and decline of British shipping, during the preceding three years, has been so rapid, that there is little doubt that, in another year, the *former will exceed the latter.* From that moment, of course, the national independence, and maintenance of our foreign commerce, hangs by a thread; because we have nursed up a body of foreign seamen in our own harbours, and carrying on our own trade, superior in number to our own, and which may at any moment be recalled by their respective governments, and united in a league against us.*

This effect becomes still more conspicuous if the action of the reciprocity system on our trade with particular countries is taken into consideration. From the details of their tonnage with this country, and ours with them,

* British and Foreign Tonnage for the Month ending 5th March 1854, and two preceding years.

ENTERED INWARD.			
	Tonnage for the Month ending March 5.		
	1852.	1853.	1854.
British vessels,	206,603	177,383	263,563
United States vessels,	41,378	60,613	89,356
Other countries,	63,022	53,320	58,338
	311,003	291,321	411,257

CLEARANCES OUTWARD.			
	Tonnage for the Month ending March 5.		
	1852.	1853.	1854.
British vessels,	295,823	218,437	264,747
United States vessels,	63,019	64,199	101,531
Other countries,	69,144	102,590	121,925
	427,986	385,226	488,203

—*Times*, April 3d, 1854.

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31. Effect of the Reciprocity System on the shipping of the Baltic powers.

it appears that, since the introduction of the reciprocity system, British tons with Sweden have declined from 23,005 tons to 7037, while Swedish tons with England have increased from 8508 to 117,918; British tons with Norway have declined from 13,855 tons to 2318, while Norwegian with British have increased from 61,342 tons to 128,075; British tons with Denmark had declined from 5312 tons to 4528 tons in 1845, while Danish tons with Great Britain have increased from 3969 tons to 116,382 tons; and British tons with Prussia had declined from 79,590 tons to 49,334 in 1845, while Prussian tons with England had increased from 37,720 tons to 256,711 tons.* The only country with whom the reciprocity system has been attended with effects more beneficial to British than foreign shipping has been

* COMPARATIVE PROGRESS OF BRITISH AND FOREIGN TONNAGE INWARDS, FROM 1821 TO 1847, WITH SWEDEN, NORWAY, DENMARK, AND PRUSSIA.

Years.	SWEDEN.		NORWAY.		DENMARK.		PRUSSIA.	
	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.
1821	23,005	8,508	13,855	61,342	5,312	3,969	79,590	37,720
1822	20,799	13,692	13,377	87,974	7,096	3,910	102,847	58,270
1823	20,986	22,529	13,122	117,015	4,413	4,795	81,202	86,013
1824	17,074	40,092	11,419	135,272	6,738	23,689	94,664	151,621
1825	15,906	53,141	14,825	157,916	15,158	50,943	189,214	182,752
1826	11,829	16,939	13,603	90,726	22,000	56,544	119,060	120,589
1827	11,719	21,822	13,945	96,420	10,825	52,456	150,718	109,184
1828	14,877	24,700	10,826	85,771	17,464	49,293	133,753	99,195
1829	16,536	25,046	9,985	86,205	24,576	53,390	125,918	127,861
1830	12,116	23,158	6,459	84,585	12,210	51,420	102,758	139,646
1831	11,450	38,689	4,518	114,865	6,552	62,190	83,908	140,532
1832	8,335	25,755	3,789	82,155	7,268	35,772	62,079	89,187
1833	10,009	29,454	5,901	98,931	6,840	38,620	41,735	108,753
1834	15,353	35,911	6,403	98,303	5,691	53,282	32,021	118,711
1835	12,036	35,061	2,592	95,049	6,007	49,008	25,514	124,144
1836	10,865	42,439	1,573	125,875	2,152	51,907	42,567	174,439
1837	7,608	42,602	1,035	88,004	5,357	55,961	67,566	145,742
1838	10,425	38,991	1,364	110,817	3,466	57,554	86,734	175,643
1839	8,359	49,270	2,582	109,228	5,535	106,960	111,470	229,208
1840	11,953	53,337	3,161	114,241	6,327	103,067	112,709	237,984
1841	13,170	46,795	977	113,045	3,368	83,009	88,198	210,254
1842	15,296	37,218	1,385	98,979	5,499	59,837	87,202	145,499
1843	6,435	44,184	1,814	97,248	4,148	82,940	70,164	163,745
1844	12,806	59,835	1,315	125,011	7,423	123,674	108,626	220,202
1845	15,157	89,923	1,215	129,897	4,528	84,566	49,334	256,711
1846	12,625	80,649	3,313	113,738	9,531	105,973	63,425	270,801
1847	7,037	117,918	2,318	128,075	20,462	116,382	88,390	303,225

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, and *Parl. Report*, 3d April 1848.

the United States of North America; and the reason is, the high rate of wages and cost of articles of shipbuilding in those flourishing States. Yet even there, after twenty-eight years' experience of the effects of the new system, British tons with America are *not half* of American with Great Britain.*

Where is it, then, that the trade and commerce of Great Britain have found their chief sources of prosperity during the last thirty years?† and what has compensated

* British and American Tonnage in the undermentioned years.

Years.	British Tons.	American Tons.	Years.	British Tons.	American Tons.
1821	55,188	765,098	1835	529,922	1,352,653
1822	70,669	787,961	1836	544,774	1,265,384
1823	89,553	775,271	1837	543,020	1,299,720
1824	67,351	850,033	1838	484,702	1,302,074
1825	63,036	880,774	1839	495,353	1,491,279
1826	69,295	942,206	1840	582,424	1,576,946
1827	99,114	918,361	1841	615,623	1,631,909
1828	104,167	868,381	1842	599,502	1,510,111
1829	86,377	872,949	1843	453,894	1,443,528
1830	87,231	967,227	1844	766,747	1,977,438
1831	215,887	922,952	1845	753,882	2,035,486
1832	288,841	949,622	1846	813,287	2,151,114
1833	383,487	1,111,441	1847	993,210	2,101,350
1834	453,495	1,074,670	1848	1,177,104	2,393,482

—Porter, 392, 3d edit.

† Tonnage of Vessels belonging to Great Britain and her Colonies.

Years.	United Kingdom.	Colonies.	Years.	United Kingdom.	Colonies.
	Tons.	Tons.		Tons.	Tons.
1821	2,355,853	204,350	1836	2,349,749	442,897
1822	2,315,403	203,641	1837	2,333,521	457,597
1823	2,302,867	203,893	1838	2,420,759	469,842
1824	2,348,314	211,273	1839	2,401,346	497,798
1825	2,328,807	214,875	1840	2,584,408	543,706
1826	2,411,461	224,183	1841	2,935,399	577,081
1827	2,181,138	279,368	1842	3,041,420	578,430
1828	2,193,300	...	1843	3,007,581	580,806
1829	2,199,959	317,041	1844	3,044,392	592,839
1830	2,201,502	330,227	1845	3,123,180	590,881
1831	2,224,356	357,608	1846	3,199,785	617,327
1832	2,261,860	356,208	1847	3,307,921	644,603
1833	2,271,301	363,276	1848	3,400,809	651,356
1834	2,312,355	403,745	1849	3,485,958	658,151
1835	2,360,303	423,458			

—Porter, 394, 3d edit.

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32. Great increase of the colonial trade has compensated reciprocity decline.

the great discouragement of our shipping in the traffic with the countries with which we have concluded reciprocity treaties since they came into operation? The answer is, that the compensating force has been found in the colonial trade, which, being wholly protected, has increased with such rapidity that the tonnage employed in that traffic has *more than trebled* since 1821, while that employed in the mother country has, during the same period, only advanced a half; the former having increased 350 per cent, the latter only 50. And such has been the increase in the trade which we have carried on with our colonies, which was *all our own*, during the period when the reciprocity system was, as already shown, eating into the vitals of our traffic with other countries, that while the tonnage with so many of them has declined during the last twenty years, that employed in the colonial trade has increased 60 per cent.*

33. Failure of the Reciprocity System to increase our exports.

Mr Huskisson assigned as a reason for conceding the reciprocity system to other maritime powers, that we were compelled to do so in order to maintain our trade with them, that our system of one-sided protection could no longer be maintained, and that the only way to induce them to take our manufactures was to relieve their shipping of the duties imposed on them. Has the result corresponded to this anticipation? Have foreign nations

* Tonnage of British Shipping to Colonies.

Year.	Tons.	Year.	Tons.
1832	1,021,892	1841	1,521,947
1833	1,018,926	1842	1,228,795
1834	1,081,328	1843	1,493,955
1835	1,152,349	1844	1,576,965
1836	1,170,650	1845	1,818,270
1837	1,139,586	1846	1,832,552
1838	1,284,611	1847	1,786,895
1839	1,287,506	1848	1,659,845
1840	1,495,597	1849	1,629,391

—Porter, 808, 3d edit.

relaxed their prohibitory duties in consequence of the removal of all burdens off their shipping? So far from having done so, the fact is just the reverse. They have taken the benefit of the reciprocity system for their shipping, and given us nothing in return. Prussia requited Great Britain for this concession by the Zollverein, which united 25,000,000 of inhabitants of Northern Germany in a league which imposed from 30 to 50 per cent *ad valorem* duties on our manufactures; America with a fixed import duty of 30 per cent on all imports whatever. Russia, France, and the Baltic powers, who profited so largely by the reciprocity system, have made no corresponding concession on their side, and the consequence is, that, after thirty years' experience of the system, our exports to the Baltic powers are still a perfect trifle, and those to France and Russia put together, with their 100,000,000 of inhabitants, are not equal to what they are to our colonies in Canada and Australia, which do not yet number 2,500,000 consumers.* And with regard to America, it is a most remarkable fact, which, but for the evidence of the parliamentary records, would be incredible, that the British exports to the United States in 1815, the very year when the reciprocity treaty with them was concluded, were greater than they have ever since been,

* Declared Value of British Exports to the undermentioned States from 1840 to 1849.

Years.	Russia.	Sweden.	Norway.	Denmark.	Prussia.	France.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
1840	1,602,742	119,425	78,016	201,462	219,345	2,378,149
1841	1,607,175	197,813	117,938	134,704	194,304	2,902,002
1842	1,885,953	199,313	134,704	194,304	376,651	3,193,939
1843	1,895,519	131,302	151,377	260,176	483,004	2,534,898
1844	2,128,926	103,475	152,824	286,679	505,384	2,656,259
1845	2,153,491	123,730	163,512	258,558	577,999	2,791,238
1846	1,586,235	146,654	183,818	340,318	544,035	2,715,563
1847	1,700,733	179,367	169,149	253,701	553,968	2,554,283
1848	1,692,000	162,819	150,117	296,466	404,144	1,024,521
1849	1,379,179	185,027	182,336	353,499	428,748	1,951,269

—Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, 364, 367.

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and double what, on an average of years, they now are, though they then had not a third of the inhabitants which they at present possess.*

34. Cause of the failure of the Reciprocity System in this respect.

It is not difficult to see what has been the cause of this most remarkable failure of the reciprocity system to procure for the country any of the advantages which its promoters anticipated, while it has realised all the evils which its opponents predicted. It is founded on an entirely erroneous principle; and the error, when once pointed out, is so obvious that it must command the assent of every candid mind. Mr Huskisson said we must lower the duties on foreign shipping, to induce foreigners to admit our goods; and he did the first, *but he forgot to require them to do the last.* He stipulated no reduction of duties on our manufactures in return for the large concessions made to foreign shipping, and the consequence was, they took the last, and did not give the first. Thence the entire failure of his system. His principle was, equal duties on the *same article;* but that is not the principle of real reciprocity. What it should be is, *equal duties on corresponding staples.* He said to the Baltic powers, "We will admit your shipping on the same terms on which you admit ours." Nothing could be fairer in sound, nothing

* British Exports to America, from 1815 to 1848.

Years.	£	Years.	£
1815,	13,255,374	1832,	5,468,679
1816,	9,556,577	1833,	7,579,699
1817,	9,930,359	1834,	6,844,989
1818,	9,451,009	1835,	10,568,455
1819,	4,929,815	1836,	12,425,605
1820,	3,875,286	1837,	4,695,225
1821,	6,214,875	1838,	7,585,760
1822,	6,865,262	1839,	8,839,204
1823,	5,464,874	1840,	5,283,020
1824,	6,090,394	1841,	7,098,642
1825,	7,018,934	1842,	3,528,807
1826,	4,659,018	1843,	5,013,514
1827,	7,018,272	1844,	7,938,079
1828,	5,810,315	1845,	7,142,839
1829,	4,823,415	1846,	6,830,460
1830,	6,132,346	1847,	10,974,161
1831,	9,053,583	1848,	9,564,909

—Porter, 359, 360.

more unfair in substance. What he should have said was, "We will admit your ships on the same terms as you admit our *cotton and iron goods.*" That would have been real reciprocity, and would at once have secured an adequate return. To lower the duties on the *same article*, not a corresponding staple, was a natural but a total mistake.

35. Continued.

Suppose, for example, that England were to say to France, "We will admit your wines on the same terms as you admit ours;" or to Russia, "We will admit your wheat on the same terms as you admit ours," it is easy to see what the result would be. But if England said to France, "We will admit your wines and silks on the same terms on which you admit our sugar and cotton goods;" and to Russia, "We will admit your wheat and hemp on the same terms as you admit our colonial produce and iron," there would be a real reciprocity, and both parties would be equally benefited. The Baltic powers had obvious advantages over Great Britain in ship-building and navigating, as the materials were found at their doors, and their sailors received a third of the wages which ours did; and we had corresponding advantages in iron and cotton goods, from the coal and ironstone beneath our feet, and the machinery they enabled us to construct. Mr Huskisson should have said to their rulers, "We will lower the duties on your shipping, which is your staple, provided you lower the duties on our cotton goods, which are our staple." Instead of this, he simply lowered the duties on their shipping, without asking or receiving any equivalent; and the result has been, that we have thrown away our naval superiority, and endangered our national independence, without even having the poor consolation of thinking that we have gained riches, or extended the market for our industry, in consequence.

Another change was commenced at this time, attended in the end with still more important effects, and which, equally with the preceding, is open to difference of opinion.

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This was the system of *Free Trade*, which consisted in the main in lowering or taking off altogether the duties on foreign commodities, whether of luxury or necessity, without stipulating for any corresponding advantage on our side, but looking for it merely in lowering the price to the British consumer. In making this change, which is an entire departure from the commercial policy of the country in all preceding times, the Government could not be said either to have directed or anticipated public opinion, for the minds of the leading and most intelligent merchants in all parts of the country were made up on the subject; and so early as the year 1820, a petition had been presented to the House of Commons from the most eminent of their number in London, which set forth the main principles on this subject with a clearness and precision which never has been surpassed. The leading doctrine set forth in that memorable document was, that the "maxim of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, which regulates every merchant in his individual dealings, is strictly applicable as the best rule for the trade of the whole nation, and would render the commerce of the whole world an interchange of mutual advantages, and diffuse an increase of wealth and enjoyment among the inhabitants of each state.[1]

36. Commencement of the Free-trade system.

[1] Petition of London Merchants, 1820; Porter, 382.

"That, unfortunately, a policy the very reverse of this has been and is more or less adopted and acted upon by the Government of this and every other country, each trying to exclude the productions of other countries, with the specious and well-meant design of encouraging its own productions, thus inflicting on the bulk of its own subjects, who are consumers, the necessity of submitting to privations in the quantity or quality of commodities, and thus rendering what ought to be the source of mutual benefit and of harmony among states a constantly recurring occasion of jealousy and hostility. That the prevailing prejudices in favour of the protective or restrictive system may be traced to the erroneous supposition that every

37. Argument in its favour by the London merchants.

importation of foreign commodities occasions a diminution or discouragement of our own productions to the same extent; whereas it may be clearly shown, that although the particular species of production which could not stand against foreign competition would be discouraged, yet as no importation could be continued for any length of time without a corresponding exportation, direct or indirect, there would be an encouragement for the purpose of that exportation of some other commodity to which our situation might be better suited,—thus affording at least an equal, and probably a greater, and certainly a more beneficial, employment to our own capital and labour.

38. Continued.

"Among the numerous evils of the protective system, not the least is that the artificial protection of one branch of industry or source of protection against foreign competition, is set up as a ground of claim by other branches for similar protection, so that if the reasoning upon which restriction or prohibitory regulations are founded were followed out consistently, it would not stop short of excluding us from all foreign commerce whatsoever. And the same train of argument which, with corresponding prohibitions and protective duties, would exclude us from foreign trade, might be brought forward to justify the re-enactment of restrictions upon the interchange of productions unconnected with public revenue among the kingdoms composing the Union, or among the different counties of the same kingdom. An investigation of the effects of the restrictive system would show that the distress which now so generally prevails is considerably aggravated by that system, and that some relief might be obtained by the earliest practicable removal of such of the restraints as may be shown to be most injurious to the capital and industry of the community, and to be attended with no compensating benefit to the public revenue. Nothing would tend more to counteract the commercial hostility of foreign states than the adoption of a more enlightened and more conciliatory policy on the part of this country.

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30. Concluded.

"Although, as a matter of mere diplomacy, it may sometimes answer to hold out the removal of particular prohibitions or high duties as depending upon corresponding concessions by other States in our favour, it does not follow that we should maintain our restrictions in cases where the desired concessions on their part must be obtained; our restrictions would not be the less prejudicial to our own capital and industry, because other governments persisted in preserving impolitic regulations. Independent of the direct benefit to be derived by this country on every occasion of such concession or recognition, a great incidental object would be gained by the recognition of a sound principle or standard to which all subsequent arrangements might be referred, and by the salutary influence which the promulgation of such just views by the legislature, and by the nation at large, could not fail to have on the legislation of foreign states. As long as the necessity for the present amount of revenue subsists, it cannot be expected that so important a branch of it as the Customs should be given up or materially diminished, unless some substitute for it, less objectionable, be suggested. But it is against every restrictive regulation of trade not essential to the revenue, against all duties merely protective against foreign competition, and against the excess of such duties as are partly for the purposes of revenue, partly for that of protection, that the prayer of the present petition is respectfully submitted to the wisdom of Parliament."[1]

[1] Petition of London Merchants; Porter, 362, 384, 3d edit.

40. Reflections on this petition.

This petition is well worthy of attention, as it is the first statement of the great doctrine of FREE TRADE, which since that time has made so entire a revolution in the commercial policy of the country, and with which, for good or for evil, the destinies of Great Britain in future times are now irrevocably wound up. The general doctrine was never afterwards more briefly and ably stated than it thus was in the beginning of this great debate by Mr Tooke, who drew up the petition. Its coming from the *merchants* of London is a markworthy and significant

circumstance. It indicates the advent of a period when the commercial body were not content to take the regulations affecting their interests from the hands of the legislature, but thought for themselves, and approached Parliament rather as teachers than suppliants. Its subsequent adoption as a part of the settled policy of the country proves that the time was approaching when the commercial interests were to gain the ascendancy over the producing, and when every other interest was to be sacrificed to those of cheapness in production and economy in consumption. Whatever may be thought of these principles, upon which the opinions of men will probably be divided to the end of the world, according as they belong to the buying and selling or producing class, one thing is clear, that it came from the country, not the Government; and that they are not so much to be ascribed to the influence of any individuals, however powerful, as to the immense growth of the commercial class in society, which enabled it to command the press, influence the majority of Parliament, and obtain the general direction of public opinion.

41. Indication this afforded of the growth of the commercial class.

So accustomed had the people of England been to regard protection to native industry as part and parcel of their constitution, that they did not for a considerable number of years perceive the danger which threatened it; and for long the doctrines of Free Trade made progress in Parliament, and in the country, without any sensible opposition. As long as the Corn Laws were not openly assailed, the landholders were quiescent; when the duties were kept upon foreign sugars, the West India interest said nothing; the complaints of the shipowners as to the working of the reciprocity system produced no general impression, as they affected only a limited class of society. But at length, when every producing interest found itself threatened, a fierce and long-continued controversy commenced; and the arguments of the Free-Traders in and out of Parliament were met by the following considerations:

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42. Argument of the Protectionists.

The principle that to buy cheap and sell dear is the great secret for growing rich, is undoubtedly true of the commercial class, which lives by buying and selling; and it may with safety be applied to small states without any territory, or a very small one, such as Tyre and Athens in ancient, or Holland or Venice in modern times, which have grown great and powerful by the operations of commerce. In such a state, the consumers live not upon the producers, for the latter are next to none, but upon the traders; and, of course, any system of policy which benefits the latter is for the interest also of the former. But Great Britain stands in a very different situation. It is not merely a buying and selling, but it is also a producing state, and the interests of the classes which live by production are much greater than those which depend on commerce. Even in Great Britain itself, the seat of nearly all our commerce and manufactures, the wealth produced annually by the agricultural class is greater than that produced by all branches of the trading and manufacturing classes put together. That produced yearly by the former amounts to £300,000,000, by the latter to only £180,000,000; the property-tax paid by the former is £2,681,655 a-year, that from the latter only £1,541,970.[1] In Ireland the disproportion is infinitely greater: its rental is £13,000,000, and its exports of manufactures only £260,000. If to this is added the immense revenues which the inhabitants of this country draw from the colonies, which, being young and rising states, are mainly dependent on production, it may safely be affirmed that the interests in the united empire dependent on production are at least triple those which rest on buying and selling. To apply, then, the principles rightly followed by a merchant in his private dealings, or a merely mercantile city in its general policy, to a mixed empire such as Great Britain, in which the great interests are dependent on production, is a total misapplication of a maxim, just in certain circumstances,

[1] Income-Tax Returns, April 5, 1845.

which cannot fail to lead to the most dangerous consequences.

43. Continued.

In a country so constituted, the commercial class itself is mainly dependent on the producing; and the principle of buying cheap and selling dear may, if pushed to extremes, prove the ruin of the class which introduced it. No merchant can, for any length of time, sell dear, unless he has rich purchasers of his commodities; and if they become impoverished in the end, by a system by which he was in the first instance enriched, he will not find that his profitable sales will long continue. Of the £180,000,000 worth of manufactures produced in Great Britain, two-thirds, or £120,000,000 worth, is taken off by the home market. This home market itself is mainly dependent upon the producing classes. It is in vain for either the merchants or manufacturers in towns to imagine that they can be durably enriched by a system which goes to impoverish their customers. They may be so in the first instance, but the effect must ere long react upon themselves; for how are the customers to continue their purchases if their means of doing so are taken away?

44. Continued.

At first sight, indeed, the consumers appear to constitute a class apart from producers; and there can be no doubt that their interests, in the first instance, are far from being identical; for the interest of the former is to buy cheap, of the latter to sell dear. It is on this opposition of interests that the whole theory of Free Trade is founded; because, it is said, the consumers constitute the entire body of society, and therefore their interests must prevail over those of the producers, who can never be more than a part. But this argument is more specious than sound, and utterly fails when the bottom of things is looked to. Consumers must have something wherewith to buy the articles of consumption; and whence does that something come? Entirely from the class of producers, in their own or some other country. The fundholder, the bondholder, the banker, the shopkeeper, the pensioner,

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the soldier, the sailor, the merchant, the shipowner, the shareholder, all depend on the producers. Let production cease in the British Islands for one year, and what will be the value of all its realised wealth—what the condition of the whole class of consumers? It is the producers who originally create the wealth which, worked up in a thousand forms, afterwards sustains and nourishes all the other classes of society. They are like the fruit of a tree, which draws its nourishment from the ground; sever the trunk from its root, and where will be the produce of its branches?

45. Continued.

The argument that, under a system of Free Trade, every nation will be brought to take to that species of industry for which nature has given it peculiar advantages, and thus the whole industry of the world will be turned into the right direction, might have some weight if all nations were of the same age, and enjoyed the same political institutions. But the diversity which exists in these respects renders it a vain chimera. How is the young state, without capital, credit, or mechanical skill, to compete with the old one, grown grey in the pursuits of industry, and abounding in everything which can add facilities to manufactures, or cause commerce to flourish? It is in vain to say, Let them take to different pursuits, each to its own, and then they will never clash. Nations will not continue chained always to one branch of industry, any more than an individual will remain chained to one pursuit. Interests, pursuits, objects of industry, change with the growth of nations as well as that of individuals; an agricultural nation will not always remain agricultural, any more than a fox-hunter will always remain a fox-hunter, or a cricket-player always play at cricket. The Americans have greater advantages than any nation in the world for agriculture; but before the years of their minority were past, they were striving to become commercial, and now an *ad valorem* duty of 30 per cent protects every species of manufacture, and their trade exceeds that

of any country in the world, Great Britain alone excepted. It is the same with Russia, Prussia, France, and all the principal agricultural states in the world. They are all striving to become commercial, and to effect this by adopting the prohibitory system, by which we have risen to greatness. Turkey is the only exception; it has long adopted the Free-trade policy in its full extent, because the Mussulmans, who rule the state, are all the denizens of towns, and have no interest in the productions of the country; and the ruin of the Ottoman empire has been the consequence.

46. Concluded.

The inevitable effect of adopting the Free-trade principle, for any length of time, by an old State, always has been, and always must be, that the agriculture of that State is destroyed, its independence endangered, and at length its existence terminated. This it was which occasioned the fall of Rome; this it is which will occasion the destruction, in the end, of the British empire. The reason is to be found in a cause of universal application and irresistible force; but so simple and familiar, that, like an apple falling to the ground, men were long of seeing the explanation of the mighty phenomenon, which lies in a matter of daily occurrence. It is this, that everything which is plentiful, and money among the rest, *becomes cheap.* The necessary effect of this cheapening of money is, that everything else becomes dear in the rich State; and thence, under the Free-trade system, the ruin of its agricultural industry. Riches are only to be found in such quantities, in a realised and accumulated form, in an old State, where they have been the growth of centuries of industry; in the young and rising one, the accumulation has not yet taken place, and money is comparatively scarce. A permanent and unalterable law of nature renders it as impossible for the rich nation to compete with the poor one in the production of the fruits of the soil, as for the poor one to compete with the rich in the production of the finer manufactures. Steam, almost

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omnipotent in the latter, is powerless in the former; England can undersell all nations in cotton manufactures, wrought up out of a vegetable growing on the banks of the Mississippi or Ganges; but it is undersold by the serfs of Poland, the fellahs of Egypt, and the cultivators of America, in the production of food for the use of man. Thence the inevitable result of Free Trade, if established on both sides, to ruin the agriculture of the rich and the manufactures of the poor one; and this is what has invariably happened when an approach even to such a system has taken place. It may be quite true that the weight of towns, in the later stages of society, often becomes such that the change is unavoidable, and it is forced even upon the most reluctant Government; but it is not on that account the less fatal, and the passion for it is the mortal disease which conducts the nation by slow degrees to the tomb.

47. Results of the system of Free Trade, as proved by experience.

Such is a brief and imperfect abstract of the debate on this great question, as it was *at last* evolved on both sides; for the importance and ultimate bearings of the question, and its inevitable results, were not in the first instance perceived by the disputants on either. The future volumes of this History will contain ample materials for forming a judgment which of the set of arguments is the better founded; but, in the mean time, it may be remarked, that the result proves that there was much truth in the prognostications on both sides. For, from the returns of the exports, imports, and importations of grain, during the seven years preceding and the seven years following the entire adoption of Free Trade by the Act of 1846, it appears that the exports, measured by official value, which indicates the quantity, have increased above 100 per cent, the imports about 90 per cent, while the imports of grain of all sorts from abroad have more than quadrupled, having now reached an average of nearly ten millions of quarters a-year, being a full third of the consumption of our people; while the falling off in domestic production,

during the same period, may be guessed at, from the decline of importation of grain from Ireland into Great Britain, which has sunk above a half, pending the vast increase from other quarters; and the exportation of human beings, chiefly agricultural labourers, has reached the enormous amount of 350,000 a-year from the two islands. *

48. State of the silk trade.

These immense results of the new system, however, did not develop themselves fully for a quarter of a century after this period; and the measures tending to Free Trade which Mr Huskisson introduced, in relation to our manufactures, were such as were obviously wise, and must command the assent of every reasonable mind. The silk manufacture was the first branch of manufacturing industry to which the new system was applied. This manufacture, which had owed its origin in England to the barbarous revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV., which drove many thousands of the best French operatives into exile, had prospered to a very great

* EXPORTS, IMPORTS, IMPORTS OF GRAIN FROM ALL THE WORLD, AND FROM IRELAND, INTO GREAT BRITAIN, AND EMIGRATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN EVERY YEAR FROM 1838 TO 1853, BOTH INCLUSIVE.

Years.	Imports into United Kingdom. Official Value.	Exports. Official Value.	Imports of wheat into Great Britain. Quarters.	Imports of all kinds of grain. Quarters.	Imports of grain from Ireland to Great Britain. Quarters.	Emigration from United Kingdom.
1838	£61,268,320	£92,459,231	1,834,452	..	3,474,302	33,222
1839	62,004,000	97,402,726	2,590,734	..	2,242,841	62,207
1840	67,432,964	102,705,372	2,389,732	..	2,327,964	90,743
1841	64,377,962	102,180,517	2,619,702	..	2,855,525	118,592
1842	65,204,962	100,260,101	2,977,302	..	2,538,221	128,344
1843	70,093,353	117,877,278	982,287	..	3,206,483	57,212
1844	85,441,555	131,564,503	1,021,681	..	2,801,206	70,686
1845	85,281,993	134,599,116	303,245	..	3,251,901	93,501
1846†	75,953,875	132,288,345	2,943,926	..	1,814,802	129,851
1847	90,921,866	126,130,986	4,464,757	11,912,864	963,779	258,270
1848	93,547,134	132,617,681	3,082,230	7,523,472	1,946,417	248,039
1849	105,874,607	164,539,504	5,634,344	10,669,661	1,426,397	299,498
1850	100,460,433	175,416,709	4,830,263	9,019,590	1,232,141	280,849
1851	110,679,125	190,652,212	5,330,412	9,618,026	1,121,362	335,966
1852	109,345,409	204,157,231	4,164,693	7,746,669	921,427	356,849
1853	..	..	6,235,869	10,173,135	1,123,178	..

† Free Trade introduced April 1846.

—PORTER, 128, 140, 345, 354. *Edinburgh Review*, April 1854, 583.

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degree, especially at Spitalfields, near London, and Macclesfield, in Staffordshire; and it had come, in 1823, to consume 1,200,000 lb. of the raw material, and gave employment to 40,000 persons. The English silks, however, were dearer than the French, chiefly in consequence of the heavy duties on the importation of foreign silk, which was intended to encourage the growth of silk in Hindostan; and it was generally said—at least by the ladies—that they were inferior in quality; though the inferiority could not have been very great, since, when they were exported to France, as they often were, and reimported into this country as French goods, they excited unbounded admiration as the production of Lyons or Rouen. The extreme distress which pervaded the country, however, from 1819 to the end of 1822, in consequence of the contraction of the currency, had so affected this branch of manufacture that the wages of the operatives had sunk from 30s. a-week to 11s.; and even at these miserably low prices the importation, by means of smuggling, had become so considerable that the home market was in a manner lost to our manufacturers.[1]

[1] Lords' Report (Second), 391, 1823; Porter, 218; Martineau, i. 345.

49. First introduction of Free Trade in reference to it.

In this disastrous state of affairs, the silk-manufacturers, in 1823, soon after Mr Huskisson came into office, presented a petition to Government, praying for a removal of the duties on the importation of the raw material—a circumstance which enabled him to make the well-founded boast, that "the trade had been the first to suggest the removal of these restrictions; and he was confident they would be nearly the first to rejoice in the adoption of their proposal." The bill to lower the duties on foreign silk was introduced first in 1823; but after passing the Commons, it was thrown out in the Lords, chiefly from the influence of Lord Eldon, who was averse to this as to every other innovation. In the following year the bill, however, was again introduced, supported by a petition from the principal silk-manufacturers in and around London. On the other hand, the owners of silk-mills peti-

tioned against any change; and Mr Buxton presented a petition, signed by 23,000 operative silk-weavers of the metropolis, who prayed that "the prohibition of the importation of foreign-wrought silks might not be removed." Pressed in this manner on both sides, it was no easy matter for Government to know what to do. At length, however, as often occurs in such cases, a compromise was agreed to, by which the duty on imported raw silk was reduced from 5s. 7½d. a lb. to 3d. on all raw silk which did come from Bengal, and 4s. on all that did not. The duty on thrown silk was lowered from 14s. 8d. to 7s. 6d. per lb.; and the prohibition against the importation of foreign-wrought silks was continued till July 1826, after which they were to be admitted at an *ad valorem* duty of 30 per cent. There can be no doubt of the wisdom of these changes. Raw silk is not a natural production of this country, and, from the climate, never can be; and therefore the levying of a heavy duty on foreign raw silk was nothing but a gratuitous burden on the springs of manufacturing industry.* Improvement in domestic fabrics is not to be expected, unless the taste is chastened and ingenuity called forth by foreign competition; and the protecting duty of 30 per cent seems amply sufficient

* EXPORTS OF WROUGHT SILKS, FROM 1823 TO 1849.

Years.	£	Years.	£
1823,	351,409	1837,	503,673
1824,	442,596	1838,	777,820
1825,	296,736	1839,	868,118
1826,	168,801	1840,	792,648
1827,	236,344	1841,	788,894
1828,	255,870	1842,	590,189
1829,	267,931	1843,	667,952
1830,	521,010	1844,	736,455
1831,	578,874	1845,	766,405
1832,	529,990	1846,	837,577
1833,	737,404	1847,	985,626
1834,	636,419	1848,	588,117
1835,	972,031	1849,	998,331
1836,	917,822		

Of which to France—

Years.	£
1842,	181,924
1845,	139,772
1846,	172,424

—PORTER, 218, 219.

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to compensate the difference between the value of money and wages of labour in this and foreign states. Accordingly, the results have justified these anticipations; for, although the export of wrought silks fell off for some years after the change was introduced, in consequence of the changes in the currency, yet it afterwards rapidly increased, and is now nearly three times what it was in 1824, when the change was introduced; and what is still more remarkable, a considerable part of these exports has been to France itself.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. x. 870, 1221; Martineau, i. 347.

50. Reduction of duties on foreign wools.

The same principles were soon after applied to the woollen manufacture. As this had always been a staple branch of our manufactures, no duty had ever been laid on foreign wool till 1803, and then it was only ½d. a lb. In 1819, however, Mr Vansittart, in order to relieve the agricultural interest, then suffering severe depression from the contraction of the currency, raised the import duty to 6d. per lb.; and this great advance seriously aggravated the distress of the woollen-manufacturers, which had been sufficiently great before.* In 1824, Mr Huskisson wisely retraced the steps of Government; and as the agricultural interest was now in a state of comparative prosperity, he

* English Exports of Woollen Goods and Imports of Foreign Wool, from 1810 to 1849.

Years.	Exports.	Imports. Pounds of Wool.	Years.	Exports.	Imports. Pounds of Wool.
1819	£5,984,130	16,100,970	1835	£7,639,353	42,172,532
1820	5,586,138	9,775,605	1836	4,655,977	64,239,977
1821	6,462,866	16,622,567	1837	5,795,069	48,379,708
1822	6,488,167	19,058,080	1838	6,271,645	52,594,355
1823	5,636,586	19,366,725	1839	5,327,853	57,379,923
1824	6,034,051	22,564,485	1840	5,748,673	49,436,284
1825	6,185,648	43,816,966	1841	5,185,045	56,170,974
1826	4,966,879	15,989,112	1842	6,790,232	45,881,639
1827	5,245,649	29,115,341	1843	8,204 836	49,243,093
1828	5,669,741	30,236,059	1844	7,693,118	65,713,761
1829	4,587,603	21,516,649	1845	6,335,107	76,813,855
1830	4,728,666	32,305,314	1846	6,896,038	65,255,462
1831	5,232,013	31,652,029	1847	5,733,828	62,592,598
1832	5,244,478	28,142,489	1848	7,342,723	70,864,847
1833	5,736,870	38,046,087	1849	7,846,169	76,768,647
1834	6,840,511	46,455,232			

—Porter, 170, 174.

reverted to the former duty of ½d. a lb. on common foreign wool, and 1d. on the finer sort; and English growers were to be permitted to export British wool on a duty of 1d. a lb. The result has demonstrated the wisdom of the change; for, while the Parliamentary Returns prove that the import of foreign wool has tripled since it was introduced, and the export of woollen manufactures has increased 50 per cent, it has been established in evidence before the House of Lords, that the wool grown in Great Britain and Ireland has increased, since 1800, from 94,000,000 to 145,000,000 lb., or about 50 per cent also.[1]

[1] Commons' Report on Wool, 1828, 76, 79; Porter, 174, 175; Parl. Deb. x. 329.

51. Reflections on these changes.

These results of the first application of the principles of Free Trade to the commercial interests of Great Britain, point in a clear manner to the effects of that application, and the limitations under which the general doctrine is to be received. It is clearly expedient to lower the import duties upon the raw materials employed in our manufactures, especially if that raw material is the produce of different climates from our own, because that is lightening the springs of manufacturing industry, without adding to the load on agricultural. Even on articles which we rear in common with other States, but used in manufactures, it is expedient to keep on such duties only as may put our producers on a level with those in other States, and compensate any inequality arising from difference in climate or local advantages. On this principle, the reduction of the duties on raw silk and foreign wool, and on wrought silk, was undoubtedly expedient. But to go farther than this, and apply the same principle to those great branches of industry on which the subsistence and independence of the country depend, such as food and shipping, in which no manufacturing skill or application of machinery can materially lower the cost of production—and in which, from the quantity of manual labour employed, the rich State, where money is plentiful, and therefore wages high, will always be undersold by the poor State, where money is scarce, and there-

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fore wages low—is to apply it in a manner which must always be dangerous, and may in time come to peril the very existence of the empire.

52. Repeal of laws against emigration of artisans, and combinations among workmen.

When so many advances were in the course of being made towards the establishment of general freedom in commerce and industry, it was impossible that the restrictions which affected the most important of them all—the market of labour—could longer be maintained. These restrictions were chiefly on the emigration of artisans, combination among workmen at home, and the exportation of machinery. A committee of the House of Commons was appointed on the motion of Mr Hume, which reported that the laws restraining both the emigration of artisans and the combinations among workmen should be repealed. The report stated, what was undoubtedly the truth, that it was impossible to prevent the emigration of skilled workmen, who were liable to penalties if they emigrated, of whom sixteen thousand had left the country in the two preceding years, and that the only effect of the existing laws was, that they were prevented from coming back, from dread of being punished. The justice of these observations could not be denied, and accordingly a bill, repealing all the laws against the emigration of artisans, passed into law with general concurrence. The report at the same time recommended the abolition of all laws against combinations, which were at once swept away by one statute passed in this year, without providing any adequate safeguard against the abuses which might take place under the new privileges conferred upon the workmen.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xi. 813.

53. Disastrous effects of the change.

The effects were to the last degree disastrous, and much exceeded any that had been anticipated by the opponents of the measure. The operatives made the worst use, in the first instance at least, of the powers thus conferred upon them. No sooner was the Act passed, than combinations on the greatest scale, and attended with the most ruinous results, arose in all the manufacturing districts. Impressed with the idea, which they have never

since ceased to entertain, that the profits of their employers were an unwarrantable encroachment upon the remuneration of their industry, and that by strikes the usurped part might be reclaimed, combinations to effect this object instantly arose in every direction. The whole manufacturing cities and districts were in a ferment, and combinations were everywhere formed, for the purpose of raising wages by means of strikes, or preventing them falling by the same means. The extent to which these combinations spread, the unity of their proceedings, the perfect system of organisation which they attained, would not be credited if not brought home to the knowledge of all by dear-bought experience. No army was ever more thoroughly organised, no discipline more completely established, the commands of no commander-in-chief or despot more rigorously enforced. From July 1824, when the bill repealing the Combination Laws was passed, till the January following, scarce any trade was at work in Manchester or Glasgow. Cotton-spinners, power-loom weavers, wrights, masons, tailors, mechanics, artisans of all sorts, struck in a body, and continued for months in a state of idleness. The direction of these immense bodies of men was assumed by committees, who exercised their authority, and enforced obedience to their commands, by the most arbitrary measures. Contumely, threats, intimidation, violence, were in the first instance employed. If these failed, the dagger and the torch were without hesitation resorted to. Fire-raising and murder were formally enjoined by the committees, and executed by the assassins in their employment; and then began the atrocious system of throwing vitriol in the faces of the recusants, and inflicting wounds worse than death itself on such as did not yield implicit obedience to their commands. So excessive did these evils become, that, early in the next session of Parliament, Mr Huskisson, after describing the defects of the former Act, introduced a bill for the better regulation of the subject, which still continues the law of the land.[1]

[1] 4 Geo. IV. cap. 9; Ann. Reg. 1821, 80, 81; Martineau, i. 344.

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By it, while all the old laws against combinations, either of masters or men, are repealed, all attempts at intimidation or violence are rigorously proscribed, and a power of summary conviction is conferred upon justices of peace and other magistrates, on the evidence of one credible witness, and with a power of inflicting three months' imprisonment.

54. Argument in favour of the repeal of the Combination Laws.

This subject, from the frequent use which has since been, and still continues to be, made of the powers then conferred upon the workmen, has become one of the very greatest importance, and still occupies the anxious attention both of Government and the country. The argument in favour of the repeal is undoubtedly very strong. It is evident, it is said, that when the cheapening system is generally introduced, and fostered by foreign competition with countries where the cost of the necessaries of life is not half what it is here, strenuous efforts must be made to prevent the wages of labour from being beat down in this country, otherwise the condition of the workmen in it will become miserable in the extreme. But how is this contest to be maintained, if combinations to keep up wages are prohibited? They are the mode in which the principle of competition acts in the later stages of society. When great capital has accumulated in a few hands, and they have the means of easily combining together, it is a mere mockery to say that workmen are not to be allowed to combine also, and meet the weight of overgrown capital by the pressure of accumulated numbers. The violence, intimidation, and suffering which often attend such strikes are to be regretted, and, when proved, should be severely punished; but it is not owing to the strikes themselves, so much as to the unjust laws which denounce them. They act as the fiscal regulations which convert the honest trader into a smuggler: they expose him to danger, and therefore steep him in crime. Threats and violence are resorted

to, because open and peaceable abstinence from labour is not permitted. Let the latter be legalised, and the former, being no longer required, will not be resorted to.

55. Argument against combinations.

On the other hand, the argument against such combinations presents considerations of not less weight. Of all the social evils, it is said, incident to an advanced and prosperous state of manufacturing industry, combinations among workmen are the greatest. Plague, pestilence, famine, are light evils in comparison, for they, in their worst form, affect a portion of the people only; but combinations ruin the whole, and paralyse for months together entire cities and countries for no interest or advantage of the wretched persons who are involved in them, but solely for the benefit of the committee-men and agitators, who get 40s. a-week from the joint funds as long as the strike continues. It is hard to say whether they do most mischief, from the spirit in which they are conducted, or the habits which they induce. Intimidation and violence are the methods which they invariably resort to for the accomplishment of their ends; and the multitude, interested in the object in view, soon come to regard without remorse any methods which may be resorted to for their attainment. Nowhere is the principle so soon adopted that the end will justify the means; and in a very short time the passive crowd comes to regard the commission of the greatest crimes done in pursuance of the common object, not only without regret, but with desire. The sufferings and privations which multitudes are compelled to undergo in order to forward the ambitious designs of their leaders, often come to equal anything recorded in the darkest days of history—the siege of Jerusalem, or the blockade of Haarlem; but vain are all efforts of the suffering majority to resist the mandates of the interested few to whom they have intrusted their fate. Worse even than present suffering, habits are acquired, during the long and dreary months of compulsory idleness, fatal to

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the morals and character of a large portion of the people; for what ruins all classes so much as want of occupation, and what so effectually as idleness pervading great numbers together? The true principle of competition is that which obtains between workmen taken singly and their masters, for then the intervention of the fatal middlemen, the delegates and committee-men, is prevented, and mutual interest alone regulates the rate of wages. The masters will never forego the labour of their workmen when it can be employed to advantage, and therefore wages will always rise when the state of the market permits it — a fall is only to be apprehended when it is unavoidable, and when reduced wages are a substitute for entire cessation of employment.

56. Reflections on this subject.

So strong are the arguments, and so pressing the interests, dependent on the permission of combinations among workmen, that it is probable they will never be prevented in an advanced state of society; and yet so completely have the anticipations of their opponents been realised, that there is nothing which invariably proves so pregnant a source of evil. Not only have all the mischiefs which were prognosticated, from their being authorised, been realised, but many others which could not have been anticipated have been experienced. Strikes, from having been legalised, have abated nothing of their frequency and violent character; but they have extended over a wider surface, become the result more of combined action, and grown to be more formidable both from their magnitude, their means of resistance, and the multitudes involved in them. Not only have there occurred, every three or four years since the Act was passed, great strikes, which have involved fifty or sixty thousand human beings for months together in the very extremity of wretchedness, and cost severally £400,000 or £500,000 to the country, but assassinations, assaults, and arsons have been regularly organised, and enjoined by secret and unknown committees, as a

part of the regular course of operations.* It is true, the greater part of these *great* strikes have proved unsuccessful, and terminated in the defeat of the workmen, after their last rag had been pawned, and their last morsel of bread consumed; but is it any consolation to the friend of mankind that such sufferings have been endured by innocent multitudes, or that a state of things continues which insures their frequent return? For experience has proved, that so far from the bad success of such strikes preventing their recurrence, the case is just the reverse, and that no amount of experience has the effect of preventing the combined workmen from again engaging in these perilous conflicts with their employers. At this moment (April 1854), thirty years after the Combination Laws have been repealed, a strike at Preston has endured thirty-seven weeks, kept fifteen thousand operatives during that time out of bread, involved forty thousand persons and their families in ruin, and inflicted a loss of not less than half a million sterling on an industrious community.

57. Causes of the frequency of strikes.

The reason of this is threefold, and of such a kind as would not be anticipated by persons not practically acquainted with such transactions. In the first place, the vast majority of the combined unions are simple operatives of little capacity, except in their own trade, easily deluded, and who readily fall under the government of their delegates and committees, who are generally men of talent, with a considerable command of language and popular topics, and who have a constant interest to renew or perpetuate these contests, because, during their continuance, they are men of consequence, and enjoy ample incomes from the funds of the association. In the second place, so far is the general opinion from being well founded that strikes are always unfor-

* See SWINTON'S *Report of the Cotton-Spinners' Trial at Edinburgh, in January* 1838 (Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1840), where a full account of this nefarious system is given from the evidence of the persons engaged in the conspiracy.

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tunate, that the fact is just the reverse; in the great majority of instances they are successful, and it is the knowledge of this which renders their recurrence so frequent. It is true, *great* strikes, which last long and become known, are generally unsuccessful, because they originate in the attempt to keep up wages in adversity at the level which they had previously attained in prosperity—an attempt obviously hopeless, because, in such cases, it is for the interest of the masters to keep the men off their hands, but which the ruling committees easily persuade their followers is just as likely to prove successful as the previous strikes during a rise of prices had been. Every great strike which lasts for months, and attracts notice, has been preceded by numerous *little strikes* which had lasted only days, and had then been ended by the submission of the masters, because it was for the interest of the masters, during the rise of prices, to keep their workmen employed, but by which a great rise of wages had been brought about. In the third place, most combinations have it for their main object to establish an equality in the remuneration of labour; that is, to prevent the industrious and active from earning more than can be attained by the indolent or inattentive. This, of course, meets with general support, because the majority of men in all professions are of the latter description. If, by strikes, the members of the bar could prevent any leading counsel from earning more than five guineas a-day, or, by strikes among doctors, any consulting physician from making more than the same sum, and insure it to all members of the profession, however idle or unskilful, there would be no want of strikes in the learned professions.

58. System which must be adopted on the subject.

In truth, the necessity of combinations, to enable operative workmen to compete with overgrown capital on the one hand, and the dreadful evils inseparable from their being carried into effect on the other, are both so obvious that the serious attention of the Government to

the subject is imperatively called for. And the following system—the result of much reflection, and not a little experience on the author's part—would probably go far to remedy the evils so generally felt: Without making any change in the law as it at present stands, except to augment the powers of the magistrate on summary conviction in such cases, let a body of central police be established at the disposal of Government, ready to be sent down at a moment's warning to any district where a serious strike has commenced. At other times, when not so required, it might be usefully employed in garrison or other home duties, and thus augment, to a certain degree, the defensive force of the country. The moment a strike begins, they should down to the menaced district in such numbers as at once to put an end to all ideas of resistance, to protect effectually the new hands willing to work below the rates which the strike is contending for, and to enable the magistrate to act at once, and with vigour, against persons concerned in acts of intimidation or violence.

59. Its advantages.

Two or three thousand men would be amply sufficient for the whole island; and they would probably save the nation ten times the expense of their maintenance. Nearly the whole evils of strikes would be prevented by this expedient, while their beneficial effects, in enabling the workmen to compete with the masters, would not be interfered with. Intimidation and violence are the weapons on which, however they may disclaim them, all strikes in reality rely; and if they are deprived of them, they will become impotent and harmless. Physical strength, the force of numbers, is what constitutes their power, and renders them so formidable; discipline, organisation, and a central force, are what alone can be trusted to meet the dangers with which they are fraught. None are so deeply interested, in reality, in their being effectually combated as the workmen themselves; for every great and protracted strike is invariably the parent

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of some new invention, which supersedes the human hand in some great department of employment, and trenches deeply on their means of support in future times. And when it is recollected that there are twelve thousand admirable police maintained in Ireland at a cost of £530,000 a-year to the consolidated fund of Great Britain, it is evident that the people of this country have a good claim for the expenditure of a third of this sum, to save themselves from the continuance of evils greater than ever flowed from Irish recklessness or crime.

60. Gloomy aspect of affairs in the West Indies and Ireland.

Hitherto the narrative of the years 1823 and 1824 has been nothing but an unbroken stream of prosperity, and of the financial reductions and legislative changes consequent on such an auspicious state of things. The prospect, however, was by no means unclouded, and in some parts of the empire the seeds of evil were springing up in rank luxuriance. The West Indies were beginning to be shaken by the efforts of the benevolent but deluded philanthropists who desired to bring about the instant emancipation of the Negro race, and the great contest had already commenced between the planters and the Imperial Legislature which was destined, after ten years' duration, to terminate in the entire abolition of slavery, for good or for evil, in those splendid settlements. Ireland was convulsed with more than its usual share of outrage and general suffering; and an association had been formed under the name of the CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION, guided by the ablest orators of that persuasion, which afterwards became so formidable an instrument in the hands of the disaffected in that distracted country. The first of these topics, however, will more suitably come under discussion in a future chapter, which treats of the vast changes at this time, and for some years afterwards, in the colonial empire of Great Britain; and the second, in the next, which will be chiefly occupied with the chain of causes and effects which terminated in Catholic

Emancipation. Enough remains of domestic misfortune in Great Britain during the succeeding years to arrest the attention of the annalist, and point out, for the instruction of future times, the dangers of the mistaken system of policy in which it originated.

61. Lord Dudley's picture of the Empire in the opening of 1825.

The year 1825 opened under the most auspicious circumstances. It cannot be better painted than in the eloquent words of Lord Dudley and Ward, who moved the address in answer to the King's speech in the House of Lords on February 3d. "Our present prosperity," he observed, "is a prosperity extending to all orders, all professions, and all districts; enhanced and invigorated by the flourishing state of all those arts which minister to human comfort, and by those inventions by which man seems to have obtained the mastery over nature by the application of her own powers, and which, if one had ventured to foretell it a few years ago, would have appeared altogether incredible, but which, now realised, though not perfected, presents to us fresh prospects and a more astonishing career. There never was a time when the spirit of useful improvement, not only in the arts, but in all the details of domestic administration, whether carried on by the public or by individuals, was so high. That world, too, which had first been opened to us by the genius of a great man, but afterwards closed for centuries by the absurd and barbarous policy of Spain, has, as it were, been rediscovered in our days. The last remnant of the veil which concealed it from the observation and intercourse of mankind has just been torn away, and we see it abounding not only in those metals which first allured the avarice of needy adventurers, but in those more precious productions which sustain life and animate industry, and cheering the mind of the philosopher and statesman with boundless possibilities of reciprocal advantages in civilisation and commerce. A great historian and statesman, after describing what appeared to him to

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be, and, according to the imperfect ideas of those times, undoubtedly was, a period of great prosperity, still complained that there was still awanting a proper sense and acknowledgment of these blessings. That of which Lord Clarendon complained was not awanting now; the people of England felt and acknowledged their happiness; the public contentment was upon a level with the public prosperity. We have learned, too, from what source these blessings flow. All the complaints of the decay of our manufactures from the change of system have proved fallacious. We no longer dread the rivalry of the foreigner in our own markets; we can undersell him in his own. The silk manufacture, since it was freed from shackles, has increased almost as fast as the cotton, which has been always free from them. We have now been fully taught that the great commercial prosperity of England has arisen, not from our commercial restrictions, but grown up in spite of them." [1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xii. 3, 7; Ann. Reg. 1825, 5, 6.

62. Picture of the country from the Annual Register.

The contemporary annalists have recorded facts which demonstrate that this glowing picture was not the creation of the orator's imagination, but the faithful portrait of the time in which he lived. "Agricultural distress," says the *Annual Register*, "had disappeared; the persons engaged in the cotton and woollen manufactures were in full employment; the various branches of the iron trade were in a state of activity; on all sides new buildings were in a state of erection, and money was so abundant that men of enterprise, though without capital, found no difficulty in commanding funds for any plausible undertaking. This substantial and solid prosperity was stimulated to an additional extent by the operations of the many joint-stock banks and companies which had sprung into sudden existence in the former year. Some of them had put in motion a considerable quantity of industry, and increased the demand for various articles of consumption; and all of them at their commencement,

and for some time afterwards, tended to throw a certain sum of money into more active circulation, and to multiply their transfers from one hand to another. As these speculations still retained their popularity, the apparent prosperity, arising from their artificial stimulus, presented an imposing aspect, and augmented the general enchantment." [1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1825, 2.

63. Picture of the times from the Quarterly Review.

Another contemporary annalist has recorded in graphic terms the effects of this universal prosperity upon the material wellbeing of all classes. "The increased wealth," says the *Quarterly Review*, "of the middle classes is so obvious that we can neither walk the fields, visit the shops, nor examine the workshops and storehouses, without being deeply impressed with the changes which a few years have produced. We see the fields better cultivated, the barns and stackyards more fully stored; the horses, cows, and sheep more abundant, and in better condition, and all the implements of husbandry improved in their order, their construction, and their value. In the cities, towns, and villages we find shops more numerous, and better in their appearance, and the several goods more separated from each other—a division that is the infallible token of increased sales. The increase of goods thus universally diffused is an indication and exhibition of flourishing circumstances. The accounts of the bankers in the metropolis and provincial towns, small as well as large, with the balances of money resting with them, ready to embrace favourable changes in the price of any commodity, or to be placed at interest as beneficial securities present themselves, are increased to an enormous amount. This, indeed, is evident from the low rate of interest which can be got in the public securities, and the avidity with which any opening for capital is sought after. The projects for constructing tunnels, railroads, canals, or bridges, and the eagerness with which they are embraced, are proofs of that accumulation from savings which the intermediate ranks

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of society have by patience and perseverance been enabled to form. The natural effect of this advancement in possessions has been an advance in the enjoyments which those possessions can minister; and we need not be surprised at the general diffusion of those gratifications which were formerly called luxuries, but which, from their familiarity, are now called by the softened name of English comforts."[1]

[1] Quarterly Review, xxxii. 189.

64. Sound condition of trade and manufactures to the end of 1824.

Facts decisive beyond the reach of controversy demonstrate that this prosperity was not only real and universal, but, up to a certain point, was based on solid foundations. "In the end of 1823, and greater part of 1824, there prevailed," says Tooke, "a general character of prudence and sobriety, without any apparent resort to an undue extension of credit. Due attention was still paid to the most obvious elements of mercantile calculation; and although there was an obvious tendency to increased speculation, the objects for the exercise of it were selected with a considerable degree of care and sobriety. The manufacturers had laid in their new materials, and erected their machinery on such terms as enabled them to supply both the foreign and the home markets with wrought goods, which, although comparatively cheap, still left a fair profit; and the trade and manufactures of the country had never before been in a more regular, sound, and satisfactory state than from the end of 1821 to the end of 1824."[2] The advance in the value of the public securities, and in property of all sorts, was so great as to vindicate this eulogy of mercantile prosperity at this period, and show it was founded on solid grounds. The Three per Cents rose in July 1825 to 96, an elevation which they had not previously attained since 1792. The stocks of all banks and joint-stock companies advanced in a similar proportion, many in a much greater; and such was the rise in the price of all the principal articles of merchandise, that scarcely any speculation could be entered

[2] Tooke On Prices, ii. 142.

into which was not, for the time at least, attended with profit, often to a very great amount. * And the consumption of the raw materials made use of in the principal articles of manufacture had more than doubled in the last two years.[1]†

[1] Tooke, ii. 142.

65. Which was owing to the extended currency.

That this extraordinary and universal state of sound and apparently durable prosperity was mainly, if not entirely, owing to the expansion of the currency which had taken place from the operation of the Act of 1822, and the general confidence in the magnitude of the supplies of gold which were anticipated from the opening of the South American mines to British capital and enterprise, cannot be for a moment doubted. The Bank of England notes in circulation had advanced, since the change of the law in August 1822, from £17,464,790, to £20,132,120, and paper under discount at the Bank from £3,622,151 to £6,255,343 in August 1824, and £7,691,464 in August 1825. The country bankers' paper had augmented in a still greater proportion: it had risen from £8,416,430 in 1822, to £12,831,352 in 1824, and £14,980,168 in

* Prices of various Articles of Merchandise in the Years 1824 and 1825.

	July to Nov. 1824.	December 1824 to June 1825.		Dec. 1824.	March 1824.	Dec. 1825.
Cotton, per lb.,	7½d. to 9d.	16d. to 18½d.	Wheat, .	63s. 6d.	69s. 1d.	64s. 1d.
Cochineal, ,,	16s. to 19s.	21s. to 24s.	Barley, .	40s. 3d.	38s. 11d.	41s. 2d.
Indigo, ,,	10s. 4d. to 12s. 11d.	12s. to 16s.	Oats, . .	23s. 4d.	24s. 8d.	26s. 8d.
Tobacco, ,,	2d. to 7d.	3d. to 9d.	Beef, per st.,	4s. 10d.	5s. 2d.	5s. 4d.
Silk, raw, ,,	16s. 6d. to 23s.	18s. to 29s. 10d.	Mutton, ,,	5s.	6s.	6s.
Sugar, per cwt.,	29s. 11d.	41s. 5d.				
Coffee, ,,	58s. to 60s.	76s. to 79s.				
Saltpetre, ,,	19s. to 20s.	34s. to 36s.				
Tallow, ,,	31s. to 32s.	42s. to 43s.				
Iron, per ton,	£6 to £7	£11 to £12				

—Tooke *On Prices*, ii. 175, 135.

† Imported into Great Britain.

Years.	Cotton, lb.	Wool, lb.	Raw Silk, lb.	Flax, cwt.	Linseed, bush.
1822	142,837,628	19,058,080	2,060,292	610,106	1,413,450
1823	191,402,503	19,366,725	2,453,166	553,937	1,662,456
1824	149,380,122	22,564,485	3,051,479	742,531	2,195,093
1825	228,005,291	43,816,966	2,855,792	1,055,237	2,888,247

—Tooke *On Prices*, ii. 155.

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1825.* Had this paper circulation been rested on a proper basis—that is, had it been perfectly secured, duly guarded from excess of issue, and secured upon a *foundation not liable to be withdrawn*—this prosperity would have been durable, and Great Britain for the next quarter of a century would have enjoyed an uninterrupted period of peace and happiness. But, unhappily, this was very far indeed from being the case: on the contrary, the currency of the empire was fixed on the most perilous and insecure of all bases, for it consisted in part of issues by irresponsible parties over whom Government had no control, and it rested in whole on the retention of the precious metals—the very thing which, under existing circumstances, could by no possibility be retained. Country bankers, to the number of some hundreds in the provinces, were at liberty to issue their own notes to any extent they pleased, which, in the high state of general credit, passed as cash from hand to hand; and in addition to this, two causes had now come into operation, which, while they immensely inflamed the fever of speculation on the one hand, proportionably augmented the danger of a collapse on the other. These were the formal recognition of the independence of the principal States of South America by Great Britain, and the great excess of imports over exports in this country, owing to the general internal prosperity which prevailed; and their united action before the end of the year involved the nation in the most dreadful calamities.

In January 1825, Mr Canning made a formal communication to the Foreign Minister, that his Majesty had

* Circulation on 30th August in the undermentioned Years.

Years.	Bank Notes.	Country Bankers.	Total.	Commercial Paper under Disct. at Bank.
1822	£17,464,790	£8,416,480	£25,881,224	£3,622,151
1823	19,231,240	9,920,074	29,151,314	5,624,963
1824	20,132,120	12,831,352	32,963,472	6,255,343
1825	19,398,840	14,980,168	34,379,008	7,691,464

—Tooke, ii. 382.

come to the determination of appointing *chargés d'affaires* with the States of Columbia, Mexico, and Buenos Ayres; and in the King's speech, on February 3d, it was declared, "In conformity with the declarations which have been repeatedly made by his Majesty, he has taken measures for confirming by treaties the commercial relations already subsisting between this kingdom and those countries of South America which appear to have established their separation from Spain." This announcement was received with loud cheers from both sides of the House; and as this was an open recognition of Liberal principles on the part of the Government, the Opposition were not slow in claiming their share of credit as being the persons who had all along maintained these principles, and recommended these measures. Mr Brougham, in particular, was so loud in his declamation on this subject that it led to a celebrated rejoinder from Mr Canning, the felicity of which for the time withdrew the attention of the country from the undoubted fact, that Government and the Opposition had changed places, and that Great Britain had now taken the lead in the advancement of Liberal principles.* This official announcement, coming as it did at a time when the minds of men were already strongly excited on this subject, and the spirit of speculation had become very prevalent from the profits consequent on the general rise of prices, operated with magical

* "The honourable and learned gentleman," said Mr Canning, "having in the course of his parliamentary life supported or proposed almost every species of innovation which could be practised towards the constitution, it was not very easy for Ministers to do anything in the affairs of South America without seeming to borrow something from him. Break away in what direction they would, whether to the right or left, it was all alike. 'Oh,' said the honourable and learned gentleman, 'I was there before you: you would not have thought of that if I had not given you a hint.' In the reign of Queen Anne there was a sage and grave critic of the name of Dennis, who, in his old age, got it into his head that he had written all the good plays that were acted at that time. At last a tragedy came forth with a most imposing display of hail and thunder. At the first peal Dennis exclaimed 'That's my thunder!' So with the honourable and learned gentleman, there was no noise or stir for the good of mankind in any part of the world but he instantly claimed it for his thunder."—*Parl. Debates*, xii. 24, 25.

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effect on the monied classes. There was no end to the projects set on foot to work out the inexhaustible mineral riches of South America, and for a time there seemed to be none to the profits realised by the fortunate shareholders. The gain made on the shares of some of the South American companies in a few months, at this period, exceeded 1500 per cent.* These extravagant profits spread a sort of madness through all classes. It seized upon the most sober and retired members of society, pervaded all ranks, swept away all intellects, and in the end ruined not a few fortunes. Joint-stock companies were set up in every direction, and for all imaginable undertakings.† There was nothing so

* Companies.	Stock.	Paid.	Dec. 10, 1824. Premium.	Jan. 17, 1825. Premium.
Anglo-Mexican, . .	£100	£10	£33	£158
Brazilian, . .	100	10	10s. dis.	£66 pr.
Columbian, . . .	100	10	£19	£82 „
Real de Monte, . .	400	70	£550	£1,350
United Mexican, . .	40	10	£35	£155

—*Ann. Reg.* 1825, iii.

† JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, THEIR OBJECTS AND CAPITALS, IN JANUARY 1825.

	Number.		Subscribed capital.
Canal and Docks, .	33	...	£17,753,000
Railroads, . .	48	...	22,454,000
Gas, ...	42	...	11,100,000
Milk, ...	6	...	565,000
Water, . . .	8	...	1,750,000
Coal Mines, . .	4	...	2,750,000
Metal do., . .	34	...	24,490,000
Insurance Companies, .	20	...	41,800,000
Banking Companies, .	23	...	21,610,000
Supply of Corn, .	4	...	410,000
Navigation Packets, .	12	...	5,540,000
Fisheries, . .	3	...	1,600,000
Pearl Fishery, .	1	...	625,000
Indigo and Sugar Companies,	5	...	10,500,000
Agriculture, . . .	4	...	4,000,000
Irish Manufactures, .	2	...	2,500,000
London Improvements,	3	...	1,410,000
Thames Tunnels, .	2	...	200,000
Baths, . . .	2	...	750,000
Newspapers, . .	2	...	460,000
Miscellaneous, . .	18	...	1,832,000
	276		£174,114,060

—*Ann. Reg.* 1825, ii., iii.

absurd as not to be set on foot; scarce anything so unfortunate as not for a few days or weeks to realise large profits to the original shareholders. When *they* had got them off their hands, and landed them in those of the widow and the orphan, they were indifferent how soon they went to the ground. The country bankers, trusting to the unbounded supplies of specie expected from South America under English management, poured forth their issues without end, and their notes were universally received, amidst the general prosperity and sanguine spirit of the times. In the beginning of 1825 there were two hundred and seventy-six joint-stock companies in existence in Great Britain, the subscribed capital of which was no less than £174,000,000 sterling.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1825, 2, 3.

67. Excess of imports over exports.

The second circumstance which at once inflamed the general spirit of speculation, and augmented the dangers with which it was attended, was the great excess of imports over exports, which went on increasing through the whole of 1823 and 1824, and at length rose to the most portentous amount in the end of 1825. The value of the imports had come then to exceed that of the exports by above £6,000,000 sterling.* This difference of course required to be paid in cash, and this could end in nothing at last but a drain upon the banks, and contraction of the paper circulation issued upon their stock of bullion. But in the mean time, and before the payments required to be made, the vast amount of imports consequent on the general rise of prices, and the profits made upon them, augmented the prevailing rage for speculation; for there

* VALUE OF EXPORTS, AND IMPORTS, FROM 1822 TO 1825.

Years.	Exports, declared value.	Imports, official value.
1822	£36,968,964	£30,500,034
1823	35,458,048	35,798,707
1824	38,396,300	37,552,935
1825	38,877,388	44,137,462

—PORTER, 356, 3d edit.

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was scarcely anything brought into the market which was not sold at a profit within it. This circumstance deserves to be particularly noticed, because it is of permanent application, and must, while our monetary laws continue on their present footing, render every period of prosperity and rise of prices the forerunner of a corresponding period of disaster. During the continuance of the former, prices rise and imports become excessive, because profitable; while exports are checked, because production has become costly. Thus a huge balance of imports over exports is occasioned, and a monetary crisis rendered unavoidable by the very circumstance which had induced previous prosperity.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1825, 3.

68. Drain of specie produced by the South American speculations.

The drain of bullion from the Bank of England, which is at all times the commencement of commercial distress under our present monetary system, was fearfully aggravated, during the latter part of 1824 and whole of 1825, by a circumstance the precise reverse of that which had been anticipated. South America, which, it had been expected, was to prove an inexhaustible source of mineral treasures, turned out quite the reverse;—it became the greatest drain upon the metallic resources of the country that had ever been experienced. Between July 1824 and October 1825, no less than £12,000,000 of treasure was exported from this country; the bullion in the Bank of England, which on 31st August 1823 had been £12,658,240, had sunk on 31st August 1825 to £3,634,320, and before the end of the year it was down to £1,027,000.[2] The greater part of this export of gold was to South America, and the cause of that brings to light one of the most instructive and memorable facts recorded in history. It arose entirely from that revolution which Great Britain had for so many years laboured so assiduously to bring about. During the course of that terrible convulsion, which had endured under circumstances of unexampled horror for fourteen years, and deluged the whole country with blood, its whole capital had been

[2] Tooke, ii. 185, 382.

destroyed; the mines unworked had in great part come to be filled with water; and the supplies of specie, which, for ten years back, had been obtained for the use of the world, had been almost all picked up from the refuse thrown out of the mines in former days, or the gold and silver plate and ornaments which the necessities of the former capitalists and proprietors who worked them had compelled them to melt down and bring into the market. Thus the new mines set on foot by the English companies during the mania of 1824 and 1825 could be worked only with English capital, and it could only be sent out in the shape of bullion or specie. The twenty millions subscribed for the South American mining companies were in great part remitted in this way. Thence the drain on the Bank, the monetary crisis, the general distress, with all their incalculable effects upon the history of Great Britain and of the world. Monied ambition prompted to national crime, and in the anxiety to reap the fruits of that crime it overleapt itself, and fell on the other side. And thus it is that the sins of men are made to work out their own punishment, and Providence vindicates the justice of the Divine administration.

69. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's budget.

Little anticipating any such catastrophe as these symptoms so clearly prognosticated, and deeming the present prosperity permanent, and beyond the reach of change, because founded upon the new ideas of commerce, the Government proceeded energetically in the work of reduction of duties, and, by the exaggerated terms in which they spoke of the prospects of the country, augmented the danger that was impending. On the 28th February, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Robinson, brought forward the budget, and drew the most flattering picture of the financial prospects of the nation. After mentioning that the excise exhibited an increase of about 15 per cent on the principal articles, and the customs, notwithstanding the large reductions of the preceding year, scarcely any diminution, he continued thus: "To what

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cause is this increase to be ascribed? The proximate cause, doubtless, is the increased capacity of the people of this country to consume the produce of other countries, aided and invigorated by the increased facilities which our consumption of foreign articles gives to other countries, in the extended use of the produce of our own industry. This increase is not accidental; on the contrary, it is something the very reverse of what is ephemeral and peculiar; it arises from something inherent in the nation, and connected with the very essence of human society. The demonstrated tendency of population to increase would alone be sufficient, in a great measure, to account for it; but, independent of that cause, there is a principle in the constitution of social man which leads nations to open their arms to each other, and to establish new and closer connections by ministering to mutual convenience, a principle which creates new wants, stimulates new desires, seeks for new enjoyments, and, by the beneficence of Providence, contributes to the general happiness of mankind. This principle may, it is true, be impeded for a time by war or calamities; it may be counteracted, as we well know in this country, by the improvidence of mistaken legislation, but it is always alive, always in motion, and has a perpetual tendency to go forward; and when we reflect upon the facility which is given to its operation by the recent discoveries of modern science, and by the magical energies of the steam-engine, who can doubt that its expansion is progressive, and its effects permanent? It appears to me, therefore, that I may safely assert that the increase in this branch of the revenue is not the result of accident or of a temporary combination of fortunate circumstances, and that I am not too sanguine when I take the produce of last year as the solid basis upon which I calculate the state of that branch of the revenue for years to come."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xii. 1722.

In pursuance of the principles thus eloquently expressed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed a reduction of

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taxes to the amount of £1,500,000 a-year, on various articles of consumption, of which British spirits were the most considerable.* The reduction on them was no less than £750,000; and it was effected by lowering the duties on British spirits from 10s. 6d. to 5s. 6d. a gallon. Those on French wines were lowered from 11s. 5½d. to 6s. a gallon. Even with these reductions, the revenue of the year was expected to exceed the income by above £5,400,000 sterling, which was applied to the reduction of debt, by keeping up the Sinking Fund.† This statement, however, was so far fallacious, that in the receipts of the year were included £4,470,000 drawn from the trustees for half-pay annuities, while the sum expended under that head was only £2,800,000, leaving a difference of £1,670,000, for which the nation got credit in the year, which was in reality effected by laying its proper burdens, in the shape of "dead weight" as it was called, on future years.[1]

70. Reduction of taxation introduced, and public accounts of the year.

[1] Parl. Deb. xii. 725, 726; Ann. Reg. 1825, 117.

As, notwithstanding these reductions, the Sinking Fund was kept above £5,000,000 a-year, the level fixed by the

* The Taxes reduced were—on

Hemp,	£100,000
Coffee,	150,000
French wines,	230,000
British spirits,	750,000
Cider,	20,000
Assessed taxes,	276,000
	£1,526,000

—*Parl. Deb.* xii. 743.

† The Income and Expenditure for the year were estimated as follows:—

Income.		Expenditure.	
Customs,	£11,350,000	Interest of Debt,	£27,233,670
Excise,	26,400,000	Do. Exchequer Bills,	860,000
Stamps,	7,100,000	Civil List,	2,050,000
Taxes,	4,875,000	Half-pay Annuities,	2,800,000
Post Office,	1,500,000	Army,	7,911,751
Miscellaneous,	750,000	Navy,	5,983,126
Trustees of half-pay,	4,470,370	Ordnance,	1,376,641
		Miscellaneous,	2,300,000
		Sinking Fund,	5,486,654
	£56,445,370		£56,001,842

—*Parl. Deb.* xii. 726.

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71. Mr Robinson's argument in favour of the reduction of the duty on spirits.

resolution of the House of Commons in 1819, and the articles selected for relief of taxation were in general judiciously chosen, the budget of Mr Robinson, upon the whole, is deserving of commendation. To this approval, however, one important exception must be made in the great reduction, to the *extent of a half*, made in the duties on British spirits. As this was a most important step, which has been attended, in the sequel, with consequences of the highest interest, and on which the opinion of the author is most decidedly adverse to the change then introduced, it seems proper to give, in the first instance, the argument by which it was supported. "The reduction of the duties on spirits," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, "is founded not only on the principle, now so generally admitted, of giving relief to the consumer, but on one of a higher order, and which is essentially connected with the morals and happiness of the people—I mean the prevention of smuggling. Smuggling, I conceive, is one of the very greatest domestic evils that can afflict a country. Its active instruments haunt us wherever we go; they hover round our coasts, penetrate our harbours, traverse the interior; they invade the splendid palace of the noble, and the humble cottage of the poor; they offer their seductions in every quarter, and I fear that all classes of society yield to their seductions. Surely this is an evil of tremendous magnitude, confounding all notions of right and wrong, and sapping, with incessant and increasing power, the very foundations upon which obedience to the law is built; it brings the law into disrepute, its violation into credit. We have endeavoured to check the progress of this measure by the most rigorous measures; we have surrounded the coast with guards and ships as with a wall of brass; we have imposed penalty upon penalty, punishment upon punishment; but all in vain. Why? Because the cause of the evil is to be found in the law itself, and the alteration of the law has not yet been tried. Let us try it now; let us apply to England

that change which has had such triumphant success in Ireland and Scotland. It may perhaps be recollected, that when I proposed to make a great change in the distillery law of Ireland and Scotland, there were not wanting persons who exclaimed, 'What, reduce the duty upon spirits! Make all the people drunk! For God's sake, abstain from so fatal a measure.' The measure was, nevertheless, taken; and what has been the consequence? So far from any evil having resulted from this step, tranquillity, order, and harmony, have superseded the disturbance, confusion, and ill-blood, which arose from the desolating extension of illicit distillation. Why, then, should we not try in England a system of which experience has proved to us the advantage?"[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xii. 754.

72. Vast increase of crime which has arisen in consequence.

The reduction of duties on spirits distilled in Ireland and Scotland had taken place in 1823, and had cost the nation £380,000 in the first island, and £340,000 in the last. Mr Robinson now extended the same principle to England, and the sacrifice of revenue, by the reduction in the two islands, was £1,500,000. The measure was justified by that gentleman by alleging its *moral* tendency, in so far as it removed the practice of, and evils consequent on, illicit distillation; and the House of Commons at once embraced, and have ever since maintained, that view of the subject. It is a curious and instructive commentary on this argument, drawn from considerations of *morality*, adduced in favour of cheap whisky, to cast our eyes on the records of crime in the two islands, and contemplate the vast *and sudden* addition to offences which took place immediately after the reduction of the duties. It would be unfair to ascribe the great increase which ensued altogether to the reduction of the duty on spirits, because, without doubt, the dreadful distress consequent on the monetary crisis of 1825 had a considerable share in it; but enough remains to show that the lowering of the duty on spirits had a most material influence upon it,[2] and to justify the observation so often made by

[2] Ann. Reg. 1822, 117.

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judges, and all others conversant with the administration of criminal justice, that two-thirds of the whole crime that is committed is owing to the excessive use of ardent spirits.*

73. Reflections on this subject.

The enormous mistake committed by Government on this occasion, of which the bitter effects have ever since been felt, but are now apparently irremediable, is one of the numerous instances which have occurred, in the later periods of English history, of the injurious effects which have resulted from legislation being so often conducted by persons destitute of any *practical* acquaintance with the subject with which they deal. To assert that the increased consumption of spirits by the working classes is favourable to their morality, is so strange a doctrine, and so contrary to universal experience, that it appears almost inconceivable it could have been hazarded in any intelligent assembly. Since the duties on spirits have been reduced a half, the consumption of them has been increased above two hundred per cent, and the proportion consumed per head advanced in the same proportion—facts which go far to explain the contemporaneous duplication of crime during the same period. As to the cessation of demoralisation by illicit distillation and smuggling, it is a real benefit; but it is dearly purchased by the wholesale demoralisation of so large a part of the working classes, by the facility of obtaining ardent spirits. There is more crime, domestic unhappiness, family feuds, and social demoralisation pro-

* COMMITTALS IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND, FROM 1822 TO 1830.

Years.	England.	Scotland.	Ireland.
1822	12,201	1691	15,251
1823	12,263	1733	14,632
1824	12,698	1802	15,258
1825	12,437	1876	15,515
1826	16,164	1999	16,318
1827	17,924	2116	18,031
1828	16,564	2024	14,683
1829	18,675	2063	15,271
1830	18,167	2329	15,794

PORTER, 667, 3d edit.

duced in Glasgow by cheap whisky in one month, than ever was by smuggling over all Scotland in ten years. There is no person practically versant with the details of both, as the author has been for twenty years, who will maintain a contrary opinion.*

74. Continued.

There is no such fit object of taxation, in an indirect form, as ardent spirits, because the addition which the increased duty makes to the price of the article, *when taken in moderation*, is so small as to be trifling even to the humblest consumer, while the addition to the public revenue is immense, from the vast numbers who partake of the comfort. It is on the drunkards alone it falls as a serious burden. The duty on British spirits was lowered, in 1823 and 1825, 5s. a gallon; and the price, in consequence, fell from 14s. or 15s. to 10s. a gallon, or from 1½d. to 1d. a glass. This diminution of price was a relief certainly, but not a large one, to the working classes, if they take only a glass or two a-day; but this advantage was dearly purchased, even by themselves, by the enlarged quantity which it tempted them to drink. The average consumption of spirits in the United Kingdom is now about 24,000,000 gallons a-year. Ten shillings a gallon on this would produce £12,000,000 a-year, or nearly a fourth of our entire revenue, spread over at least as many millions of consumers, and felt as a burden by none except the drunkards, upon whose vicious habits it was a restraint. Can there be imagined a species of taxation so productive that it would produce twelve millions a-year, and yet so

* Spirits consumed, and Criminal Commitments, in the United Kingdom.

Years.	Spirits consumed.			Criminal commitments.
	Gallons.	Population.	Rate per head. Gallons.	
1821	9,822,578	21,193,458	0.46	29,143
1831	21,845,408	24,029,702	0.90	35,230
1838	26,486,543	25,907,096	1.02	52,235
1840	21,859,337	26,443,495	.82	64,722
1848	23,010,808	26,800,000	.92	72,840

—Porter, 545, 556, 557.

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light that it is felt as a burden only by those upon whom it operates as a restraint from crime?

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75. Temperance leagues.

The evils experienced from the reduction of the duties on spirits have, during the last thirty years, been felt to be so excessive that they have led, in every part of the country, to societies and leagues for the purpose of promoting temperance among the working classes, and in some instances they have been attended for a time with surprising success. In Ireland, in particular, where cessation from drinking ardent spirits was, during the years of activity in the Roman Catholic League, made a primary object of effort with the Roman Catholic clergy, the success of the attempt was most remarkable: it fell in Ireland from 12,296,342 gallons in 1838, to 6,485,443 gallons in 1841.[1] But the success of this, as of all other attempts to run counter to a great and universal instinct of nature, was only temporary: the reaction in favour of whisky has been nearly as strong as the action in favour of temperance had been. All attempts to stop *entirely* what is prompted by a general instinct of nature, must end in disappointment; or, if it succeeds, it never fails to induce evils of another kind greater than it removes. To regulate it, and reduce it to moderation, is the only wise course. This can never be effected by temperance societies, how widespread or zealous soever; for their efforts affect only those who are already regular, sober, and well disposed. It is by an enhancement of the price *alone* that the consumption of the immense and heedless mass can be permanently diminished, or temperance enforced as a habit on the great body of the people. If ever a statesman would deserve a statue of gold, it would be he who could retrace the step taken with such general approbation by Mr Robinson in 1825; but the influence of the publicans in the legislature is too great to permit any hope of such a consummation being effected, at least in this generation.

[1] Porter, 556.

Following out the principles laid down by Mr Huskisson in the preceding year in regard to Free Trade, he

Renewed measures in favour of Free Trade.

continued the reduction in this of the import duties on several articles of consumption, chiefly those used in the different processes of manufacture. The articles selected for the reduction were foreign woollen goods, upon which the duty was reduced from 60 per cent to 15; on foreign linens, which were lowered from 100 on an average to 25 per cent; on foreign paper, from £6, 10s. per cwt. to £3, 10s.; on glass, from £80 to £20; on earthenware, from 75 per cent to 15, and 30 on ornamental porcelain; on foreign gloves, from 60 per cent to 30; on iron, from £6, 10s. to £1, 10s.; on copper, from £5, 9s. 3d. per cwt. to £2, 10s.; on lead, from 20 per cent to 15; and on various lesser articles not enumerated, from 50 to 20. The general result was, "that, upon foreign manufactured articles, where the duty is imposed to protect our own manufactures, and not for the purpose of collecting revenue, the import duty will in no instance exceed 30 per cent." "If the article," he added, "is not manufactured much cheaper or much better abroad than at home, such a duty is ample for protection. If it be manufactured so much cheaper or so much better abroad as to render £30 per cent insufficient, my answer is, first, that a greater protection is only a premium to the smuggler; and, secondly, that there is no wisdom in attempting to bolster up a competition which this degree of protection will not sustain." Resolutions to this effect were passed unanimously in the House of Commons, and embodied in acts of the legislature. There can be no doubt of the wisdom and justice of these observations; and if they had been applied to agriculture and shipping, as well as manufactures, we should not have been now (1854) importing annually ten million quarters of foreign grain, or seen the foreign shipping employed in carrying on our trade nearly equal to our own, instead of a third of its amount, as it was when Mr Huskisson commenced his labours.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xii. 1201, 1206.

Another change of an equally momentous character was in the same session of Parliament brought forward

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77. Great and wise change in the laws regarding our colonial shipping.

by Mr Huskisson, which also appears to have been founded in true wisdom as well as a liberal spirit. This was in reference to the trade to the colonies. This trade, in conformity with the colonial policy formerly common to this country with all the nations of Europe, had been entirely confined to the shipping of the mother country. This system, however, had been so far relaxed in the year 1824, that by 3 Geo. IV. c. 44, it was permitted to carry on an intercourse between any countries in America and our colonies there, in the ships of those countries; and also to the colonies to trade to any countries in Europe, provided the trade was carried on in British ships. These great concessions, which were equally advantageous to the Americans and our own Transatlantic colonies, were met in a very illiberal spirit by the government of the United States. "What," said Mr Huskisson, "has hitherto been the return made by the United States for this indulgence? In the first session of their Congress which followed the opening of this trade by our Act of Parliament, they passed a law imposing alien duties in their ports upon all British ships which might trade between those ports and our colonies, upon the same terms and duties as the like productions of any other country; meaning thereby the like productions, not of any other foreign country, but of our own country, or of our own provinces in North America. This is a pretension unheard of in the commercial relations of independent States. It is just as reasonable as it would be on our part to require that sugar or rum from our West India islands should be admitted at New York upon the same terms and duties as the like articles the growth and production of Louisiana, or any other of the United States." To obviate this inequality between the United States and other countries, Mr Huskisson proposed to admit "a free intercourse between all our colonies and other countries, either in British ships or in the ships of those countries allowing the latter to import all

articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the country to which the ship belongs; and to export from such colonies all articles whatever of their growth or manufacture, either to the country from which such ships came, or to any other part of the world, the United Kingdom and all its dependencies excepted. All intercourse between the mother country and the colonies, whether direct or circuitous, and all intercourse of the colonies with each other, to be considered as a coasting trade, and reserved entirely to ourselves." The resolutions to this effect were unanimously adopted by the House of Commons, and passed soon after into law.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xii. 1106, 1107.

78. Reflections on this change.

There can be no doubt that these changes were alike founded in wisdom and justice. Colonies should be considered as distant provinces of the mother country, and treated as such. No burdens should be imposed on the staple productions of their industry, which are not imposed on corresponding productions of the parent state. Free Trade with all the world should be permitted to them as much as to the mother country; the trade between the two should be reserved to themselves as a coasting trade for their mutual benefit. This is no burden or restriction upon either; on the contrary, it is a reciprocal advantage. Perhaps the whole colonial system, and the commercial intercourse with all other countries, could not be better summed up than in the maxim: "Absolute Free Trade with the colonies, no taxes on their staples which are not imposed on our own, a monopoly of the trade between the two, and with other countries *real reciprocity*,—that is, admission of their staples on the same terms as they admit ours." Under such a system the colonies for long would have desired to continue the connection, because they derived benefit; and the British empire, held together by the strong but unseen bond of mutual interest, might for centuries have gone on growing with the growth, and strengthening with the strength, of its mighty descendants.

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79. Approach of the monetary crisis.

But amidst all these important changes, and when Government and the country were lulling themselves into a fancied security from the belief in the boundless course of prosperity before them, the small cloud was already visible on the horizon, which was soon to involve all in darkness. The King's speech, delivered on 6th July, congratulated the country on the "great and growing prosperity on which his Majesty had the happiness of congratulating the country at the beginning of the session;" but already symptoms of the approaching storm were visible to the reflecting few. The fatal effects of a paper currency dependent on the retention of the precious metals, and consequently abundant when they were plentiful, and contracted when they disappeared, began to show themselves. Importations, stimulated by the high prices, became so prodigious, that no amount of consumption on the part of the country could take them off, and they began to fall. Cotton, wine, silk, wool, and all foreign articles, soon came to decline rapidly in price; and this induced a general demand for money to meet engagements which could no longer be made good by sales, or enable the holders to keep on till prices rallied.* But the bankers to whom the applications were made were themselves in equal or greater difficulties, and could not make the advances required of them. Exports had declined from the high rate of wages and cost of the raw materials; and thus the balance daily increasing had to be paid in cash. The South American mines, instead of

* PRICES OF THE UNDERMENTIONED ARTICLES.

	December 1824 to June 1825.	January to June 1826.
Cotton,	16d. to 18½d.	6½d. to 7½d.
Cochineal,	21s. to 24s.	13s. 6d. to 15s. 6d.
Indigo,	12s. to 16s.	7s. to 11s.
Spices,	11s. 6d. to 12s.	6s. to 6s. 9d.
Tobacco,	3d. to 9d.	3d. to 8½d.
Silk,	18s. to 29s. 10d.	13s. 3d. to 16s.
Sugar,	41s. 5d.	38s. 9d.
Coffee,	76s. to 79s.	47s. to 49s.
Iron, per ton,	£11 to £12	£8 to £9

—TOOKE, ii. 157.

producing anything, were a constant drain upon the metallic resources of the country, for the Revolution had brought them into such a state that for years they could not be worked to a profit, and they entailed a loss of nearly the whole £20,000,000 subscribed. The consequence was a steady drain upon the treasure in the Bank, which continued to decline rapidly during the summer and autumn of 1825, until in August it was only £3,600,000, and daily diminishing,* and in December was only £1,024,000.[1]

[1] Tooke, ii. 158, 161.

80. Dreadful severity of the crash.

It may easily be conceived what, in a great mercantile community, deeply engaged in the most extensive and onerous engagements, must have been the effect of such a sudden contraction of the currency, at the very time when its expansion was most loudly called for; but imagination itself can hardly conceive the consternation and distress which followed. The country bankers, whose issues had nearly doubled in the preceding year, having reached the enormous amount of £14,000,000, were the first to be assailed. They were besieged with applications from their numerous customers to make advances; but the demand for gold was so excessive that their stock of specie was soon exhausted, and they had no resource but to apply to the Bank of England for assistance. It was the magnitude and constant increase of this demand which constituted the source of embarrassment to that establishment. Very naturally, and, indeed, unavoidably, the Bank contracted their issues, which, in the first week of December, were down to £17,000,000. The effect of

* Bullion in the Bank and Notes in Circulation.

	Circulation.	Bullion.
February 28, 1823, . .	£18,392,240	£10,364,230
January 28, 1824, . .	19,736,000	14,200,000
April 1824, . . .	19,200,000	13,800,000
February 28, 1825, . .	20,753,760	8,779,100
August 31, 1825, . .	19,398,840	3,634,320
December 3, 1825, . .	17,477,290	2,167,000
December 24, 1825, . .	25,709,410	1,024,000

—Tooke, ii. 160, 167.

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this was to bring a great number of the private bankers to an immediate stop. In the end of November, the Plymouth Bank failed; this was followed, on 5th December, by the failure of the house of Sir Peter Pole & Co. in London, which diffused universal consternation, as it had accounts with forty country bankers. The consequences were disastrous in the extreme. In the next three weeks, seventy banks in town and country suspended payment; the London houses were besieged from morning to night by clamorous applicants, all demanding cash for their notes; the Bank of England itself had the utmost difficulty in weathering the storm, and repeated applications were made to Government for an Order in Council suspending cash payments. But this was steadily refused as long as the Bank had a guinea left; and meanwhile the consternation over the whole country reached the highest point. Every creditor pressed his debtor, who sought in vain for money to discharge his debts. The bankers, on the verge of insolvency themselves, sternly refused accommodation even to their most approved customers; persons worth £100,000 could not command £100 to save themselves from ruin: "we were," said Mr Huskisson, "*within twenty-four hours of barter.*"[1]

[1] Tooke, ii. 156, 161; Ann. Reg. 1825, 123, 124; Martineau, i. 359.

81. Increased circulation forced upon the Government.

In this extremity, Government, despite their strong reliance on a metallic currency, were fairly driven into the only measure which could by possibility save the country. It was evident to all what the crash which threatened universal ruin was owing to; it arose from the currency of the country being suddenly contracted from the drain upon the banks for specie, at the very time when an expansion of it was most called for to sustain the immense pecuniary engagements of its inhabitants. The remedy was obvious—*expand the circulation irrespective of the drain of gold.* This, accordingly, was done by Government. Immediately after the failure of Pole & Co.'s bank, frequent Cabinet Councils were held; and it was at length wisely determined to issue one and

two pound notes of the Bank of England for country circulation. Orders were sent to the mint to strain every nerve for the coinage of sovereigns; and for a week 150,000 of sovereigns were thrown off a-day. But here a fresh difficulty presented itself. Such was the demand for Bank of England notes, to fill the void occasioned by the general discrediting of the country bankers' circulation, that no amount of strength applied to the throwing them off could enable the Bank to keep pace with it. In this dilemma, when the specie in their coffers was reduced to £1,000,000, and the run was daily increasing, an accidental discovery relieved the Bank of their immediate difficulties, and enabled them to continue the issues to the country bankers, which saved the country from total ruin. An old box, containing £700,000 in one and two pound notes, which had been retired, was accidentally discovered in the Bank of England, and immediately issued to the public. By this means, the adequate circulation was kept issuing till the new notes could be thrown off. The effects were soon apparent. The people, having got notes, abated in their demand for gold; confidence began to revive, because the means of discharging obligations was afforded; and at a meeting of bankers and merchants in the city of London, resolutions declaratory of confidence in Government and the Bank of England were passed, which had a great effect in restoring general confidence.* So vigorously were the new measures carried

* "1. That the unprecedented embarrassments and difficulties under which the circulation of the country at present labours are mainly to be ascribed to a general panic, for which there are no reasonable grounds: That this meeting has the fullest confidence in the means and substance of the banking establishments of the capital and the country; and they believe that the acting generally upon that confidence would relieve all those symptoms of distress which now show themselves in a shape so alarming to the timid, and so fatal to those who are forced to sacrifice their property to meet sudden demands upon them, which it is no imputation upon their judgment and prudence not to have expected.

"2. That it having been stated to this meeting, that the Directors of the Bank of England are occupied with a remedy for a state of things so extraordinary, this meeting will refrain from any interference with the measures of the Directors of the Bank, who, they are satisfied, will do their duty towards the public."—TOOKE, ii. 168.

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into effect, that the circulation of the Bank of England, which on the 3d December had been only £17,477,290, was so raised that on 24th December it was £25,611,800! Thus was the crisis surmounted, though its consequences long continued, and left lasting effects on the legislation and destinies of the nation. Marvellous circumstance! The danger was got over, not by any increase in the metallic treasure of the country, but by a *great issue of paper, when there was no specie to sustain it.*[1]

[1] Tooke, ii. 184, 181; Ann. Reg. 1829, 124.

82. The crash was not owing to the instability of the banks, but to the monetary laws.

Sir M. W. Ridley said, on 3d June 1828, in the House of Commons, "that in 1825 and 1826 there were seven hundred and seventy country bankers, and of these sixty-three had stopped payment. Out of the sixty-three, twenty-three had subsequently resumed their payments, and paid 20s. in the pound, and of the remainder thirty-one were making arrangements for the payment of their debts, and there was a great hope that every farthing would be paid. The country bankers who had failed in 1826 had paid, on an average, 17s. 6d. in the pound."[2] When it is recollected that the Funds, which had been 96 in 1825, were down at 76 in December 1825, and all other securities in a still greater proportion, and mercantile stock, on an average, reduced to a half of its former value, this indicates at once the stability of the banks in general, and the enormous amount of the losses which the catastrophe occasioned to the country. On the public funds alone the loss was from 20 to 30 per cent to those who were compelled to realise; and on property of all kinds it is within bounds to say that the loss was above £100,000,000. It is evident that the country bankers, with very few exceptions, were perfectly solvent when the crash began. It was brought about solely by one cause—the drain of specie; the want of one species of property, but which, under our monetary laws, like air to the individual, is indispensable to national life. And it might have been entirely avoided had the monetary laws

[2] Tooke, ii. 161.

permitted the issuing of another species of property, to sustain the currency when the one on which all depended was withdrawn; and had the issue of £8,000,000 of notes by the Bank, with no gold to pay them, which arrested the panic when at its height, been permitted by the law at an earlier period, so as to prevent it.

83. Conclusions to be drawn from this catastrophe.

Uninteresting to those who read history merely for stirring incidents or romantic events, the annals of Great Britain from 1819 to 1825 are fraught with the most important lessons to the reflecting, on which the attention of statesmen in future times should constantly be fixed. They demonstrate at once the all-importance of the currency upon the fortunes of the country, and illustrate in the most striking manner the *double set of dangers* to which a monetary system, based entirely upon the retention of the precious metals, is exposed. From the first introduction of the metallic system in 1819 to the extension in 1822, the history of the country is nothing but the narrative of the dreadful effects produced by the contraction of the currency to the extent of above a third of its former amount, and the social distress and political agitation consequent on the fall in the price of every article of commerce to little more than the half of its former level. Its annals, from the extension of the currency in July 1822, to the dreadful crash of December 1825, illustrate the opposite set of dangers with which the same system is fraught when the precious metals flow in in abundance, from the undue encouragement given to speculation of every kind by the general rise of prices for a brief period. To make paper plentiful when gold is plentiful, and paper scarce when gold is scarce, is not only a dangerous system at all times, and under all circumstances, but is precisely the reverse of what should be established. It alternately aggravates the dangers arising from over-speculation, and induces the distress consequent on over-contraction. The true system would be the very reverse, and it would prevent

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the whole evils which the preceding pages have unfolded. It would be based on the principle of making paper a supplement to the metallic currency, and a substitute for it when required, not a representative of it; and, plentifully issued when the specie is withdrawn, it should be contracted when it returns. Thus over-speculation at one time, and monetary distress at another, would be alike avoided; and an equal circulation would maintain the health of the social system, as it unquestionably does of animal life.

END OF VOL. III.

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